War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Larry Smith, 1987

The muscles the M-x missile plans and so forth. I was then working as the chief of staff to Senator Tom McIntyre from New Hampshire. Who was chairman of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee and one of the things that we did with him was to review all the proposals that all the services forwarded to the Congress for new weapons systems. That was the prime place where the Congress did this work. That's where I first heard about it it would have been about 19. 74 the emacs ones that call the annex it was called the Advanced ICBM Technologies Program or something like that. And this was the way it was were done the first time I heard about the AirMax was in 1976 when for the first time it was called that in a parameter a request from the Air Force to the Congress. Let's start at the start of the top if you don't mind. That maybe we don't at least we can take a down.

But I'm going to have a little bit of movement here if that's OK. But it's more or less than this right here or there were. Here's the way a a system of this sort is developed and proposed to the Congress. You have a level of development in which you have components that are advanced technology and no. OK. In 1976 the Air Force asked for about seventy eight million dollars to begin to develop a IMX missile. It was I would say three quarters of that money or more was just for the missile. There was very little money spent to design a basing system. At that time the Air Force was primarily and

inventing the next generation of lambastes muscle. We had been on this case for a couple of years before that as the air force had come in and asked for the component technology so we knew it was coming. And we we studied it very carefully. The problem here for us and the administration had was just at the time that they were they were asking for these monies. The president came in and this was President Ford in a presidential election year in April of 1976 came in and asked for a half a billion dollars on a third of a billion dollars for 15 new Minuteman three missiles which was the previous generation. So our committee looked at that and said Now wait a minute. If If If If you're so if you're so concerned about the survivability of the current missile the minimum and three that you want to move that quickly to the max then why are you asking for a half a third of a billion dollars more for 50 50 new minimum

three missiles are either obsolete or they aren't and they're obsolete we shouldn't be spending that money for new ones. So they said it's clear that the president does not think that the problem is so pressing that we can't take the time to sort this out. The committee then cut that proposal by about 40 percent and ask a set of questions of the president. Now this was a at this point in 1976 was a crucial stage in the whole in the whole development of the airMAX and how the country looked at it and it went like this. At that time no one could tell the Congress why we wanted to do what they were asking to do. Was it primarily because we thought our missiles were survivable and you needed a new survivable placement based missile. Or was it that we wanted a new missile that could do better and more what our current muscles than the Minutemen 3s were doing and the ways to be able to attack the Russian missile force and to kill it since no one could really tell us that clearly the committee took the position that will cut the proposal by enough to get their attention and then we will ask it

explicitly as part of the legislative history. The president the United States to clear this up. And it was the committee's conviction. In fact it was the Congress's conviction that if we were going to proceed to do something this important that we all knew why we were doing what was being proposed to be funded. And that was the beginning in 1976 of the debates that lasted then for eight or nine years. We're looking for. In 1976 when the Air Force first asked for money is dedicated the IMAX it was about 78 million dollars. The committee looked at this and said no one on behalf of the executive branch from the president on down can explain why we should proceed as there as were being asked to proceed one. One potential explanation was that we wanted a new muscle in order to be able to

fight and win a so-called limited nuclear war. We would we would knock out their missile silos and they would knock out their eyes and we would have enough of that capability to do it. The other theory was is that since the Soviets were. Some people thought getting the ability to attack our silos. We need to be able to base survivability our own. So since the Olympics program was both a muscle and abasing scheme we thought this ought to be sorted out which was which was the most crucial part of it. Or were both of them. So the committee said cut the cut the request by over 40 percent enough to get the the executive branch's attention and say Would you put in and asked explicitly as part of the legislative record that the president United States review this and say what it is he wanted us to do. Why did he want us to buy an MC system. Was it to make the missiles safer against US Soviet attack or was it to be able to attack there. Or both. And that's what happened in 1976 it set up the debate for the next eight years.

Now that let me say one other thing. I'm sorry the committee took the position at the time. In fact both the House and the Senate committees the Congress the United States took the position that the only reason we should proceed with TMX was to ensure the survivability of our missile force. They made explicit statement that they were not interested in proceeding with the emacs in order to attack the Soviet missile force unless our own was survivable. So they asked the president to clear up what took our the Congress took its own position which is proper under Article 1 of the Constitution. I think the sense was is that if we had a problem this was the problem. In other words there was there had been a thorough debate in 74 and 75 at least in the Senate

about the basic doctrine or policy that the country should adopt. So the fundamental question underlying the Amex and so many of these debates is the questions almost never addressed. And that is what is the purpose of nuclear weapons. Why do we have these things. Well it's easy to say well we want to deter the Soviets from attacking us but that's that's true but it's not enough to make clear that the most dangerous and and missing part of the debate is the link between an explicit purpose and an explicit answered the question why we have these weapons and a particular program in this case the attacks that were being requested. Yes sir. For the first time the AirMax was defined to the Congress in the classified reports as a habit with in a way that made it clear that the missile would have the ability to attack the Soviet silos with all other hardness and concrete and steel and to be able efficiently to destroy them

for the first time. It was clear explicitly that the AirMax was a missile that was being designed to fight and win a counter-force so-called limited nuclear war with Iran. It was the first time we had a weapon being proposed that could do that effectively. That it is the first time that that a weapon had been proposed to the Congress that that could effectively take out destroy Soviet missiles and their Silas's the first time it had been proposed to the Congress that we buy a weapon for the. That would have the practical purpose and effectiveness to destroy the missile Soviet missile force in their silence. And remember that most of the Soviet force then and now we're in there in their land based missiles. There's been a thorough debate within it within the Senate in 1974 and

