Great Decisions 1963; 2; State Department Briefing: Red China and USSR

I believe that it's not true on Titan Tank. Welcome to another State Department briefing. I am John Steele, Chief of the Time Life, Washington Bureau. In a moment, you and I will join a group of distinguished State Department officers in a briefing on the vital question of currently troubled relations between communist China and the Soviet Union. The men we shall join are all of them, experts in their field.

It is their business first to study and to praise the developing relationships between the two giants of the communist world, and thereafter they help formulate recommendations which, through the Secretary of State, go eventually to the President for consideration in the making of our world policies. The Soviet Union and Red China, acting together and in unison, would represent an extremely powerful combination. Together these two countries occupy more than one-fifth of the land surface of the globe. Their populations constitute nearly one-third of all the people on this planet. The British geographer, MacKinder, once prophesied that possession of this Eurasian Heartland, would confer such power that it could lead to world domination. Whether or not this is true, it is obvious that a close alliance of Red China and the Soviet Union is a combination with an enormous economic, political, and military potential.

For this reason, the state of that alliance is a matter of very great concern to us all and to the entire free world as well. It's a matter of receiving the closest of government scrutiny today. In recent weeks and months, not only are the so-called demonologists who specialize in the subject, but all of us become aware that the two great communist powers are not speaking with one voice. They ping the snares at the west as a paper tiger and Moscow snaps back that the paper tiger has nuclear teeth. The Chinese denounced the Soviets for being, as they say, timid as mice, while Khrushchev deplores Chinese policy as madness, leading to thermonuclear world war. For more appearances, a great debate is taking place behind the iron and the bamboo curtains, a debate which could have more medicine applications for the future of the communist block and, indeed, for the future piece of the world.

To piece together for us, the essential facts in this half hidden debate and to give us their interpretation of it, we will be privileged today to hear the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, we will be speaking to us later in the program. The Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Ulexus Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, W.A. Barrow Harriman and the Director of Intelligence and Research for the Department of State, Roger Hillsman. We are also pleased to have with us a number of distinguished citizens from outside the government, including some well-known students of communist affairs. We'll be hearing from some of them following the briefing, and now let us begin. Roger Hillsman, all of the thousands of bits and pieces of information which our government can collect on this subject from all over the world, flow into the State Department's

Bureau of Intelligence and Research which you add. Would you sort out for us the facts which you think are essential to this story? Well, Mr. Steele, to begin with, the dispute has a long history. As long ago as the 13th century, you'll remember, the Mongols overran the first Russian State, and they occupied it for 200 years. Later, Russia, in its turn, expanded eastward. And this continued in modern times after the communist revolution in Moscow. But when the Russian expansion reached areas under Chinese influence, it was halted, and has even been forced to retreat, especially since the Chinese Communist took power. For example, Russia extended its influence and acquired some special rights in Manchuria in the late 19th century when it constructed a railway to the Pacific. But the Chinese Communists insisted on ending this situation at the time of their first

agreement with the Soviets in 1950. Outer Mongolia has been another bone of contention. It was once a Chinese province, but the Soviets engineered its independence in the 1920s. Since the war, however, Chinese influence in Outer Mongolia has been rising. China and Mongolia have concluded a number of political and economic agreements, including a much heralded border agreement and arrangements for thousands of Chinese laborers to go to Mongolia to work. The Russians, for their part, have poured more aid per capita into Outer Mongolia than into any country in the world. The border between Russia and China has also been an issue. And Jo and Lai, the Chinese Communist Premier, has mentioned this publicly. There have been intensified efforts on both sides of that border in recent years to develop

population centers along it, although this may be motivated in each country by economic considerations as the government's claim. But even though all these matters have disturbed Sino-Soviet relations, the real deterioration began in 1958. Until that year, the Moscow-Baping Alliance function pretty much as everyone expected it to. That military aid was forthcoming for Mao Zedong's armies, Soviet economic aid, laid some industrial foundations for Chinese development. The emphasis was on socialist unity, on strengthening the Communist camp and promoting the world revolution. Policy differences were quietly settled behind the scenes. But from 1958 on, Chinese attitudes on international matters began to conflict very significantly with Soviet policy.

