War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Takeo Fukuda, 1987

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WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES 9123-9124 TAKEO FUKUDA

US Use Atomic Bombs on Japan

Interviewer:

SINCE THE BOMBINGS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, WE HAVE BEEN LIVING IN

THE ATOMIC AGE, AND IT IS THIS FACT THAT HAS INSPIRED US TO MAKE THIS

PROGRAM. SINCE WE ARE AT A TURNING POINT OF THE ATOMIC AGE, WE WOULD

LIKE TO HEAR FROM YOU ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCES AND YOUR UNIQUE POINTS OF

VIEW ON THE ISSUES. WOULD YOU PLEASE START BY TELLING US ABOUT THE TIME

PERIOD WHEN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI... OR RATHER ABOUT WHEN THE WAR WAS

ENDING? THE THEORY THAT THE ATOMIC BOMBS WERE DROPPED IN ORDER TO MAKE

JAPAN SURRENDER IS STRONGLY PREVALENT IN THE US MAY I ASK YOUR OPINION

ON THAT?

Fukuda:

Well... although there are various theories as to why the US used the

atomic bombs specifically at that time, there is no clear consensus.

But people say that in the end the bombs did hasten Japan's surrender.

Although Japan's surrender wasn't sped up by much, I am sure it did

have that effect. As you know, we were experiencing air raids everyday

at that time. I was at the Ministry of Finance, and even that sturdy

building of the Ministry was not safe. If the Ministry of Finance had

been destroyed, it would have seriously impacted Japan's ability to

wage war. So, the departments of the Ministry were dispersed to rural

areas across the country. Only the top members of the Ministry were

moved to the Bank of Japan. The Bank had a safe. Even if we were

attacked by air raids and bombings, we could escape and hide in the

safe. So, we used an entire floor of the Bank of Japan as the head

office of the Ministry. I was working there. So early in the evening of

August 6th, Seiji Hasegawa, the manager of public relations from Kyodo

News Service--it was called "Domei" then came to us, saying that a

massive bomb was dropped. He said it appeared as if a fireball dropped

from the sky and an enormous mushroom cloud formed where it fell. He

then said it certainly didn't seem like a normal bomb, but that no one

was sure exactly what it was. We didn't know what it was for about 24

hours. We spent the next day or two not knowing, and then realized that

it was not a typical bomb, and that it might have been what was called

an atomic bomb. The bomb fell on Nagasaki next. The Supreme Council for

the Direction of the War took place on the evening of the 9th with the

emperor present. There the decision was made to accept the Potsdam

Declaration. The Imperial Conference was being held late at night. The

Minister of Finance always attended Imperial Conferences since he was a

key Cabinet member. We stayed up all night waiting for his return. He

returned to the Bank of Japan where we waited. He said to us, "Thank

you for your hard work," and then said, "But it seems that the Potsdam

Declaration will be accepted after all". This meant the end of the war,

or rather our surrender. That is what we realized, four days after the

atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

Interviewer:

SO, THE JAPANESE LEADERS AT THE TIME HAD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BOMBS USED IN AIR RAIDS SUCH AS THE GREAT TOKYO

AIR RAID AND THE BOMBS DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI?

Fukuda:

Yes, they had a clear understanding.

Interviewer:

I SEE. I HEAR THAT ANOTHER THEORY OF WHY THE US DROPPED ATOMIC BOMBS ON

JAPAN WAS THAT THE US WAS SEEKING TO CONSOLIDATE AND FLAUNT ITS POWER

TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THIS?

Fukuda:

Well, only a small minority of people have made this argument. From a

historical standpoint I can say that at the time the US and the Soviet

Union did not need to flaunt the power of their positions relative to

each other since at that point they had a very close-knit relationship.

Also, at the time, the US was proud of its absolute dominance relative

to the Soviet Union. So, I believe that this kind of power

demonstration was not the reason the US used the atomic bombs on Japan.

All in all, the US was very much aware that the Japanese military was

quite strong. What I believe is that the US had considered the

potential loss of officers and soldiers if they were to move forward

with a strategy of landing on the mainland. I believe that they wanted

to take control of the course of the war quickly.

Japan's Commitment to Nonproliferation

Interviewer:

NEXT, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE ERA IN WHICH THE

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) WAS DEVELOPED. JAPAN SIGNED THE

NPT IN 1970 AND RATIFIED IT IN 1976. THERE IS A SIX-YEAR PERIOD IN

BETWEEN, AND DURING THAT PERIOD IN 1971 YOU WERE APPOINTED TO SERVE AS

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IT SEEMS THAT THAT AMOUNT OF

TIME--SIX-YEARS--IS QUITE LONG.

