War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with John Eisenhower, 1986

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Transcript

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES C03037-C03039 JOHN EISENHOWER

President Eisenhower's Threat to Use Nuclear Weapons

Eisenhower:

Ah, it's not a talk show.

Interviewer:

WELL WHAT WE WANT IS TO BE ABLE TO TAKEOUT BITS OF WHAT YOU SAY AND PUT

THEM IN THE CONTEXT WITHOUT USING THE QUESTIONS... OK. COULD YOU FIRST

OF ALL DESCRIBE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TRIP TO KOREA THAT THE

PRESIDENT MADE IN 1952...ANYTHING THAT YOU CAN REMEMBER ABOUT HIS

REACTIONS TO THAT WAR AND HIS FEELINGS ABOUT THE WAR?

Eisenhower:

Well, I remember all the events very vividly, but I don't remember

anything of great significance with the subject at hand. He was

primarily interested in getting the views of and Admiral Bradford who

was...back at that time as to the conduct of war, the prospects and

what he should do about it. Ah, he visited the troops. In a way, this

was almost as a fulfillment of a campaign pledge and quite possibly, he

could have obtained all the information he actually got back in

Washington. But it was good for him to get up there and it was good for

everybody's morale. They did discuss the future command arrangements.

Ah, General Van Fleet wanted to be, wanted to go home...

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK HE WOULD HAVE, HE MANAGED TO BRING THAT WAR TO A HALT BY

THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DO YOU THINK THAT THAT WAS ONE HE WOULD

EVER GONE THROUGH WITH IF NECESSARY?

Eisenhower:

That's I really can never say what the boss would have done. I find

that my batting average on guessing what he would have done has always

been very low. I've tried predicting in the past. Ah, he was fed up

with that war and was going to do something radical so it was not a

completely empty threat. He was never one to make a, a threat without

being willing to back it up if he was pushed to that extent. He as he's

written in his book, they passed the word to Nehru in India that the

United States would not be restricted as to the type of weapons that

would be used. If the peace talks fell through, nor the geographical

limits that had been imposed before that. They knew that Nehru would

pass the word to Mao within a few minutes. And somehow miraculously the

peace talks began to take on some significance, after that. As you

pointed out in our conversations earlier the death of Stalin might have

had a significant also. Naturally, the administration is inclined to

take full credit for the actions they took when things worked out

favorably.

Interviewer:

WHAT... IS...IN 1955. I DON'T KNOW IF YOU HAVE ANY DIRECT RELATIONSHIP

WITH THE PRESIDENT OVER THAT ONE. BUT DO YOU THINK HE WOULD HAVE

ACCEPTED, THAT HE WOULD HAVE USED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DEFEND

THOSE ISLANDS IF NECESSARY?

Eisenhower:

In '55, I was not in the White House, but the same thing happened again

in '58. And I was there, in the second series of threats. Ah, I believe

he would have gone to all lengths possible to avoid using nuclear

weapons, but if things had gotten tough enough they would have been

seriously considered, I'm sure.

Interviewer:

YOU SAID SOMETHING TO ME EARLIER ABOUT HIM A POKER PLAYER. PERHAPS YOU

COULD REPEAT THAT THOUGHT FOR US...

Eisenhower:

Well, yes Dad was known for playing golf and for playing bridge. He was

an expert bridge player. But it's never been noticed that he was an

expert poker player also. To keep any friends in the Army, he quit

playing poker when he was young, he was so good at it. And he felt in

the nuclear business that no matter how horrible that the nuclear

weapons were, and no matter how difficult the decisions were, generally

he had the cards. And I think that he played his hand with confidence

as a result.

Relationship between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev

Interviewer:

VERY SHORTLY AFTER THE RESOLUTION OF THAT CRISIS, OF COURSE CAME THE

OPEN SKIES OFFER AND THE VISIT TO GENEVA WHERE YOU WENT WITH HIM. COULD

YOU DESCRIBE THE PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE TO THAT OPEN SKIES OFFER WAS? DID

HE REALLY EXPECT IT TO BE ACCEPTED?