75 about whether we ought to adopt a so-called counter-force doctrine that is a policy that would have explicitly said that it is our purpose to be able to attack the Soviet missiles in their silos as some Americans thought the Soviets were planning to attack our missiles in our silos. Now if you have a problem of that sort as many people were beginning to think that we were wherever we were and no have that is what later became known as the window of vulnerability in which the Soviets could take them. Let's let's run this up and tell me how the surrounding things get there had been a May. There had been a major debate in the Senate in 74 and 75 on the primary question of why we have nuclear weapons particularly why we have land based versions of nuclear weapons. The classical view that the country had for the most part had a consensus

was that the only reason we had these was to deter a Soviet attack. There was another school often identified with Secretary Jim Schlesinger who had just come into office and that view was easily understood as saying Well in addition to be wanting to deter Is that what we had to do was be able to do what we feared they were doing preparing to do namely to attack their missiles in their silos. In other words to begin to prepare to fight a limited nuclear war so-called counter-force war. So we are. Well there was a lot of confusion about what in fact our forces were designed to do and what they could do. In fact night in the 1970s after a thorough review by President Nixon and his administration there was a targeting guidance that made it

clear to him that the people who are actually responsible for targeting weapons and pointing them certain targets and destroy them as a part of our nuclear policy. It was clear that our policy at the time enabled the president to attack a whole a whole variety of Soviet targets not just cities. In fact there was no at no time then nor now do we attack Soviet cities or population as such. The primary target then and now was so-called military industrial targets those factories and other kinds of installations that would enable the Soviet Union if we got into a war to get to it to continue to wage that war. So the point is that the public debate missed that there was never a choice then nor is there now even though someone like Dr. Brzezinski who served Carter and some other people who simply were ignorant of this either the last of the sentence let's roll it back up. We're not

developing this. Does that mean people who oppose counter-force weapons such as the Max took the position that if we would had the ability in vain to threaten the Soviet lambastes force where most of their missiles exist that in a time of crisis this would put a hair trigger on nuclear war. It would mean that if they thought something had they saw something on the radar. That looked like a missile force in the middle of a tense times they might then loose their own muscles the fear that they would have to use them or lose them. In other words so so what. What many people agreed upon people including Paul Nitsa at the time and those of us who also were worried about the the problem of the Soviet threat to our missiles or the presumed threat what we said instead of trying to build a missile to attack their forces.

Let's instead concentrate on the issue of survivability. How do we make sure that our missiles will be able to survive the worst kind of an attack that they might be tempted to to mount on ours. And so when you were in 1976 when we first came to grips with the IMAX the issue of whether we ought to build it in order to make our own missile for survival which then put the emphasis on the basing scheme or whether we ought to build it in order to threaten their missiles. And in my judgment of many people lead us to a hair trigger on both sides was at the crux of the matter. And the Congress took the position that at least those who were who were engaged in the issue that the only primary reason that we would build the AirMax or should pursue it was still in an early stage was to ensure the survivability of our own forces which would be in our interest but which would not put the which would avoid threatening us the Soviets own forces at the same time it would give us a more stable set of forces facing each of

the first United States has the United States had then and does now a mix of forces of strategic forces we have a formidable force at sea on our submarines. A very formidable force on our bombers which at that time included primarily bombers and so-called short range attack missiles. We also had a formidable force as we do now and our in our own land based missiles. We had a so-called triad of forces by the way that gave us more different ways of surviving an attack that we might fear from the Soviets than the Soviets had in an A in a kind of attack they might fear we would mount on them because most of their forces were in lambastes missiles and which were targetable. So the point is if the primary concern was

would we have enough survivable forces in the worst case to retaliate against the Soviet Union if they had attacked us enough varied strategic nuclear forces. We clearly had these three kinds of forces and that was that gave us a credible redundant survivable deterrent. Part of the problem about the debate as it developed after 76 was that the concentrated almost entirely on the on the lambastes missile. And there were people who earn who would almost dismiss the forces we had at sea or for that matter on bombers. In fact it crept into the language. I remember people talking about this in a committee room and they'd say well the kind of missile force we have at sea could deliver only 60 Kaytee which in which it's nukes speak for sic the equivalent of 60000 tons of TNT a bomb

that would be five or six times the force of what was dropped on Nagasaki and because it was not a big yield a big burst they would say well it's only 60 Katie dismissing it as if it were nothing. We have most of our forces at sea have had that capability. So my point is as the as the debate developed in the 10 years after 1976 or so this this this focused almost entirely on the qualities that that can be achieved only on an based forces. That is something that is going to be that can attack Soviet forces quickly within a half an hour that will be accurate enough to take out their silos and which would have a big enough black blast to take out their silos and all the rest of our forces seem to be devalued in the conversation. This was all under the so-called Title of the window of vulnerability which was almost entirely about an argument about lambastes muscles.

McIntyre and those of us who are working with him felt that first of all the country ought to decide what what kind of a nuclear policy we wanted we should decide what the primary purpose of these nuclear weapons should be and then we ought to buy weapons that would fit and carry out that policy not the other way around. In other words just because you can invent something didn't mean it was a good thing to have. In fact if you had boughten if you if you had bought. Certain kinds of weapons of sufficient accuracy and blast yield they call it in combinations that would enable you to destroy a Soviet missile in a large hardened target silo no matter what you call it. If you had enough of them it would amount to a counter-force war fighting warfighting doctrine or policy. Words. If it walks like a duck and talk like a duck and look like a duck it was going to be a duck in terms of warfighting policy no

matter what you said. And so the first point is that Senator McIntyre and others of us who argued this case contend was that in a free country we ought to decide together what it is we want to do and then by the technologies that would carry that out. Not the other way around. The second that there was there was another reason why why Senator MacIntyre's and those of us who worked with him felt that a so-called counter-force policy a warfighting policy would be dangerous and it was just simply this that if we ever got into Iraq a crisis between the two superpowers which the the men and there are almost entirely men would be in positions of decision they would be tired they would be anxious they they. They would be under enormous stress and if at that time the two forces on each side which faced each other that were seen by all sides as having the capacity to take out the other it means that you could put a hair trigger on the war.

