Vietnam: Coups and Crises

- Transcript
I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, I don't know if I'm going to be able to do it, in ilfluj, on the ryx sachet, on the ryx sachet, on the ryx sachet, on lfiners, on these Brood slope likeADD, on swamp and on expulcus with the설ult of all those Lithuanian people, I don't know if I can do The streets are constantly patrolled by soldiers, and tanks are positioned on almost every corner,
ready to fire at an attacker, whether he be an outsider or one of their own. Only a few months ago, their own soldiers invaded the palace and murdered the president. And no sooner accomplished but another coup, this time bloodless, but shattering to the morale and unity of these people. And while their leaders jockey for personal power, they must continue fighting in a war which has been going on and on for 20 years, and a war in which the United States finds itself deeply involved with no acceptable way to get out. This is Marguerite Higgins, nationally syndicated columnist for News Day, the Chicago Daily News, and other papers. Yet, NAMM is an enchanting, magical country of palm -dotted mountains, lush green -plat toes, white beaches. It could be a tourist paradise where it not for war. This small country of 14 million people has many different races, and at least five major religions, including
Confucianism, Taoism, other forms of answers to worship, the strange, cow -dye religion that claims three million adherents, Catholicism, and of course Buddhism. The key part of Yet NAMM is the rich Mekong Delta, where most of Yet NAMM's peasants live, and where the war will be won or lost. And the deep rural Delta life is so primitive that most peasants have no idea what is going on in the city. By contrast, most Americans, unfortunately, know only the headlines relating to Saigon, a city of less than a million. During the anti -government demonstrations led by a few Buddhist leaders in Saigon last year, scores of peasants that I interviewed later in the countryside professed no knowledge or interest. All they wanted was protection from the dreaded Communist Yet Cong, and the chance to enjoy a somewhat better life that was coming their way as a result of the programs of assistance inaugurated by the late President Diyem, with the vital help, of course, of American aid. In these films, you will see what
finally happened when the coup d 'état toppled President Diyem and his brother No Diyem knew leading to their murder by the military junta, and finally, to another coup d 'état, 90 days later. These barbed wire entanglements and watchtowers along the 17th parallel are tangible evidence of the tragedy of this country. They have stood here since 1954. It was then that after seven years of civil and colonial war, Vietnam was divided into territories. The communists to the north, the non -communists to the south. Since then, loudspeakers hurl a thousand voices into the communist -dominated land with words of freedom and appeals for resistance against red violence. And from the other side of the river, for just as many years, the loudspeakers shout back down with your enslavement to American imperialism.
Weeds now grow on the road that used to unite north with south. All connections between the Vietnamese, this side and that side of the 17th parallel, are severed. Only once a week, a lonely postman crosses the one intact bridge over the BN High River. But even this bridge seems to separate more than unite. The partition of Vietnam should have ended the war that began in 1946. By terms of the armistice, the communists were to withdraw to the north. But over the years, they have continued to infiltrate southward far below the 17th parallel. The forces of the free republic have had to defend themselves against the constant attacks of communist guerrillas known as the Vietcong. Soldiers of the new republic are often no match. They are well -armed but young and inexperienced despite American training,
while the northern guerrillas have been up to their game for ten years. From jungle strongholds the Vietcong terrorized whole provinces, each month several thousand people are killed in sneak attacks. They are the most bloody battles that have happened anywhere in the world since Korea. This has been called a dirty, untidy, disagreeable war, fought in the kind of terrain ideal for stealthy guerrillas and discouraging to the forces trying to flush them out. Swamps, mountainous, jungles. The Vietcong officers take the fear of the night in the jungle out of their men, so that theirs becomes primarily a nighttime war. They move easily and freely when other Vietnames are ill at ease.