At first, the Chinese criticisms of Khrushchev's policies were camouflaged in the fall of attacks on Yugoslavia and on Tito, whom the Chinese consider a renegade communist. In April, 1960, an article entitled Long Live Londonism appeared in the Chinese Communist Journal Red Flag. This article was the beginning of a massive Chinese propaganda attack on three basic principles of international communist policy as proclaimed from Moscow. These three principles that Baping rejected were, first, the concept of peaceful coexistence with the free world. Second, the idea that war with the free world was not inevitable, and third, the belief that the so-called transition to socialism in the capitalist countries could be achieved by peaceful means.

In attacking these doctrines, the Soviet doctrines, the Chinese in effect were accusing Khrushchev of betraying the revolution. They still didn't denounce him by name, but in private they did name names. The whole world, communist and free, understood. The Soviets, for their part, immediately rushed back, and the conflict was out in the open. It has been gathering force ever since. Just a very abbreviated sketch of the event since that time shows that this was no paper quarrel. In August, 1960, with the Chinese economy on the brink of collapse, the Soviet Union withdraws all its technicians from China. Then the Kremlin summons representatives of 81 communist parties throughout the world to a great so-called unity conference at Moscow. Instead of unity, the meeting produces a bitter dispute between the Soviet and Chinese

camps, virtually splitting the communist movement wide open. Albanian delegates, supporting China, walk out. In 1961, the Soviets begin to withdraw their aid technicians from Albania. Albania retaliates by kicking out the ones remaining. China signs an aid agreement with Albania in effect, taking over the Soviet position there. Soviet submarines are withdrawn from their Albanian base at Volona and do not return. At the 22nd Communist Party Congress in Moscow, Khrushchev denounces the Albanian leaders. Joe and I rebukes Khrushchev for this and walks out of the conference, staying in Moscow just long enough to lay a wreath pointedly at Stalin's tomb. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets remove Stalin's body from its place of honor, the side-laning, and scratch his name off the Mussolium in Red Square.

After further angry exchanges, the Soviet Union breaks off all diplomatic relations with Albania. In 1962, a summit meeting of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, this is the Communist International Organization, is held at Moscow. Albania, although a member of the Council, is not invited to attend. The Council Charter is revised to allow admission of Asian members and outer Mongolia, a member of the Soviet camp, is admitted to membership. Communist China, either is not admitted or refuses to join. Soviet President Brezhnev visits Yugoslavia, and Tito, hated by the Chinese, is an honored guest in Moscow, where he even addresses the Supreme Soviet, vaping calls the Soviet withdrawal of missiles and bombers from Cuba, quote, amunic, pure and simple, unquote.

Chinese armies invade Indian territory, while the Soviets continue economic and even some military assistance to India. In recent weeks, as you know, the exchange of abuse between the two Communist powers has reached still greater intensity. Now any assessment of these facts obviously has to be provisional, when events are moving so swiftly as they are now. I won't try to predict the future, but I think a few facts are particularly significant. First, the Chinese Communists have flatly repudiated Soviet authority over themselves and the rest of the Communist camp. The monolithic character of the Communist movement, perhaps its greatest source of strength, has disappeared, at least for the time being.

Second, this controversy has spread far beyond the Soviet and Chinese borders. All of the Communist parties of Asian countries, except those of Ceylon, India, and Outer Mongolia, are supporting China, or at least they have tried to stay neutral and avoid taking sides with Moscow. Many other Communist parties are sharply divided. Third, Albania has defied Moscow and has been supported not only by Beijing, but by a number of other Communist parties. And fourth, the Soviets have used great economic pressure against the Chinese in an effort to bring them into line, and this effort has failed. Soviet aid to China has been completely terminated. Chinese goods no longer receive special treatment on the Soviet market. And trade between the two countries has dropped off drastically, as you see, on this chart here.

I should say that trade in oil, which is very important to the Chinese Communists, is still going on. But that's quite a difference there. In fact, the Chinese are even being required to ship $200 million worth of scarce goods to the Soviets each year in repayment of past debts. And this at a time when the Chinese economy is strained to the limit. The Chinese used to speak of building a socialist society in a mere few years. Now they speak in terms of decades. Against facts like these, it's difficult to believe that the sinosoviate bloc can soon recover the kind of unity it has had in the past. Thank you, Mr. Houseman. For the sinosoviate bloc to recover its former unity. But does the possibility still remain that even without this philosophic unity, these two powers may be able to work together militarily, perhaps against the free world?

