Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Douglas Kinnard, 1982

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Transcript

Kinnard's incursion operation into Cambodia

VIETNAM

Kinnard, General Douglas

SR 2939

Tape #1 Side 1

Pix 980

Take 1

Interviewer:

If you just start telling me about the preliminaries, the run off,

the...

Pix 980

Take 2

Interviewer:

If we could just carry on with you describing the maps and the photos.

Kinnard:

Now one of the uh more interesting, in a way humorous, incidents that

happened in connection with our going into Cambodia was the seeking to

get some kind of map or photo of the area since we had been forbidden

to conduct conventional operations there previously, when the

commanding general who would be conducting the operation, and I were

talking together several days before we decided we needed some aerial

photos, so I dispatched the Intelligence Officer down to MACV in

Saigon, to get some photos of the area early one morning.

And of course there were a lot of things going on and uh I didn't think

much about it. But late in the afternoon it suddenly dawned on me that

I hadn't seen this fellow before, since then, so we tried to get a hold

of him and it turned out he was still down there. We got him on the

phone and I said, where are the maps, we need them, and where are the

photos, rather, and he said, well they won't give them to me. What do

you mean they won't give them to you? And I said, do you explain why

you want them, and he said, well they don't seem to know anything about

it.

I said, well tell them to go over and talk to the Chief of Staff-

Abrams, Chief of Staff and he'll explain why we need them. Well, in a

few hours he returned with the photographs and then we found out why

they didn't want to give them to us, was the photographs of course

disclosed these huge craters, that B-52 bombing had been going on for

some time- a year or more and we weren't aware of it officially.

Indeed, I wasn't aware of it at all. Most of us weren't.

So I guess they didn't want to give us photographic evidence of that.

But even though we were going to conduct an operation in to Cambodia.

So I guess it was a question of Intelligence people not knowing what we

were doing and also protecting this other bombing that we weren't privy

to. But, anyway, that was I thought an interesting episode.

Interviewer:

What about the notification about COSVN movements, if we could go on

about that?

Kinnard:

Well COSVN, of course, moved around a good deal across uh the border

there and we were generally aware of their location through the normal

intelligence means. And uh, uh, we knew, for instance, the day that the

operation was to begin that they had left the area which is not

surprising, because our movements I'm sure on the other side of the

border alerted that something might well happen.

And of course it was, I presume, a rather small thing. Perhaps a

foxhole and a couple of radios, and we went from the briefing that

morning and the operation began, was due to begin, at seven o'clock and

Nixon's speech came on about that time and here was President with his

map making a big issue of the fact that we were going to capture COSVN

which wasn't anything to begin with, as I've said. And of course we

knew it wasn't there.

So I realized immediately that that was a gaffe and I'm not sure quite

who put him up to that. I think he later found out he was kind of

infatuated with a notion of COSVN being a major sort of United States

sprawling type of headquarters, which it wasn't.

Interviewer:

And how about your meetings with Charley Whitehouse? You talked before

about the political impact.

Kinnard:

Well the night before the operation was definitely to begin, and we had

finished our final briefing, everything was set to go. Charley

Whitehouse who was our our uh sort of senior diplomatic official in the

second field force where I was Chief of Staff at the time, and I sat

down to chat about the operation, and we didn't talk about the

technical details, but what we talked about was the impact of the

United States. And both of us agreed very strongly that it was going to

be a very severe political impact at home.

What we wondered about was why, you know, given these sort of marginal

necessity for the operation, anyone would undertake it given the

political impact, and uh but we assumed perhaps that we were wrong,

being that far away but it turned out that we had a sensitivity for the

political impact which was substantial, I guess.

Function of the Cambodian operations

Interviewer:

Can you pref--give me a rundown of the objectives of the operation and

whether they achieved those objectives.

Kinnard:

Well, I think the objectives at our level, you know for years...

Interviewer:

Sir, could you say the objectives of the operations...

Kinnard:

Oh, excuse me. Yeah. I think the objectives of the Cambodian operation

at our level were rather objectives of a technical military nature in

that for years the sanctuaries had been used, of course, just on the

other side of the border which gave the other side the initiative, and

so forth, but for various political reasons we were constrained from

normal ground operations. The result, of course, was a rather

substantial build up at times of manpower which at the moment was not

there because of operations being conducted further to the West, but a

good deal of supplies.