And the number one purpose of nuclear weapons in my judgment should be to prevent the use of even one nuclear weapon so that if you believe that I mean it I'm talking about what is in the Supreme National Interest it is to prevent the use of even one nuclear weapon and it counter-force warfighting technology and force would make it would endanger that policy by making it more likely that one of these things could be used in staying power. We must always keep separate in our minds as we talk about this the nuclear weapons that we have developed and put in Europe. Then and Now for the purpose of ensuring that we could deter certainly a nuclear attack against Europe from the Soviet Union but also

it was our stated policy then and has been until this new treaty comes about. That we use these nuclear weapons in Europe to deter a conventional attack against Europe. But in general that was that was a separate discussion from the one where we're talking about when we when we review the history of the max the I-Max was a classic weapon for for intercontinental strategic purposes. And the policies that were at stake then were were quite separate and only a little bit related to the ones that we've heard more recently about the role of nuclear weapons in Europe and how that relates to a Soviet attack or a conventional nature and so on. There are two terms that are very similar in their in their language which really referred to two separate questions one is the issue of first strike

which is a term that is associated with whether either side should have the ability to attack the other strategic forces in such a way that they could expect military or political profit. And the other is a term very close to a first strike called the first use and a debate that has occurred in the last seven or so years led by a group of distinguished former defense and security policy officials saying that we should not have the capacity or a policy of using weapons first in Europe. Is a different argument. The argument about first use and euro means should we state to the to the Soviets that we would never use nuclear weapons first. These are different kinds of weapons. These are different kinds of weapons than the emacs based in Europe should we say that we will never use those. So if they come at us with a conventional attack we still won't use nukes nuclear weapons first. And on that question it's a separate one. But on the question of first use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

My own view is it doesn't matter what we say what really matters is what we do. If the president will get up every morning and call Gorbachev before breakfast and say I just want to be sure that we'll never use nuclear weapons in Europe. First it wouldn't matter nearly as much as what we actually do if we have weapons of that kind in Europe if we train our troops that way if our manuals look that way if we if they know that our conventional forces are weak enough that we may actually have to use nuclear weapons if any of those things happen. That's what will persuade the Soviets that we might use them first and that what makes Europe in my view a less stable and safe place. But that's a separate debate about whether one does or doesn't. I'm trying to give you another bite. OK got it. Got it. That's right. I remember one way to think about the max. It's like a novel. It's a series of chapters

and each of them has a sort of internal narrative and set of characters. And and it's played in different scenes. There was a prehistory to the max before 76. There are only probably a handful of us that were looking at it and reading the documents and so on in 76 it was still only a handful just a few people on two of the subcommittees of one in the house and one in the Senate. So maybe as few as a dozen people that were looking at it in 1976 when the air force first asked for funds for the Amex by name they actually for the first time also defined what that missile might look like. And I remember sitting one April afternoon in the Senate Armed Services Committee rooms. They're wonderfully beautiful handsome rooms with the battle flags of the different units in the background and this is where the country's business is done usually in secret session. And I was sitting there trying to puzzle through these documents that the Air

Force had sent over about the max. Now remember we had had for two years prior to that in 74 and 75. Two of the finest debates that the Senate has ever had on the key question of why the country ought to have nuclear weapons and for what purpose. There were so called counter-force debates so I'm looking at these and leaping off the page for the first time an official in official records was a description of what this missile would look like. It would have something like 10 or 12 warheads. It would have an accuracy with that would be extraordinary. The the blaster yield effect would be very great. And by very simple calculation that even I as a as a non technical person person could do it meant that if we went ahead and bought those and bought as they were saying we ought to buy 300 of them that no matter what we called it we would have achieved a direct threat. To the Soviet missiles land based missile force which is the core of the preponderant US

core of their of their entire strategic system. So in our own interest it was clear that I'm have lost it now. So you've got that far. And I. Why. So those who had a poet right. Yes. There were there were. There. It had been debated in the Senate in the most explicit terms whether in fact it was in our national security interest to put their missiles in their silos at risk. And the Senate frankly was split fairly evenly. If we had by the way adopted the view that we should do that explicitly as a matter of policy it would be a RADICH would have been a radical change in our in our nuclear policy. We had for all the previous years for the most part explicitly foresworn that. Why. Well because in our interest we wanted to avoid a hair trigger on nuclear war and it had been conventional a policy conventional wisdom for part of that time that we therefore ought to

avoid as we hope the Soviets would avoid forces that would threaten the other the other side's own nuclear forces particularly lambastes forces so there that afternoon I looked at this document and it was clear that no matter what we set our policy to be that if we went ahead and bought 300 of these missiles counter-force muscles we would have the most awesome counter-force arsenal that one could imagine and one that clearly would have defined a policy. So then the question was should the Congress insist that the president and the rest of the government state first what our purpose was and then buy the weapons to pursue that purpose or. Should we simply proceed to build a weapon that even in the absence of a clear policy would nonetheless define a policy. So one of the key issues in the entire debate was how we decide as a free country on what what the purpose of nuclear weapons should be and how we then buy different equipment to pursue that policy. So it would be clear that we are

pursuing our best in our best judgment what our own security interests are. We get it. Yeah OK. There were there were about $78 billion or something like that requested by the way. That's a very small number. It was a very early stage in the Emacs development and I would say something like three quarters or more of that money was devoted to the missile. So there was only relatively few dollars devoted to how we would base the system survivability. And the reason was frankly that not very many people at the time were that concerned about what later became the central issue of the late 70s and early 80s that is the so-called window of vulnerability. People simply did not believe at that time that the Soviets were mounting the kind of attack to our missile force that would that would require us quickly to find a way of basing them survivability. Now there were other people who were concerned about that already. Panetta was concerned about some of the Senate Armed Services Committee who was