It was to counter the Vietcong that the United States went to the aid of the South Vietnames Army. First as advisers, then as semi -participants. Even so the guerrilla forces remain to be driven out. Despite all the deployments and strategies and American advisers, the Communist somehow continue to intensify their activities. One reason is the fact that the South Vietnames have never been able to concentrate completely on the war. In the last few years their attention has been distracted by the political intrigue and turmoil surrounding the palace in Saigon and the man whose picture adorned its facade for nine years. President Ingo Dinh Dinh. Go Dinh Dinh rule South Vietnam from the time of the partition in
1954 until his violent overthrow last September. When he first took over, first as premier, then as president, he began his work at a disadvantage. He was less well known in his own country than Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Communist North Vietnames, who had become a national hero in the war of independence against the French. To build up his authority against this, Dinh began a deliberate personality cult to himself. He was given the halo of father of the fatherland, defender of independence. The DM regime tried to hammer its political philosophy by loudspeaker recordings and every other propaganda means into the Vietnames. Those who knew the initial conditions in which DM started his governmental activity would not have given a dime for his chances of success. But against all pessimistic prognostication,
albeit at the cost of his own popularity, DM did succeed in overcoming the threat of anarchy. He mobilized and organized politically, the chaotic divided Vietnames people. Instead of the private armies of pseudo -religious sex and the mercenaries of river pirates and brothel keepers who terrorized the country in 1954, discipline militias were created by the DM government. They even recruited the young women for elementary military training. This did not create undeluted enthusiasm among all those affected, but these measures were immediately greeted, especially by DM's allies, the Americans, as worthy and useful efforts in the common struggle
against communism. In 1954, in place of the ousted French colonial power, the United States undertook to protect South Vietnam. It supported the DM government with arms that since then have amounted to $3 billion. After the catastrophic political failure in neighboring Laos, the United States intervened with its own troops in South Vietnam to a total of 15 ,000 men. These specialists in jungle warfare originally were to act as advisors. Their role soon grew. They found themselves not only training the Vietnames, but also flying them into action, and then the US troops found themselves engaged in battle. 178 American soldiers have died in the fight so far. Despite the casualties,
American soldiers have always been classified as advisors or observers in this Vietnames war. As in South Korea, the United States has sought to fight a war without attacking an enemy where he can be hurt and to fight without trying to win an all -out victory. The official policy of the US has been that this is essentially a Vietnames war, a war they must fight themselves. But even US newsmen covering the battle area have never pictured the American role as only that of a spectator. From the time that DM took office as president, he had the support of the US government, that is until he began to lose favor with his own people. In 1962, dissidents attempted a coup against his regime, but it failed.
The United States continued to support DM, but more and more he and his cohorts became an embarrassment. News releases began filtering out of Saigon, charging DM and his family with corruption and nepotism. By the first of 1963, it was quite obvious that he was involved more in politics than in fighting the war. Stories and papers throughout the world complained of DM's obstinacy and his militant puritanism, and above all against the uncontrollable ruling clique of his family, especially his brother and go didn't knew and his sister -in -law met him knew. These US newsmen soon began feeling the frustrating hand of censorship on their stories
leaving South Vietnam. The Caravelle Hotel has a bar on the 8th floor, the headquarters of the American press. Madam knew called it the poison kitchen. She claimed deliberate lies had been printed against her and her brother -in -law. Then, last May, a dispute between the government and the Buddhist community over the Buddhists' right to fly their religious flag grew into violent demonstrations. The Buddhists retaliated against the DM persecution by staging a series of protest suicides that shocked the world. In August, a secret police raided and smashed the major pagodas in Saigon. Marshal Law was declared. Monks and high school students were arrested by Ngo didn't knew the President's brother and
head of the secret police. News wife labeled the suicides as barbecues. During three months, they glorified that. They proposed that cheated man more badly than they proposed to the worship of people. They glorified him. So, I really think of my duty to ridicule that act in order to stop the spreading of bad examples because I think that even in your country, suicide is a crime. Here, it is more than that. It is a cheating. The cheating plan and it's the burden. And to see people, the rebels, the slaves in Buddhist Marx, they use the pagodas. They put even martial guns, arms in the
pagodas, all the communist documents. They use the pagodas as a center of subversive activities. So, if we who have the duty of protecting this country and to protect this victory, which is coming, which is so near, if we accept to give the immunity of religion to those people. So, the guerrillas, they don't have an amount to stand in the market. It is enough for them just to wear the sack on the wall and to go into the pagoda. These are some of the communist propaganda leaflets that in fact were found in great quantity in the Saigon pagodas when they were stormed and temporarily occupied by Vietnamese troops on August 20, 1963. A few
days after the raids, most of the monks and nuns who had been arrested were able to go back to their houses of worship. Throughout the temples were pictures of the first burning monk, Tikkwang Du. All the altars were loaded with photographs. Some said the storming of the pagodas was a sacrilege of the Buddhist shrines by the Roman Catholic, the M Family. Others said the action was deliberately provoked by the way the temples were being used for political purposes. The greater part of the Buddhist clergy were not involved in the turmoil. Nuns who were imprisoned told their families about their experiences. This contributed heavily to the crystallization of opposition to the DMs. Largely as a result of these actions, the United States decided reform was needed in the government in Saigon.
