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This is the fifth day of Sept and the 1961 conference and for the next hour and a half will be broadcasting the discussions live from the conference hall in Geneva park near Orillia Ontario. The conference is arranged by the Canadian Institute on public affairs in cooperation with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. And this year is considering diplomacy in evolution. Last evening our topic was the realities of war. Our topic tonight will be the realities of disarmament and I want to introduce the speakers the chairman of this evening session Frank beers of the CBC. Mr. Peters. Tonight our coaching conference takes up probably the most important and certainly the most baffling question before us this week. How do we negotiate just disarmament or how do we even begin to negotiate. We all recognize the dangers of our present situation so much so that many of us have been one refused to think very much about the problem and decide it is just too
complicated or too insoluble. We pounce on the sports pages or turn the dial and our attention to Have Gun Will Travel. Then as Chris just said the other day the disarmament experts themselves have got stuck in the talks like flies in the molasses and we sigh and say whatever will be will be. But of course we know this is not good enough. The stakes are far too important for us merely to bury our heads. We know this even before we are told by an expert such as your own the reason there that the arms race is allowed to continue its accelerating pace. Our country meaning the US will have less security not more with each passing year. Now let me promise you that in the next hour and a half we can get some idea of the realities of disarmament. The situation as it is today an explanation of some of the main proposals that are before us and some of the conflict conflicting viewpoints that are current. You're going to
do this with five speakers on the platform and yet bring in some questions from the floor. Stay with us and see how this is done. Our distinguished guest who will lead off tonight his generals are Jeffrey born who in 20 minutes will outline the situation as he sees it. He will be followed by the four other speakers before each of whom will make a specific comment or proposal and a period of five minutes. Then we'll throw it open for discussion and also questions from the floor. Many of you were introduced to General born last night two years ago he was coming down to the Imperial Defense College and in the post-war years he was General Officer Commanding first in the British sector of Berlin then of the 16th Airborne Division. He was director of operations in Malaya prior to Malaya and independence and if you recollect still another trouble spot he was commander in chief of the British forces in Cyprus and the Middle East just as late as 1957 Jeffrey is now retired from the Army
and he's serving as director general of the aluminum Development Association headquarters in London. Ladies and gentlemen I give you general subject. Ladies and gentleman I should explain that although I feel I'm friends here today I ought perhaps reveal to you that I am not an expert on disarmament. If I had been asked to speak on the fence I have been on my home ground have I been doing it for 37 38 years and I might have been able to speak with more assurance. But a fortnight ago I was asked to speak on disarmament and so I've been making it up and I find it extremely interesting and it has rather gripped me. And so although I'm not going to say anything very startling I would like to show you that what I do say I say with complete assure and sincerity.
The first thing is we live in a divided and dangerous world. Why don't we start to disarm the dangers of an uncontrolled arms race in nuclear weapons are growing and the mere amassing of military power. As Mr. Frank has just said will no longer or not much longer give us security. Both the West and the Soviet have produced outline plans for general comprehensive and complete disarmament. General in that they apply it would apply to all countries comprehensive in that they would embrace all weapons and all kinds of forces and complete in that they would aim to reduce national forces to zero. Except for those required for internal security. The West has also insisted that any such general disarmament plan must be controlled first to ensure that our obligations are respected and second to keep stability by maintaining a level balance of power throughout the phases.
Why don't our governments make even a small start towards this aim and remove step by step the terror under which we live the terror which is called the balance of terror. And what you heard about last night from Dr. Henner kissing it. Now before I go to get down to the actual plans which have been considered I'd like just to perhaps remind you a few basic considerations on the subject. The first is that although an arms race is a rather terrible thing it by no means automatically leads to war. We have examples of the Anglo German the Anglo French naval race of the last century the Anglo-American naval race. Another example is the Anglo German naval race between nineteen hundred to a nineteen hundred fourteen. Many people thought that that led to World War One.
But it's extremely doubtful if that was the main factor. There were other power factors operating and if you come to the phase just before World War Two and you consider the arms position I think you might agree that the fault lay in the opposite direction that we did not keep up in the arms race that we allowed Hitler to get ahead. The French the British and the Russians could be accused of not amassing sufficient obvious power to prevent Hitler from launching his great gamble. So it's by no means an automatic process. It's not automatically certain that an arms race leads to war. Another point although the new horror weapons have made a lot made general war nuclear war no longer a logical extension of policy by other means. There are great risks of small wars growing in the big ones.
The stakes are very high quite out of proportion to the pre-war scale. As I mentioned last night. So the success or failure of disarmament agreements and the results of arms races from history are really in my opinion hardly relevant at the present moment. I don't think it's much good looking back. Another point. A world almost completely disarmed under a general design and agreement except for internal security forces would still not be a safe place. If the rivalry is continued it would still be possible for an aggressor to have to attack and defeat an enemy. And I'm afraid that would happen and if one country concealed under a general disarmament agreement in which nuclear arms were abolished concealed only a few hydrogen bombs it could blackmail and dominate the world.
An inescapable implication there for a general disarmament is surely for the nations of the world to set up a supra national government and some machinery for keeping the peace. And for that well government to maintain a truly international police force. But I have to call it a fire brigade with integrated contingent of Navy Army and Air Force. And don't forget that it's not an easy thing it's a highly complicated business it's not yet been fully examined. But just one point about it and that is that that international fire brigade would have to be strong enough to beat the strongest nation and for a long time to come it would definitely have to have nuclear weapons with means of delivery. In other words missiles and hydrogen bombs
are a long way from that. Now the rest of the Russians and the West have both had missed admitted at various times that this is the logical and final solution to internal international security. But of course it means that nations will have to give up large chunks of their sovereignty as to the world government. And this is a very long way from the present United Nations and it's a long way from the small embryo United Nations emergency forces that we've seen so far. Under these conditions what is our immediate aim. Surely it must be to improve international security. And how is international security threatened. It's threatened by two things. First of all this arms race between the Soviets and the Western powers which though at present fairly stable and perhaps getting more stable of Dr. Henner getting it told us last night but could
get out of balance at any moment. For example the invention and successful application of an anti-missile missile would wreck the stability. So it's not we can't count on the stability for it to continue. And secondly the second thing which threatens us. Are the dangers arising from an expansion of the nuclear club. The End Class problem as you know you've heard about it. Imagine what security would be like if we had not three or three and a half atomic power but 10 or 20 in a few years time. Imagine the complications and the added risks of that. Now our efforts to reduce these risks so far have fallen undertook two categories. First these plans for general disarmament which I have mentioned and secondly partial measures often described as arms control.