concerned about it. So the way that the issue was resolved in 1976 and it was a turning point in the history of the program was that there was sort of a pincher movement that came politically on the air force in the fall of 1976 one from the Congress in which the two congressional committees with the most responsibility the two armed services committee says you should if you're going to proceed to develop the unmix you should do so only for the purpose of ensuring the survivability of our missile force and from the other side within the department itself the civilian side you had opponents are saying that the number one problem with the survivability of our sort of our missile forces and that that required a and accelerated development there Max. So those two things put together put it sort of squeeze the air force to switch the focus from the from the missiles side to the basing side. And it's set up what what proved to be one of the most frustrating and probably hilarious if it weren't so

serious journeys in the search for the perfect basing system over the next several years. One day in 1976 the Congress through the legislation on on this on the AMEX said that you shall not build the muscle for the express purpose of putting them in a in a silo. Technically you would build somewhat different muscle to put it in a cycle and you would if you're going to carry it on a truck or something like that. They said further the only primary reason we want to pursue this that is the development of the IMAX program when the missile is to ensure its survivability so for heaven's sake go out and fire and put that make that the emphasis of your work. And third they said to the president please tell us why you what it is you want us to do what is the purpose of these weapons. What is the threat to that purpose and then please relate the next request before you go into the next stage of

development what they call full scale development. Please explain to us the connection between the AirMax program both basing a missile to the purpose and the dangers to that purpose as you see them. Otherwise we won't consider your we won't consider your request for the next step. Right I knew you were I wasn't given what you want him. In 1976 after the two committees look at him at the Air Force request they said back as they gave him some of the money that they would not consider moving to the next stage of development of the AirMax unlet until they had found a survival survivable basing mode. I need to try it again. I've gotten what you want. Let me just thank you. So after looking at these questions in 1976 the

Congress said back loud and clear in writing to the president on the air force we don't want to move to the next stage of development of BMX unless you can find a way of basing our missile survivability. That's the problem we want to fix and what ever get you right. When I was a private in the army I remember reading the sign hung up in our office. There isn't any reason it's just our policy in the early days of the emacs. In fact throughout the history of the emacs one of the struggles was to relate what was being asked to any clear definition of policy. In 1976 at this crucial point there was not a very clear definition by air force or anybody else aware of why we were doing what they proposed to do. The money was put in the

muscle so we had to reason backwards that that the primary focus of the of the program was not to make it survivable but to build a missile that would be more threatening or more lethal to in the fighting of the so-called counter-force conflict. Clearly Congress came to a different judgment when Congress told the president the air force that they were that they were primarily concerned about survivability. There were at least two reasons why they did so. First of all that there were people like Paul Netzer and others who really believe that that the Soviets were mounting a threat to our muscles and that this threat would be something they would exploit for both military and political profit. So that later the later cry about the window of vulnerability was already in full blossom and was influencing the max then. Then there was just the practical politics of it. There were many people who did not really want to have a counterforce capability as would have been achieved by them.

Who nonetheless said I'm willing to bet some money now in military research and development to make sure that the Soviets don't get an edge on us in the way the opponents and others are talking about. So that's what an R&D program is it's supposed to you know had certain dangers that might develop. So people who were both opposed to the counter-force weapon and others who were really wanted it nonetheless could agree on the one thing is which is that we ought to make sure that our muscles that we do have or will be dealt with the survival of my. You have to give you two reasons but I'll try to keep it short. There are two reasons why Congress insisted on shaping the program on the issue of survivability. One was that there were many members who really were concerned

that the Soviets were going to threaten our missile force in their silos for military and political profit. Later known as the window of vulnerability argument and the other was is that as a practical political matter even those people who were who did not want a counter-force missile capability nonetheless were willing to spend R&D money research and development money to hedge against that threat. And so there was in effect a common denominator of interest. When we got the definition of the Amex program for the first time in 1976 it was clear that if you were just going to buy the missile it would cost you about one third of what it projected cost of that same missile force in a survivable basing scheme. At

that time they were talking about $33 million or something. So it was a it was 11 billion versus thirty three billion. It was also clear that if you were going to emphasize the missile or counter-force side of it that you could take the same muscles and put them in the current silos. I'm going to have to try it. Turning now to Canadian. What I want to try to do is to relate it to this issue of how how a free country decides. Let me try that. I know and I understand. You just wait. You know what it is. You know this is not easy to say let me try it again. Well let me try this. One of the hardest things to do in policy and in making

and politics is to look down the road and to see what is likely to be produced by the first decision and one will inevitably be a sequence. Well I sat there in that room that afternoon it was clear that if we would proceed simply to buy the muscle which could be bought rather cheaply and simply to put it in the same silos that we now had that the country would not likely ever face up to the primary question. Why is it we were doing what we were being asked to do. In other words the basic debate about why we should have nuclear weapons and particularly this nuclear weapon would likely have been avoided. Why. Well because it was cheaper and people weren't asked being do hard things. If on the other hand if we emphasize the issue of survivability which was a proper issue with the right issue it was also going to set in motion a series of events. That's just clear as a bell to me that afternoon a series of events that would engage the American public because you had to put it someplace and it would engage the higher regions of the American government to invent such a thing. Not easy to do

but which would also insist that there would be a direct relationship between that development and an explicit purpose that the country could could agree upon having worked it through. And and so when the committee agreed to tie this issue now to survivability rather than simply buying another muscle is it clear that we were setting in motion a quality debate that would serve the country very well. It also was clear that it would make it very difficult for the advocates of the system to bear that burden. But if they did and if the country agreed with them then we could clearly perceive what shouldn't have happened under any circumstance was that we go ahead with something so important as the fundamental redefinition of our nuclear policy one which in my judgment would have been very dangerous. But putting aside whatever so fundamental revision without having thought it through together as a free people after the Congress had written this direction out to the department defense and air force emphasizing and survivability