Fukuda:

Yes.

Interviewer:

AND PERHAPS THERE MANY VARYING DEBATES REGARDING...

Fukuda:

Yes, Yes.

Interviewer:

SO WHAT KIND OF THINGS DO YOU REMEMBER THE MOST?

Fukuda:

What I clearly remember is that China had succeeded in nuclear testing.

That success produced a great impact, or rather a shock, in our

country. Back then, Japan and China had a relationship quite different

from what we have now. If anything, Japan held Taiwan and the Republic

of China in favorable regard. Given the period in time, we were shaken

by China's attempt--back then we called it Red China--to possess

nuclear weapons. And well...Japan wasn't the only country. This

incident was a great shock worldwide. That's how I feel. So in this

context, our awareness about nuclear non-proliferation had been

significantly elevated, and that eventually took the form of the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Interviewer:

INDIA PERFORMED EXPERIMENTS AS WELL.

Fukuda:

Yes they did. So, Japan had a moment of realization that if nuclear

proliferation occurred, we would encounter a serious problem. This is

especially true since Japan upholds a national policy of not possessing

nuclear weapons. So in the context of the new constitution, this means

that we will not possess armaments knowing that they could threaten

other countries. The idea was to protect the safety of Japan by

depending on the good will of other countries. How should I put it...

with this, Japan took the first steps on a path that no other country

ever had before. So in regards to nuclear weapons in particular, the

position that we take needs to be very different from that of other

countries' since Japan is the only country in the world to have

experienced the harsh lessons to be learned from atomic bombs. But, at

the same time, a new problem concerning the peaceful use of nuclear

power had emerged. The problem arose before the nuclear

non-proliferation efforts were taking place. It was around 1955. People

in Japan had mixed feelings about the growing inclination to adopt the

peaceful use of nuclear power. We have experienced immense suffering

caused by atomic bombs. But if nuclear power could be used differently,

it could have wonderful and peaceful effects on society. Since it was

facing this kind of environment, Japan was in a difficult position. So

anyway, since Japan has limited sources of energy, the ability to use

nuclear power as energy seemed to have incredible potential. So around

1955, the Atomic Energy Basic Act was passed and the Atomic Energy

Commission was developed. Also, a governmental institute called the

Atomic Energy Agency was established, and then money was allotted in

the budget to move forward with nuclear power generation. All of these

things started happening, and they illustrate how Japan jumped at this

newly emerging way of peacefully using nuclear energy. While we were

following this path, however, problems arose with China and India as we

already mentioned. We were faced with a situation where we needed to be

repentant... rather we needed to reconsider how we should deal with

these matters regarding the peaceful use of nuclear power. That is how

the concept of nuclear non-proliferation was adopted, I believe.

Interviewer:

BUT IT SEEMS THAT THERE WAS SOME OPPOSITION THAT HELD THAT IF JAPAN

SIGNED THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, IT WOULD BE INTENTIONALLY

THROWING AWAY--HOW SHOULD I PUT IT--THE NUCLEAR OPTION. MAY I ASK YOUR

OPINION ON THIS?

Fukuda:

Yes, there were various opposing opinions. The strongest argument from

the opposition was that--as you might imagine from what we discussed

earlier--signing the Treaty would undermine Japan's capability of

peacefully utilizing nuclear power to supplement its scarce energy

resources. So yes, one argument was that we would face a serious

problem if limitations were imposed on the peaceful use of nuclear

power purposely used for generating energy. There was another argument.

As I have discussed, realistically speaking, Japan is in no position to

possess nuclear weapons. Even though the Japanese people believe that

possession is absolutely not possible, there was an argument that held

that losing our freedom of choice under the Treaty was questionable.

But this argument did not become a major topic of debate. There was one

issue that did become quite controversial. This argument held that the

Treaty itself may be promoting nuclear disarmament, but the problem was

how we should go about adjusting the disproportion created between the

five nations that possess nuclear weapons and the rest of the nations

that do not possess such weapons. This was a persistent debate. I would

say that these three arguments were the main subjects of debate. After

that the arguments went on and time passed. That's about it.