I won't describe the plans in detail because that would take a long time. And anyway you only have to read the pamphlets in the newspapers find out the details have all been published. I only mention the difference the difference differences between them between the West and the Soviet. Now as to general disarmament Mr cristóbal put forward two plans to the United Nations one in 1959 and one in 1968. The west have put forward their comprehensive plan also and in June 1960 the Americans but the last Western plan in which they took account of Russian points of view. In this very complicated and enormous task the West would prefer to advance step by step. Beginning with modest but important steps their plans therefore have been faced and not tied to a strict timetable. Because it's quite impossible to estimate how long the various stages would take.
They hope by this method to improve the international climate and so to make possible bigger steps in the future. And then the later phases the Russians have recently admitted that Christians of the original great disarmament plan in four years was a complete washout quite impossible. As for example they mentioned that it would take more than four years to set up the inspection control system merely for a nuclear test but they gave the show away when they admitted that you cannot reach a general disarmament plant in four years. Take a great deal longer than that. Now we have pivot to the west have insisted on two principles. First disarmament in its various phases must give equal security throughout. This means that disarmament must be balanced especially as between Convention on nuclear weapons which must be reduced stage by stage parallel to each other.
And incidentally the Russians agreed to this also that they haven't produced it in their plans. And the second thing on which we insist is that there must be international control and supervision to make sure that agreements are carried out. The West is not prepared to rely on words alone nothing less than the liberty and survival of the world is at stake as our British prime minister Macmillan has put to the General Assembly last September. Quote in the vital matter of national survival. It is not enough just to sign agreements we must be assured. So therefore we insist on supervision by inspection and control right from the beginning of any plan. Now the Russians on the other hand are deeply suspicious of any inspection apparatus or control apparatus today regard as a form of espionage to penetrate the security of their country. And you realize of course that they've got security in their countries and we have not got it enough. When you got to go
around reading the notice boards to find out where the British Army is and I dare say you can do the same with some other armies. They fear that if any agreement is reached on any measure of disarmament or control in the first days the West will perhaps then find a pretext. Possibly they might say the inspection control is inefficient they'll find a pretext for calling off the later phases and progress that toward complete disarmament. So the Russians have always insisted that they must be given a promise to go right to the end of the disarmament plan right through before agreeing to any control system. So here we are in a dilemma. However the British Commonwealth prime ministers meeting in March 1961 examine this problem with great care and they issued a statement which I won't quote but they did come to the conclusion that it would not be
impossible with goodwill and confidence and trust to find a solution to this dilemma. I think possibly the sort of thing they were thinking about was signing two treaties. The first a general one with a promise to go right through to the end to complete disarmament at the same time signing a separate treaty and more detail Drita for phase one something they felt could be arranged. I don't think it would be impossible but of course you have to have a thing called trust and confidence with a capital S.. I just finished off the story about general disarmament. The Geneva 10 nation disarmament committee met. The Russians put in a plan and they walked out within three weeks. They walked out. Three weeks is not very long to consider a general disarmament plan. They walked out without any reason at all and the Americans submitted a revised
Western plan on behalf of the West based that a lot of their own previous ones but counting taking account of Russian points Russian views on the day after the meeting closed I was never there to receive it. And that Geneva 10 PA committee has not yet met again. At the present time Mr. McCloy I was a friend of mine when he was high commissioner in Germany I used to play tennis with is now leading the American delegation and talking privately to the Russians which I think is a very good way of doing it and trying very hard to get talks going again. The atmosphere is not very good now is to pass all measures. As a predominant danger present live in the threat and use of nuclear weapons and it's clearly a long haul before we can possibly reach any general disarmament agreement. But if serious attempts have been made to limit the risks at the present situation of the present situation and to reach agreement
on little bits of the problem. Rather like our Mr Annan is dead and used to nibble away at his foreign affairs problems he said if I can gain a little peace by one bit at a time that will suit me. At the same time if we could possibly advance step by step on various items which I give you a list of it would be again it would be a first modest step. Here is a list which might be taken separately or might become a package of partial measures. Incidentally these partial measures are very often gathered together under the name arms control. They prohibit weapons of mass destruction in outer space. It shouldn't be difficult to direct the file every time a space vehicle goes off it's no secret about it shouldn't be difficult be measures against surprise attack. That is by no means impossible.
There were talks about it some time ago. Not at all and for all but cut off. See limitation and balancing of conventional forces. That's been done before. It's been done with naval forces quite successfully. Di got a lot of fissile material and conversion of existing stockpiles of fissile material to peaceful uses. Getting more difficult but not impossible. And last but by no means least and certainly not last in order of time. A ban on nuclear tests. For the past two and a half years the three nuclear powers have been engaged on this last problem. The scientist as you heard from Mr. Richard called it and it two evenings ago got along very well on a professional basis. So did the civil servants. So did the official diplomat at the meetings.
