War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Edward Teller, 1986

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WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES E00001-E00003 EDWARD TELLER

[2]

Fear of a Nazi Atomic Bomb

Interviewer:

DR. TELLER, IN 1939 THERE WAS A GREAT FEAR AMONGST PHYSICISTS WHO HAD

RECENTLY EMIGRATED TO THE US THAT THE GERMANS MIGHT BE DEVELOPING AN

ATOMIC WEAPON. WHAT WAS THE BASIS OF THAT FEAR AND WHAT WAS DONE ABOUT

IT?

Teller:

In 1939 there were a few people, not very many, but specifically two

Hungarians -- Leo Szilard and Eugene Wigner -- When the news arrived

about uranium fission and that was discovered in Berlin, in the Kaiser

Wilhelm Institute... they became very worried that one could make an

atomic bomb and that the Germans would be the first to have it. This

news came in January, 1939 -- That means a few months before the Second

World War started. I would not call it a wide spread worry. But a few

people who had been in Germany and who fled from Hitler did get very

worried about it. They happened to be my friends. And so I got

involved.

Interviewer:

IF YOU CAN TELL ME THE STORY...

Teller:

Wait a moment. This unfortunately was one and a half minutes... Ask me.

Ask me. It's better.

Interviewer:

IN 1939, THERE WAS A GREAT FEAR AMONG PHYSICISTS WHO HAD RECENTLY

EMIGRATED TO THE US THAT THE GERMANS MIGHT DEVELOP AN ATOMIC WEAPON.

WHAT WAS THE BASIS OF THAT FEAR AND WHAT WAS DONE ABOUT IT?

Teller:

In 1939, two Hungarian physicists, who happened to be my close friends,

Eugene Wigner and Leo Szilard, got very worried about the possibility

of the Nazis inventing, acquiring and atomic bomb. They actually went

to Einstein and talked him into writing a letter to Roosevelt

suggesting that a project on the possibility of an atomic bomb be

started in the United States. When the letter was actually ready for

Einstein's signature, I entered -- as far as I'm concerned -- as a

slightly active member in serving as Szilard's chauffeur. I took him

out to see Einstein. He received us in a morning coat, signed the

letter, and gave Szilard and his chauffeur something. Though that was

only one minute...Tell me when you are ready and I'll go.

Interviewer:

OK.

Teller:

In 1939, two of my friends -- somewhat older than I was -- Eugene

Wigner and Leo Szilard got very worried about the Nazis acquiring an

atomic bomb. They persuaded Einstein to write a letter to President

Roosevelt. And I happened to be their friend. I happened to hear about

all that. And I served as Szilard's chauffeur. When the letter was

ready I drove Szilard to see Einstein. He signed the letter and gave

something to Szilard and also to his chauffeur. This time it was 43

seconds...Is that all right? In 1939, two Hungarians, Leo Szilard and

Eugene Wigner got very worried that the Nazis would use newly

discovered fission and invent and make and use an atomic bomb. They

persuaded Einstein to write a letter to President Roosevelt. Szilard

could do anything in the world except he did not know how to drive a

car. He was my friend. And I drove him to see Einstein. And Einstein

signed the letter and gave Szilard some tea. And because he was

democratic he gave some tea to his chauffeur as well. After the Nazis

surrendered Szilard worked in Chicago. He and others formulated a

petition -- that atomic bomb which was nearing completion -- It was

late spring of '45. Let's start all over.

Petition to Prevent Bombing of the Japanese

Interviewer:

(DISCUSSION CONCERNING PHRASING OF STATEMENT.)

Teller:

After the Nazis surrendered, Szilard and others in Chicago issued a

petition that the bomb should not be used against the Japanese without

first demonstrating it to them. I found that highly reasonable. Szilard

had sent me a copy with request to circulate it in Los Alamos. I felt I

should not do so without talking to Oppenheimer, and he persuaded me

that we physicists don't have the knowledge to base any recommendation

for or against usage. For me it was a relief not to be involved. And I

did not sign the petition. Even today I'm sorry that I did not.