The DM refused to take the suggestion to make peace with the Buddhists and instead staged a triumphal ceremony. The commander of the attack against the pagodas, Pera Troop General Ton Tat Dien, arrogantly held a review of his troops and congratulated them on their successful action. Detachment of the Saigon population, even monks faithful to the government took part in the ceremony and gave the soldiers presents. Naturally this demonstration of
solidarity was arranged for by the DM government. The DM had hoped that the propaganda leaflets and the weapons found in the pagodas would vindicate his treatment of the Buddhists, but by this time the President could find few sympathetic listeners. It had become apparent in Washington that the United States was going to have to change its policies in South Vietnam. Henry Cabot Lodge was given broad authority and sent to Saigon to replace the U .S. Ambassador. The beginning of the fall of the DM had commenced. In September, U .S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff paid a visit to the Asian nation. They were
greeted with a flower decked display of the weapons DM soldiers had captured. It has since been claimed that it was during this visit of McNamara and General Taylor that the dice were finally tossed against DM. Ambassador Lodge tried to persuade DM to liberalize his regime, the President refused to listen. Instead he sent his sister -in -law Madame Ngu on an American tour so she could protest American interference. The United States then began applying pressures, first it cut back DM's non -military aid. Then it stopped the pay to news special forces. Meanwhile world opinion had become so violent against DM and his alleged treatment of the
Buddhist monks that the United Nations finally set a commission to Saigon. Its job to find out whether or not religious freedom was being threatened in South Vietnam. The commission was under the chairmanship of the Afghanistan -U .N. Ambassador Abdul Rahman Pazvak. It met with all the leading Buddhists in Saigon and then paid visits to two pagodas, the Exile Loy and the An Quang, the centers of political resistance against the DM regime. Shortly before the arrival of the commission at one pagoda, the seventh monk had committed suicide by setting fire to his gasoline soaked robes. The suicide took place on the street adjacent to the pagoda with the intention
that the commission would have to witness the act. A last minute a change in schedule spared them from it. It was later asked of a Buddhist official what was the reason for these frightful suicides. The question was put to the Reverend Tick Not Min Chairman of the Buddhist Union. He replied, when the government did not accept our five demands for equal status, the sacrificial death of the Reverend Tick Quang Duk was justified according to Buddhist doctrine. But all the burnings which took place after the signing of the agreement with the government were not condoned by us. These monks were encouraged and incited by
people abroad and by foreigners here and we have nothing to do with it. It is a thoughtful DM who on October 26, five days before the revolt appeared at a parade commemorating the founding of the free republic of Vietnam. Among the parade of soldiers is the man who is destined to kill DM one week later. In his anniversary speech the president even said, we have come through our recent trials and have emerged stronger and more unified and more experienced.
But his words hardly found an echo. Over the anniversary celebration hovers the heavy pressure of unresolved tension like the stifling air of a threatening storm. During the next five days the tension in Saigon rises hour by hour. It discharges into the open at midday on all Saints day in November 1st. The first shooting can be heard coming from the river banks outside Saigon. Armed posts take over at all street corners but still the situation is unresolved in the
capital. Later the special forces the presidential guard drives up to reinforce the palace guard under the direct command of the president's brother, new. Armed cars go into defense positions along the almost deserted streets which lead to the Gia Long Palace. In the meantime the night of the 1st to the 2nd of November has come and the reporters wait in the bar of the hotel Kerevel. They keep tuned to the American Army radio for further bulletins. Radio Vietnam announces the formation of a revolutionary committee of 14 generals. The coup has made their ultimatum to president DM but he as yet has made no reply. After a heavy tank artillery attack on the special forces barracks
a curfew is laid on Saigon and the city seems completely deserted. The American ambassador tells his people to remain home. The radio reports the news. The ambassador and the commander military assistance command announce that all Americans are cautioned that a curfew from 1 ,200 hours last night to 0 ,700 hours this morning is in effect for the Saigon Cholan Gia Dan area. For their own safety Americans should stay off the streets unless movement is absolutely necessary for conduct of official business. If movement is necessary proceed with caution and be prepared to produce identification. For all others remain where you are until after 0 ,700 hours this morning. Music from now until 6th time then for Don
Buster. Between 1 and 3 o 'clock in the Avenue La Loa a hard day 100 yards from the palace troops have been brought up in complete silence. Here fatigued after 24 hours of alert some of them sleeping they await the order to attack. The station of the revolutionary committee that was playing dance music an hour ago has now gone over to marches. The fire of the attackers is still being answered from the palace but dead in wounded of the revolutionary side of few.