And uh since uh that time the supply movement was a rather tenuous

thing down that long trail system. Our feeling was that if we could

destroy and capture and take some of these supplies it would take a

good deal of time to build them up again. And in effect, this would be

a break for the uh South Vietnamese forces we were operating with in

that area. Sort of a boon to Vietnamization, you might say.

And I think in that technical sense, we were probably successful. We

did destroy a good number of supplies and statistics have been

published captured some, and so I think in that very narrow sense, that

the operation was probably a success. But, of course, one must weigh

that versus what happened later in Cambodia and what the impact was

politically at home. And it turns out to be a rather small part of the

equation, sort of technical.

Interviewer:

Um, why, could you explain why the operation was necessary given the

fact there were thousands tons of bombs already dropped on the area by

B-52's?

Kinnard:

Well, I think of course there is a limitation, you know, to what you

can do by aerial bombardment and Billy Mitchell and Duellet,

notwithstanding. Uh the air enthusiasts, uh the results of WWII proved

that until the you know the technical surprise at Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, so that bombing, you know, is not really that effective in

detail. I mean there's things that can be concealed, you can't bomb

everywhere. You know, certain things could take a little bit of

fragmentation.

And so I think that just simply you have to go in and take them out of

there and seize them. I just don't think you can do that much bombing.

You know, there were huge areas that were covered over by triple

canopy, they were, you know, unknown. Some of them were dug in which

gave them, except for a direct hit, you know, a fairly good uh uh

ability to take some kind of bombing fragmentation.

So I think that technically, from a purely technical reason, there

wasn't reason to go in and disrupt the whole supply system and to take

it out, in addition to bombing. Of course, we hadn't known about the

bombing in advance, so maybe we would have changed our estimate, had we

known about that.

Interviewer:

What about the morale of the soldiers at the time. There was no problem

about that, was there?

Kinnard:

No, I don't think so, the uh, as you know...

Interviewer:

Say I don't there was any problem.

Kinnard:

No, I don't think there was any.

Interviewer:

Just wait two seconds and then go.

Kinnard:

I don't think there was any really serious problem in troop morale as

far as the Cambodian incursion began. As you know, there was a decline

in uhm morale of American Army, particular in Vietnam, beginning I

would say, around this time. Around 1970, and certainly by `71 having

to do with the last man theory, you know, and so forth.

I don't think the Cambodian incursion, my recollection, caused any

major morale problems. If anything, it sort of generated a little bit

of enthusiasm among those groups who wanted to do something. You know,

it was tangible, here at last is an enemy or real supplies, and so

forth.

And I don't think you know, any casualty of course is unfortunate. But

my recollection of the casualties of that operation they were not heavy

primarily because the enemy was operating elsewhere. You know, when we

got in the area. So I don't think there was...from my point of view I

don't think it was a major morale, but there was an obvious decline in

morale during that period that kept going on and on as Vietnamization

progressed. Oh, I don't recall any serious problems with combat units.

Interviewer:

Okay. Cut.

Could I just ask you about...

980 Take 3

Interviewer:

I'll just ask you about the impact of the operation. We'll go over that

ground. If you could talk about the purpose and the results of the

operation.

Kinnard:

Well, the purpose of the operation, you know, the incursion at our

level was a rather technical one, a rather straight military one,

didn't involve deeply in political ramifications of it and it was, you

know, to destroy the buildup of supplies that come down the trail for a

long time and realizing the long time it would take to replace them,

presumably if we destroyed and captured, this would give the South

Vietnamese in our area a sort of break uhm, extend Vietnamization in a

way as kind of a bonus.

Now there could have been people over there, too, but it so happened

they were operating further to the west at that time. So in that very

technical and narrow way I think you could say the operation was a

military success in that area. Now you must lay that against larger

political, what happened in Cambodia, what happened in the United

States, then you probably would come up with a different answer.

Interviewer:

Okay. That's it.

Kinnard:

That tight enough?

Interviewer:

Yeah. That's good.

Information and secrecy among U.S. military during the war

Pix 981

Take 4

Interviewer:

Could we just start, Doug, while you explaining about your analysis of

these statistics, about death caused by sanctuaries, and caused by...

Kinnard:

It is the role of the sanctuaries, of course, is on one level

self-evident in that the enemy can retreat into them, you can't go

there, that leaves them with the initiative and so forth. Oh when you

start trying to be more specific as to precisely how many deaths were

caused by allowing sanctuaries, then it becomes more difficult. I got

into the research on that a little bit.

