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W BJC FM in Baltimore in cooperation with the Maryland Center for Public Broadcasting and Johns Hopkins University present the annual undergraduate student project. The 1971 Milton S. Eisenhower symposium. An 11 part series of featured speakers presenting formal addresses followed by informal question and answer sessions. This year's topic. Soviet American relations or dilemmas of power. On this program Mike Mansfield majority leader of the United States Senate will discuss the Nixon administration and detente a critical view. Thank
you. Mrs. Mansfield Ladies and Gentlemen good evening and welcome to the final lecture of the Milton S. Eisenhower symposium the United States and the Soviet Union the dilemma's of power. We hope that this series has been both educational and stimulating by presenting a variety of viewpoints. We hope that we have given our audiences an opportunity to understand a complex and difficult relationship. Five years ago the student council established the symposium. Since that time the council has continuously supported the efforts to improve and expand this series. We are grateful to the student council and the undergraduate community it represents for providing us the opportunity to present
this program. And now my cochairman. Our guest tonight the honorable Mike Mansfield received his B.A. in M.A. degrees from Montana State University from one thousand thirty three to nine hundred forty three. He was professor of Latin American and Far Eastern history at his alma mater in 1042. He was elected to the United States Congress where he served for five terms in one thousand fifty two. He was elected to the United States Senate by the people of Montana and subsequently was re-elected in one thousand fifty eight thousand nine hundred sixty four thousand nine hundred seventy. Senator Mansfield was elected majority whip of the U.S. Senate in one thousand fifty seven and assume the position of majority leader in 1961. Senator
Mansfield experience in foreign affairs is extensive. He served as President Roosevelt's representative in China in 1904 and was appointed United States delegate to both the Inter-American conference and the United Nations six session by President Truman in September of 958. Senator Mansfield was appointed by President Eisenhower as U.S. delegate to the 13th general assembly of the year when he undertook foreign policy assignments to West Berlin and Southeast Asia for President Kennedy and undertook a similar assignment for both Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Senator Mansfield is a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. The American clergyman James Freeman Clarke once wrote that quote The difference between a politician and a statesman is a politician thinks of the next election and a statesman thinks of the next generation. And of course ladies and gentlemen it is my pleasure to introduce one of America's statesman
the honorable Mike Mansfield. Much of the. Mr Chairman ladies and gentlemen of the student body members of the faculty my fellow citizens at five o'clock this afternoon I phoned Johns Hopkins and said that I would not be able to be here tonight at 6 o'clock thanks to a Republican filibuster.
On campaign contributions. I called again and said I would be delighted to fulfill my previous commitment. I am delighted to find myself delivering the benediction to these proceedings. It is not an uncommon experience. The last word is something that is rarely reserved for the leadership in a senate of on limited debate. Notwithstanding this built in propensity for talk ever. The Senate has acted with on usual dispatch during the past few weeks. The only roadblock occurring on Fortunately today and very likely it will extend into the next several days. While this symposium has pondered the dilemmas of power the Senate has
sought to resolve several of them. With regard to Vietnam for example the Senate voted first to establish a national policy of full withdrawal within six months later at the insistence of the house which had an assist from the administration. The specific time span was removed and full withdrawal was accepted only as a congressional rather than a national policy. Still later in other legislation and with the reluctant concurrence of the House and the administration the Senate's insistence on full withdrawal from Vietnam was established as national policy but still without a specific withdrawal date. Finally in a foreign aid bill the Senate is making one more effort to restate its pristine and more emphatic position on Vietnam that
is full withdrawal within six months. I've. In similar tubs and stops and starts the Senate voted to cut then to increase parts of foreign aid then to reject it in toto only to resuscitate most of the administration's aid programs into bills. A short time later underscoring the fact that foreign aid is a program with more lives than a cat. Contrary to the appearances these actions are more than marches up the hill and down they are not empty gestures. They say what the people of the nation are saying in a language which is audible in the other branches they say that the Senate wants the war in Vietnam to end completely and soon. They say