Interviewer:

SO, FROM THE US AND OTHER COUNTRIES' PERSPECTIVES, JAPAN HAS ADVANCED

TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH, AND BECAUSE OF THIS, IT WOULD NOT BE

SURPRISING IF JAPAN POSSESSED NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I AM NOT SAYING THAT THE

ENTIRE US THINK THIS WAY, BUT IT IS ALSO QUITE COMMON FOR PEOPLE IN

EUROPE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO HOLD THIS KIND OF OPINION. BUT QUITE CONTRARY

TO WHAT PEOPLE WOULD THINK, THERE ARE ONLY A FEW OF SUCH DEBATES IN

JAPAN--NAMELY ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT SEEMS

AS IF THERE IS A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PUBLIC SENTIMENTS IN JAPAN

AND OTHER COUNTRIES...

Fukuda:

Yes.

Interviewer:

WHERE DOES THIS DIFFERENCE COME FROM?

Fukuda:

How should I put this... I believe that our nation was reborn after our

defeat in the war. A new Japan got its start. In some sense, this new

Japan was something that was imposed by the US But that kind of

sentiment hardly remains now. Anyhow, this new Japan would not possess

armaments or military force. This is where our nation stood. And from

this position, we built relationships of trust with other nations while

protecting the safety of our own nation. Behind all of this exists the

issue of nuclear weapons. We have experienced the terrifying lesson of

what nuclear weapons can do, and I believe that people here feel that

that experience must never be repeated in any other country. So the

pillar of the new Japan's national policy is, I would say, the

establishment of a security framework that does not depend on military

force. This is an ideal of a very lofty nature, but it is what we are

trying to do and I believe it is what we should try to achieve.

Interviewer:

WERE THE SO-CALLED THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE

EXTENDING THESE ARGUMENTS?

Fukuda:

Well, that resolution has no direct connection with constitutional

issues, but both are similar at a basic level. What these principles

state is that Japan will not possess, manufacture, or permit the

introduction of nuclear weapons in the country. Simply put, Japan will

never possess something as dangerous as nuclear weapons. From the

constitutional point of view, doing so might have been acceptable as

long as they were to be used for defense only. But that is basically

just something that is theoretically arguable from an academic

perspective. In reality, I believe that the resolution was founded upon

the consciousness shared by the entire Japanese people of not

possessing, manufacturing, or permitting the introduction of nuclear

weapons into our territory. Compared to the prewar period, Japan's

national power today has expanded by 25 times. Back then, we only had

one twenty-fifth the economic strength. In that time--ten years

back--iron was what symbolized national economic strength. We were

preparing for the outbreak of war. With everyone scrambling to increase

production of iron, we were able to produce 4.5 million tons of iron.

But now, 40 years... well a little more than 30 years after the war

ended--we produce 100 million tons of iron. On top of that, Japan's

industrial power in many fields has increased by 25 times on average.

With only one twenty-fifth of the strength, Japan was had one of the

top three naval forces and one of the top five armies in the world.

Japan was a military power. Today, Japan's economic and industrial

power is 25 times stronger and its capabilities are impressive. As we

can see in the trade deficit problem between Japan and the U.S.,

Japan's technological capabilities have progressed and developed

significantly. With that much economic strength as well as scientific

and technological capabilities, Japan could be a military superpower if

it wanted to. But Japan must not choose that path. Fortunately, we have

our constitution. We also have the awful experiences of the past.

Having had these experiences, Japan stands where it stands. And with

our new start, we must insist on not possessing military force even

though we have the capability. We have to stand firm and say that we

will not do such things even though we are strong, and we must persuade

the people of other nations to create a world where there is no need

for military power. With this lofty ideal, Japan aspires to make a

contribution to humankind.

[END OF TAPE 9123]

Interviewer:

I'D LIKE TO MOVE ON TO ANOTHER TOPIC, IF THAT IS OK. GOING BACK TO OUR

DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AT THE TIME THAT

JAPAN SIGNED THIS TREATY IT WAS SHELTERED UNDER THE US NUCLEAR DEFENCE

UMBRELLA WITH THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY. DID THAT HAVE ANY

INFLUENCE ON JAPAN'S DECISION TO SIGN THE TREATY?

Fukuda:

Well... there were some debates on that matter but nothing significant.

So, yes, it did.

Japan's Response to Carter's Nuclear Policy

Interviewer:

I SEE. THE NEXT QUESTION IS FROM MORE RECENT TIMES. WHEN PRESIDENT

CARTER...

Fukuda:

Yes.

Interviewer:

IN THE 1960S, OR WAS IT THE `70S...

Fukuda:

He was elected in the 1976 presidential campaign and assumed the

presidency from January of 1977.

Interviewer:

THAT IS WHEN YOU WERE APPOINTED TO SERVE AS PRIME MINISTER.

Fukuda:

Yes.