Eisenhower:

The proposal evolved, at least as far as he was concerned very rapidly

after he arrived there. There had been discussions of matters such as

the Open Skies Proposal within the government before he went to Geneva,

but he apparently took all that in, and set it aside. And when he got

to Geneva, he sincerely believed that he thought it up for the first

time. Ah, the Open Skies would definitely have increased United States

security because it would have given us access to a lot of information

about the Soviets. The type of information they could get about us from

the phone book. It would have been in everybody's interest. It was a

radical thing and he certainly checked very carefully with Admiral

Bradford, who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that time and

with General Grunther and SACEUR. Ah, but he was quite prepared to go

through with it. The percentages, what the percentages were that it

would have been accepted by the Russians is, is questionable. But it

was a disappointment that that fell through. A great disappointment.

Interviewer:

BUT IT DID GIVE HIM A BIT OF A HANDLE ON WHAT WAS GOING ON WITH THE

RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP AT LEAST. CAN YOU DESCRIBE HOW THAT HAPPENED?

Eisenhower:

Well, he's, yes. At Geneva, there the Russians claim, the Soviets

claimed that they were a four man team of four equals,... being the

first among equals, but Khrushchev,...and...supposedly also equal

basis. After the proposal that day, the whole group of us were going

out to the next room for a small cocktail gathering, and by prior

agreement the boss stuck pretty much with the Soviets. And he walked

along with Khrushchev, and Khrushchev came right out and said that it's

a very bad proposal, it's a spy system. So the boss claimed afterward

that he'd picked up at that point that Khrushchev was the man to deal

with and he just forgot about...and the other figure heads. It was

quite an event.

Interviewer:

WHAT DID HE THINK ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV OVER THE YEARS AS THAT COMPLICATED

RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPED. DO YOU REMEMBER HIM EVER COMMENTING ON

KHRUSHCHEV?

Eisenhower:

Ah, dad had a habit of referring to people that he was dealing with

such as Khrushchev as 'this fellow'. But even though Khrushchev did a

lot of things that were pretty spectacular and pretty belligerent, you

just couldn't help having certain feeling of warmth for him. And I

believe that dad felt that feeling of warmth also. Ah, there's one

thing that was, was reassuring about Khrushchev, that is that he liked

living. Ah, there was no ascetic about him. That he was going to pull

down the temple with him. He liked living. He liked attention. He liked

human relationships. So it's much more you have a more secure feeling

when you're dealing with somebody like that on serious issues than you

are somebody that has a lot of hidden agenda. It would be a mistake to

really think that you've figured out Khrushchev, but he still, I, I

personally have a rather warm feeling toward him.

Interviewer:

IN SOME WAYS DO YOU THINK THAT THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THEIR OWN

MILITARY, FOR EXAMPLE, OR WHAT THEY WERE TRYING TO DO WERE IN SOME WAYS

QUITE SIMILAR? KHRUSHCHEV TOO WAS TRYING TO SLOW DOWN, TO USE NUCLEAR

WEAPONS TO LIMIT DEFENSE SPENDING, FOR EXAMPLE?

Eisenhower:

I don't know. I don't know, but he did fall on the agricultural issue,

on the military issue some years after.

Military Inter-service Rivalry and the Pressure of Nuclear Weapons

Interviewer:

CAN YOU TALK A BIT ABOUT THE, BOTH FROM YOUR OWN EXPERIENCE WHEN YOU

WERE INSTITUTING PLANS FOR THE ARMY, AND FROM WHAT YOU SAW OF YOUR

FATHER'S VIEWPOINT OF IT, ABOUT INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY AS IT, AS IT

AFFECTED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PARTICULAR?