too that the Senate is great is growing insistent on a sweeping revision and scale down of foreign aid. The apparent indecisive most of the actions arises in part from the fact that there are other centers of federal power in the House and in the presidency wherein other ideas are held and with which the Senate must come to terms. It is also a reflection of a kind of dilemma of power. It is symptomatic of the uncertainty of the Congress in confronting the salient factor of the contemporary international situation. I am sure this symposium has long since identified that fact or it is the surge of change which is sweeping the globe from the rim lands of Asia to the Western littoral of Europe. International relationships of a generation are
giving way just as currencies fixed in value for decades are now floating. So too are all the alliances and alignments. In this nation a new outlook is readily readily elect detectible. It is present especially in the young who are not bound by the fixations of the past but it is by no means confined to the young. The international experiences of the past few years have shocked the thought patterns of the entire nation. In the United States the time for a change in foreign policy is right. If this situation finds a counterpart in the Soviet Union then we may well be on the threshold of the liquidation of the dubious heritage of the Cold War. Ironically the era of cold war is ending not in the PO's ition Zob strength
which at one time were regarded in US policies as an essential of peace. Indeed the secretary of defense has even raised doubts about the present capacity of our defenses. Nor is the Cold War closing and drastic changes in the state systems of these two in Europe or the West which once in the eyes of more militant idiology in both countries were held to be the only basis for its ending. Rather the he does been taken out of the Cold War. If I may mix the temperatures by degrees all conflicts have dissolved slowly and symposia such as the one which is taking place here. To which I allude as symbolic. Of the growth of peaceful interchange between the two systems. The old conflicts are also diluted by the emergence of other international considerations which are pressed into the purview of the two nations.
China for example now looms large in the concerns of the Soviet Union at the same time the United States is immersed in the practical and urgent threats to the economy more or less to the exclusion of the theoretical and distant menaces of alien idiology. Ironically this tradition comes at a time when the affairs of the nation are presided over by a Republican administration which was once in the front ranks of what was termed the battle for the minds of men. May I say that the irony is all to the credit of the incumbent political leadership. President Nixon has been able to set aside the things of the past in the light of present reality. He is acting to remove some of the barnacles which can cross the foreign policy of the United States without detracting from the administration's
achievement in any way. I think it is fair to know that the times have been over right for this change. I like to think that the level of reason is such in this nation that the transition might have come under any perceptive administration of whatever particular partisan stripe. But perhaps that is an excessively sanguine expectation. In any event there is little question of the general effectiveness of the incumbent administration. It is an effectiveness which tends to support Walter Lippmann is thesis that liberal change is best brought about by Conservative government. The critical element Remember I'm talking about foreign policy the critical element in the administration's new approach to international policies it seems to me is the Nixon doctrine which was in that unveiled in
Guam in 1969 that doctrine set the stage for a diminution of the role which the United States has played across the spectrum of world affairs for 25 years. In so doing it elevated a concept of policy much articulated but little practice since World War Two that of shared responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. The changes which have been wrought by the doctrine are already evident not only in Southeast Asia but elsewhere around the globe as bases are closed and U.S. military forces abroad are reduced. In some quarters there is a tendency to see in this process of military contraction some sort of shameful furling of the flag rather
than change just sensible and wrong. Overdo it acts to reduce that to heavy burdens which have been carried for too long. BY THE PEOPLE OF THE NATION. Often in the vague name of international commitment. Moreover if the flag has been plagued by a mistaken policy in places where it does not belong as in Indochina its withdrawal under the Nixon doctrine is not only an essential act in our vital national interest it is also the only honorable course. Indeed if the doctrine is to have signal historic significance in my judgment it will bring about not a partial but a complete determination of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. That means everywhere on the mainland be it Vietnam Cambodia Laos or Thailand. And by land sea and air