And they actually after two and a half years a very hard and laborious work which other people in this room know more about than I do reached agreement on the contents of the treaty. They even agreed on how to run a control system. There would be 15 control post each manned by international technicians 30 of them. Two thirds of foreigners in each country regulars like to gather evidence of nuclear fallout 3 inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union and vice versa with no right of veto. Not entirely satisfactory but a big advance on anything previously agreed. Unfortunately all this unprecedented agreement on principle and even on detail have been completely vitiated for the time being at any rate by the new Russian proposal to impress as a tripartite system at the executive level on disarmament and inspection and Contro. This is of course parallel to a similar proposal to substitute three men in case of a
single secretary general of the United Nations. It's a parallel proposal although these troika proposals have been wrapped up as a sop to neutral opinion. Including always a neutral man. It clearly is a backward step because it involves the official power of veto and restores the power of veto to the communist to paralyze international action in any direction which they think desirable. And we've had plenty of that 95 uses the veto in the Security Council for the last two years. This was a real disappointment because a nuclear test ban would have been achieved had four great advantages. First of all it's a good idea to start a nuclear test anyway. Secondly the ban would undoubtedly help stop the spread to the end spread of nuclear weapons to the nth power and stop that 10 or 20 nations having having nuclear forces and upsetting the
stability which is so important. The setting up of an inspection and control system which we had actually agreed would have been a splendid pilot scheme for other similar schemes in disarmament and lastly it would have been the first modest step in any disarmament since the end of. Since atomic weapons arrived. So there we are. We thought we'd overcome the technical scientific and many other difficulties. We'd agreed to have an indefinite ban on testing the atmosphere. We'd agreed to have a research program to cover to find out how to detect underground explosions. We degreed the control inspection system. However the Russians changed their tactics. Not for the first time. Indeed I think it's the only consistency is to be able to change their tactics without blushing. Anyway that is my experience in Berlin because we used to pursue a zigzag course
and now they've turned the whole problem of the nuclear test ban which had reached such a promising point back into the middle of the United Nations where we all know how it will sound. In my opinion as a side aside to this little part of the problem in my opinion the Russians have missed the boat. It's their mutual interest to stop to the nuclear arms race. It's their mutual interest to agree on a test ban. And while they've been taking all this time and now they've stopped the thing in the meantime we've had one more power added one more tonic power added namely the French and they've got to wait a little longer. Go on negotiating like that and we have some more. This brings me to the point of urgency. I think Dr kissing I mentioned this last night if not I'm going to continue with scientific invention and technical knowledge or technological innovation is making the control problem more difficult and more complex
as the years go by. At Birkenstock recently a joint meeting between the American assembly and my own Institute of Strategic Studies a London body they agreed this quote The next generations will not forgive us if we bequeath them a world of many nuclear powers and of space weapons. Or a weld which dwells in constant fear sudden or accidental war simply because the major industrial powers are divided by divided by alien concepts of society. It's getting a put it in a book. The rate of technological change continually outstrips the pace of negotiations. Whatever might have been the prospects of the Baroque Lilian Taub plan of 1946. For controlling nuclear weapons the number of those weapons and the size of stocked stockpiles now makes inspection impossible. Similarly we
might at one time have stopped being able to arrest the proliferation of rockets. That's all in the past tense now. But we haven't got very long. Now there's one bright spot on this rather gloomy summary of the present position. At least I feel it's a bright spot and that is the question of neutral opinion. After about nine years a spasm Modric and apparently rather fruitless talks on disarmament and arms control they don't seem to have got very far. But the neutrals the uncommitted powers as they're called now outnumber both the West and the communists in the United Nations. And now that the Russians have proposed that both United Nations administration and any disarmament control system should be administered by trinities consisting of one communist one west and one neutral individual. It seems the design of
discussions in the future likely to take place with strong neutral representation at the conference table. My own view is that this although it will not accelerate and might even slow up the actual rate of achievement will the same time to something in the nature of a spur to a continuation of discussion any agreement on disarmament must of course be reached between the two super nuclear powers. But I can't help feeling it's a good thing for them to be kept talking at it. Talking is better than shooting. Now Canada at this point I speak with some humility because I don't know Canada well that I've visited a number of times. Canada in my opinion is in a very strong moral position as a leader of this neutral opinion. After all Canada is a highly industrialized and very scientific nation.
And it could perfectly well have decided a number of years ago to make not only the bomb. But the means of delivery and it could have quite a respectable nuclear strike force now if it had been policy. The policy has been different its policy has been to work. As an agent for peace and it had great influence at the United Nations. You want to have a Canadian politician here to speak on this subject someday like my friend Mr Lester Pearson but his influence and other influence of the Canadian government have been very strong indeed. I know this from personal experience and it's very largely due to Canadian effort that the successful United Nations emergency forces have been assembled and have been successful. Admittedly that's a very much smaller problem to look after the Gaza line and to do something somewhere else that's in the Congo than it is to tackle it is a problem but I think
it is very well qualified to walk bravely into this business. Now my own country the UK I must lay out how many how many minutes ago a couple of minutes has I think some right to be in the forefront of our moment to disarm discussions. First of all it had a lot to do with the invention of this beastly weapon and it still has a nuclear strike force. And secondly it is not just talked about disarmament but done a hell of a lot about it. I won't go into the details except to say that in spite of the fact that Great Britain has still very great commitments. And what I call an extremely important part of defense against the communists namely in Middle East Asia and Southeast Asia and NATO for that matter the fact remains you had reduced our forces over the last four years from seven hundred twenty thousand four hundred eighty five and the still going down. I really deeply regret the national service element that's to say the conscript element has dropped from a quarter of a million to
13000 and in parenthesis I'd like to say that I regret that also very much because the fine fellows I had and I had him in my lap I had him in Cyprus and they fought just as well as a regular us. No conclusions or would it be better if we left. If I put my conclusions in which are rather general into the thing related at a later time in the discussion except now say one thing and that is I've got some conclusions do I think the outcome very well lately but I would like to emphasize this point that when we're talking about national and international security the two things defense policy and disarmament policy the opposite are the two sides of one single coin and the two things go together. And in my opinion it's high time that the two these two vital subjects for our security should be dealt with by the same men in each country.
Hard time we did that the United States are beginning to do this. I don't think I can say the same for other countries. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the arms race is a very very dangerous business. Indeed there isn't a great deal of time left to us before the complexity is of these weapons of mass destruction. We'll sort of take charge of us and run away with it. Security will not be given by continuing the arms race and it's up to not only governments but to private opinion mobilized perhaps by coaching conferences in this country and I should like to think by parallel to teaching conferences in the communist side of the world to discuss these problems and reinforce the view and the actions of their governments in no uncertain terms a
bit. Now that to find analysis of the realities of disarmament was given to us by general subject reborn. To carry our discussions a step further now I introduce a well-known American writer and advisor in the field of foreign policy. Mr. Marshall Dr. Marshall is a graduate of Texas and of Harvard. During the war he was not in the U.S. Army and later a member of the State Department policy staff has since undertaken a variety of assignments for example last year. He was alumni visiting professor of International Studies at the University of North Carolina. Mr. CB Marshall thank you. My role is the uncertain one of commentator a lady down in Georgia being asked her opinion on commentators said she likes sweet taters a little better. That puts me in mind to say something nice now about Sir Geoffrey's talk.