Interviewer:

DURING CARTER'S PRESIDENCY, VARIOUS POLICIES REGARDING THE PREVENTION

OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SUCH AS THE REGULATION OF PLUTONIUM EXPORTS,

WERE IMPLEMENTED. I'M SURE THEY HAD VARIOUS IMPACTS ON JAPAN. HOW WOULD

YOU EVALUATE THESE US POLICIES? AND WHAT KIND OF INFLUENCE DID THEY

HAVE ON JAPAN?

Fukuda:

Okay. ... Are you rolling? Ah, you are. Okay. Um... it doesn't seem

like it. Then, please repeat your question.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS JAPAN'S REACTION WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER ESTABLISHED HIS NUCLEAR

POLICY?

Fukuda:

President Carter's administration came to power when I became the Prime

Minister. Right before this time, China's nuclear testing occurred. I

had already been informed that President Carter was unduly tense and

uneasy about nuclear proliferation issues, and incidents like this just

added to his reservations about the problem. With a series of domestic

and international events highlighting non-proliferation issues, people

wondered if he could do it, but then President Carter released his

policy statements concerning nuclear proliferation issues. This policy

affected many nations. Basically, these policy statements were intended

to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation, which was wonderful. We

were happy to raise our hands in agreement, and the countries of Europe

agreed as well. But the effects of this zealous approach to

non-proliferation were significant limitations on the use of nuclear

energy for peaceful purposes. Countries like Japan, Germany, France,

and the United Kingdom, where there were efforts to promote the

peaceful use of nuclear energy for the past 10 years, could not accept

this. In 1977 during the first year of President Carter's

administration and my first year as Prime Minister, a summit was held

in London. President Carter emphasized that nuclear non-proliferation

was imperative. But during the next year's summit held in Bonn,

participants from other countries assailed Carter's decisions and

opinions. Heated debates were heard at the plenary session as well. In

some cases, participants gathered in small groups and discussed how

they should handle President Carter's policies. During the summit, it

turned out that participants mutually acknowledged each other's

opinions, so appropriate measures were considered accordingly. So

negotiation between these officials took place with that mutual

understanding of each other's standpoints. Compromise was also reached

in regards to the problem surrounding the nuclear Tokaimura fuel

reprocessing plant. To this date, we have been working to reach our

objectives with that program while paying respect to President Carter's

stern non-proliferation measures.

Interviewer:

WITHIN JAPAN, WERE THERE THOSE THAT VIEWED PRESIDENT CARTER'S POLICIES

AS SELF-SERVING ONLY FOR THE U.S.?

Fukuda:

Not to that extent. People understood what President Carter wanted to

do. In particular, since this happened right after the nuclear problems

in China and India occurred, I did not see much criticism for President

Carter's stern approach because, at that time, everyone was uneasy and

anxious about nuclear proliferation issues. Still, Japan would face a

difficult situation if we were forced to give up our standpoint. Of

course other countries had similar hopes to use nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes. And their standpoint should not be undermined

either. It is safe to say that, to this date, officials have been

working to take into consideration and incorporate objectives and

claims from both sides of the spectrum.

Threat of Nuclear Weapons into the 21st Century

Interviewer:

SO, AS YOU HAVE JUST DISCUSSED, TIME HAS PASSED, BUT I SUPPOSE THAT THE

NUCLEAR ERA IS STILL UNDER WAY. FROM A NATIONAL DEFENCE PERSPECTIVE,

WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS ON OUR COUNTRY BEING UNDER THE US NUCLEAR

DEFENCE UMBRELLA?

Fukuda:

As you know, 13 years from now we will enter the 21st century. And

there are many discussions concerning the turn of the century. I'm

often invited to these debates. And when I go to them, this is what I

say: "Discussing topics such as what the next century should look like

is very respectable and important. But do you really believe that the

21st century will come?" That is a bit of an exaggerated expression.

But I say this because there are several unlikely but possible

scenarios in which we won't see the next century. The first scenario,

as we've been discussing, is rooted in the issues surrounding nuclear

proliferation. Today, there exists a quantity of nuclear weapons within

the Eastern and Western blocs with the potential to wipe out the entire

population of the world 60 times over. The world possesses weapons with

that much power. If they were to be used, the Earth would come to an

end. I acknowledge the fact that world peace is maintained because

people don't want this to happen. But these weapons do actually exist.

It is possible for them to be used at any time. There's no guarantee

that they will never be used. If by any chance they were used, we would

be in no place to talk about the next century. That's one problem.