Interviewer:

THAT WAS GOOD.

Teller:

Unfortunately it was 54 seconds...

Interviewer:

WHEN YOU'RE READY...

Teller:

After the Nazis surrendered, Szilard sent me a petition that the Atomic

bomb should not be used against Japan without demonstrating it to the

Japanese first. I thought this was highly reasonable. And because I was

asked to circulate the petition in Los Alamos, one went to see the

director, Oppenheimer, and he persuaded me that we physicists don't

know enough about matters of usage that we should give an opinion. I

was greatly relieved by that. I did not want to get involved. I did

nothing. Even today I regret it. I now am very sure that it is our

opinion. I have to do it again. I am sorry. I'll try again. After the

Nazi surrender, Szilard sent me a petition which I was to circulate in

Los Alamos.

Interviewer:

(BACKGROUND DISCUSSION).

Teller:

After the Nazis surrendered, Szilard sent me a petition to circulate in

Los Alamos that we should not use the atomic bomb against the Japanese

without first demonstrating the bomb. I thought this was highly

reasonable. But Oppenheimer talked me out of it. And I felt relieved

because I was not certain that I knew enough to make a recommendation

in this regard. Today I am sorry that I backed away. I think this is an

important part of our responsibilities.

Hydrogen Bomb

I'M STAGED NOW FOR PROGRAM 2. PRODUCER SUE CROWLER. AN INTERVIEW WITH

DR. EDWARD TELLER OF THE HOOVER INSTITUTION.(BACKGROUND DISCUSSION)

Interviewer:

DR. TELLER HOW DID YOU HEAR ABOUT THE SOVIET BOMB AND WHAT WAS YOUR

REACTION TO IT?

Teller:

I participated in a briefing in Washington in September, 1949. It was

on some other topic. At the very end there was a statement

--incidentally the announcement of President Truman that the Soviets

exploded an atomic is an actual fact...We should take it seriously.

This disturbed me very greatly. I knew of the possibility to develop a

hydrogen bomb. We have worked on that for many years. But not worked on

it at all seriously. Stalin had stated in '45, we in Russia will have

the atomic bomb and we will have much more. So my immediate reaction

was. What will they do next. I called up Oppenheimer and he said, keep

your shirt on. I was not satisfied. I tried to forget about it. I was

working at that time for a year in Los Alamos. One day I got a phone

call from Ernest Lawrence. He wants to visit me. He and Luis Alavarez

came and they asked me about our earlier work on the hydrogen bomb. I

told them how far we got and they urged me, particularly Ernest

Lawrence -- It was absolutely necessary that we go ahead. I just found

that I could not...could not do differently. There were more people

with whom I talked. Actually I asked to see Lewis Strauss (?) who

served on the atomic energy commission who I knew would be interested.

And indeed he was. I do not remember whether I was invited be Senator

Maclean to see him or whether I asked for an interview. But I did go to

see him. And his mind had been made...was made up by that time. He

wanted to know about details which I did furnish. Now that was 2

minutes and 31 seconds.

Interviewer:

(DISCUSSION ABOUT MAKING A STATEMENT ON THE BOMB)

Teller:

In the fall...I'm sorry. I have to do it again. In September, 1949, I

happened to be in Washington for some discussion. At the end of that

discussion, just incidentally it was mentioned -- President Truman's

announcement of a Soviet nuclear explosion is a fact. There is a

nuclear...a Russian nuclear bomb. I was very much disturbed. I called

up Oppenheimer. What should we do next. His answer was, keep your shirt

on. I was very greatly worried.

Interviewer:

DOCTOR, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE REACTION TO THE SOVIET BOMB.

Teller:

I heard about the Soviet bomb at the end of a meeting in Washington on

an entirely different subject. Yes, the Soviets had a test of a nuclear

bomb. I was greatly disturbed. I called up Oppenheimer. Asked him,

"What do we now?" And he said, "Keep your shirt on." I felt that this

was not the proper reaction.