Well, there are factors pressing them together. And you must remember that there is still the sinosoviate military alliance, which guarantees Russian support for communist China in the event of attack. And in 1958, Khrushchev, and firmly, at least in a letter, seemed to expand on that to include any kind of attack. So I think you have to keep these defensive obligations in mind when you consider how far this break will go and whether it will still permit them to cooperate militarily with attack. Khrushchev also recently suggested that his country and communist China downplay their differences. I think it was done in East Berlin called for what amounted to a public truce. You anticipate any such development? Well, the Chinese Communist rather promptly rejected this offer. And the volume of polemics from the Chinese side has certainly been very high.

In fact, the Chinese are distributing pamphlets on their position throughout the world to other communist parties in nine languages, including Esperanto. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Hilsman. Mr. Hilsman, your present responsibilities lie primarily in the Far East, but you also are ambassador to the Soviet Union during World War II when Stalin was still very much alive. What do you think is that the what of the Soviet difficulties with their Chinese allies? Well, Mr. Hilsman, I think we must understand that the competition or conflict between the leaders of the communist parties in the Soviet Union and China goes back a long ways. I found that my numerous talks with Stalin that he did not have much confidence in Mao Zedong. When I referred him to Rajindan, that he called the communist majoring communist some people laughed. They were confusing Stalin statements with those of certain unrealistic observers

who talked of Chinese communism as an agrarian reform movement. Of course, what Stalin had in mind was that the Chinese communist were not real communist to Stalin, the only real communist, were those who would accept domination by the Kremlin. Now today, this issue is out in the open. Secondly, there is a major sum of Soviet difference, not in the ultimate objective, but as to the method of achieving that objective. Both Moscow and Pei Pei are determined that communism shall sweep the world, but there is a deep difference between them and sailing the methods to be employed. Now that the Soviet Union has achieved remarkable industrial and scientific progress, the Kremlin leaders have become much more cautious. They do not want everything that they have built up to be devastated by nuclear war.

Communist China, however, has a radio-less to lose. The Chinese communists are not only in a more backward state of development, but they have failed in their attempt to catch up with the collapse of the so-called Great Leap Forward. The man named Chinese people have been living on an inadequate diet for the last several years. Many industrial plants are closed down due to the failure of their agricultural to produce the needed war materials and then, of course, of their inability to import them. The Chinese words are incensed at the Kremlin leaders, because the Kremlin has turned its back on them in this situation, as Mr. Hilsman describes, it is natural that Khrushchev should be pursuing his policy, which he calls peaceful-core existence, using all means to penetrate and subvert free countries, to encourage local wars of liberation, but shy away

from nuclear conflict, as he proved in the case of Cuba. Now, communist China, however, as we see in the ruthless attack on India, is more militarily aggressive when Stalin's post-war plans to take over Western Europe were frustrated by that great, collaborative effort of the national plan. Stalin turned his attentions towards the Far East and concentrated there his ambitions. I'm in the North Koreans. He thought he could get control of the whole career, thus strengthening the Soviet position on the Pacific. When this attack was thrown back, he retreated, and left to the Chinese Communist, the defense of North Korea against the United Nations counter-attack. Now, there appears to be a rather way for position.

The Chinese Communists have attacked India, while the Soviet Union is still friendly to India, and continues to give her economic assistance, as well as mid-21 aircraft. The Chinese Communist objectives of India appear to be not only to protect their newly-built world through the dark, from Syrian province to Tibet, but also to humiliate India, and explode the concept that India is a great nation on which other Asian countries can depend. No, no, no. In fact, all the Indians I met, when I was in New Delhi, last November, recognize that the red Chinese aggression is a long-term threat, and there are two of their way of life as narrow-footed, and through their survival and freedom, as others have stated. The red Chinese hope to destroy the image of India's success as a free and independent nation, and thereby weaken resistance in Southeast Asia, and open it up for further communist

aversion and aggression. Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, not only have a surplus of rice, but could support a much larger population, and then grow even greater surpluses for export. It is not yet clear, however, whether the Soviet Union or want a communist Chinese takeover of Southeast Asia, there appears to be a conflict between them for influence with the North Vietnamese Communists, further now, the Soviet Union has been supporting Indonesia with massive military and economic assistance. In the region, leaders have indicated concern of the red Chinese expansionism. Now, women can be sure where the conflict between Moscow and Pete being will lead. So far, there is no indication that the Soviet Union will aggregate their military alliance

with red China, but now that the monolithic structure of international communism has been publicly shattered, the historic rivalries between Russia and China could tend to aggravate the conflict. Thank you very much, Mr. Harriman. There have been many reports, some recent, that communist China soon will achieve a nuclear capability. What will this mean to the Russians and to the West, do you think? Well, Mr. Stere first, I think we should make sure that there may be an explosion of nuclear device in China within the next year or two, but that is quite different than developing a large arsenal of weapons with nuclear warheads. That may take many years, but when it does come, it certainly will make the world a final dangerous place, even when it is today. That is assuming that the leaders of China, red China at that time have the same attitude they have today.