Another less extreme scenario is rooted in the fact that after the oil

shock, order in the world--namely the order created by the Bretton

Woods system--completely crumbled. As we can see in the fluctuation of

exchange rates, the world economy is in a very unstable and tumultuous

state. If we fail to resolve problems that might arise, it is possible

for us to encounter a devastating situation like that of the 1929 Great

Depression. World War II itself was an extension of what happened in

1929. I don't know how it might take place, but the decline in the

economy might well create problems that could destroy our chances in

the 21st century. Let me continue to the third scenario. The population

reached five billion this year. When we take a holistic look at the

population, the environment, and our living conditions, we see

significant problems. But overall, nuclear proliferation is the most

worrisome. It is an issue concerning all human beings. We must make

tenacious efforts in order to eradicate such weapons. Fortunately,

Japan's role is unique and important. We do not and will not possess

nuclear weapons even if we are capable. I believe that it would be very

persuasive if we could encourage other countries in that respect. I

believe that our greatest responsibility as an international nation

that lies between the Western and Eastern blocs is to fulfil the role

of promoting and creating a peaceful world.

Interviewer:

DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT ACHIEVE THAT?

Fukuda:

In order to create one way to fulfill such a role from our current

standpoint, four years ago I founded the so-called ex-key-figure

summit, or namely the InterAction Council of Former Heads of State and

Government. Specifically, I developed its framework, made a proposal,

and called for other countries' contacts. This group has profound

concerns about global affairs. Officials currently in power are also

worried about such matters. However, current officials are faced with

various constraints due to the fact that they are representatives of

their nations and leaders who are responsible for their countries'

destinies. And at the same time, these officials are extremely busy

with their daily work. In that respect, their time to think about

issues that are so extensive as to concern all human beings is

seriously limited. Nevertheless, we cannot just watch silently what is

happening in the world. The ex-key-figure summit brings together former

Presidents and former Prime Ministers who want to use their experience

and knowledge to cooperate with the revitalization of the economy and

to promote positive action around the globe. The summit includes

countries from everywhere in the world, except for the US and the

Soviet Union. If these two countries had joined they would have fought

from the very start. So the organization has gathered less than 30

former leaders from around the world except for those from the US and

the Soviet Union. What is interesting is that many of my colleagues

from when I was Prime Minister are in the summit; from developed

nations, for example, we have Mr. Callaghan. So with Mr. Callaghan from

the United Kingdom, Giscard d'Estaing from France, Andreotti from

Italy, Schmidt from Germany, Trudeau from Canada, and Fukuda from

Japan, six out of the seven former leaders of the developed nations

during my term is Prime Minister have joined. This is because we did

not invite Mr. Carter from the U.S., or a representative from the

Soviet Union. Anyway, six members have joined us. We have had some

earnest discussion and I realized that we all felt the same way. We are

all actively engaging in specific initiatives. When we formed this

group, summit meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union

had collapsed and the idea of starting them back up was inconceivable.

So with this in mind, our members started urging these two nations to

take specific actions. We sent our messages to them every time we had

an assembly and sent letters, urging them at least to meet and maintain

communication. Finally, for the first time in seven years, a United

States/Soviet Union summit was held in Geneva in November two years

ago. Right before the Geneva summit, we held a meeting within the Board

of Directors from the ex-key-figure summit and discussed how we should

encourage and energize this summit meeting. In the end, we decided to

say "your two countries hold the key to the preservation of world peace

and to the future. It is great to have this summit and for you to meet

with each other. So with a sense of responsibility, make this summit a

success." At the same time, we asked them to not let this meeting be

the last one, but to meet again once or twice yearly, for example, and

to then institutionalize such meetings. We sent a wire and dispatched

an official to Geneva in order to communicate our message as well as to

give encouragement to the leaders of these superpowers. During the

summit, they issued a Communiqu鮠And their Communiqu頩ncorporated

what we advised in the telegram and our messages to a significant

degree. My understanding is that our expectations have seeped into

things since the United States-Soviet Union summits are to be resumed.

So with this, we are gaining some slight view of the future. For the

past year, we have been making the utmost effort and utilizing all our

knowledge and intellect to devise policies and plans concerning, for

example, how we should improve the U.S.-Soviet relations, especially

regarding the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Interviewer:

I SEE. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME.

[END OF TAPE 9124 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with Takeo Fukuda, 1987

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-0z70v89m40

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Credits: Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation
Writer: Fukuda, Takeo, 1905-

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
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Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Takeo Fukuda, 1987,” 1987-07-14, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed November 21, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-0z70v89m40.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Takeo Fukuda, 1987.” 1987-07-14. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. November 21, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-0z70v89m40>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Takeo Fukuda, 1987. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-0z70v89m40