Eisenhower:

That's that's a long one. There's a lot to that. Obviously, the nuclear

weapons did not begin inter-service rivalry. In the late 19th Century,

they called off the Army-Navy football game for one year because a

general and an admiral were going to have a dual. Inter-service rivalry

has been going on. The the atomic weapons did exacerbate it to a large

extent by giving the newly organized Air Force a tremendous hegemony in

the Defense Department for a period of time. And rightly so, because

after all, the first priority had to be Strategic Air Command and

maintaining a nuclear retaliatory capability so as not to tempt

yourself into nuclear war...with less of the victims. But, the question

then turned out turned on how much is enough? It's always been the

question. And the Air Force, of course feeling their oats, being newly

independent in riding high, wanted a very, very large share of the

Defense Department budget. Much more so than naturally the Army and

Navy thought they should have. So I remember when we were in the

planning business it used to annoy me, the Air Force used to talk about

their great big thermonuclear weapons 'our quality weapons'. Well that

term didn't do much for me. But it, what it really amounted to was it

exacerbated the disagreements, the rivalry over roles in missions. Ah,

it was very severe, And the Army had, was on the verge of paranoia

while I was on the Army staff there in '57, '58, I believe that's been,

to a large extent dissipated since then.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THERE WAS A SENSE, GIVEN THE ADMINISTRATION'S VERY

FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASICALLY, GIVEN THAT THEIR VIEW

THAT IT WAS A WAY OF LIMITING THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND PROVIDING

PROTECTION AT REASONABLE COST. DO YOU THINK THERE WAS A SENSE IN WHICH

BOTH THE ARMY AND THE NAVY FELT THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SURVIVE...WAS TO

GO FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A FAIRLY POSITIVE WAY?

Eisenhower:

Yes, there was that. Ah, The Army reorganized it's infantry division in

something they called a 'Pentomic' division. Which was a five-sided

monster and they got rid of it in a hurry. But the whole idea was to

show that we're atomic also. However this was a very real problem. If

we were facing a potential enemy in Western Europe and we were short on

manpower and we had tactical nuclear weapons to make, to fill in the

difference, to make up the difference quite obviously, the Army is

going to increase these weapons. So, it's not all just bureaucratic

infighting. That the, that caused the Army to think atomically. Ah, the

place where I think the Army got off outside of its sphere in the

inter-service rivalry was in the missile business. Not the tactical

nuclear weapons.

Interviewer:

CAN YOU EXPAND ON THAT A LITTLE BIT?

Eisenhower:

Yes, I can, as long as you want me to. Ah, you know, after the war the

Army brought back Von Brahn and his team from Peenemunde down to

Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, and had them reinvent the V-2 weapon.

Well, that they did. And they then went on to develop the Corporal,

which was our tactical guided missile. The first of our Army guided

missiles. Then the Sargent, then the Redstone, and then they

discovered, by chance that sophisticated Redstone which is a pretty big

rocket booster could put a satellite into orbit. And so they notified

the Defense Department that they could do this. But we had the Vanguard

Project going, which was the official US program, which was supposed

not to have any military secrets. So the Army was just told to put

those things on the shelf, and they did until Sputnik went up and at

that time, Neil McElroy, the new Secretary of Defense, talked to them

at Redstone Arsenal, recommended that the Army go ahead. And, of

course, they did. They put up Explorer 1 in January of '58. Ah, but

then after that the Army tried to claim that space and air were two

different elements. And the Army thought well, we should be in Space as

much as the Air Force. Now, that's PR, as far as I'm concerned. And

we...on that. The brule was that the Air Force Aerospace was one word,

and so the Army got a bloody nose on that bureaucratic battle.

Interviewer:

THAT WAS HERBERT YORK WHO DECIDED THAT IN THE END, WAS IT?

Eisenhower:

Ah, I find that Herb York, was a very brilliant fellow, and a very good

man. Ah, I find it difficult to say that anybody on the staff position

made a decision. They got to have at least cleared it with their

bosses.

Interviewer:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WAS PROBABLY THE FIRST FIGURE TO BE DRAMATIC ABOUT

IT IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD, WHO ACTUALLY HAD AVAILABLE TO HIM THE

ABILITY AT LEAST IN THEORY, AH, TO WIPE OUT HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF

PEOPLE IN A MATTER OF HOURS. HOW DID THAT AWESOME RESPONSIBILITY

ACTUALLY WEIGH ON HIM, AS FAR AS YOU KNOW?

Eisenhower:

It weighed very heavily. But he viewed it soberly, not with any panic.