that doctrine will also provide if it is to have historic significance. The rationale for a continuing reduction in our one sided military efforts elsewhere in the world. Notably in Western Europe under NATO's notwithstanding the diminution of the US military presence abroad. The United States is not about to disappear from the international scene. This nation's weight is immense and it will continue to be felt in many ways and in many places that is as desirable as it is inevitable. Indeed a sensitive concern with affairs beyond our borders remains an essential of the world's civilized survival that such is the case argue strongly for a most do dishes use of our resources abroad. There is no longer a surplus to be
expended in haphazard almost indiscriminate fashion for fear that the label of isolation might otherwise be pinned on our policy. It is reassuring therefore. That along with the military contraction the omni presence of U.S. economic aid is also in the process of receding around the globe. In this scale down which effects largely the bilateral programs of aid the Senate has played and will continue to play an important part. It is to be anticipated that pressure from the Senate will bring about further changes in the basic design of the program. The fact is that the present system has lost much of the charisma. Which was imparted to it by the Marshall Plan. The point 4 program and the Peace Corps of another time. Foreign
aid has become in recent years a lavish grab bag. And international pork barrel and a world wide arms distribution as presently constituted. The program is an economic drain on the nation. More seriously it has led the United States via the path of a well-meaning humanitarian generosity into unwarranted political and military involvement in the inner affairs of other people. Thanks. It may be that foreign aid can be recast into its earlier form of people to people cooperation as it involves economic development. The program has already moved in large part out of byte not channels and into
multilateral agencies. That is a welcomed change. It has the virtue of permitting the burdens of cost to be shared with other countries at the same time. It insulates this nation from adventures in Yoni lateral internationalism which can lead as we have seen in Indochina into tragic entanglements under the no direction and US policies I believe. Underlying these new directions is a growing tendency to be oh this nation's interests are less in the context of any logical generalities and more in terms of national well-being and survival. Viet Nam has alerted the people to the consequences of a blind pursuit of it illogical. OB sessions the dollar crisis and the dangerous sidetracking of the nation's inner needs by the demands of the involvement in
Southeast Asia. Every below what lies at the end of the road of indiscriminate internationalism and sport. It is to be expected that the United States will exercise greater discretion in choosing grounds on which to defend a more narrowly construed concept of this nation's responsibilities. And interests in the world. It is essential that the implications of the no US approach be considered most carefully by the other nation dilemma's of power are juxtaposed against ours in this symposium. Indeed the risks of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union may even be increased temporarily by the president contracting of the United States position. That would be the case if the contruction led to probings of the new limits of our
interests abroad. If such proceedings were to occur they could very well it's right close to the vital considerations of civilized survival. The effect of a number of other shifts in the balances of world power must also be considered in this time of the world is moving away from a bipartite determinism of international politics. Major questions of war and peace may no longer rest overwhelmingly in the province of the Soviet Union and the United States. Now China is emerging as a major power. So too at least in economic terms is the European community and Japan. With more major nations on the scene more differences to settle and perhaps more sources of military and nuclear power to manipulate the
problems of peace grow more complex. We may find that the risk of conflict increases in proportion. To the rising number of contenders and the broader the diffusion of international power. Hopefully these on happy possibilities will not come to pass. They need not if the devotion of the role of the United States and the Soviet Union is accompanied by greater understanding and restraint between these two nations and timely adjustment of relationships with third nations. The United States and the Soviet Union are in a unique position at this point in history. They are emerging from a protracted period of mutual antagonism without having come to a direct military confrontation. There is little doubt that the combined strength of the two nations in harm and
good is sure to them a substantial share in shaping the conditions of peace. By the same token in Dist harmony that's right can lead to the ultimate disaster of nuclear war. Or at the least it could condemn the possibilities of establishing a durable peace for decades to come. I do not think that this new situation and the opportunities presented for negotiations have been lost on the Nixon administration. The president as you know is pursuing a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. He is proceeding on the assumption that many of the differences between the two governments can now be accommodated and that the interest of neither is served by continuing conflict in this process. The highest priority should continue to rest on the