I then was sent by the Armed Services Committee the Senate to the west coast and at the SAC headquarters to review the program as it was then. So I remember meeting with two Air Force generals superior professionals. One was General Kelly Burke and the other was general Hopfer who was the program manager. Burke was in the sack headquarters in Nebraska and he called into his office shut the door and he says now Larry have you read this piece about missile survivability. And I said well yes it was a classic piece of literature on. And he says well you know we don't think it's really a problem here we think that we can leave these missiles in silos and it's going to work just fine. And so this direction is given us in the Congress is frankly a problem. And I said well that's the way it works you know the Congress says this is what you need to do and so on. Then I went out to the west coast and general for the program manager said Larry have you read this and it was a particular piece of literature. He says I don't see why we have to move him out of the silos. We

can handle it the Soviets are not going to be able to attack them with any certainty or confidence. I said well there may be general but this is what in effect the bosses said. So in effect what we had in 1976 was an Air Force that really was very comfortable with leaving the the putting the new missiles in the same silos comfortable that the Soviets would not be able to attack them with sufficient confidence that they could get military or political profit. This was two years before the wonder of unability. So you got a sense that you're talking about the Air Force officers who I met in this work in the program office and in the command General Doretti who is commander in chief of SAC and others were really trying to do the country's work. This was to be sure there may have been officers later who were in the business of trying to sell them the missile like you would a car. But that time they were trying to struggle to

find the right question and then answer it. One of the things the Congress really helped them do was to define the question because as I said earlier I'm sorry that your currency were that and see how I can do this the debate continued for a number of years after the 76 decision about how important survivability really was. Some of the operational air force commanders and their officers felt that it really wasn't necessary to move to survival basing scheme. Only later did they realize I think as they as the country began to work this through that if you put this wonderful new missile that could threaten the others that

the Soviets missiles in our own current missiles and if if both sides became convinced that our missiles were could be attacked then what would you get is the absolute worst of both worlds. You'd have a missile that was more threatening to the Soviets in a silo that was no more survivable. So what you in effect would do is draw fire. It was worse than than where he had begun. Now it took a while for everybody to work that through and finally most people said well we just have to find a way to basing this thing survivable. So in the current situation. Yes. One of the sort of hilarious if it weren't so serious aspects of this whole tale. Was that once the country said we've got to find a way of basing the survivability we when went

through dozens in many ways hundreds of different ways of trying to survive to do to do that. This was started under the President Ford. It continued through President Carter and on into the early Reagan administration. Well I'm going no no fewer than I am willing to say something like to make sure that the signal that the missiles could survive an attack but that might let me let me roll that one more time back up right the first the first proposal was to put to build a huge tunnel sort of like a massive sewer pipe. That would be hardened with concrete and steel and then build a truck that would drive up and down in that at different places and at one time they're also going to stop them at that particular point that had been specially hardened like Well that was an

enormous sort of task you had to build a special truck for it was going to be on a desert. It was very hard. So then that sort of went away for reasons that we could win. So that went away. Then they came up with the idea of some people called the Big Bird. Now you would take a an airplane that could stay aloft for a long time and you would put them M-x missile on there and in a time of crisis you would go aloft where you couldn't be shot at the over that you'd be over the United States and you simply circle as long as the crisis existed. Well that proved not to be very effective because it's so expensive and you could only put a missile or so in there and so on then they came up with something that at one time with them are hilarious spacing schemes was to make a what amounted to an artificial lake in the American West. Now of course those who are not from the West may not be aware but there's not a whole lot of water there and what is is is sort of value by folks. But the idea was to put a lake in the middle of

the Utah desert and to put protective silos underneath that lake you'd pump the water in and out. And you wouldn't let the Soviets know where you'd put the pea under the shell and so on. But the lake would basically protect you. So when someone said well yeah you could do it another way you could actually put it in the ocean. You could call the submarine force which of course we had. Somebody said why don't you just put it in the Great Lakes. But there was another one another another basing scheme was to take a small muscle and to proliferate it throughout the West. I'm talking about thousands and thousands tens of thousand two hundred ten or twenty thousand of missiles cheap small and you'd put them in silos that would be cheaply built and very soft and you basically beat the threat by putting those by by proliferating those muscles so that the Soviets could not attack them all.

Well of course the guy who thought about this idea had never filed an environmental impact statement or met with the Mormon Church apparently. As we learned later was necessary both in both cases to do but there was a whole series of. There was one much later in the debate and certainly will what stuff. Now Karl I've given you that in short form. Every one of these basing schemes and so let me try one more time. No but if you want me she can start. LOUISE. OK. All right. Between 1976 and 1982 our government went through dozens of schemes. And if you look at them as a set what we were struggling to do was to find a an answer. That would satisfy us technically. That the Russians could never

that we would survive any attack that the Russians might mount. And there was a whole set of underpinning technical judgments and calculations under these. One of the most difficult things about this and similar debates is that it's very difficult to to base your conclusions as a government on actual scientific or empirical evidence. You can't go out and try one of these things well let's try a follow up. A massive attack on the United States to see with our missile force survive you can't even attack one missile because we can't quite properly have a Abana against open air testing which is what would be required to even attack one missile with one missile with one nuclear weapon. So all of this with all this argument about which basic scheme would work with by the way still continues in the sort of the parts of the of the security community that remain so. Totally out of touch with reality and particular political reality.