He was used to making big decisions. He did order the Normandy

invasion, which was only the fourth invasion he had ordered under his

difficult circumstances. He was used to thinking big. And he saw that

he was possibly faced with an Armageddon or, at least something, a

World War III that would surpass the horrors of World War II even. So

he, he handled it very well as far as carrying the responsibilities

concerning. He was very conscious of the consequences of the use of

atomic weapons. He was way ahead of his time that way. At Geneva, there

was a dinner that was held just between the Americans and the Soviets,

at the villa, and dad expanded a toast into a short speech, which was a

little bit of a veiled threat. He said it's absolutely essential that

we work out peaceful solutions to our problems between us, because an

exchange of nuclear stockpiles between our countries would mean

eradication of human life in the Northern Hemisphere. And I can still

see myself, I was sitting down at the end of the table, I was sitting

watching. I was...was taking it in. And I'm sure that they all took it

in because he said it in a very calm, very matter-of-fact way. Here's

what we've got to do because we'll wipe out human life in the Northern

Hemisphere. Ah, at a later time, I remember in an NSC meeting one time

a briefing was given about how to reconstruct the country after a

nuclear exchange. And the co--the chairman of the council of economic

advisers gave a short talk on how we'd restore the dollar after this.

Dad stopped everything. He said wait a minute, boys. He said, let me

tell you something. If we have an exchange of nuclear stockpiles, we're

not going to be talking about restoring the dollar, we're going to be

talking about growing, grubbing for worms. And that stopped the meeting

for the time being. Then they went on with whatever else they were

doing. Very conscious, very conscious. At the risk of getting a little

technical about this, of course there's a difference between an

exchange of nuclear stockpiles and a limited use of nuclear weapons,

which in those days was considered a possibility and perhaps, because

it hadn't been thought through as well as it should have, things

happened awfully fast in those days...

[END OF TAPE CO3037]

Interviewer:

THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THE SERVICES AND THEIR DEMANDS FOR A GREATER BUDGET

AND MORE WEAPONS...

Eisenhower:

It devastated them. He was in a position of course during the war of

commanding all three services. And he was absolutely sold on the idea

of cooperation among the services and he couldn't understand why they

couldn't be a little less selfish. At West Point just after World War

II, he stood up on what they call the poop deck and said to the Corps

Cadets, he said, I'd like to see all the services in one uniform. Now,

he may have retreated from that position later, but he felt that the

Joint Chiefs should look at the United States defense problems as a

body and forgetting their own services. He also felt that the Joint

Chiefs should assume the responsibility of keeping their requests for

military appropriations within the capacity of the country to afford

(?). The Joint Chiefs didn't buy that. They thought that their

professionalism would be threatened so they asked for what they, each

service asked for what they thought they should have. The end result?

Such exorbitant demands that the civilians had to make the services

decisions for them. Made their, our strategic plans, so called

strategic plans completely meaningless. Ah, he was at his best when he

was tussling with the Pentagon. I remember in a press conference one

time, one of his better statements, they said, 'Well does it bother you

that all these generals are in disagreement with you?' And he almost

spit, he said, 'It so happens I know more about this business than

these generals do.' It was beautiful. I loved it. Ah, he he never did

completely understand the services' point of view, and that's just too

bad.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THEY UNDERSTOOD HIS?

Eisenhower:

The Army had a little...there. But I think you'll find generally, that

when somebody reaches a position outside of a hierarchy, they tend to

bend over a bit backward to avoid showing favoritism. That wasn't

really my father's thinking. He wasn't going to, he wasn't going to, he

wasn't bending over backwards so much. It just made sense. Here we had

a great, greatly expanded for the Korean War. We didn't need that many

divisions anymore, but the real threat to the country was the Soviet

nuclear capability, growing. And so that's where the emphasis had to

go. Well, he was absolutely adamant, he said, 'if we keep enough ground

power to fight the Soviets on the ground, without the, without any

aims, but we have nuclear weapons', he said, 'we're going to have to go

a garrison state.' And he was right. Because after all, the Soviets

keep these, the great land forces, but they are a garrison state. We'd

have to go into their system. So he felt that the Army just, it was

their duty to accept the role of a small striking force. Advisers for

indigenous forces, Europe and the periphery of the Soviet Union, and

that they didn't feel like they had to carry the ball all the time and

he was disappointed in the Army and the Army was disappointed in him.