For in the morning at Don on November 2nd the tanks go into position around the palace. Several rings of them bombard DM stronghold in preparation for the assault. At
6 .35 the Marines and the paratroopers begin the attack. The white flag is hoisted over the shattered and smoking palace but the troops continue to storm the building looking in vain for DM and his brother knew. Just 20 bodyguards are taken prisoner the weapons are captured their barrel still hot from shooting. It is apparent that the palace has been defended to the last minute by hundreds of soldiers. They must have gotten away in some unexplained
fashion with the president and his brother. The troops search all the rooms in the palace which have become scarred with the traces of machine gun and mortar fire. The soldiers surge through the smoke blackened reception chambers with their tattered soaked tapestries and up the stairs to the president's study. They take the same path that the day before American Ambassador Lodge and US Admiral Filt had done to take leave in the truest sense of the word of President DM. Meanwhile in the palace courtyard more prisoners mainly civilian members of the president's household staff they have been assembled and are being examined for identity and weapons. It is only much later that the coup forces discover that there are
three underground tunnels leading in different directions from the palace. They also learn that the president and his brother along with most of the bodyguards left the palace by one of these exits just before the assault began. A communications man radios the news of the flight of the president to the rebel headquarters. Meanwhile outside the palace grounds the people of Saigon ignoring the burning and exploding tanks break out into frenetic jubilation at the site of the fallen DM fortress. The soldiers are the heroes of the day. They bring them concrete rewards in the form of bread and soup. As for drinking the
thirsty warriors looked after themselves out of the personal supply of the palace. Above all the youth of Saigon celebrates the rebel victory with extreme joy. They considered the regime of the fallen president and objectionable tyranny. Now the young demonstrators are storming the parliament to rip the pictures of DM and his brother from the wall and trap them in the dust. The first manifestations of joy soon turn into vandalism. The Vietnamese mob burns the bookstore
that belongs to Archbishop Tuk, a second brother of the president. The plunders run through the city pillaging all that is inside. They storm police stations, set afire to government buildings and official automobiles. But this threat of chaos brings the generals on the scene at once and in a few hours they reestablish law and order. This officer, General Tran Van Don, was a hero of the mob this day. Three months later he was jailed by rival generals.
The leader of the Buddhist resistance against DM, the monk Tiktri Kwang, is carried into the pagoda. And for the first time in months thousands of Buddhist believers are able to assemble without fear in their temples. There was also prayer this morning in the church of the holy heart in the Saigon suburb of Cholan. Up this aisle a few hours ago after their flight from the palace president DM and his brother new strode unmolested through the crowd of worshipers to the front pew. They stayed for a long time here in deep prayer according to
French priest Fernand Pilo. The father also said that the president used the church telephone to call the rebel headquarters and surrender himself. It is since been established that the two deposed leaders were arrested at the home of a Chinese businessman where they had gone to seek refuge. On route back to rebel headquarters a major connected with the coup d 'état shot and killed the two men. Their bodies were taken into the St. Paul hospital where troops are on guard day and night. Just after the coup the rebel forces held to the story that the two brothers committed suicide. It was also claimed that their bodies were to be buried in the hospital cemetery in two graves which still remain empty. Why the fallen leaders had to be murdered was questioned by many, even allies in Europe and the United States. A young army colonel who fought in the palace assault gives his reasons. Can you tell me something about the end of the
president? Do you think was necessary that he died? Well he must be killed because we have the order for him already to surrender. And so does he don't serve the life of the Vietnamese people. So we must kill him anywhere. If he's suicide that's okay. If not? Well I don't think he... Well if he captured by our soldier or myself I should kill him already. Because before we go to destroy this palace we have told to them why save the life of the soldiers. But they don't want to know. So sorry for him. But the residents of Saigon had little time to reflect on the murder of their