Charles a second said he admired virtue even if he could not emulate it. Americans feel the same way about the lucidity of British style and its reserved as well as an instance of British style. I recall the three Englishman sharing a train compartment where they kept their reserved by me one book matters by giving his name saying he was a brigadier married had two sons. Both are German. The second did likewise again a brigadier married two sons. Both solicitors The third said he was a pub keeper unmarried had two sons both Brigadiers. So do we. Excellent presentation. Suggest to me this perspective all collective undertakings embrase to General pieces in one. The problem is to establish a frame of reference to get a
resolution of will to establish terms of agreement and commitment and then a pattern of action to make them actualities. The second arrives when these things have been done. It embrace is the task of applying and to belly sing the procedures. Buckley agreed to in the first the first phase sketchily put is that of politics. The second is that of administration. It is in the pursed. The purposes are at issue. Values at stake and men are engaged in the onerous business of weaving a common purpose. Only after resolution of will on these matters do we move into the realm of administration to the application of common Will case by case to give effect to that which has been decided. One of the easiest fallacies
one to which men of goodwill are most prone is that of thinking that the normal feasible thing is to jump right into the middle of the second phase just by wishing it will. If men were angels this would probably always be feasible. But men are in the human condition under an impulse of goodness. An urge for. And inherent harmony of interest many people and there are some here in this conference often get impatient of the political aspects of life more likely than not they try to I'll beat its requirements by creating a sort of dream world by imagining that of all power to decide. We're just in the hands of people sharing their point of view. Then the onerous process is of politics could be step stepped or equally all when they take refuge in a system of analogy imagining the issues of international
politics into some sort of frame of metaphor treating them as if they were like the problems of marriage. The bridge table or commercial transactions to name a few examples that I have heard here this week. The analogies do little good. The world of politics has a character of its own moral where you and I do a little good by saying that its problems paradoxes and anxieties are miserable and mean for us and that we prefer to walk by on the other side of the road. Somebody is still going to have to take care of them. Now the great problem is that is you disarmament test ban and so on have lingered on and on in the political phase and have not been susceptible of being moved as yet into the administrative phase. And it is vain for any of us merely to exhort to think we should be
different and that the problem we should not even be the kind of problems that they are in fact anguish and deploring. I'm not going to help much if at all. A root of the problem is that the problems at the POE didn't just weapons should be the root of the problem is they propound difference I should say about its character and how to go about it. The West's position is that the problem of the prodigious weapons should be walled off from the profound political divisions. The basic conflict of Outlook purpose and interest affecting the relations between the great powers that this must be done by creating a structure of trust. A pattern of enforced assurances to operate in this field even though it may be missing from other aspects of the relationship. The adversary position. Simply put is this script the structure of trust. Skip the procedures. Just
get the thing done. Don't bother with method as Sir Geoffrey's implies. This looks like a propaganda approach. Pure and simple but it reflects also the reluctance of a closed system to open itself up to an inspector rate. I think we can at least However credit the communist side of this issue with a curious candor. The statement of the Communist leaders of the 81 countries meeting in Moscow last November called disarmament a fighting slogan in the communist effort to overcome other interests outlooks and purposes premiere of Khrushchev's speech of January 6 last called it an effective factor in the fight against those disposed to counter the communist thrust. Both documents make explicit the point that disarmament is in the
communist view to be a means of forwarding the defeat of their opponents. And I think there in lies the basic point of this problem. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Marshall. The problem of disarmament inevitably is one that tension of scientists as well as foreign policy experts and military. One of the younger who was thought and written about the problem is John associate professor of chemistry at the University of Toronto. Dr. pursued his studies at Manchester University Princeton at the National Research Council of Canada. He attended the Pugwash meeting of scientists in Moscow in December 960 next month. He will be attending a follow up meeting in Stowe Vermont. General bones of expertise I feel I must point out that I'm a member of
the general public who has somehow strayed up onto the stage. I think that will become evident. There is I think general agreement that something must be done and done soon to control the arms race. General bone was most eloquent at the close of his remarks on that subject. General Bowen has discussed the two main contending policies which have been suggested to achieve this limited arms control on the one hand and complete disarmament on the other. He favors arms control is the more realistic objective. Disarmament appears to him I believe and certainly to Dr. Marshall to be by comparison utopian I should like to suggest that on the long view and it doesn't have to be a very long view at all it is arms control that is utopian not disarmament. The best we can hope for from arms control is a few more years in which to convince ourselves
and the Russians that there really is no alternative to disarmament. I would entirely agree with Dr. Marshall that the way to agreement on disarmament is not blocked by technicalities but by and willingness to pay the political price the political price for disarmament is high. It is nothing less than the renunciation of force as an instrument of diplomacy. East and West will only pay this price if they see absolutely no alternative. Now the Western powers have marketed a cheaper product. Limited arms control and are asking why pay more. I should like to try to explain why. Basically the objection to limited arms control is that it is a palliative with a very short period of effectiveness. I don't think it is generally realized
how short that period is likely to be. The arms control idea is this. Each of the great powers will retain a large arsenal of nuclear weapons in vulnerable to a surprise attack by the other. This is supposed to guarantee that a large arsenal will never be used. It is actually only a very partial guarantee. But let us suppose that we are prepared to accept it as sufficient. Both sides let us say feel fairly secure with stable deterrent as it's called and are anxious to restrict a useless and dangerous continuation of the arms race. Why should they not then agree to arms control. That is to say as Jeffrey said and inspected test ban or inspected demilitarization of outer space or an end to the production of fissile materials and so on. There are two major reasons why they may not agree. One is that the nations are still going to have to settle their
disputes somehow and that somehow means ultimately if the disputes warranted recourse to limited war they are therefore reluctant to enter into agreements that might interfere with their ability to fight a limited war. For example if the test ban talks break down it will be due I think in quite large measure to the pressure that Russian generals must be putting on crucial and American generals on Kennedy to resume testing in order to develop new limited war weapons. The second difficulty with arms control arises from the rapid pace of technological change about which you have heard from General bone and of which you are anyway well aware while we've been here coaching a Russian cosmonaut has even solved the seemingly impossible problem of eating a three course meal without putting on weight. Weapons technology will bring with it new threats to the stability