The Army always loyal, figured that he had some bad advisers that we're

giving him the wrong information as it went up the chain.

Interviewer:

OF COURSE THERE WERE SERIOUS STRATEGIC ARGUMENTS BETWEEN THE NAVY AND

THE AIR FORCE, PARTICULARLY, ABOUT HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH, WHAT THE OBJECT

OF THE AIMS SHOULD BE. WERE YOU AT ALL INVOLVED IN THAT? OR DID YOU GET

TO KNOW ABOUT THOSE DISAGREEMENTS?

Eisenhower:

No. I wasn't involved in it because the Army, I was on the Army staff

in the Plans division but I was certainly a close observer and our

recommendations to our bosses in the Army staff, when it came time to

voting in what we call the 'joint arena', was how to vote, which side

to vote on. Ah, there was a little bit of a tear there in a way because

the Army and the Air Force were close emotionally. Because the Air

Force sprung out of the Army. But we felt that the Air Force was

getting too much of their, of the defense budget and so our real

strategic thinking, our sincere strategic thinking, our bureaucratic

interests were tied in with the Navy. So it was a very messy time and

it's not a pleasant thing to think about, the attitude of the Army's

staff at that time.

Interviewer:

YOU SAID SOMETHING EARLIER TO ME ABOUT WONDERING AT ONE STAGE WHERE THE

RUSSIANS FIT INTO THAT? COULD YOU REPEAT THAT?

Eisenhower:

Well war planning at that level does not involve any red arrow, so to

speak. It consisted on those days of verbal concepts of how a war will

be fought in which you can usually attain agreement between services if

you say enough nice about every service. But then when you get down to

forced tabulations, that's when you're talking about money and also the

command structure. And in those items, we became so obsessed with the

interests of the other services, I remember remarking to myself

one-time, 'don't the Soviets get any time at all in this war planning?

Don't they even get some attention?' It was pretty bad. I don't think

it's that bad now. After all, we, bear in mind, we were going through

growing pains in those days.

U-2 Photo Surveillance

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK THAT THE, COULD YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE WAY

THAT THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZED THE U-2 FLIGHTS. I MEAN, THAT WAS VERY

MUCH A PERSONAL DECISION EACH TIME, WAS IT NOT?

Eisenhower:

He kept tight control over that as he did tight control over the use of

atomic weapons and approval of new nuclear devices. The scheme was that

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs with a certain team would come in

periodically with maps and with a route of flight and they would show

the President what they intend to do. There were only three people in

the White House that were cleared for this besides the President

himself. One was Gordon Gray, the head of the National Security

Council. The other was General Goodpaster, Defense Department liaison

officer and me, as General Goodpaster's assistant. Ah, all the

President could possibly do was to ascertain that the matter had been

thought out carefully and that the request was reasonable. He was

always reticent. He always realized, appreciated that one of these days

a U-2 was going to go down. Ah, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles

had always assured the President that the Russians would never admit

that a U-2 had gone down because they would never admit that we had the

capability of flying over...well, Dulles was dead wrong on that one.

Ah, he would, give it one week's limitation. At the end of the week,

you've got to come back again. And the, Gary Powers, the U-2, in the

first of May in 1960 went down to the seventh day of the week.

Interviewer:

YOU WERE PRETTY SURPRISED THAT HE SURVIVED THAT?

Eisenhower:

I was. Sure. Ah, I was very bitter against the CIA because Allen Dulles

had assured the President in my presence that no man would ever be

taken alive. And while, when we first heard about the U-2 going down,

our reaction was only just feeling sorry about the pilot. Well,

communications broke down some place between Allen Dulles and the

working level out in the field because they gave Powers a parachute

which was not exactly consistent with the idea that no man would be

taken alive. So actually it was a very badly messed up bunch of

statements and public relations that we, the administration was

generally following the time honored rule of deny your agents. But how

can you do that when they've taken someone alive, especially an

American alive. So, it was a breakdown. It was a bad trip, in more ways

than one.