fallen president. Within 90 days after DM's fall the government of South Vietnam was once again toppled. A group of rival generals without bloodshed or fighting rested control of the government from the military junta who had ruled less than three months. Even to a country long suffering from the tortures of war and turmoil the new coup came as quite a shock. The new boss of the stun nation is Major General Ingoyen Khan, a tough military man, go teed and garbed in green paratroop fatigues and a red beret. He has told his people and the world that the new regime is not an overthrow of government but a reorganization of the first junta. Khan has made himself premier. To keep some sort of national unity he made General Duang Van Min the head of the former junta chief of state. Khan claims his mission is to inject vigor into the long and weary fight against the communists and
he hopes to restore popular confidence to the government. But the only thing that is certain in Vietnam is the uncertainty. Many are afraid that these personal coups could be contagious. Others feel this latest upset made demoralized the army which is the only truly organized element in the country. Two days after General Khan took power some 1 ,000 college students marched through the streets of Saigon calling for the return of the popular ousted leader Major General Min. The demonstration though was peaceful. There was none of the temper or the police restrictions that marked student protests under DM. It might be a good sign. It is certain that General Khan is going to have to turn the tide quickly or he too will find himself opposed. The people of Vietnam are reaching a point where the coups and the wars are too much for
their minds to absorb. They only want to forget. And so on the weekends they return to the bars and dancing. Although you never see the war in the city sometimes when the music dies down and the night is still you can hear the howitzer is pounding away. They sound very close. While Saigon concentrates on its civil problems the communist vietcong continue their attacks moving closer and closer to the capital.
And for the present the United States finds itself hopelessly involved. And the free world worries that this tiny war can become the big one. It remains a question whether the two recent coup d 'etat serve the interest of Vietnam and the United States whose common priority certainly is to win the war. In the month after the November 1 coup d 'etat the war in Vietnam suffered its severe setback. There was confusion and chaos. The vietcong seized more real estate and weapons and killed more Vietnamese and Americans than in any other period in history. There was no post -coup continuity in Vietnam. Every key official was fired and replaced. It had taken President D 'Am nearly a
decade to find and train a core of reasonably good bureaucrats such as the 42 province chiefs who were the key to order and progress in Vietnam. Yet after November 1st every single province chief was purged. Americans can grasp the situation only by imagining what might have happened if after the assassination of November 22nd. President Johnson had fired the entire cabinet, the chiefs of staff, every governor, mayor, trade union leader, etc. and in the time of war. Well anything less than the strong authoritarian rule of ADM and new suffice to keep Vietnam going and wartime. Well the new rulers in Vietnam be forced in the end to resort to the same measures because after all they have the same problems, yet con infiltration, irresponsible immature and selfish intellectuals who are indifferent to the war and prone to riot and so on. One coup d 'état almost always leads to another. Can the pattern of stability begun last
November be remedied? Last year in Vietnam the United States took the risk of overturning a loyal anti -communist ally in time of war. We have paid a price and perhaps learned a lesson in the sharp deterioration in the war that followed this coup. We have learned from the selfish jealous bickering inside the Vietnamese military why President Yan was perhaps not wholly wrong when he tried to limit the authority and power of the generals and keep their energies on fighting rather than on politics. The six tragic burdens that took place without any headlines after the November 1 coup showed us that Buddhist practice this form of suicide even under a Buddhist regime such as the military junta. This junta of course came into power with a boosting and backing of the pagodas. But setbacks are not irreparable. Defeated forget the most important thing of last year in 1963 that despite occasional turmoil in the city,
despite the tragic death by fire, the war was beginning to go better in the countryside which is where it will be won or lost. And if the tide was beginning to turn last summer there is hope for it to do so again. We have with us here Congressman Clement Zablaki of Wisconsin, the chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Congressman, you're a veteran of Vietnam. You've made many trips there. What do you think in hindsight over the wisdom and the judgments that led to the United States encouraging a coup d 'état against DM and New in November? I believe it was most unfortunate as our subcommittee or study mission had reported that any coup d 'état the time that we were there in our last visit was just three weeks prior to the ZM overthrow would not be in the interest of our country or the free world. There was no indication that the ZM government had a proper support of the type that some of our people in the United States would desire for a