But anyway all of those schemes turned on judgments which had the appearance of scientific calculations. But in fact we're for the most part judgments that is to say you couldn't test it. You couldn't go out and try it. And I'm actually introducing different issues. This is of interest to you I'll try to crank it up and give you one other angry. What are you looking for. Yes. He's always. Got it after 76. Our country search for six or eight years for the perfect basing scheme. We wanted a way of basing these things that under no circumstances would per well let's try to get hold on to that.

Well just think about upstairs. I just I stopped looking. OK. Let me try one more time and then we're going after 1976. Our government looked for the perfect basing scheme. We went through dozens or even hundreds of different ways of fixing this part of the problem was is that all of these were based on calculations that had the appearance of scientific certainty. And but in fact were based on on judgments that were highly theoretical highly mathematical highly abstract rather than something you could really get your grips on you couldn't go out and test it to see whether this would work in a way that we would start a car and see if were to go around the block so that the argument always then turned almost as if our government was a nymphomania. I'm sorry I can't do that. I try to see

so that no matter what seemed to be the favorite answer at the moment because it was rooted in theory rather than something go out and test was immediately subject to challenge. And so that no matter which one we'd settle on momentarily it would attract critics from all sides and there was no way of settling the argument. Only later only in 1980 3 or so that we'd come up with a scheme that sort of moved us away from the definition of the question. The question for years had been how can we invent a basing scheme in which we would be highly confident that our missiles would survive a Soviet attack. Having failed to find one and still one in the missile the airforce came up with a very interesting argument that says why don't we redefine the question as how can we make sure that the Soviets could not attacked our missiles with confidence. So we move the uncertainties about whether we could survive something we were never able to to look to the

uncertainties about their confidence in their attack. From their point of view. Well that was just right. And we came up with something called dense pack. Well the problem is that this one like a lot of these others were schemes that were subject to the snicker factor. I mean people would start describing people just sort of start giggling. In the case of the dense pack the idea was was to base missiles so close to to each other. That the Soviets not really understanding how the first missile would have nuclear effects that could eat up the second muscle the so-called fratricide. Now I'm going to detail you've got the you got this necrophile. So do you think this is pacing people the interesting thing about the opponents of the different basing schemes is that they seem to come from all sides of the political spectrum and they came from all sides of the argument about you know how

why are we all to have these things and so on. For example one of the early schemes the so-called trench scheme was who was killed for all practical purposes by a very conservative physicist from the West Coast who on the basis some calculations on the back of an envelope said well you've you you've got the hardness of this. This scheme miscalculated and in fact you're going to find that nuclear effects will will propagate and multiply themselves in ways you haven't taken into account and that's a dumb idea. So he basically at a crucial point we're talking about when Carter came in in 77 took what was then the best candidate that the Air Force had and shut it down as it were from the right. Well that then kicked into motion this incessant search for some other way of doing it. And every time you come up one with one either somebody will say Well look I won't that won't be compatible with an arms control or that won't be are compatible with the local community or someone else say it won't be it won't work

because there's this problem that it won't fix the problem was that all of these schemes were not subject to testing. You couldn't go out and really tested in a way that nobody would have any confidence it was by its very nature it was more like a theological argument than anything else. You know we're a nation of pragmatists. We're practical people let's say the way we've done our business for years and say here's something we want to do or here's a problem facing what we want to do. Let's go out and fix it. And the ultimate proof will not be what works in theory but will work in practice. But one of the missing elements of the debate was there was no way to test whether it would work in practice. So in the in the late 70s as this AirMax problem got tangled up with the politics of salt Carter administration was obviously interested as many of us were. Having a good arms control agreement but they knew that somehow the AirMax program was tangled up with the salt work in two ways. First of

all as a practical political matter the Carter administration needed to show that they would have a strong nuclear force. At the same time that we were negotiating with the Russians. So arms control and the Amex became sort of married in a shotgun marriage. They needed each other. The other fact I can try that one more time travel. In the late Carter administration the next program got caught up in the politics of salt. As a matter of practical politics those who wanted solid sense that they had to embrace it and Max and find a way of basement Survivor Survivor. And those on the other hand who wanted them Max knew that they had to invent a scheme that would be compatible with any part of a general package with saw. So there was sort of a forced or shotgun marriage between the program and the saw advocates sort of a strange breed. This then required the AirMax investors to find a basing scheme

that would be compatible with so well as sort of a tension there. On the one hand since we're going to reduce or limit the number of missiles you've got to make sure the Russians know how many we have. On the other hand to make it survivable you've got to make sure that they don't know where they are. So this does prove to be a very formidable design problem for those who were trying to fix the problem and survivability. So. The biggest the biggest turning point in the program's effort to find a basing scheme was first of all simply the agreement that that was the problem. Once that was set in motion it was going to be enormously difficult if possible or to find something that would meet the the the standards of confidence that the country expected.