And I would think that the Soviet Union is already concerned over that matter, and what we have are some bearing, the President attitude, and the reasons why they seem to want to keep China as developed, to slow. There has been considerable sentiment expressed in congressional quarters, bottom along the lines that military assistance to India should be predicated upon India's outright abandonment of its non-aligned policy in favor of an open outright defense alliance with ourselves. Do you think that any, that such suggestions have any merit? Well, I would think that it would be desirable for India to break our relations with the Soviet Union, for instance, and they will, under Indian government, have indicated that they are in for a struggle with red China, but they are still maintaining a fund relations with the Soviet Union.

Now, they are giving Soviet Union so good in the economic and some of those resistance. And I think it's not a bad place for Mr. Khrushchev to be, he's hanging on the hands of a dweller between what he calls his friend, India, and his ally, China, if India would break with the Soviet Union, it would tend to bring the two countries together. The two countries of China, the Soviet Union, China, and the Soviet Union. Well, you mentioned military aid to India. Can you give us some idea about the scope of our present, our present military assistance? Yes, our present military program is an emergency program of about 60 million dollars. They British, and other members of the country, they leave an equal amount. It is far and among mountain divisions to help resist another attack if it comes. You expect to mark the increase in this aid?

Well, that hasn't been, they haven't asked for it, they're not a matter of analysis and consideration. There is an emission that is studying the air requirements, but no decision has been made beyond this movement. Well, about the scope of Soviet assistance, military assistance to India. Yes, economic assistance is very well, but the military assistance is purely token assistance. They are living, I think, out of those migs, they promised, in some years from now, to help them develop a factory to board migs, whether that would come off or not, is to really to judge. Hardly substantial in the military field. What is substantial? Well, they aren't a significant sort of oil, but they are, rather than that, I think, and Riley, I should think, people, they must be very annoyed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Harris. Mr. Hammond. Mr. Jackson, you served a good many years in the Far East, including China, and behind the Iron Curtain as well.

What light can you throw on all of this for us, and what does it mean to us? In part, Mr. Stale, I think the answer is to be found first in the historical background in nature of China as a country, and secondly in the basic nature of communism itself. What is not by accident that China called itself the Middle Kingdom, the Chinese character used to write its name, still today is the character for middle or center. Now all peoples at some stage have thought of themselves as the center of the world, around which everything else revolves. Most of them are more or less gotten over it when they found that it hardly fitted the facts. However, through the thousands of years of Chinese history down into the last century, the Chinese have probably had less reason to question the fact than any other people. It was only in the last century that China began to have any relationship with the outside

world, on a basis other than as a Susan and Vassal. Others were shut to any relationship of equality with other states. The doors to the outside world have now again been shut, and there is today no major people or group of leaders who are in the true sense more ignorant of what is going on in the outside world than those in the Peking. Surrounded by a population greater than that of the Soviet Union, the United States, and all the countries of Western Europe combined, they are smugly sitting in Peking, distaining the rest of the world, except insofar as they look forward to it, it's again being brought under Chinese suzerting, with envoys again bearing tribute to Peking. Now while they're having their economic difficulties, as has been pointed out, and these difficulties are serious indeed, I see no sign that this has shaken the smugness of their

rulers or their goal of a communist empire with the Middle Kingdom at its center. Now this leads to the second point, that is the basic nature of communism itself. All of us who have lived under the communist system are impressed with the fact that since it lacks the automatic controls of our economy and society, communism requires firm and unquestioning control from a central point of all means of production, including most importantly the human resource, that is people. It is not just that communist leaders are evil people, hungry for power that requires them to control the lives of those under their role. It is an imperative of the system that they do so. It is equally clear that to operate such a system there cannot be several directors, but only one central direction.

Now this is just as true of relations between communist states as it is within such states. Until the rise of Peking, Moscow was on every count the dominant communist power, and except for Yugoslavia, all other communist states and parties unquestioningly accepted Kremlin and direction. But given the psychology of the Chinese leaders, it was inevitable that Peking eventually would challenge and refused to accept Kremlin domination. All of us recognized that this time would probably come, but I think that it has come and is developing considerably faster than many of us thought likely. It did not seem rational that Peking would cut itself off so soon from the Soviet technical and capital assistance, which it so badly needs, but the fact remains that it has done so.