democratic government. But we must realize that ZM had more support than anyone ever had in that country of the people inside non and particularly in the rural areas. Therefore, he had brought about more security to the country than anybody had in the past or since. The business of instant democracy for Asia. How realistic is it? How did the DM regime compare for example with the regime in Thailand? Well, there isn't any comparison because the regime in Thailand was an instant democracy either. The Thai regime, Sarit was for example more totalitarian and there was less democracy in Thailand than there was in Vietnam in my opinion. This democracy is in Korea. I believe that the DM was sincerely trying to bring about a broader base of support and he told our committee he told me that the next national assembly and we were there for the opening date we arrived there the national assembly opened
on October the 7th. We arrived on this October the 6th that their first order of business was to make even further liberation improvements in order to get broader popular support. But trying to get a lesson from the past in a country torn by civil war with a yet con communist opposition. Can you have a liberal democracy under those conditions? How much authoritarianism if any is needed? Of course it is needed and it has been demonstrated since the DM overthrow that there must be a strong and forceful leadership in a country where that country is threatened by communist. We have had an example in Malayah that if in Malayah the British and the government of Malayah at the time would have permitted the liberated out of view point that some are advocating for Vietnam the communist in Malayah would have never been defeated nor would
the Huckspin defeated in the Philippines. And if we are critical today of the situation in Vietnam or that we haven't worn completely when you fight a guerrilla war there will never be a complete military victory. There isn't a complete military victory even in Malayah or the Philippines as of this day there are pockets of communist struggles. Now if people only understand that in those countries where the circumstances were more, we are bitter for control or defeat. So it was geographically remote from the communist times in Malayah for example they could drive the communist into the mountains and starve them out. This is impossible in Vietnam because the Viet Cong are infiltrating through Laos into the South Vietnam and further in the Delta area there is a plentiful of food and you can't starve them out. I want to support you on the business of Malayah in that comparison because Robert Thompson who is head of the British Advisory Mission
to Vietnam and who helped very much bring about the success in Malayah told me I think about four weeks before the coup d 'état that the degree of authoritarianism that was in Vietnam was absolutely necessary and he was terribly worried about the pressures on the government to relax. For example we think it's alright to have street demonstrations. Mr. Thompson thought it was very unwise for our government to pressure the MNU and to permitting street demonstrations fearing that the Viet Cong would get in and make trouble and things like that. So you have a very prominent British supporting what you have to say to go on now to where we are now Mr. Congressman there's a great deal of defeatism about Vietnam. There's a great deal of hopelessness about the Delta. What is your view of this defeatism and of the situation in the Delta? There is absolutely no reason for this defeatist attitude
as far as our position or the position of the 10th to defeat communism in the Vietnam. We must bear in mind that the French had control over Vietnam over 60 years except for four years when the Japanese had occupied Vietnam. But the French have never had a representation. Never had any control in a Delta area. The Congress were there. The Delta area was not lost by them or anyone else to the communists. They were there and he drove them out and we have no pockets of control. Something the French never had and many people don't understand. I think that what adds to the defeat of or to the lack of success, let me put it this way, of our efforts and that of the Vietnamese in Vietnam is the fact that
some don't understand the true situation and are undermining our efforts by their ridiculous statements. In the Delta, in other words, every time that our forces go beyond the pockets that we have, we're picking a fight because the communists have held it for more than 20 years and therefore we have to expect to fight. What we're doing is not liberating territory or regaining lost territory. This was always communist held in the last 20 years so we are not regaining lost territory but liberating territory. That is exactly correct. In doing so, it's a difficult task. When you are fighting guerrillas, they may be peaceful farmers in the rice fields, paddy fields at a daytime and our communists at night. They're difficult to identify and if the criticism that we have eight or ten to one in military strength in our military soldiers. That is about the proportion