Interviewer:

BUT YOU DON'T THINK THAT THE PARIS SUMMIT WASN'T A GREAT MISSED

OPPORTUNITY? CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT YOU THINK WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED

WITHOUT THE POWERS THING?

Eisenhower:

We were all concerned about what was going to happen at that summit.

The subject was European security, which was a nice way of glossing

over the Berlin threat, that Khrushchev had levied six months earlier.

After the euphoria which was not fomented by my dad at all over the the

Camp David meeting with Khrushchev in September of '59, after that

artificial euphoria, Khrushchev was the one who talked all the time

about the spirit of Camp David. We all had certain misgivings and

thought, now, what's going to happen when the world's disappointed as a

result of this conference? Well, as it turned out, my personal feeling

is that Khrushchev, having discovered the U-2, found a way out of a,

this summit that was going to be disappointing to his people as well as

everybody else's, and he took it. He didn't need to take it. He didn't

need to admit that they'd taken Powers.

Interviewer:

SO IF YOU COULD JUST SIMPLIFY THE THOUGHT. YOU'RE IMPRESSION IS THAT IT

WASN'T GOING TO GO ANYWHERE ANYWAY AND THEY WERE USING THE U-2 AS AN

EXCUSE TO GET OUT OF IT. IS THAT RIGHT? COULD YOU JUST SORT OF

ENCAPSULATE THAT THOUGHT A BIT MORE?

Eisenhower:

I believe that the U-2, pardon me. I believe that the May 1960 Paris

Summit would have been a disappointment no matter what happened. As

Adlai Stevenson put it at the time, we gave Khrushchev the 'crow bar

and the sledgehammer to break it up.' So, it worked to our

disadvantage. But I'm afraid that we were in for a disappointment

anyway.

Challenges to the Competency of Eisenhower's Presidency

Interviewer:

[BACKGROUND COMMENT].

Eisenhower:

...no, he was a fine man, but he wasn't up to his elbows in this fuss.

He kept himself distant from that to some extent.

Interviewer:

SO YOU, IF YOU COULD JUST DESCRIBE THAT MEETING, I'LL FILL IT IN WITH

THE QUESTION...

Eisenhower:

OK. Ah, I forget what day it was that the Secretary of Defense, Tom

Gaits, who was a very splendid Secretary of Defense, came in to the

boss' office and told him about the meeting that they were having out

there in Omaha, off the airbase. The Integrated Operations System.

Which really meant that the Air Force fire plan for retaliation against

potential aggressors...namely the Soviet Union, and the Navy, were now

being brought together for the first time. Up to that time the Navy had

held out and said well, we want to be able to destroy the Soviet Union

all by ourselves. Well that didn't make sense, so Tom Gaits, as the

former secretary of Navy, was a little shaken up because he'd been the

butt of a lot of criticism from his former associates in the, in the

Navy, for forcing them to go out there and to get together with the Air

Force. So as far as I can see it worked out very well and I think it

was quite a monument to Gaits that it worked. And this is what the boss

was looking for in a Secretary of Defense. It was quite a traumatic

thing for the people who had been fighting the bureaucratic war.

Interviewer:

WHAT DO YOU THINK OVERALL ABOUT YOUR FATHER'S PRESIDENCY, WITH REGARD

TO THIS WHOLE ISSUE OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOW

DO YOU THINK HE COPED WITH IT?

Eisenhower:

I don't quite understand. You're trying to prod me into what he's hired

for...(??) What do you think was your father's greatest contribution

in...

Interviewer:

(DIRECTION AND RESTATEMENT OF THE QUESTION).

Eisenhower:

OK. When I look at studies of my father's administration, I am struck

by the criteria that they so often use. It's difficult, of course, from

1952 to 1986 to put yourself back into the atmosphere of that election.