that is to say to be billeted of the deterrent. Paradoxically enough even though both sides may be wedded to the idea of stable deterrence both sides will be forced to work full speed to invent ways of destabilizing the deterrent force that the other side will destabilize it first to the other side's advantage. Or to put it differently we would rather there were no anti-missile device. But we are working hard on one to make sure that we get it first. What should the Russians do if we do get it. The anti-missile device. I'm just using this story as an illustration of my point. Should they simply prepare to use more missiles so that some will get past our anti-missile device. But that would contravene agreements to End production of fissile material or to End production of missiles themselves. Should they try to shorten missile delivery time by launching the weapon from satellites that would contravene
an agreement to demilitarize outer space. Clearly there is going to be a great reluctance on the part of east and west to enter into arms control agreements. The political prize in terms of inspection teams will therefore have to be very low indeed to make these agreements saleable. Still it is worth trying in order to gain some time however to imply as is frequently done that arms control can achieve anything but a short term alleviation of our difficulties. Is utopian in the extreme. Complete disarmament. It's true demands a willingness to accept a degree of supranational authority. Surely this is not beyond the bounds of possibility even though it rests on the hope that mankind can be persuaded to behave wisely in the interests of self preservation. I think I might just pause for a moment and ask Jeffrey whether he'd like to add a
comment to anything that Mr. Marshall has said or Mr. Pullman. So Jeffrey does encourage you just this moment a little except to say that I entirely agree with Mr. Marshall's observations about the jump straight into administration and how difficult it is. I agree with everything he said regarding Mr. Poleon is pointless. I would like to make this clear. And that is that although I subdivided the subject between general disarmament and partial measures Contro I did not put one in front of the other militant by one before the other. We British regard them as equally important. Fundamentally disarmament is the thing we're aiming at. But if we could achieve a step even a modest step as a pilot scheme particularly one which contains a successful control an inspection system agreed international system we would regard it as a great gain and that is why I delegated somewhat on the abortive and that it disappointing without
regard to the nuclear test ban. Thanks thanks said Geoffrey. And one of the most difficult things to do because it is the most practical for this audience is to suggest what kind of his position should be. Is there any initiative we should take. I'm hoping that Mr. John Holmes might have something to say on this as many of you know Mr. Holmes was assistant secretary of state for external affairs before taking his present position of president Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Mr. John Holmes Mr. Chairman I am in a dilemma I agree with very much with Sir Geoffry summary of the present situation difficulties and also with point which Mr. Marshall has made. I also have the greatest respect as always for Mr. Pallone. I agree with him that arms control can be only a palliative. But I do think we have to as I think he agrees also look seriously at it. The trouble it
seems to me is that we can hardly avoid the conclusion we come to the end of the road insofar as our disarmament negotiations along traditional lines are concerned. There are reasons why these negotiations have made no headway are not simple they are very very complex. I agree with Sir Geoffrey that the Russians have reversed their policy without blushing. But I do think in all honesty it would be difficult for us to deny that the Western positions were also frequently reversed. And I think we should say we here because Canada as you know is a member of the five car subcommittee which worked for a long time on this subject and I feel that as one who very often drafted statements explaining why for instance we were at one time convinced that the linking of nuclear and conventional disarmament was essential and at other times it was highly immoral. About the only way I can be one up on the Russians is to blush. However there are no formula to explain why the negotiations didn't get on.
And I don't think it's enough just to say that it was because the Russians simply used them to make propaganda so did we. During the sessions of the five car subcommittee all five of us played a kind of musical chairs for months. We knew the conference was going to fail. We had to keep maneuvering however so that the break up would occur at a time when the other guy was caught without a good explanation to set up. But on the other hand it's just as Pat and shallow I think to say that they failed because they were sabotaged by Pentagon generals. I know for a fact that President Eisenhower. I intervened at times and his influence was considerably greater than that of the generals. None of these glib explanations is adequate. And in spite of my apparently cynical comments about the negotiations I don't think it's fair to say that they failed because of a lack of will on the part of the participating governments. The talks failed. Not really because we wanted them to fail but because we could never come to grips
with any proposals which were remotely applicable to the world situation as it existed then and now. I agree with Jeffrey that the major reason for the failure of these negotiations has been the Soviet desire to have a kind of disarmament which would help them most in their plans to widen the area of communism in the world. And I don't agree with you Jeffrey but I agree with Mr Khrushchev that he doesn't mind because Mr. Khrushchev has said this very clearly to us now we in the West. Mr Christoph has made it quite clear I think that he wants an agreement on disarmament. He does not want to end the agreement on disarmament or anything else which would stabilize the present balance of forces. Whereas we in the west are more willing or at least we convince ourselves we are more willing to settle for stability and the acceptance of present positions. But we must be desperately honest with ourselves. Are we prepared to settle for the status quo for for instance in Germany. The Russians can't settle for stability because there is a dynamic philosophy. Is our
Western philosophy static. Don't we hanker to make a few more yards. I think the reason we have to look very clinically at our own interests and those of the Russians is that US are Jeffrey said. We must at least push on with some partial measures. We can't have disarmament on a substantial scale. We will have to try to find some feasible measures of control which would take some of the grave danger out of our perilous situation. And I think any such agreement if it is to be accepted by the Russians will have to be one which they and we both consider gives us room for maneuver and expansion. In fact if it doesn't sound too cynical I think we both have to enter into such agreements in the hope on each side that within its framework we could each outsmart the other. Now the question arises as to what part Canada might play in furthering agreement. I think Sir Geoffry has made us all realize the responsibility which there is on us. Perhaps in the general way we might do by broadening the base of our disarmament proposals
I think that the leadership which the Canadian government is taking now on pressing for disarmament does give us the opportunity to press also for study of arms control schemes of various kinds not as substitutes for disarmament I assure you Mr. Filani but something which we can work on. At the same time. And I think we ought not to insist too narrowly on a revival of disarmament negotiations on traditional lines. I was very pleased to hear Sir Geoffry say that he thought that the neutral states could play a very useful role I think it is important to involve them to give them a sense of responsibility for these things. And I do think there pressure can be useful. I'm not quite sure of either Sir Geoffry was including a candidate as a leader of neutral states. And in spite of the fact that I was reported as pressing the other night for a constructive neutral isn't there as I had said constructive nationalism I do not consider can of they can really be described as a neutral state. There is one kind of arms control measure I think one of the more possible and feasible ones in which Canada might play a