[END OF TAPE E00001]

Teller:

In 1945, Stalin had said, "We will have the atomic bomb, and we will

have much more." This is something I could not forget. When they did

get the bomb in '49, the obvious question was, "What will they do

next?" And I had been thinking for a long time, for years, about the

possibility of the hydrogen bomb. And that we had discussed in Los

Alamos. So I called up Oppenheimer. I'm sorry. That I already said. So

I have to start all over again.

Interviewer:

(DISCUSSION, CLARIFICATION)

Teller:

Shortly after Hiroshima, Stalin had said, "We in Russia will have the

atomic bomb, and we will have much more." This I could not forget. I

knew...I have known for years, about the possibility of the hydrogen

bomb. I could not quite see what we should do next. I was working then

temporarily at Los Alamos. And one day, Ernest Lawrence called, and

asked to see me. He came. Listened to how far we have gotten with the

hydrogen bomb. He had similar worries as I did. And he said, With the

knowledge we already have, there is no question, but we must go ahead.

Interviewer:

(REPEATS QUESTION) DR. TELLER WHAT ROLE DID YOU PLAY IN THE DECISION TO

DEVELOP THE HYDROGEN BOMB?

Teller:

Shortly after Hiroshima...

Interviewer:

(START OVER).

Teller:

Shortly after Hiroshima, Stalin made the statement, We in Russia will

have an atomic bomb and we will have much more. When they got an atomic

bomb, much earlier than anyone predicted, my first thought was, What

will they do next. I had been thinking about the possibility of a

hydrogen bomb, a bomb based on fusion rather than fission -for many

years. I was very much bothered but I could not quite make up my mind.

In those days, at least for a limited period, I worked in Los Alamos.

And...a month maybe after the Soviet atomic test, the great physicist

Ernest Lawrence called me and asked me whether he and Louis Alvarez,

another one of our colleagues, could come up and see me. Of course I

was happy to see them. They wanted to hear about the hydrogen bomb.

They had similar thoughts as I did. And Ernest practically put down the

law. Under these conditions it is an absolute obligation that we should

work on the hydrogen bomb. And that helped out my...helped to make up

my mind. And from there on I did proceed.

Interviewer:

OK.

Teller:

The first official reaction to the idea that now we must work on the

hydrogen bomb came from the general advisory committee of the atomic

energy commission. It was completely negative. The general advisory

committee, consisting of very well know, very excellent physicists...

Interviewer:

(CLARIFICATION OF DISCUSSION)

Teller:

The first reaction to a proposal that we work on the Hydrogen bomb was

a very definite No! by the general advisory committee of the atomic

energy commission, the argument was that the atomic bomb is already

powerful enough and if we will not work on something even more

powerful, even more devastating, we could expect that the Soviet Union

won't work on it either. Because of Stalin's earlier statement, I could

not quite believe that. Also,...I'm sorry, I can not do it...

Interviewer:

SO IF I ASKED YOU WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT AGAINST

DEVELOPING THE HYDROGEN BOMB WE CAN PICK UP FROM THAT.

Teller:

The first response to the proposal that we should now that the Russians

have the atomic bomb work on the hydrogen bomb -- The first response

was a resounding no by the general advisory committee of the Atomic

Energy Commission. Their argument was that an atomic bomb is powerful

enough. And if we are not going to work on anything more powerful, the

Russians won't do so either. Because of Stalin's earlier statement, I

could not accept that argument. Here were a number of very excellent

scientists arguing that we should not look into a possibility. They

argued for continued ignorance. And this I could not accept, We now

know that actually, the Soviets had been already working at that time

on the hydrogen bomb for 18 months. We know that from Andrei Sakharov,

the man who made the Soviet hydrogen bomb and is now in disfavor. And a

dozen years ago, actually the early '70s he said when he started, when

he was drafted to work on the hydrogen bomb. So we now know that if he

had not gone ahead without our even understanding what's going on, the

Soviets would have been way ahead of us. Look I will answer -- in fact

you don't need to ask me, I will just continue. And what I would like

to do now is to say that this phase of the discussion ended when Truman

made a policy decision and then the other phase started and talk about

it--

Interviewer:

WHAT I'M REALLY INTERESTED IN IS WHY YOU THOUGHT IT WAS TECHNICALLY

FEASIBLE...