negotiations with regard to disarmament. THE SALT talks have been described by the president as the most important arms control negotiations this country has ever entered their success could provide an inestimable contribution to international stability. By the same token however their failure could signal a resumption of the nuclear arms race at a point of great risk. The initial indications reveal at least a mutual understanding of viewpoints and a mutual eagerness to move towards agreement. The Soviet concern has already delineated as seeking to forestall the US people I meant of defensive weapons. That is the Anti Ballistic Missiles and to enlarge the talks to include US nuclear weapons which are deployed at forward bases in Europe. And
elsewhere within relatively short range of Eastern Europe. On the other hand the prime us concern. It is clear is the desire to limit Soviet fence of missiles and to maintain our alliances in Europe and the Far East. Each of the two governments have acknowledged the priorities of the other. At least that is a beginning in which the cards have been placed on the table. The candor is refreshing and provides in my judgment some modest basis for hope to the arms burdened people of both nations. In the months ahead to negotiate our lives will be preoccupied with complex questions involving the mathematics of limitation. In what way must the United States curb its P point of ABM. And by how much if agreement is to be reached. At what point should there be
a ceiling on offensive Soviet ICBMs or on Soviet missile carrying submarines in order to achieve it to achieve an agreement. If the negotiators financers of this kind an agreement is reached the Senate will be well prepared to act on its responsibilities with regard to ratification. Even now the talks are being watched with special interest in the Senate. Just a few weeks ago I visited the US AMBASSADOR TO THE SALT talks who was at that diner in Helsinki and I must say I was reassured by his optimism. Beyond just a moment it seems to me that the two most complex issues which will confront the Soviet Union and the United States during this period of transition involve the relationships with inner Europe East and West and with China with respect to China. It seems to me that the
president has taken a highly significant initiative in his decision to go to be a visit should not be expected to achieve much in the way of substance. After all the first step on a journey is the longest. After a lapse of contact for almost a quarter of a century however the very act of going should open a new prospect for building a stable peace in the western Pacific. Yet these prospects are to materialize clearly they cannot be pursued by the United States in China. Oh oblivious to the concerns of the Soviet Union or Japan it would be dangerous in the extreme if the path to be king were to bypass either Moscow or Tokyo. In my judgment a durable pattern of international stability in East Asia depends upon relations of common among all
four principal powers. I am delighted therefore that by the Treaty of Okinawa and in reversion as well as in his brief meeting in Alaska with the Emperor of Japan the president has acted to protect it so to speak. One plank in his journey to the Chinese capital at the same time his announced visit to Moscow should safeguard the other especially when it is coupled with the public assurances that he has given that a read between China and the United States is in no way designed to exacerbate Sino-Soviet difficulties. It may be that the round up personal contact by President Nixon will lead subsequently to more tangible results than meetings of this kind in the past. Oh now for example remembers a glass bottle and what was achieved there. A natural follow through of
the president's visit. It seems to me might well be Quadri partite talks on the maintenance of peace a piece of the Pacific with regard to Europe. Negotiations underway and agreements already achieved appeared to be leading to a more stable situation. That progress provides further rationale for the reduction of the military deployments out both the Soviet Union and the United States. The circumstances are there I believe for a new trust for peace in Europe. The present administration has shown a great responsiveness to the circumstances that has here to fore been the case for its part. I believe the Soviet Union has given evidence of a new flexibility in responding affirmatively to the Eastern policies of Chancellor Billy Brown. I refer
in particular to the non aggression pact which the Soviet Union and West Germany have already initialed and a similar treaty with Poland where in West Germany has explicitly accepted the auteur ness boundary. Finally it should be noted that the Soviet Union has provided in a four power agreement with France the United Kingdom and the United States. Oficial acknowledgement of the present status of West Berlin and its ties to West Germany in the light of these agreements as well as the hopeful emanations from the SALT talks. There is a timely opportunity for negotiating neutral and balanced reduction of forces between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries such reductions might well be over and above what I have long since believed can be a uni lot will draw down of 50 percent in