There was another major turning point in another major turning point in the search for a basing scheme was when they settled finally in the late 70s on some variation of what was called a race track scheme and this was simply a one way of having you know the old shell game you don't know where the pea is under which which shell which is the way you make the Soviets uncertain about where they are to spend their forces if they were going to attack but the turning point came as soon as they began to focus on that. When we began to say we're going to put it here or here up to that time it was an abstract debate about a technical design. Very few people involved only among the defense community. But when when the country said we think we're going to put it in Nevada and Utah or perhaps in Wyoming or in New Mexico or in Arkansas all of which we're at one time or another throughout this

period considered for one form or another. Spacing what you found was the local communities had a great deal of interest. And at that time politics then developed particularly in Utah that frankly opposed the deployment of that muscle in whatever scheme in their local communities for reasons that were totally unrelated to the technical debates that had gone on in the of the think tanks and in the in the government of offices after we had gone through all of this search through all these Wepa basing schemes. The it was finally agreed that we would have a so-called race track basing scheme like a shell game and that when we would put it in Utah. Now remember the debate at this point had been largely among a small number of people within the security community who thought about it in theoretical and abstract terms but when they said we want to put this specific scheme in this specific place in

Utah then for the first time you got the American public engaged and when they they thought about it they thought about in fundamentally different terms and the theorists had they said we're talking about right here. We're talking to our families living down the road. We're talking about water that you're going to need it. You were talking about a construction crew comes in who we don't know and they're going to start dating our daughters as really happen. We're talking about not in. And we're talking about most of all we're talking about a vivid sense from where we live every day about what a nuclear war might look like. And so that what has appeared to be OK in theory proved to be absolutely laughable and rejected and unacceptable in when we thought about it in terms of where we live. Yes. When I sat in that room in 76 and looked at it for the first time the description of this missile

and realized that it would define a new policy I realized that all of that all the arguments about this had been theoretical but I realized also that if the Congress put I realized I'm sorry. OK. All right. So when I for the first time saw the missile defined in this document that the department defense had sent to our committee I realized that no matter what we called it it would define a new policy a warfighting policy. I realized also that if we if the committee and the Congress said instead we want to make sure that whatever we buy will survive an attack from the from the Soviets that that would inevitably engage the American public because eventually we were going to have to define a particular basing scheme and our and defend the theory and in practical terms not theoretical ones. And we were going to have to put it in a particular place where Americans live every day and I believed at the time that the character of the

debate would be radically transform not to a yes or no but to the different way of thinking from one form which was had been highly mathematical to one that was very vivid and concrete that all Americans could could engage in because there are certain questions that American citizens have as much standing as any theoretician or any official no matter how high how high that is what is it we're really trying to do here. And another question is how would it work in practice. Another question is how does that fit with this other thing. And as soon as we got the argument in that in defining those terms it was inevitable that we were going to have a different quality debate. One of the amazing things is that six years after the Congress gave that direction that we ought to form this shape this program for the purpose of survivability in literally the same room that I had first read that document

the Senate Armed Services Committee still believe that the President Reagan had largely because people who were his supporters and friends in Nevada and Utah had said that we were that we were not going to pursue those basing schemes that had been proposed to that date. And so he sent in late 1981 a request for a just Lemasle but for no basing scheme that anybody had any confidence in. And so the Congress then in this case the Senate Armed Services Committee looked at this and said we said six years ago that that if you couldn't make it survivable we were not going to give you the money. And they cut I think it was a billion and a half dollars out of that request anyway as much as it was they had for the missile and for what they thought were dumb and impractical basing schemes. And they insisted that the president go back and still try to come up with a way of basing a survivable well in the in the end what you got was a defeat.

Or a rejection of the original proposition the original proposition from in my mind was 300 Mitchel's in the current silos with 10 or 12 warheads and so in other words a counterforce capability and then and right now it is as you said it's a done deal. It will not be more than 50. It probably won't even be 50. And in this case no matter what you call it even though it's a counterforce missile individually the total force of 50 axes does not make up a counterforce American counterforce capability. There are not enough of them there. And the fact that they are not based survivability means that frankly most of the serious people in this business no longer believe that either side could really attack the other. For in the hopes of military or political profit. And the words what the AirMax missile experience did was to force

Americans back to the classic way we solve problems. That is true. How would this work in practice. And as soon as we looked at it when we we looked at the argument that was used to be called the window of vulnerability. When's the last time you ever heard the term window of vulnerability. It's out of the American language and it is no longer argued about. We now believe what I always believed was the case in which most Americans believe that that is the case and that is that neither side could ever plan to attack the other with nuclear weapons in the hopes of getting military or political profit to try to do that is just literally unreal. It's out of touch with human common sense and the way we learned that something we had always believed in was to go through this very difficult argument to face up to what is what we're trying to do here. And what would it take to do it. Well the problem survivability that we have to have a survivable evasion scheme let's look at a woman none of those things will work. We don't want it here. Let's go back and review the question and the premise and

the theory behind it. And then we basically rejected it not a single vote but by just it went away with a whimper. Three you know one of the really difficult things to do to understand is how some of these decisions are made even though I participate in and many of them for all of the organs about the character of the muscle whether it was a counter-force missile or they could actually get that done. And the survival basing scheme is one of the critical questions with how many we would actually buy. And the original 300 dropped down to 200 under Carter and then it was down to a hundred or something like that for a while under early Reagan. And then one day so far as I can tell from the public prints in one afternoon in the White House Ed Meese or somebody scratched his head and said How

about I'm sorry I've got this wrong. No no no. And I've got this. I got to roll it back up just one bullet. Let me try again. You know these these debates and the decisions are made are not are not as neat and pretty as a lot of theoreticians or political science would have us believe. Things sometimes just happen and nobody quite knows the reason why the original request for 300 missiles which would have given us a counterforce capability no matter what you call it was reduced under Carter to 200 which was sort of on the cusp one day one afternoon and then in the middle of 1981. Somebody in the White House I was told was at me scratching his head and said How about a hundred that's a nice round number. Well no matter how you based a 100 m X's even though each one of them had the technical capacity to attack a hardened silo together they did not make a counter-force capability. So the issue that had been argued out in theory years before was settled because somebody said 100 sounds like the right

number. Then was now than that number of. Now that number one hundred has been further reduced because of the confusion about how to base even them that number survivable. So we're now down for all practical purposes to 50 and there's no way in the world that we're ever going to go above that number. In a sense the entire history was rather like a fever that came over us as a people. There was a time when we were deeply anxious about our own security for a whole variety of reasons including the hostage crisis and so on. There was also a case that was also true that there was a sort of a theoretical argument that needs to be worked out and they became sort of the vehicle through which we made the we had that experience. But ultimately the AirMax which is the symbol of all that has now gone away with a whimper because not because of any theoretical argument but because in political practice

what needed to be done that is to find of survival racing scheme simply couldn't be found in political practice which. The Soviets don't have to file environmental impact statements. They're much freer to allocate the resources and build what they think they want. The dangerous things is is what that means. There have been people who've argued that a democracy free people have a hard time competing with an authoritarian government. I don't believe that. I think we did pretty well. One of the things we learned and I suspect the Soviets are learning from us that the idea that you could fight and win a nuclear war is got to be one of the dumbest goddamn ideas that we ever had ever come on the human race and we rejected it by looking at how it would work in practice.