role. So Jeffrey has mentioned this particularly he's spoken of the desirability of limiting the members of the nuclear club. And this is a measure which might best be achieved by the initiative of those countries which have not at the present time but might soon expect to have nuclear weapons. Now if Canada is going to reverse its intention to have nuclear weapons and as you know there is still that debate in the country on this subject I think it would be wise to do so within the framework of a general international agreement. Now of course to do this would mean a very very difficult choice for candidate A choice of obligations on our part because we have defense obligations with our allies to accept these weapons. And Mr. Jeffrey has said defense and disarmament policies are two sides of the same coin. I don't push propose here to argue which course we should follow it with regard to nuclear weapons it's much too broad a subject but merely to suggest that a Canadian rejection of nuclear weapons I think would be in itself quite purposeless unless
we exploit it to secure an international agreement limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. If by our rejection we could help achieve this and it might be argued of course that we were thereby serving better the strategic interests of ourselves and our allies and by adding our small nuclear weight to their defenses. But it's no contribution to disarmament to reject nuclear weapons for a candidate in order to give ourselves a high moral glow. The real problem is that of Soviet and US nuclear weapons and we can't contract out of that world dilemma with a gesture which is really a very limited consequence. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Holmes. I suggest again whether he wants to say a word you prefer to hold it until the next day. No I enjoy it it's got to be willing to survive. Now I turn to a man who by now is also
an old friend of the coaching conference Mr. Ritchie Calder those who were with us for his opening address to the conference. Remember that in addition to being perhaps the best known science writer in the English speaking world Richie Calder is now professor of international relations at the University of Edinburgh. During the war he was director of plans of political warfare in the British foreign office and in the years since then he's been a member of many missions in Britain he was vice chairman of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Mr Ritchie cult. Well as the chairman has said I'm the vice chairman of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament to which the adjective unilateral has been added not by us but by opponents and we now wear it like a chef and accept it as a complement just as a civil society friends don't object to being called Question. My answer is the first on the nuclear aspect of all of disarm all of
arms control. You may have noticed a difference of Geoffrey's package he put it forth on the list as he said it was a comprehensive package and he wasn't putting it in terms of priority but I want to put it in terms of priority. I would put it first for reasons of down mention present. But I should also explain as we say in House of Commons of London one at least I must declare my interest in either direction. I'm also on the executive of the British United Nations Association and I campaigned very vigorously for general to fall in this posing of unilateral. The other side called multilateral. Indeed I can't see it anyhow. Anyway why an emphasis on ultimate weapons the nuclear weapons destruction in any way for the purposes of multilateral to some in our campaign on nuclear disarmament and in the edge bomb. We have catechize rise and caricature
of the nuclear bomb we've identified it with the ultimate futility of war and I'm sure you all agree and I discussions here everyone except you. That's why we've made people aware as they have never been before about the nature of all weapons of mass destruction including any excessive conventional weapons which may have been developed since the last war. If anyone says to me biological warfare is was my answer is less than what was western what we have made in the West is a chemical walk. As people say maybe was less than what. I think with some and I think I did it with some consistent and rational knowledge about scientific biological and psychological consequences of nuclear weapons I do insist against all disclaimers that differ not only in magnitude and my goodness the magnitude but also different in kind and what is more and this is one of our positions in the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament. They're not a positive peacetime hazard. Even a we think they may never be used and that nuclear war is we think it's I would as an act of policy. That's why I insist that nuclear weapons are not just part of the package deal of generalism and all of arms control but out of priority something you got just got to sweep off the chessboard or what is going to be a long drawn out game as I think most of us realize here tonight. This game incidentally and I've been pretty heavily involved and it has been going on for twenty four years already. Now let's get those things those weapons into the very front of us thinking and of our negotiations. That brings me to another point. We are in Britain and the campaign are insisting that Britain should take the initiative by renouncing the bomb as a diplomatic gesture. Remember that the conference is dealing with the promise of an evolution. We have it we
have made. We have the bomb. We've made it we've tested it and it still maintained it we have at least a limited means of delivering it effectively. But we were told by Mr. Jeffrey and indeed tonight again that it is better to get as many fingers off the triggers as possible. Well we're suggesting that we should remove one thing as a positive way of discouraging others from John in your club as members incidentally unwanted either by the USA all the USSR but in my view a far more important consideration is that Britain in this way and I repeat we're discussing here diplomacy in evolution. Britain in this way could take a powerful political initiative which is lost at least lost in relation to the other two great powers by being big enough politically to lead those uncommitted nations to have the courage to lead the uncommitted nation to form two thousand of the world and who have no direct engagement in the nuclear issues
except as a potential victim. This is in part the answer to the question which is put to me on the very first night of this conference about how to influence the attitude expressed as I told the story then by illiterate peasants who said that the atom bomb was a bomb which the white man dropped on the yellow and would never have dropped on the white. I do insist that here we are looking for all breakthroughs we are looking for our imagination we are looking for strength of purpose and in this. Going back to the illiterate Japanese peasant. There is a possibility that one PA who took a lead as Jeff has pointed out in the creation of the nuclear weapon one part might show the way might restore some confidence that and statesmanship. Now one last point. The logic of the case of those are those who feel that Britain should land unilaterally renounce the bomb as a proud general disarm also demand the logic that it also demands that Britain have
no part of a new I repeat nuclear nature that I got out of since I have been here quite a lot of people in Canada feel that that applies to Canada as well. Mr. Goddard what you say about British policy or what you hope it would become I see seem to detect differences between you and Jeffrey and also Mr. perhaps Mr. Marshall and I think you differ also from something that John Holmes said about Use the sense of Canadian renunciation of atomic weapons we haven't got them yet. If it weren't part of a general international pact I wonder whether any of the others speakers while were waiting to bring questions from the floor would like to challenge Mr. Calderon any of the points me Jeffrey would you and say at this stage.