U.S. force levels in Europe. May I say that I do not regard the present level of U.S. forces in Europe. In any sense as a bargaining chip in negotiating a mutual reduction of forces with the Soviet Union. There is no bargaining power in the irrelevant and excessive. An excessive an antiquated us be pointed in Europe. And the enormous cost which it entails cannot strengthen the US position in negotiations. It can only weaken further the international economic position of this nation. Whether the Soviet Union reciprocate or not therefore I believe the United States would be well advised to make a substantial reduction of its military deployment in Western Europe. Indeed a
uni LOTRO initiative in this connection may even act as a spur to mutual agreement. I do not think the Soviet Union will find an Praktica bone to keep inflated forces in Eastern Europe. When there are not inflated U.S. force levels in Western Europe. I am reminded again of Dwight D Eisenhower's conclusion that one division of U.S. forces in Europe would suffice for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty. That conclusion was set forth a dozen years ago by the first commander but has been studiously ignored by successive administrations both Democratic and Republican ever since. Looking beyond prospect of developments in arms control and the political and the military and military stabilization of Europe. It seems to me that a major objective of our relationship with the Soviet Union should be a
substantial increase in economic interchange. This nation's trade with the Soviet Union and the entire eastern bloc. Has been held in check for many years by russkie barriers designed to prevent the shipment of so-called strategic items to communist countries. The president ministration has moved to facilitate the growth of trade in non-strategic goods with Eastern Europe. Nevertheless the volume of U.S. trade with the Bloc countries remains slender by any measure even though this trade rose by 30 percent in 1970 over the previous year. The total volume now amounts to only seven tenths of one percent of U.S. trade with all countries. Until the advent of the present administration the United States government has been most reluctant to spur commercial relationship with Eastern Europe. By contrast
the Western Europeans have pursued these ties with great vigor for a number of years. In 1969 their combined trade with Eastern Europe was 15 times that of the United States in dollar value. The bow tension of east west prayed could be more fully realized by U.S. business. If certain steps were to be taken at once one would be the restoration of equal treatment to Soviet export commodities and a bill to accomplish this is now pending in the Congress. Another would be to revise the list of items to permit American business to sell goods in Eastern Europe goods which are now freely offered there by other Western nations. Still another would be to broaden the executive waiver power by which prohibitions can be lifted on financing sales to Eastern European nations through the export import bank. None of these things will necessarily
result in a dramatic upsurge in trade but they might lead to increasing economic contacts over the long run that could do much to strengthen the stability of the Soviet US relationship. Following closely on the heels of trade is the whole matter of cultural interchange which has so much to do with the perceptions that the two nations have of each other. Hopefully if the people of the United States and the Soviet Union educate enough of each other's students listen to enough of each other's musicians watch each other's athletes compete. Oh and a sufficient number of symposia and so on through a wide range of activities. They might come to an increased understanding and appreciation with consequent reduction in the possibility of conflict. That is the promise on which our
cultural exchange program is based. It seems to be to meet to be on a sound basis. Unfortunately the present program with the Soviet Union has fallen on hard times for a variety of reasons not the least of which had been acts of harassment by militant groups in this nation. The Soviet Union and the United States have come a long way from the days of the Berlin blockade the Hungary an uprising the Cuban Missile Crisis and the bombastic Encounters of the 1950s and the early 60s. We stand now at the threshold of a new era in which many of these suspicions an antagonism of the past can be set aside. President Nixon has an opportunity to consolidate this progress and
this progress to which his administration has so greatly contributed. It is a moment of historic opportunity not in terms of national gain or political profit but in the opportunity which is offered to increase the probability of the decent survival of modern civilization. If there is any lasting good closure to which this symposium has crossed it is that both nations the Soviet Union and the United States should not fail to see this opportunity. Thank you very much.