Now this does not mean that either the Soviet Union or communist China is going to be any less communist than they have been in the past. No war and does it mean that the communist communism is going to present fewer dangers to us. In fact, the greater belligerents of the Chinese communists unrestrained by Soviet caution may present greater dangers, particularly in the areas around China's borders. We have already seen this demonstrated in the Chinese attack on India. However, it does mean that communism is changing and our responses to it must be tailored to meet the changing situation. It means that communism will no longer be a single monolithic movement directed from Moscow and serving solely the Soviet national interests.

There will now be in the movement competing centers of power with stresses and strains that are already evident in every communist party in the world. During the almost four years that I was negotiating with the Chinese communist Geneva between 1954 and 1958, what I found at most annoying and frustrating was their supreme self-confidence that they need make no concessions of any kind, and that if they just waited long enough we would be forced to make all the concessions to them. It is very hard to arrive at any understanding with people who officially call you the most ferocious enemy of the people of the world and who believe that your destruction by war is inevitable. My own view is that the incompatibility of communism not only with the aspirations of individuals, but also with the aspirations of nations is clearly coming to the surface.

In addition to communism, the great revolutionary force of this century has been nationalism. Just in the 17 short cheers since the end of the Second World War, 45 new free states have been formed and more are in the process. Each of these states is fiercely jealous of its national independence and does not want to be dominated by anyone. None of them has chosen communism for itself. I think that each of them is increasingly recognizing that communism is incompatible with the maintenance of its independence and that the United States on the other hand represents no threat to its independence. Very recognized that we truly mean what we say and we state our policy as being that of fostering the development of a world of peaceful, independent, and economically prosperous

states. Thus, we have come to terms with the nationalism of this century. Communism has not been able to do so and cannot do so and still remain the communism that we have known. My own conviction is that when the history of this century is written, nationalism will have proved to be a more powerful revolutionary force than communism. And this gives me confidence for the future. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. I'd like to ask you whether the current difficulty between red China and Moscow makes more likely an easing of tensions between Russia and the West, including ourselves. I think it's difficult to generalize too broadly in this. However, it is likely that there will develop a certain common interest between ourselves and the Soviet Union in the light of this.

For example, we've mentioned the Soviet interest in seeing the China, the probable Soviet interest in seeing that China does not develop a nuclear capability. We have a similar interest. It may also be that Soviet Union does not look with favor upon Chinese expansionism into Southeast Asia. If so, there may be a basis for understanding with the Soviet Union on that. Whether the recent failure of the Soviets in the last few weeks to exacerbate the tensions in Berlin, or to indicate that they're going to bring the Berlin situation to a crisis, is due to their relations with the Chinese Communists, or whether it's due to our firmness with respect to Berlin. It's difficult to say it's probably a combination of both. In this connection, there are new diplomatic steps or new policies, which the United States could consider under taking an order to exploit this, so the trouble.

We're still, I think, we should be very careful not to appear to be interfering in what is a family quarrel. We all know that there's nothing that unites members of the family quicker than having outsiders intervene in this. So I think on that, we must be very, very careful. However, I do think that where there are common interests develop between ourselves and the Soviet Union, such as, for example, the development of nuclear power in China, I think we should be prepared to negotiate with the Soviet Union. There have been some suggestions from time to time that since Khrushchev sounds a little softer on the matter of nuclear war than do the red Chinese, we'd better strengthen his hand lest he be kicked out or thrown out and replaced by a hardliner of the Chinese Communist School. What do you think of this line of thinking? Well, it seems to me, Khrushchev has shown considerable ability to take care of himself through the years, and I doubt that he needs our help or that he would ask for our help.