But the fact is that the American people were frightened to death at

that time of the Soviets and of the Chinese too. Time magazine had had

the Chinese on the covers. We thought they were twelve feet tall. Ah,

dad was hired because of his military background, because of his

understanding of the Pentagon and because he was trusted also. He was

not hired as for slum clearance, or for progressive views,

particularly, although they were more or less assumed. Ah, his main

function was to keep the United States safe during the awful period

when we didn't have the balance of terror yet. Where you had an

atmosphere where the side that shot first might possibly win a war, if,

whatever you call winning a war. Ah, it was a very, very unstable

period and it needed somebody with my dad's stability and ability to

handle responsibility to get us through that, Now, having gotten us

through that period, with honor and with good posture at the end, after

all he left the United States still has strategic advantage. That was

his biggest contribution. There are other things you can say he did but

he was hired because of his understanding of our national security

problem and I think he pulled it off very well.

Interviewer:

WHAT WAS HIS REACTION TO THOSE

Eisenhower:

You want me to do that again?

Interviewer:

NO THAT WAS FINE. BUT WHAT WAS HIS REACTION TO PEOPLE LIKE STUART

SYMINGTON AND OTHERS WHO PERHAPS USED ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE THAT THEY

HAD BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS JOBS, TO ATTACK HIM. HOW DID HE REACT TO THOSE

KINDS OF ATTACKS, THE MISSILE GAP ESPECIALLY?

Eisenhower:

Ah, bear in mind to start with that Mr. Eisenhower's opinion of

politicians was not very high to begin with. So he accepted it somewhat

as part of the game, this very artificial missile gap that Senator

Symington came up with, I guess toward the end of 1959 or something

like that and lasted, the idea lasted until one month after the end of

my dad's administration. Ah, it was a bad thing. Ah, dad could not

admit until May of 1960, that he'd had the U-2 to tell him that, how

weak the Russians actually were in missiles. He didn't like it. But he

sort of accepted it...politicians...too bad.

Interviewer:

HE DIDN'T FEEL THAT IN SOME SENSE THERE WAS ACTUAL ALMOST TREACHERY

GOING ON. THAT IT WAS AN AREA HE SHOULDN'T CRITICIZE THE PRESIDENT IN.

Eisenhower:

Oh, I think he felt very strongly that it was everybody's duty to

support the President. Of course he had felt that. He felt that way no

matter who the President might have been actually. He was of course,

accentuated as long as he was the President. But, I didn't think that

he thought in terms of treachery when it came to political

maneuverings. I think what he viewed was that they're going to spend it

to death by this scare over the missile gap, but this is politics. He

wasn't afraid at that point of the Russian capabilities

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK A MAN LIKE THOMAS LANPHIER WHO WAS EX-GENERAL DYNAMICS AND

WENT IN PUBLIC AND TALKED ABOUT THE MISSILE GAP, WAS HE THE KIND OF

PERSON THAT YOUR FATHER HAD IN MIND WHEN HE TALKED ABOUT THE

UNWARRANTED INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX?

Eisenhower:

He was one of them. Sure. He was, he was one, but he certainly didn't

have, I don't think that Thomas Lanphier as such ever had much of a

place in Dad's mentality. He was thinking of the overall picture. After

all, he had been fighting to hold the Pentagon to a reasonable size for

his whole eight years. There was nothing whimsical about that military

industrial complex talk. Nothing whimsical about it. Or inconsistent.

[END OF TAPE CO3038]

Air Force Nuclear Capability and Strategy

Interviewer:

[BACKGROUND COMMENT].

Eisenhower:

...By and large he was very weary of new manned bombers. He felt that

the age of the missile had arrived and he had a slight suspicion that

there was some effort to extend the life of the manned vehicle past

it's normal span. So, I think he did approve some research on the B-70.

But his heart was not in it.

Interviewer:

WHEN YOU SAY THAT THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO EXTEND IT BEYOND ITS NORMAL

SPAN, I MEAN WHAT WAS HIS SUSPICION. WHY WOULD HE THINK THAT THE AIR

FORCE MIGHT WANT TO DO THAT?