Senator Mansfield has agreed to entertain questions. We will alternate from aisle to aisle. Please do not touch the microphones. Thank you. How much control does the Senate exercise over the military and political activities of the CIA. I'm referring specifically to activity in into China. Very little I'm sorry to say. It took a long time for the Senate to become cognizant of the fact that the CIA was engaged in a lot in a large way in Laos especially in the creation of a so-called clandestine army in the subsidizing of Air America and other factors and. Carrying on activities of that nature which have certainly done that country little good but brought to it a great deal of harm. There is of course a couple of subcommittees in the Senate and I believe in the house to which you're
supposed to look into the activities of the CIA. I happen to be on one of them but unfortunately we don't meet with them often enough. Senator I'd like to question your explanation of the current rapprochement. Now going on between United States and the Soviet Union on behalf of the National Caucus the labor committees which is a group on this campus now on the one hand it seems that you are saying that this is taking place because of a new higher level of reason on the part of leaders in government and an interest in world trade and interest in peace. No I didn't say that but go ahead. And on on the other hand. There seems to be in any case a failure to take note of certain hard economic realities and also explain this occurrence particularly the collapse of the machine tool industry in this country over the last two years in which machine tool orders have been halved over the last two consecutive years. And today particularly significant because the Department of Commerce has just sanctioned the licenses for the building of Mack trucks in Russia. What I'm saying is that the rapprochement seems to be
based on. A realization now of severe economic collapse collapsing world trade the prospect of of depression now mooted two weeks ago in The Wall Street Journal and. And if this is the case if this is the case then the new rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States has certain very pessimistic features which you have not mentioned. If the economy does collapse if the county does collapse in that case there seems to be the prospect now the situation we rapidly turned around it was the exploitation of Eastern Europe of the Third World will be used as a basis will be will be used. Last sentence please this we last cents will be used as a basis now to restructure and an economy that is put into a depression. You maybe Roy. Would. Would. It's true. That you may be right in your reference to Western Europe but as far as this country is concerned I think I gave
you the figures of trade seven tenths of one percent for all of the Eastern countries including the Soviet Union but I think probably a bigger factor in the rapprochement which is coming into being I think between the US and the USSR. Perhaps China. Senator Mansfield one of the things that you had mentioned during your speech regarded exchange programs with students between Soviet Union and the United States I'd like to limit this a little bit and ask your opinion on what future you see as far as cooperation in the space program goes and specifically regarding education the exchange students in science and technology. Well answering the latter part of your question first I would like to see a decided upswing in student exchange the first part of your question I think we've been spending too much money on space and I would like to see a cooperative effort in which not only the children doing but other countries to meet. Senator Mansfield is there is there any truth to the rumor that
you and Senator Scott made accompanied the president on his journey to China and if there is any truth to the reports. I wish you a speedy and rewarding trip. Well I kind of question I like. Thank you very much but there's nothing to the rumor although I must say that since Nixon has become president every now and again I have breakfast with him upstairs in the White House and of course it's not because he loves me but I happen to be the majority leader of the opposition party. Oh we get along very well. I like him personally but I don't first meeting he mentioned him a lot. What he was going to do about China in the Far East of course being from California. That's understandable because those watches come from the West look toward look over the Pacific rather than the Atlantic. And he said something had to be done because you just couldn't ignore a large
country of 800 million people. And he told me what are you going to do and he did indeed Tayla over the succeeding months. I once in a while he mentioned that he'd like to go to China but I don't think he ever had a thought in his head. In the beginning at least that he would go to China as a matter of fact he was making every effort and going out of the way to help me to go to China. But Mr. Kissinger rode that camel to Peking came back with the invitation and the president in a four minute address to the nation accepted it. And I'm delighted that he's going. I hope it's the beginning of a new era a bettering of relations between the two countries. And if I don't go with the president on his journey to Peking I don't expect I'd like to be one of the first. After he returns. Senator Mansfield the Middle East is an area of very possible confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. And recently you were quoted as saying
Israel should get down off its high horse and seriously consider negotiating a peace settlement. I say that statement if correctly quoted is refreshing and unusual. I would like to I'd like to ask you for an elaboration of that and ask you to comment on the objectivity of the press in reporting a role in the Middle East. Well outside of the high horse I have I would take that statement but I don't know what just sources for that particular high sounding phrase but I am I am in favor of the Rogers and Nixon approach to the Middle East. The approach being pushed by Assistant Secretary Sisko who appeared in this symposium some time ago which seeks to walk a line between the Arabs and the Israeli which seeks to maintain a balance of strength or power and which seeks to bring the
two together somehow someway someday those people are going to have to meet and work out their differences because there's a place for Israel in the Middle East. There's a larger place geographically speaking for the. Combined the Arab state. So I wish the administration Well it has my full support and I devoutly hope that the day is not too distant when if I may use your phrase. Both Egypt and Israel will get off their high horses and get down to bedrock. What has been the effect in the Senate or the activity in the Senate excited by Nixon's rejuvenation of the McCarren Act by executive order. And how does it look for that Senate bill I think it's 20 to none for me there I didn't know that he had revived the McCarren Act in exact Executive Order eleven 6 0 5. S A C being. Around.