Now that we find that certain arms control proposals are possible that the Soviets are looking these things in different ways. It may well be that they learn from us on that. You're right. I'm just thinking it through the debates we had in seventy four and seventy five about whether we ought to prepare ourselves to fight a nuclear war. We're some of the best. I knew about in my 14 years in the Senate. And that idea was deeply disturbing to me to members of the Senate of all persuasions. We had a good argument about it. And even though. My own personal view got defeated both times in a divided Senate it was clear that the country was come to grips with this key

question for the first time in the modern era. Why is it what is it we were really trying to do here what what were the purposes of these weapons. And those two so-called counter-force debates which didn't get a lot of notice but which the senators look back on as being very special times in which the Senate acted as I hope our founding fathers wanted us to to argue questions. They look back. I've I've lost it. All right. What are you going to say. All right. I got it in 1974 and 75 when Secretary Jim Schlesinger began to advance the notion that we ought to buy the kind of weapons that could only be used for the purpose of fighting a nuclear war. What we had. For the first time was a person who was a product of a culture Rand a Ph.D. in economics and so on who looked at these questions almost entirely an

abstract in theoretical terms and he triggered one of the biggest and best debates on the central question of why we ought to have these weapons in the United States Senate. So there were a lot of people who who for the first time scratched their head and said this guy's simply out of touch with the real world. The close of course it does. If you want to get that on film then we're here. I think the net effect of all these debates about the Amex has been to resolve. That issue pretty cleanly. What you find is are sort of after effects of the same logic being applied to other weapons systems. For example the the midget man proposal which is a single warhead and lots of them is a

is really based on the same logic as the AirMax is just a different answer to it. I think it's that we still haven't totally come to grips with the basic question Why do we have these weapons what do we want to do with them. What does that require us to have. And I think what we're going to have to do. We're going to make any progress is not to come up with one or more other weapon systems to solve the old questions we're going to have to redefine the question. And I think the question should be how can we in practical terms prevent the use of even one nuclear weapon and that means we're going to have to think about different questions and we have been arguing about how can we talk stop a nuclear terrorist. How can we stop one by miscalculation. How can we make sure that neither side's theorists can convince themselves and the body politics on either side that you could actually use one of these things with for profit. If we can do that that is the clearest path I know to some sort of sense of safety in the face of a nuclear danger.

That's. The the fundamental issue that a free country faces in the face of of a really deeply technical questions is how can we come to grips with this as a free people and decide the original vision that we had was that we as a free people could could shape our own future. Well how do you do that when you have a technical issue of this kind and the way you do it is you have your own congress and your own president and your own self say what is it we're trying to do here. And how is that technical fix relate to that purpose that we've argued through. That's the way you make the connection. If you try instead to become an amateur or technician or an amateur expert. Then all you'll do is pick up the same confusion that the technical community has one of the things that the technical community does not do well

is to relate specific conventions to clear national purpose. We have to do that for them. As Churchill said experts ought to be on tap not on top. Yeah well I mean obviously there well but the problem. Just because a thing can be invented doesn't mean that it's good for us and just because the Soviets can invent invent something doesn't mean it's good for them. It's not it's not so much what we think or what we build It's how we think about it. Do we think about it in ways that are actually practical and concrete Do we actually say if we were to go ahead and build this thing how would it work in practice. And as soon as we looked at the theoretical underpinnings of the next muscle and a lot of other missiles are being proposed the theory simply melt in the face of actual human experience. I mean it's it's it is a form of. Of unreality

to consider the human specie to seek something that you could call rational in most of the of the of the the kinds of attacks that were being talked about as part of this debate. What we have to do is somehow regain our sense about what is half what is what is real it's not just a question of what is true in a technical sense and it's not even just the sense of what is good and sense what are my values. It's a fundamental question is what is real meaning that we are a nation of practical people. And we have to solve problems in you know in a practical way. One of the ironies of this entire program's history was how it finally how we finally decided not to proceed. I still am. OK the person who probably killed DMX as it was originally proposed was Ronald Reagan and he killed it not out of some theoretical notion he simply killed it because he didn't think he wanted to put it in

Utah or Nevada or by one of those designs. An irony. The irony was it was Ronald Reagan who finally did in the AMEX. He did in it not because of any engagement in the theoretical arguments he did it because he didn't want to put it in Utah. He didn't like the race track system because he thought it was incompatible with salt. He did it largely out of instinct by all signs. And although they aren't. And one more time. The irony is the irony is is that the guy who did in the Max was Ronald Reagan and he didn't do it in because of any theoretical doubts. He did it because he didn't want to put it in Utah and Nevada and he did it because he didn't have any confidence in some of the basing schemes that were offered to him and he did it even though he Ronald Reagan had been the principal sponsor of the very theoreticians who had given us the window of vulnerability. And even though he had in many ways read into office partly on on that on that crime. So so so these things are

ironic in that way. And that was Wes Clark