that was prevalent in Malaya because you had to have that many to fight a guerrilla because it's so difficult to identify and to defeat. Mr. Congressman, I believe that it's seldom that the entire picture of Vietnam is taken, of course, the greatest geographical area is north of Saigon. How has the United States and its Vietnamese allies done in clearing northern South Vietnam? They did very well as a matter of fact in Saigon during the President Xi 'em's regime. As a matter of fact, he will ensure history will equitably report and truth report has saved South Vietnam from North Vietnam because when he took over and inherited this problem, if the North Vietnamese wanted to exercise a forceful offensive, they could have taken all of South Vietnam. During the Bau Dai regime, it was
when Jim, with his determination, took over that he had saved and there are tremendous strong pockets in North South Vietnam as you put it along the demarcation, 17th parallel demarcation. Now, this was, of course, supposed to be a temporary line of demarcation but has sort of solidified but there are strong pockets in the north and in a central park. In other words, the Diem regime or the Vietnamese themselves since 1962 liberated many of the northern and central provinces. What more they have done, they have rehabilitated some 800 ,000, perhaps a million, refugees from the north. They were able to, when these people fled from North Vietnam to take them in and assimilate them and they are very difficult economy. This is no small feat. Of course, one of the important things that led to the coup d 'état was the image of Diem
as a persecutor of Buddhists. What did your committee find when you went there? Well, we couldn't find any persecution of a Buddhist religion, as per say, nor have I'm happy to report neither that the United Nations Commission find any Buddhist persecution on a basis of a national policy. There may have been local officials who became overly officious and had restricted some of the activities of the Buddhists. But I want to point out some of the restrictions were on the statute books, the time of Bao Dai and some of the complaints, the five points that the Buddhists had presented as discrimination to President Zien. President Zien agreed to rectify them, and as I earlier stated, the National Assembly had also agreed in their next session to correct the statute books, to give them equal, but the Buddhist persecution was a front.
It was an excuse for all particular phases of political opposition to Diem to come under that umbrella. It was a political, it may have a very initial instant, but a religious. They may have had a few grievances in the beginning about their flags and in the property. They did have, of course. And bad police methods. And very bad police methods. But if those were bad police methods, certainly the assassination of President Zien even was worse to behold. To see President Zien to be assassinated by his own military people and the police to say that some tenant or some underling had done so is no excuse. It was hard to believe, and first they said it was suicide, so that I'm afraid to get it. So it's suicide with the hands tied. Behind their backs. And I talked to the relative who took the body from the hospital and had it cleaned up
and so forth and put in decent robes. And Madam Zong told me that Diem was shot once here in the back of the neck and knew it was just ripped apart in his back. I know he had a dagger wound in the front. It was not the decisive one, the wounds were in back. In other words, you found that there were Buddhist political opposition to Diem. And so far as he broke up demonstrations and tried to prevent the distribution of propaganda. It was to try to prevent them from overturning him and affect the Buddhist one. Yes, they have, unfortunately. Congressman Zablaki, President de Gaulle of France has proposed the neutralization of Vietnam. How feasible do you think that is? Well, the best answer to that proposal would be as to how effective has neutralism been in Laos. I don't think it would work. The North Vietnamese don't want a neutral Laos. They would not agree to it at all. And why should we support any
such proposal? I think the North Vietnamese have just driven across the waste of Laos showing how good it would be. How their intentions are. And what good is it to be neutral if they continue to make a military push? Well, the International Control Commission was not, it was inoperative in Laos. Considering the situation in South Vietnam, do you think it would be necessary to send American combat troops? To lose Vietnam would be a tremendous blow to the entire free world. I would support limited United States forces if necessary to hold out. You think it would be necessary? I don't believe it would be necessary. But if it should become necessary, I believe even that step should be taken. Thank you, Congressman Zablaki. This is Margaret Higgins of News Day. This is
NET, National Educational Television.
- Program
- Vietnam: Coups and Crises
- Producing Organization
- National Educational Television and Radio Center
- Studio Hamburg Film Produktion
- Contributing Organization
- Library of Congress (Washington, District of Columbia)
- AAPB ID
- cpb-aacip-512-xw47p8vk6s
- NOLA Code
- VCAC
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- Description
- Program Description
- 1 hour program, produced by Studi Hamburg and NET and initially distributed by NET in 1964. It was originally shot on film.