However, I do think that where we have a common interest with Khrushchev, where we're able to reach an agreement that is in our interest, I think we should be prepared to negotiate with him. I'm sure that your question does not imply that we should make concessions to Khrushchev that would not be in our interest simply in order to see if it maintained him in power. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. That concludes the briefing. We turn now to our very distinguished audience, and to begin with, to four special guests whom we have invited because of their particular interest in background and their subject. These are Professor Kurt L. London, Director of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University. Dr. William C. Johnston, Professor of Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced

International Studies. And Mr. Warren Una, a foreign affairs correspondent of the Washington Post who recently visited Southeast Asia, and Mrs. Lorraine B. Torres, Staff Associate of the American Association of University Women, and a one-time Asian Affairs Specialist in the State Department's Intelligence Bureau for South, who would like to begin. Dr. London. In view of the frequent use of such terms as conflict, split, break when discussing Sino-Soviet relations should be not first of clarifies the meaning of these terms. When we consider the relations between communist states are really taking place on two levels, party and state, Albania, for instance, there is a complete break, both in party and state relations. In case of Yugoslavia, when we had the break in party, what are we talking about in

the final subject of this, ideological split, methodological split, is it an unofficial break? Is it just a dialectic argument? Governor Hermann, would you like to answer that? Well, you've got a great deal of territory, but I think that there's no such thing as a break so far. There's been a real conflict and a real competition, as has been described. I don't think there will be a break unless there is a repudiation of the military agreement between the two countries that will indicate that both ideological and the party and the two nations will have some of the terms to work together. Now, I'm not suggesting what that will happen. Another factor of this is this oil exports from the Soviet Union to communist China. Chinese China needs that oil, and when you see that stop, there will be another milestone towards a break.

If you see it stopped. If we see it stopped there. Secretary Johnson, there's been a great deal of confusion in this country as to the United States policy regarding John Kaishak and nationalist China. What is nationalist China's harassment of the Chinese mainland, doing to any sign out Soviet relations today, and what does US's – the United States' relationship with John do to exacerbate this? I don't know that our relations with John and the entire wrong are having much effect on this relationship. Of course, in so far as the Chinese communist field themselves threatened, they may be marbledred. I think also that the Soviet Union would probably not be content to see our communist China disappear as a communist country, as long as it remains communist, at least a nominal sense of the term. The Soviet Union would have the hope that there might be some change in leadership that

would bring it back closer together in its relationship with Moscow. Do any of the other briefers, Motto, comment on Mr. Rumor's question? We have another question. Yes, Ms. Torres. One longstanding difference between these two communist parties has not been specifically mentioned yet. That is the Soviet policy, condoned by Lenin, of supporting non-communist nationalist movements, at least temporarily. The Chinese communists have bitter memories of the application of this policy when in the 1920s they were ordered to work within the Roman dawn, and further pains suffered two military defeats in Shanghai and along the pond. Is the application of this policy still a major difference between these two communist parties, particularly in relation to India? Mr. Johnson? Yes, I think in general the Soviet Union remains much more willing to work with so-called neutralist non-communist states, and those who do the Chinese.

This, of course, has been one of the sources of conflict between them. My King has, in effect, been saying to the Soviet Union, why do you give so much help to these fuzzy neutralists alike India when we, your good friends and communist comrades need help more than India does? I think this is going to continue to be a source of difference between them. Because there's no difference in the objective, like the Soviets were to use these countries believing that they can undermine them, and these non-communist countries that believe they can undermine them, and eventually they take them all for Congress. It's again a question of method, but I think we're quite right. This dispute is about ideology, about the organization of the communist bloc, where the power shall lie, but it's also about policy towards the West, differences in view about policy towards the West, and about policy towards the neutrals and the underdeveloped world.

It's all facets of the same dispute. Do we have other questions from Marty? Yes, Dr. Johnson, on the question of nationalism, which you spoke, is it really a struggle between nations or is it a struggle between the leadership of the communist movement? I think there are two elements, and I think there's a personal element between the communist leaders. So I think the underlying factor is a struggle on the basis of national interests. That is, the Soviet Union is struggling for its national interests and China is struggling for its national interests, and this is the underlying factor in the relationships between them, and this is going to remain, I think. Yes, Mr. Runa. Mr. Hilsman, some people in this country may wonder about the idea of a sign of Soviet rift being particularly to the interests of the United States, does this present some problem some of us might suspect existed?