Uh in 1966-'7 when I was Chief of Operations Analysis in Saigon, in the

headquarters, and people were of course trying to get some

justification for us to operate, and so we uh did a good deal of

statistical work attempting to show that uh because of the sanctuaries

so many US deaths were caused. But it essentially a fruitless kind of

operation and not statistically very sound. It was one of those things

that on one hand is self-evident and the other hand, when you start

trying to prove it it isn't quite that easy. And uh so I think there's

a little hocus pocus connected with it.

Interviewer:

What about the story of your difficulty in getting the maps and the

photographs [incomprehensible]...Could we go over that slightly

briefly.

Kinnard:

When we uh began the detailed planning of this operation it was evident

to us since we never operated in Cambodia, that we needed some kind of

map or aerial photo. So I dispatched the G2 down to pick these up at

the headquarters in Saigon and he had great difficulty in getting them.

And after many hours I finally got him on the phone and said, what's

happening down there? And he said, well they won't give me the aerial

photos of Cambodia, and I said, why not? Tell them, well I don't think

they know that we're going to go over there.

I said well go over and tell 'em to see the Chief of Staff Abrams,

Chief of Staff, he'll explain it to them. So that worked, at least, and

we got the photos and when he came back with them, we found out why

they didn't want us to see them because here was the photographic

evidence of the B-52 bombing and it had been going on for a year or

more. Which, of course, we weren't aware of. It was not involved in our

daily work and uh uh we didn't know it and they didn't want us to know.

It was held secretly uh for obvious reasons.

Interviewer:

That's good. That's very good. Now about the Wheeler back channels

thing... If you would ruminate about that?

Kinnard:

Yuh. I've often thought as historians try to reconstruct what happened

in in Cambodia, especially the decision making processes, how far off

they're going to be if they look at the normal kinds of messages that

went back and forth because most of what happened there, in my

recollection, was done on the so called back channel message, which

goes only from the sender to uh whom ever he wishes to have the

message, and of course, the eventual disposition of these messages is

up at the discretion of the person who sent them.

And if you take this to the channel where the war was... where the

incursion was mainly planned, between Abrams and Bus Wheeler, the joint

Chiefs of Staff, this was all done by back-channel, for obvious

reasons. And uh uh uh of course, eventually, Wheeler had all of this

stuff shredded, and so that no longer exists, and Abrams' stuff has

been sorted out in various categories, some of it destroyed, the more

sensitive stuff put away. And the less sensitive stuff available, I

suppose, soon to researchers.

But the whole story of the planning and the execution of and the

rationale of this is really gone. And if you try to reconstruct it

based upon the sort of normal message traffic, you're really dealing

with a fiction. Ha ha.

Interviewer:

You said "for obvious reasons" [incomprehensible], what were the

obvious reasons.

Kinnard:

Well, I think that it was closely held and sensitive operation which

had many political overtones to it.

Interviewer:

Would you say, "The Cambodian incursion was a secret...

Kinnard:

Oh, the Cambodian incursion was, of course, a rather carefully held

operation. We had, you know in my whole area in which I operated in

which there were over 150,000 American troops. Only seven of us, for a

week or so, knew that this was coming up and so uh uh it was closely

held in Vietnam, it was closely held in Washington, I gather, and it

was closely held between the two.

So, therefore, it was natural to use the so called back channel message

in which the sender can control precisely who sees the message. In all

of my correspondence back and forth on it, even to Saigon, was done on

this back channel message, and all of the Abrams-Wheeler correspondence

on it was done on back channel messages. And of course Wheeler had

these, along with his other things, shredded before he died. And

Abrams' things have been sorted out, most of the sensitive stuff either

put away or or destroyed.

So that the real story of the planning of the operation from a military

point of view, at least, doesn't exist. And if one were to look at the

front, for normal message traffic, would appear in such things as State

Department documents and other things, eventually, that really won't

tell the story.

American misunderstanding of enemy and ally in the Vietnam War

Interviewer:

Okay. Uh, what was your story about General Do Cao Tri?

Kinnard:

Oh yeah. One of the interesting things about the Cambodian incursion,

of course, was that the uh operations of the ARVN forces preceded ours

first without our physical going across the border and eventually with

it and toward the end as we were pulling one of their major operations

in which adviser, would be involved, we had picked out a certain day

the new commander of the field force.