- Program Description
- This documentary, which covers the November, 1963, coup d'etat against the Diem regime and the bloodless January, 1964, coup against the ruling military junta, traces the history of South Vietnam from its partition nine years ago at the 17th parallel with North Vietnam. The program records the nation's fight against the Communists, the meaning of United States military support, the eventual conflict between the U.S. and Diem over handling of Buddhist suicides, other civilian protests and military strategy, and other events leading to the overthrow of Diem's regime.?The documentary shows how Diem, at the cost of his own popularity, did succeed in his early rule in overcoming the threat of anarchy by mobilizing the divided Vietnamese people and creating disciplined militias. The program documents American military support against communists in jungle warfare in South Vietnam, and the eventual strain between Diem and U.S. military policy advisers. Some of the causes of the gradual opposition to the Diem regime are attributed to Diem's obstinacy and his rejection of American military advice, the ruling clique of his family, and resentment by American journalists covering the war.?The documentary records the Buddhist monks' protests against alleged repression of their religion by the ruling Catholic family, and relates that Diem was less responsible for the nation's internal problems than his counsellor and brother, Nhu, and his wife, Madame Nhu.?The program shows Communist propaganda leaflets found in great quantity in the Buddhist pagodas of Saigon during a government attack in August, 1963. The commander of this attack, Paratroop General Ton That Dinh, eight weeks later leads the overthrow against Diem.?Tension mounts with the arrival of U. S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and a United Nations delegation, who survey the crises and the continuing Buddhist protests. American newspaper reporters later say that it was during Mr. McNamara's visit that the dice fell against Diem. After the Secretary's departure important items of American military and economic aid were suspended, and the Vietnamese generals chose to take part in the revolt against their own President.?Five days before the revolt. President Diem leads the parade in commemoration of the founding of the Free Republic of Vietnam. But unresolved tension continues and breaks out into the open on November 1, 1963, All Saints Day. Cameras follow the shooting on the streets, the attack and sacking of the President's palace, the celebration of the coup by young demonstrators who storm the Parliament.?French priest Father Fernand Pillaud relates in an interview that President Diem -- who fled the palace -- attended the All Saints Day mass in his church, and then called rebel headquarters on the church telephone. According to the rebel committee, Diem and Nhu committed suicide, and were to be buried in St Paul's Hospital cemetery.?General Ton That Dinh is asked about President Diem's death. He declares that the President and his brother must have committed suicide - "perhaps in Cholon. " But the documentary reports, the general was a witness to their killing at rebel headquarters. A commanding officer under the general says: "The President had to die We had to kill him wherever we found him. If my troops had captured him, or I myself had captured him, then I would have shot him."?Miss Marguerite Higgins, distinguished Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, hosts the program. Miss Higgins, correspondent and columnist for Newsday, covered many of the South Vietnam events recorded in this program. Formerly with the New York Herald Tribune, she joined Newsday in October, 1963. In the opening and closing portions of the program, Miss Higgins comments about the Vietnam situation. Also, she interviews Representative Clement Zablocki (D.- Wisc.), who is a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and is chairman of the House Far East Subcommittee. In October, 1963, he headed the U.S. Congressional delegation that went to South Vietnam to evaluate the situation. Vietnam: Coups and Crises is a 1963 production of Studio Hamburg, Germany. The interview portion with Miss Higgins is a 1964 National Educational Television production. (Description adapted from documents in the NET Microfiche)
- Broadcast Date
- 1964-03-02
- Asset type
- Program
- Genres
- Documentary
- Media type
- Moving Image
- Duration
- 00:58:43.020
- Credits
-
-
Host: Higgins, Marguerite
Interviewee: Zablocki, Clement
Interviewee: Dinh, Ton That
Producing Organization: National Educational Television and Radio Center
Producing Organization: Studio Hamburg Film Produktion
- AAPB Contributor Holdings
-
Library of Congress
Identifier: cpb-aacip-f6d6c4cb726 (Filename)
Format: 1 inch videotape: SMPTE Type C
Generation: Master
Color: B&W
-
Library of Congress
Identifier: cpb-aacip-3b0181026c2 (Filename)
Format: 2 inch videotape
Generation: Master
Color: B&W
-
Library of Congress
Identifier: cpb-aacip-2ae4eafeabe (Filename)
Format: U-matic
Generation: Copy: Access
Color: B&W
If you have a copy of this asset and would like us to add it to our catalog, please contact us.
- Citations
- Chicago: “Vietnam: Coups and Crises,” 1964-03-02, Library of Congress, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed May 8, 2025, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-512-xw47p8vk6s.
- MLA: “Vietnam: Coups and Crises.” 1964-03-02. Library of Congress, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. May 8, 2025. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-512-xw47p8vk6s>.
- APA: Vietnam: Coups and Crises. Boston, MA: Library of Congress, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-512-xw47p8vk6s