Well I don't think we want to get into a long discussion. About the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament because it's been going on in my country now for as you know very well now for a long time. I don't like to make two points. First of all it is by Although I think I'm be the first to admit that political aspect is at least as important as the military. We've been hearing that day after day and it's accusing it mentioned because it has said it last night. I'd be the first to admit that. And it's a gesture of that kind. Where to have an effect on the disarmament problem. I must admit it would appeal to me. But although I stressed the coming increasing importance of neutral opinion uncommitted opinion. The fact is that they do not possess the weapon they are not interested. They are not although interested at a distance they are not in fact protagonists in this dreadful power
struggle which is got to be resolved. And if I thought that British renunciation of nuclear strike would have any effect on this to Khrushchev at all I might begin to think it was a good thing but I'm absolutely convinced in the opposite direction and the other point is that as Mr. Coulter said it does renunciation of the British nuclear power would automatically affect our participation in NATO. And I'm afraid it would lead to the not the destruction but the falling apart of NATO which we simply cannot afford at this point. In fact it was said in Great Britain not long ago that the logical. Corroborate to unilateral disarmament on the part of nuclear disarmament on the part of Britain was that we would have to take full out of the new NATO alliance. And I don't agree with that. Mr. Pollen you want to contribute and I'd just like to quarrel a bit with you Mr. Chairman. I think it is possible to disagree with Mr. cold and yet agree with Mr.
Holmes this is a pretty complicated set up. What I mean is that in my view to come to the point I don't believe that it would serve a useful purpose for Great Britain to renounce nuclear weapons because I feel that this would be interpreted around the world not as a moral gesture but as an economy move or a tactical gesture and in fact if it ever came to pass it would probably be both of thieves and because it would not be interpreted as a moral gesture. It would not have any effect on the policy of say France or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China by Israel by Egypt and so on. So in this I disagree with Mr. calls I while agreeing with him that and Mr Filipe who spoke the other night that it ends are not everything I mean means mean something and that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has done a good job of education which is valuable. I hope it doesn't succeed and it's well now turning to Mr.
Holmes. I don't want to talk too long but one can agree with him and say that Great Britain should not unilaterally divest itself of its nuclear weapons but it does not follow from this that Canada should frivolously obtain them. Well Mr Calder should have a chance to say something but I think he will have the results of the questions the audience from the audience and I'll just remind him that he may want to settle a score or two. That's all right after we have the first question from the audience may I suggest that you take questions from the two aisles if possible in turn. Speak into the mike but not too close about 12 inches away I would suggest and most particularly would you indicate who you want to deal with your question when you when you have phrased your questions now may I have the first question from
over here. First of all I should like to point out that I mean almost complete agreement with almost everything that is being saved. Well I say this because I'm going to strike a question at the panel and so I should not be accused of being a colonising for size. Can I suggest one question from each questioner we have a limited time. All right. Would like to ask Dr. Marshall. He has aptly pointed out that disarmament is in the Soviet interest which is also clearly to be seen from the SRD manifesto that was recently published. The proposal for the next communist Congress. Well if it is illegal to stop the Soviets let these armament become a reality. How are we going to rationally explain or make an attempt to explain so that these sort of years as far as our position indicates have sabotaged
these argument proposals and especially the nuclear test ban protocols. I am aware that I agree with Dr. Marshall. I want to point this out but there is this difficulty of trying a national explanation of why did the Communists act in the way they did. Or commercial. Well I'm not sure I appreciate the question but I'll try. I think it's true of dis armament as it is of peace that there's always general agreement on the purpose in view that the dispute develops over the conditions and the dispute is over the conditions of peace it's not over the question of having peace and deep difference between the United States and the Soviet Union or between the West I should say the Soviet Union is that with the conditions of disarmament I now I to could
perfectly clear that the Soviet Union wants disarmament under conditions which will forward a general set of political aims which they have put forward a little over and over again which we all very well I'm sure. And I think it's it's over this point that the the crux of the matter turns I don't know what there is so abstruse about this when it comes to explaining it to the world I think is perfectly clear. And on the other I can't see who it is from here. Certainly taught me a little curious that nobody on the planet have dead was the only concrete proposal or part from that moment to come from don't effect the cut and I have in mind that a plan which had been put cork several years ago could the Pano the trash are mine to write this proposal have been reductive by then and could not be ready by now.
This is a proposal for the removal of arms from certain border territories. According to reports the withdrawal of troops specifically from the communist satellite countries and from West Germany. Right now what speaker with should be asked I think. So Jeffrey you have something to say on that. Well I try very short if I may first of all I didn't include it in my talk because it's nothing whatever to do with this out. I don't I'm not being rude I'm just. Separate subject. It's a matter of limitation of forces in a certain area. And it was discussed ad nauseum three or four years ago in Europe as a hook but unfortunately the rapacity plan for removing forces and from that the threat of nuclear war in the middle of Europe. However why'd you make the barrier involves two things First of all the withdrawal of Russian forces and secondly the withdrawal of American forces.
The object of course behind the plan is to get the American forces out of Europe. That's a very serious consideration. I happen to believe I'm only giving a personal answer here but it I think it does care and side I happen to believe that they vehemently indeed that creation of military vacuums is a highly dangerous to seeding. I prefer a front like the Elbe where the Russians and the Americans have faced each other at three hundred yards rise for 17 years and they have not yet found a shot in anger across across the Elbe. I like a frontier like the one across the middle of Korea which is clearly definable on a platter and I like a line of mountains. I do not like a gap in the middle of a vacuum. If you create a military vacuum somebody will fill it. In this case it will be the Russians because they happen to be nearest. That is why I don't like that particular plan. Does anyone else on the panel disagree. That assessment Mr. Pollen.
I hate to put myself against Jeffrey on this point but my recollection was that the Republican plan in 1957 was provided for a denuclearization of Germany Poland and Czechoslovakia and not for a neutral area. And that in my feeling would be that this would be an extremely valuable thing. Forces would still be there in the way that Jeffrey describes it. But the danger of a limited nuclear war starting and escalating would be reduced and I wonder whether the Soviet Union might not find some reassurance in the fact that nuclear weapons were not in Germany. It was not new demilitarization is that right. It is only to be denuclearization whatever the word is.