Eisenhower:

Well, I have a little thesis here about be careful of people of

accomplishment. They're likely to admire their accomplishments, and

push them when they're no longer of great use. Now, it's a tremendous

accomplishment to build a B-70. It's a tremendous accomplishment to fly

it. It's a tremendous accomplishment to do various things. But is it

nationally useful? Now the people who do it are going to push it. And

the people who came up, I don't mean to criticize the service, I'll

criticize any service, but people who came up in, flying the airplanes

it's very difficult for them to say well, the day of the, of the manned

bomber is over. So you really can't take their recommendations at face

value. You've got to evaluate what is needed here. Ah, the more

difficult, the more source of pride sometimes the more we're likely to

hang onto it longer than it should be held onto. And I believe that was

one of the problems the Air Force had. I believe the Air Force was a

little, well, I think they were almost sorry that missiles were

invented. That's just me talking.

Interviewer:

ONE LAST QUESTION. ARE YOU CONSCIOUS OF YOUR FATHER BEING AWARE IN ANY

DETAIL, WORRIED ABOUT THE ACTUAL AIR FORCE AND LATER, JOINT WAR PLANS

FOR THE ACTUAL USE OF NEW STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF THE TIME EVER

CAME. DID HE KNOW WHAT THOSE PLANS WERE? DID HE APPROVE OF THEM? DID HE

FEEL THAT THERE WERE, THERE WAS OVERKILL INVOLVED IN THEM?

Eisenhower:

He did not study the war plans in detail to the best of my knowledge.

And the services were not terribly anxious to pass these war plans up

to the civilian levels of government. But he knew what he wanted to

accomplish. For one thing, you couldn't use atomic weapons without his

permission. So even though the war plans said that atomic weapons are

to be considered conventional weapons, actually none of us in the heart

of the Pentagon, in the bowels of the Pentagon really believed that.

And you'll notice that when we went to Lebanon in July of '58. Admiral

Brown admitted that we had a nuclear capability and in such a fervor

they had to assure that they wouldn't be used. I believe that the

picture of nuclear weapons being so conventional is exaggerated, was

even in those days. He knew what restrictions he was putting on. He was

very careful and he was very careful to keep a tight reign, on what

would actually be implemented by way of a war plan. Without knowing

what they were doing in the woodwork, without his knowledge.

Interviewer:

DID HE WORRY ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE ARSENAL, ESPECIALLY THAT SAC WAS

BUILDING UP. DID HE THINK IT WAS POSSIBLY EXCESSIVE?

Eisenhower:

I don't believe so at that time. Ah, he was primarily concerned about

the cost and if the cost didn't get excessive it didn't worry him so

much. The reason being that in those days we did not have the Polaris

submarine. So we did not have the stability that this balance of terror

later established, This was an era in which nuclear war was conceived

as being able to go either way, whoever shot first. So, it, during his

time, there was always room for, for more as far as nuclear weapons

were concerned, although he didn't expedite them as much as it was

later expedited.

Interviewer:

DO YOU THINK, GIVEN THAT SITUATION, THAT IF THE CRUNCH HAD REALLY COME,

YOUR FATHER WOULD HAVE BEEN PERSUADED, AS I'M SURE HIS GENERALS WOULD

HAVE BEEN ADVISING HIM, THAT HE OUGHT TO GO FIRST?

Eisenhower:

To fire first? Ah, the war plans were well publicized for NATO, called

for the United States to retaliate in case of a ground, massive

ground...operation in Europe. But what went on in his mind about that,

I don't know. If there'd been a massive ground attack it was prob--I

don't know, he would have seriously considered it, that's all I can

say. In case of retaliation, of course, you'd retaliate. The trick of

the Berlin crisis was to avoid having a diplomatic prestige matter turn

into something of a holocaust magnitude. Very, very awesome

responsibilities here. The whole thing.

[END OF TAPE CO3039 AND TRANSCRIPT]

Transcript

Transcript

Series: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

Raw Footage: Interview with John Eisenhower, 1986

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-028pc2t63d

If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/15-028pc2t63d).

Description

Credits: Interviewee2: Eisenhower, John S. D., 1922-
Publisher: WGBH Educational Foundation

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: 799a81f9d9ec521d2adea06524a72d1999284d36 (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with John Eisenhower, 1986,” 1986-04-02, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed September 8, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-028pc2t63d.; MLA: “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with John Eisenhower, 1986.” 1986-04-02. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. September 8, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-028pc2t63d>.; APA: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with John Eisenhower, 1986. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-028pc2t63d