Teller:

That will come. That will be included... The first phase of the

hydrogen bomb debate ended when Truman made a decision that indeed we

should go ahead. The whole debate lasted only a few weeks ago. In the

first place, there was objection about the feasibility of the hydrogen

bomb. But when the President made his political decision, then the

opponents of the hydrogen bomb started to say, It cannot be done. It

won't work. Actually, we had in the meantime discussed the question for

years. And I saw several different ways how the hydrogen bomb could be

turned into a reality. I felt very certain that at least one of them

will work. In the end, all of them did. It was a very remarkable

situation where those who gave least thought to the subject argued

against it. It then happened to be that they were actually wrong. The

first suggestion, the complete suggestion, turned out to be a little

difficult. And we backed off before really executing it. The second

phase of the debate forced me into making a suggestion which was more

obviously feasible. At that point the objections stopped. We went

ahead. And indeed, on the first try, in the, it succeeded. I believed

that if we had not succeeded we would not have had a second chance. In

that way we were forced to work quite efficiently.

Interviewer:

(REPEAT TO MAKE SHORTER)

Teller:

The first phase of the hydrogen bomb debate lasted only a few weeks. It

ended when Truman made the political decision to go ahead. Then the

moral issues were no longer argued. Instead, the objection arose. The

hydrogen bomb is not feasible I felt very confident that it could be

done. And the main reason was not only did I have in great many

discussions and calculations of years behind me, but we had several

proposals of which one was selected for actual execution. But there

were several other possibilities. The original suggestion turned out to

be a little difficult. Another one, however, became so plausible in

subsequent discussion that even before we fired the first hydrogen

bomb, it was generally accepted that this in all probability will work.

Interviewer:

(DISCUSSION ABOUT LENGTH OF SPEECH)

Teller:

The first phase of the hydrogen bomb debate, the public phase, lasted

only a few weeks. It ended when President Truman made the decision to

go ahead with the Hydrogen bomb. At that time, the opponents shifted

the ground that it will not work anyway. I felt very sure that it will

because there were several possibilities. In the end, we found a

particular proposal that just could not be contradicted. And indeed it

worked.

Interviewer:

(BACKGROUND DISCUSSION)

Teller:

Actually, in the debate, quite a few people have been involved. One of

them was Lewis Strauss, a commissioner on the Atomic Energy Commission

who later became Chairman. He was very definitely for it. I wanted to

....

Interviewer:

(REPEAT)

Teller:

Actually, quite a few people were involved in the hydrogen bomb debate.

One of them was Commissioner Lewis Strauss. He was very much

interested. I went to see him on my initiative and from then on he was

a definite supporter of the program. And other was Senator Macmillan.

When I went to see him, he already heard about the decision of the

General Advisory Committee and he did not need any persuasion. He was

more strongly for working on the hydrogen bomb than was I. Now the only

point is, could we have this question and I'll answer the question my

way and don't interrupt even if you don't like it. Let me try and I

will try not to make it too long.

Interviewer:

ANY TIME.

Teller:

The hydrogen bomb debate made it obvious that the leadership at Los

Alamos together with the General Advisory Committee -- all the people

that were really informed -- could very easily arrive at wrong answers.

Further more, the hydrogen bomb itself opened up a great new field. And

the job that had to be done, become too big for one laboratory. I felt

very strongly that we need competition between two independent research

places in order to make sure that we do a good enough job. The military

were first opposed to that idea. Secretary Lovett, Secretary of Defense

was against the second laboratory to argue. And he then wrote a second

letter to the Atomic Energy Commission directing them to set up a

second laboratory without even bothering to say that he ever disagreed

with this position. This is how the second laboratory in Livermore came

about.