Well, I certainly think that those people who think that a break between the Chinese and the Russians are going to solve all of our problems ought to be a little bit more cautious. It's certainly going to be a changed world, but either in the long run or in the short run, it might not be all to the good for us. You might have two aggressive communist bloc activities going on at the same time, which would more complicated. On the other hand, a highly unified bloc is a source of great power. So I think the answer is mixed, very much depends upon how the thing goes. I think we're going to go home, might have some of the say on this too, but I think you said it well. We have other questions. Yes, the gentleman in the second one, will you give us your name, please? I'm Herbert Stein. I wonder whether we should attach any significance to the ideological content of the debate between the Soviet Union and China, or is this just a kind of campaign oratory, which

only means that one party is in and the other party is out and that they would not behave differently from each other if they each face the same real power situation. Well, each side, if I take that each side uses the dogma to defend what it means to do, but for some time, I think it's been a fact that there's been a pragmatic approach to dogma to use it for the particular purposes that the leaders of each country had at that time. Well, let's forget that underlying all of this is a basic concept of communist dictatorship and these are really very fine points that are being argued about so heatedly. No, I think you can answer very well. Dr. Johnson, in the relationship of such a man, well, the Sino-Soviet debate, how much longer are the Chinese communists going to let him pretend at least to play a ball with

Moscow, and to the extent that we have to step up our assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, how much longer the Chinese communists are going to permit us to do that without intervening? Well, you've had two different questions. On the first point, it looks as if Ho Chi Minh is trying to apply both arms against the middle. He wants to get Russian support. The Vietnam do not wish to have the Chinese overrun them. You might say that their hearts are in Moscow, but their stomachs are in China. I think there was gentlemen in the – yes, will you get a true name, sir, before you? The Franco-Bryant of the Committee for Economic Development. The break where the dispute we're talking about here today in the communist world is so big that it's bound to have repercussions also outside the communist world. And I would like to ask Governor Herman if these are now becoming apparent, for instance,

President Duvall of France speaks of the possibility of an alliance between continental Western Europe and Russia. And he wants to diminish American influence in continental Western Europe. Do you see in this an encouragement to go by arising from this dispute in the communist world? I think as you put your question, there are some facts which I'd have to question back in 1943 to go out there might be an alliance between France and the Soviet Union, but he's long since dropped that idea. He has recently indicated that it would have been desirable to expand trade between Europe and Europe and the Soviet Union.

He's also indicated that Europe should stand on their own feet and not be dependent upon the United States. Actually, we would like to see Europe stand on their own feet, but at the present time, unfortunately, what needs the United States certainly melt our assistance to resist so the Union aggression should have come. Yes, in the back roll, gentlemen. You must end up kind, I'd like to ask Mr. Hillman at P4C's during the remainder of the 60s, the Soviet Union moving toward the Chinese position with regard to taking the offensive and the underdeveloped areas of the world. No, I wouldn't think so. There are endless possibilities as you go further and further into the future for circumstances change, and their tactics will change with it, certainly the Soviet Union is flexible in this, but I think they have lived longer in the wide world than the Chinese Communist have.

I think having possessed nuclear weapons, having faced the crisis of Cuba, that they understand the dangers in the world, and I think that their policies are going to be more sophisticated. I think they still have the same objectives as the Communists have always had, but I think they're more subtle and sophisticated in their application, and I think part of it is their attitude towards these underdeveloped countries. Is anybody else want to come that on that? No, I think that's probably a bit like Mr. Hillman. I'm concentrating on the giants, there are some times as a tendency to neglect some of the almost giants. Now, Indonesia is the world's fifth largest nation, and she has a very large Communist Party, the Prime Minister of Malayat, the Tanko Abdul Raman, is very fearful that Indonesia's Communist Party is pushing Indonesia into interfering with his interests in forming a federation of Malaysia. How does this reflect on Sino-Soviet relations? Is this something the Soviet Union would not want to see tampered with? Is this something China would be eggy Indonesia on?

What would Indonesia's response be? That's how Malayat, the President's time, certainly nationalism, as Mr. Johnson has pointed out, is the strongest emotion of Sakhano, and the Indonesian people as a whole. There are influences other than the Communist Party, at work of the Army and other parties that are strongly, they saw Indonesian independence from any Communism. There are some of them that are strongly opposed to Chinese aggression and fear, Chinese Communism, but whereas they are getting substantial support, as I've said, from both military and economic assistance from Russia. It's still their thrust in West Virginia, who was a nationalist, trust, not a Communist Trust, and if two are to say that the future of Indonesia will hold, we hope that Indonesia will remain an independent country, and I agree with that, Mr. Johnson said that the

force of nationalism, probably, in the case of Indonesia, as well as other countries, will be the stronger one than the pervasive force of Communism. Mr. Johnson, why did the Chinese allow their differences to become so public in the period from 1958 to 1960, which was a very bad period for them economically? This is one of the great puzzles of the whole dispute. I think, though, that you perhaps ought not to be looking too much for hidden things. I remember the McCauley quote about, they spent endless days and nights searching for the hidden motives behind what were only simple blunders, and I think this is true of this. I think you also must remember that a dispute like this within a block of the nature of the Communist block has a dynamism of its own, and once it starts to roll, it begins to roll.