To me. Again because it isn't a case of a not being revived if it's on the books it's a case of it being enforced right well there's a House House bill 969 and Senate bill 22 94 that are right now. I guess there may be a committee or an I don't know the procedure but they're in the working for an Act means for it for that executive order and they only first let me say that I think you're the fellow I want to have my job and I know. You're. Good to. Talk to. Say that seriously. Because he has done his homework. There is no bill of that nature on the calendar. None on which hearings have been held so a lot has happened perhaps is that it Bill has been introduced referred to a committee and there it lies. Do you see the US turning away from the United Nations as a medium for bringing about international cooperation. I don't think you should apply to a Congress what a very minute minority feels about
the United Nations and it's a very very minute minority. As far as our withdrawing from membership no one has any thought of so doing. As far as hearing through these subsidiary organizations the World Health Organization the Aiello the new drug control group you know it's going to like it is our intention to live up to our responsibilities financially and otherwise but I would beg you not to get the idea that the Congress has in its peak turned against the United Nations because of the fact that the United Nations on its own responsibility saw fit to admit defeat. Senator you spoke of the possibility for reduction of United States forces in western Europe on balance reduction by Russia and Eastern Europe. Isn't that assuming a certain amount of trust by the Russians of their socialist camp which has not been demonstrated as an instance of the
Czechoslovak invasion in 1968 which show that the Russians would not be willing to reduce their forces beyond a certain level in relation to the armed forces of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Well you you have a point. The Russians do maintain a number of divisions when you do I think in East Germany a number in Poland some injective Slovakia and two or four in Hungary. But I would imagine that the that the Russians would to give consideration to the possibility of pulling back some or all of those divisions under the appropriate circumstances. And I do not think their action is going to be based on the maintenance of three hundred five thousand U.S. troops in Europe or 1 million 300 5000 What will each do will be in our own interest. But I deplore the fact that a quarter of a century after the end of the second war that we have five hundred thirty five thousand military personnel independent still stationed in Western
Europe. And I believe with President Eisenhower It just happens I have something here. That there could be a sizable reduction and let me let me quote President Eisenhower in the Saturday Evening Post in 1963. This is a quotation though for eight years in the White House I believed and announced to my associates that a reduction of Americans bank in Europe should be initiated. I'm speaking of President Dwight Eisenhower. Should be initiated as soon as European economies were restored and they are restored. The matter was then considered too delicate a political question to raise is still being considered too delicate to raise. I believe the time has come when we should start withdrawing some of those troops and later on he said again it's a direct quote. One division can show the flag is definitely a step. Well I don't want to go down to one division yet but I think two divisions might be enough and
I would point out that in addition to that we have a brigade or at least a. A regimental team in Berlin. Furthermore most all of our European allies have reduced their conscription period to except perhaps for Greece and Turkey. Some are done away with conscription entirely. Their total amount of their gross national product is smaller than ours and France has withdrawn from NATO though it still has two divisions and a battalion divisions in southern Germany and a battalion in Berlin. Canada has reduced its forces by 1 happens you can reduce them still more. Britain is not offering it. It's not. Well none of the other countries are living up to their full commitments and as far as Portugal is concerned when a member of NATO it's concentrating on Angola Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique and not on NATO's.