[END OF TAPE E00002]

Reaction to Sputnik

Interviewer:

DR. TELLER WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE NEWS OF SPUTNIK? HOW DID YOU

FEEL AT THE TIME?

Teller:

From 1945 onward, I had the very definite opinion that... we are

underestimating the Soviet efforts in military matters, in the question

of space, in other similar issues. Sputnik did not come as a surprise

to me. And I believe that we continue this mistake. We are seeing just

the civilian every day effort of the Soviet Union and we know that in

that, they are poor. They are not emphasizing it. Where they put the

main emphasis, there they are excellent and so Sputnik did not come

as...as a surprise to me. And it was obvious that we have to do every

possible thing to get into a space program ourselves.

Interviewer:

(REPEAT)

Teller:

I was not in the least surprised by the Soviets succeeding in putting

an object into space. Sputnik. From 1945 onward I felt that we are

underestimating Soviet military technology and other fields related to

the military field. This is still my opinion. In fact, at the time of

Sputnik they were temporarily ahead. It looks more and more as though

in military matters, the Soviets are and will be permanently ahead of

the United States.

Interviewer:

(REPEATS QUESTION ABOUT THE USE OF TEMPORARY)

Teller:

I was not in the least surprised by Sputnik. In military matters, in

matters of space -- anything like it -- the Soviets have not been taken

sufficiently serious. We see their everyday civilian efforts. And

there, their technology is lacking. In the big programmatic decisions,

the Soviets have been and are excellent.

Nuclear Testing

Interviewer:

(BACKGROUND DISCUSSION)

Interviewer:

NOW I'M GOING TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE TEST BAN TREATY WHAT WERE YOUR

REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE TEST BAN TREATY IN THE LATE FIFTIES AND ISN'T

IT THE CASE THAT YOU BELIEVE THE US SHOULD CONTINUE TESTING AND WHY?

Teller:

Look, this is not what we discussed. The Test-Ban Treaty came not in

the late '50s but in '63.

Interviewer:

OK.

Teller:

In the 1950s, in the late 1950s a...

Interviewer:

(START OVER)

Teller:

In the late 1950s, we had an agreement with the Soviet Union that

neither of us would test anymore. I did not like it because I did not

think we could check it. We had been assured that any test series would

take so much preparation that we would know about it many months in

advance. The Soviets resumed testing in the early '60s. And we knew

about it one day ahead, when Khrushchev announced as it was the biggest

test series that ever has been. At a slightly later period, we

concluded a test ban with the Soviet Union against any tests in the

atmosphere. At that time there was a new and strong reason why we

should not have gone ahead. In their test series that proceeded that

final test ban, the Soviets found out a lot about how to defend against

incoming rockets. We had no similar experience and in this way, we put

ourselves at a permanent disadvantage in regard to Soviet Union.

Use of Nuclear Weapons

Interviewer:

DR. TELLER, ARE YOU SURPRISED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE NOT BEEN USED

IN WARFARE SINCE AUGUST 1945?

Teller:

Nuclear weapons should not have been used in 1945. Our whole purpose is

to understand what can be done with nuclear weapons. And by

understanding and by being prepared, to prevent their use. I expected

that they will not be used again and I hope that if we behave

reasonably and remain strong enough, they will never be used. I tell

you I really feel ill.

[END OF TAPE E00003 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Edward Teller, 1986

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-154dn3zw7f

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Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Teller, Edward, 1908-2003
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: ef9b997715fe0af292bad1965a318c256dc0523e (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Edward Teller, 1986,” 1986-02-24, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 17, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-154dn3zw7f.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Edward Teller, 1986.” 1986-02-24. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 17, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-154dn3zw7f>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Edward Teller, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-154dn3zw7f