I don't really think you ought to try to read too much into the precise date that the quarrel became public. But the elements of it there have been there a long time. Is that really necessary that Communism must be monocentric to be really dangerous? If we have a polycentric development and communism, could that give us just as much trouble, particularly if you have two world centres in the future perhaps, of Communism, Moscow, and Peking? Well, that's what I meant to say when I was replying Mr. Oz question. That doesn't necessarily turn out good for us. No, I think we all agree on that. But the point I was making was that the polycentric communism was a different kind of communism and a monocentric communism, and correspondingly we've got to deal with it in a different way, and you'll do a monocentric one. Questions? Yes, gentlemen and gentlemen, give us your name, Mr. Johnson, do you feel that Communist China is more willing to accept a nuclear war, or is this just a propaganda blow from

the nuclear war? I think, as Mr. Hilsman said, I think Communist China probably does not yet understand the fewer realities of the nuclear war, to a degree that Soviet Union does. Soviet Union has lived through and with this nuclear development, and as we have, and both the Soviet Union and the United States appreciate this, the best moment I think the answer is yes. It's not understanding nuclear war and the possibilities of it, I think, Communist China's probably more than you have to be seen to be believed. I think Mr. Hilsman is seeking stuff. That's it. Ask me, Dr. Johnston. Hilsman, can I ask you a question back on the Vietnam situation, do you think that, to the degree to which we succeed in our objectives in Vietnam, there's going to come a point at which the Chinese Communist will not want to let us succeed and may therefore act in a much more vigorous way that they have up to date? If you're suggesting that if the Viet Cong appears to be losing the war, the guerrilla war

in South Vietnam that the Chinese will feel it necessary to enter massively, I would say, no, they will not. I think they would like to win, but winning in South Vietnam, which is on the free world side of the Iron Curtain, is not the same thing as losing on the some center of Chinese Communist power or having a center of Communist power threatened. I think it's perfectly clear from what the Chinese Communist say and the way they behave that although they're aggressive and sometimes reckless, they do have a sense for the consequences of a major war in the Pacific and don't think they can afford it. Would they be more likely therefore to push into India again, on that score, on that reason? Well, you're jumping from one set of circumstances to another that's quite different. Thank you very much.

And now I'm sure we would all like to hear the views on this subject of the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Spio. Ladies and gentlemen, this is the briefing room of our State Department Operations Center. Well, in night, information falls into this center from out over the world, including up to a thousand telephractic responses over twenty-four hours. The sounds of our offices are on duty around the clock, and others meet here continually to be briefed on to work out plans. Sure, this makes us one of the busiest foreign offices anywhere in the world. Out of this intense activity is directed essentially to our main business, the advancement of American interests and our foreign relations, and the world-wide struggle for freedom and peace. Daily, sometimes hourly, we ask ourselves, what does this particular development mean to the United States and to the rest of the free world?

Was it in danger our interests? If so, are we taking the right action to protect them? And what more can be done? When we consider current sign-all Soviet relations, involving as they do this vast area at the center of the Eurasian landmass, we offcast those the same questions, and only history can give the final answers. We must constantly reevaluate our working conclusions. But at this moment, I think we can sum up these conclusions under two headings, a warning and a note of encouragement. The warning must be directed against wishful thinking. Both principal communist powers are committed to a communist world system, to the destruction of freedom. The chief arguments between them are over how it must do barriers. That is over method. That gives us no reason to relax our guard. The communist threats to freedom are still serious, and indeed in some areas, they may increase

in the months ahead. Our task is to continue resolutely on the path we have chosen, maintaining and strengthening our defenses and building a free world, while striving for negotiation to reduce the areas of conflict. At the same time, I think we can find a mis debate among the communists, an important confirmation of a truth we have long recognized. What is, to great Karl Marx, what it is communism, not modern democracy, which contains within itself the seeds of its own decay? This is cause for encouragement about the future of freedom. For confidence that if we persevere, if we do not grow weary and falter, we can move toward a rule of law and a world community truly at peace. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and gentlemen, thank you very much. National Educational Television has presented State Department Briefing, Red China and the USSR,

one of a series of eight television programs, based on topics selected for nationwide discussion. During Break Decisions, 1963. Thank you. .

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