But word came back from Do Cao Tri who was our ARVN commander in that

area that it couldn't be conducted in those days the stars weren't

right and he in fact was staying home in bed that day, astrology was

not quite correct and therefore the operation would have to be

postponed a day or two until things were right. Now this was a sort of

"Welcome to Vietnam" message to our new field force commander who was

not uh interes--experienced with taking astrological matters into

account in military operations.

Interviewer:

That's good. Let's also go over again the COSVN disappearing act.

Kinnard:

Hmm. Hmm. One of the things that I found interesting was, as I looked

at Nixon's speech on, on the incursion, after we had started it, a few

minutes after we had started it, was the great emphasis he had placed

on the COSVN headquarters, sort of portrayed it as a kind of Pentagon

that we were going to capture and my guess is that at best it was a

foxhole and a couple of radios. But in any case we knew that in the

last twenty-four hours it was well out of the area in which we were

going to operate in which we knew from our normal Intelligence means,

and so it was never really an objective. Although, as he portrayed it,

it was a major objective to the American people. Seemed kind of a

wooden type of presentation to me, uh.

Interviewer:

Let's deal now with what Vietnam taught people and what it meant, what

it means now for the other program, for D. Ellison's program?

Kinnard:

Well, I think there's no end of a lesson. I think, I suppo--

[Incomprehensible]

Kinnard:

I think Vietnam was pro--

Interviewer:

Sorry. Sorry. Don't look at me. Go ahead.

Kinnard:

Well, I think Vietnam was no end of the lesson certainly for the

military and everyone else. I suppose the thing that you would have to

emphasize is that we really didn't know the enemy we were dealing with.

We really didn't know our allies, but out of it came a sufficient

caution that I suppose the lesson to the military for the future is to

be very very cautious in getting involved in such operations.

Uh, of course, we knew that after Korea that "No, never again school"

in Asia. I think, however, in Central American operations which are

being discussed these days that probably among the more cautious group

will be the military who know what it is to get involved in that kind

of thing.

Interviewer:

What about your own thinking about Vietnam? How has that evolved from

your experience there, from [incomprehensible]?

Kinnard:

Well, of course, I must say that despite my involvement over there for

a couple of years. I...

Interviewer:

Start...

Kinnard:

No. How is my thinking evolved in terms of Vietnam since my involvement

there in the mid to late '60s, I find now that I've done a great deal

of research and writing on it that I really knew nothing about the

background. I didn't understand the enemy we were dealing with, I

didn't understand the allies, I don't think as my book on the War

Managers indicated, most of the generals didn't understand the

objectives and we're certainly willing to admit that in 1974.

I guess I now understand uh uh a little more about it, and I guess I

understand also that had the decision makers understood what I now do,

even without knowing the outcome, they could not have made the

decisions they did. It was a total lack of understanding of the

situation we were involved with. Sort of simplistic tying it in with

Cold War things, you know.

Interviewer:

What were the flaws do you think, were they fundamentally tactical, or

strategic, or just the overall involvement?

Kinnard:

No. I think there were, the uh, well, I don't know if you would call

the flaws over there strategic or tactical, uh, at the sort of

operational, the military operational level, you don't fight an

operation on that scale without going where the enemy is. I mean, you

don't fight it at his choice in time, and location which would give him

the initiative. And so what you have here is you're fighting a war of

attrition in which the enemy has the initiative.

And so that becomes a war of wills and this is the situation where the

enemy in this case had the will and we had the power. But you can't

apply power where he has the initiative unless he wants you to, so we

fought it in the wrong dimension. We had the power and didn't use it,

he had the will, and that's the kind of war we fought, it was a war of

wills. I think that was the basic tactical or strategic mistake,

whatever you wish. That okay?

Interviewer:

Yeah, that's fine. Cut.

Transcript

Transcript

Series: Vietnam: A Television History

Raw Footage: Interview with Douglas Kinnard, 1982

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-1g0ht2gb59

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-1g0ht2gb59).

Description

Credits: Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Kinnard, Douglas

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 3f7dc9bc970d45c33e8ac7beea882699fbf17174 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:21:21:29

Citations: Chicago: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Douglas Kinnard, 1982,” 1982-04-01, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 17, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-1g0ht2gb59.; MLA: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Douglas Kinnard, 1982.” 1982-04-01. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 17, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-1g0ht2gb59>.; APA: Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Douglas Kinnard, 1982. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-1g0ht2gb59