So there are a lot of factors to consider plus this one thing. There are one hundred twenty eight admirals and generals in Europe one for every twenty three hundred men. That's a lot of a dispensation. There is a congressman and senators who complain that the president has too many powers especially in relation to foreign policy. On the other hand Congress is given several powers to the president on certain issues such as telling the president he can decide what to do about the nuclear explosion telling him he can decide what to do about the two as deferment and telling them what he can he can decide what to do about the economy. Could you comment on this this problem of giving powers away and complaining about
the Congress in the Senate especially at the time of Franklin D Roosevelt has voluntarily given up a good deal of its constitutional power to the president. And that has been you know we're trying. No we're trying to bring about a restoration of those powers. But just as it was easy to get into Vietnam and hard to get out. So was it easy to give these powers to the president and now it's hard to get them back. But frankly as you've indicated we have no one but ourselves to blame. And as far as I am concerned I'm sorry the the explosion took place. I think we've had enough of underground overground atmosphere.
A matter of fact both the United States and the USSR as enough in the way of nuclear capability to amount to about 15 tons of TNT for every living person in the world. Too much for Mansfield. What do you think of replacing the present draft with Universal. Not necessarily military service. If there is to be a draft it should be universal but it shouldn't be on the basis that it operates and has operated over the past several decades because too many college students for example because they come to college don't have to go. But the poor black and the poor white has to go. And some of the students have become professional students like it a lot in America until they reach a certain age were old were no longer eligible. There are other inequities too. So if you're going to have a draft system make it apply to all the lame the blind don't want to alarm you want to try to find something for you.
I'm time to let producer for the last Eisenhower TV's oppose him and with me is Dr. Milton assize now. Thank you for stopping him sir. I'd like to ask you one question that's what your expectations are for. The Symposium Americans of it really. Well first let me say that. I really do believe that we have a better opportunity at this moment to bring about an accommodation between the Soviet Union and the states than we've had any time in the history of the two countries. If you look at progress in the SALT talks minuscule as it may be the development of an agreement on Berlin the prospect of a security conference in Europe the desire of the Soviet Union to develop wholesome trade with the United States their expressed willingness. To work with us on problems of the environment and
perhaps in spades. I see us approaching the time of reaching sufficient understanding that ultimately we work together to build peace and world peace. Well these two nations will cooperate only if it is based upon genuine human understanding. And so I see this impost helping not only to create understanding among the students and faculty for Johns Hopkins but thanks to television and to the press and to the book that will follow. I see it helping bring new understanding in the people and states for the past hour you have been listening to Mike Mansfield the majority leader of the United States Senate discussing the Nixon administration and they taught a critical view. This program concludes the dilemmas of power series.
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Series
Dilemmas of power
Episode Number
11
Episode
Mike Mansfield
Producing Organization
Johns Hopkins University
WBJC (Radio station : Baltimore, Md.)
Contributing Organization
University of Maryland (College Park, Maryland)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/500-x921hm45
If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/500-x921hm45).
Description
Other Description
This series presents a variety of lectures on Soviet-American relations. The lectures are followed by informal question and answer sessions.
Topics
Politics and Government
Media type
Sound
Duration
00:59:05
Credits
Composer: Schwartz, Donald
Producing Organization: Johns Hopkins University
Producing Organization: WBJC (Radio station : Baltimore, Md.)
AAPB Contributor Holdings
University of Maryland
Identifier: 5495 (University of Maryland)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
Duration: 01:00:00
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Citations
Chicago: “Dilemmas of power; 11; Mike Mansfield,” University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed August 17, 2022, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-x921hm45.
MLA: “Dilemmas of power; 11; Mike Mansfield.” University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. August 17, 2022. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-x921hm45>.
APA: Dilemmas of power; 11; Mike Mansfield. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-x921hm45