Well all I can say following that discussion last night. The bigger the tennis the happier I am. This is one of those analogies that Mr. Marshall plaiting about. I want that kind of a plan was rejected by not only the British government but by the American government. Erupted for the reasons I gave admit that my description other attacks get that it may not have been deadly accurate record but there were other plans of that kind to have a sort of neutral area in the middle of Europe and I'm afraid it wouldn't work. I think it was not because I think it was not quite so firmly rejected by the media who certainly didn't approve the plan as it was put forward but who did feel I think that there was here the nucleus of an idea which was worth pursuing. And I think there have been suggestions recently in quarters which were previously very hostile to the suggestion that it might be worthwhile looking again at some of these possibilities because if you are going to have any kind of arms control
agreements you may have something arising out of a consideration of this kind. I've been hoping for a comment from Dr. Keith our very able chairman of last night who's technically qualified in this area. I wonder whether you might ask him to intervene now. How do you mean it's conduct you keep looking back to. And so and being one of the great specialists and. Who is trying to publicly they think that if freedom and peace in the world.
Then of the Atlantic community and there is another expert who will. MR. Who says that enemy each other. There has never been possible disarmament and he says there never will be today. There is possible under the Western Union idea that may disarm one against the other and we decide on the partial basis within a region.
What do you think of that. So you agree that a partial approach to disarmament. I feel rather than because I haven't studied Atlantic Union the talk of a new study design. You may well be right. I have great respect for Mr. McCloy's judgment. I'm afraid I counted and I think very useful. Now I mean we have come from. Doctor. Mr. Chairman I'd just like to make one or two comments on remarks that have been made. I couldn't agree more with the statement I think made by a virtue called that we must achieve a renunciation of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As an arm of diplomacy. We couldn't any of us disagree with that. But now let us face the.
During the period when America has had all the nukes. She has not used the availability of nuclear weapons in support of her diplomacy. She has never threatened to bury the only nation that has shown any sign of using their weapons to support diplomatic persuasiveness has been the Russian. When the Cooper incident caught up Mr. Crew shell was very quick to say or imply that if America moved into Cuba or didn't in that part of the world that they would have to face the consequences of the Soviet nuclear missile. Now we mustn't overlook. This is the basic difference between the sides one to one side. Aggressiveness is
unthinkable. Those who are interested in freedom are not aggressive people. The other side are basically aggressive types. It doesn't my complete to the reality of the disarmament problem and we must bear in mind because it's no use hoping freedom will be defended by wishes. And it's no use letting us feel that freedom is something that can be compromised. A second comment I'd like to make is a technical one. It's more to illustrate some of the dangers of generalization and a further two over further to face some of the technical facts of the Melissa situation we talk about wanting to ban all nuclear weapons. Total nukes. Now supposing
we got nukes it is armament but that we have done nothing at all at the same time about the gradual bouncing off of conventional. It stayed as it was today but we have reached a situation in which nuclear war just couldn't happen we couldn't escalate into nukes at all both sides would reject a pact to have no nuclear weapons at all. Now I've spent many years as I started off in 1937 specialists with a love interest and that took a contribution in the field of antisubmarine was. Not the front of the military situation today is that if there were no weapons of nukes the Russians could beat us in the mountains with an event a few months this is not arguable low have now a fleet of submarines nine or ten times as large
as Germany at the start of the war and all that happened since the law has been to increase the advantage of the subs. On to some courses now it's sort of a limited war to the crusher. Rely on no work. Nuclear weapons aside it is a certain as eggs is eggs that we would lose the law and the only thing that gives us any hope whatsoever of countering the Russian certainly is to eliminate bases by nuclear bombardment and their ability to have new challenges now are just as a simple plain fact there is no disputing this fount it is the clearest derivation from any study of the Miller situation but I'll just interject it as a warning against the mountain and the ideal of having
just one. Something produces a stability in another situation. And this side of the hole. Mr. Polanski has stated that he hopes the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain would fail. I would like to direct a question to me and to Mr. Caldera getting the opinion of this question. If Britain released one bomb being highly vulnerable and small as a target how many minutes would it be before Britain would cease to exist as a political or a geographical entity. Do you understand the question. Mr. Lane You mean well and I have seen estimates that perhaps four of the 20 megaton hydrogen bombs would be enough to
utterly disable and ruin Britain as a minor great power. I quite see that but I wonder whether the question is referring to the possibility of an accident because he mentioned if Britain released a bomb and did he know. And so yes it has bombs. Would there be no possibility of releasing them other than by accident. If not why have them now. If I was to collage here I must admit I don't. I still believe and I find it very different to begin to be convinced otherwise that a war or a nuclear war could in fact happen by accident. I know all that said all the things are being discussed and by golly they're getting more and more elaborate.
We've had about and him a soundless hours we're going to have anti anti anti-missile missiles miss out and we can go on indefinitely there but I think I might try to answer the question differently at it in fact. We're talking now about the independent of terror to Britain is in fact Britain where two years of the terror as was suggested in one hundred fifty. Defense policy as a means of stopping or intervening in a major incident in which the Russians use conventional forces that they were that we would in fact use nuclear weapons and we would have nothing else to counter what I do very strongly feel Peter's over and over again that this was in fact a very bad diplomacy and bad for Britain in the sense that we would never find that major incident but assuming that we did it you mean that in fact we used to have an independent thing. It's exactly like a sheriff going into a saloon and facing a lot of the
people I'm sorry Dr. Marshall Mr. Marsh I beg pardon. Correct me that night again last night by that Mr. Mouse wrong I'm sorry to make another analogy but the ship the sheriff who goes around with the six guns a six bullets in his revolver and faces a lot of desperadoes he fires his six bullets. And then he's had it and that in fact is the position of Britain and I would estimate 10 for 10. Well that's a judge say 20. I wouldn't say completely destroyed Britain for all practical purposes. Might I add that it does not interest British defense policy the fact that we like the United States might be destroyed. At the present time it's the British government's policy to have a balanced force of nukes striking power as well as conventional weapons. I happen to think that the most important power part of the British contribution to the Allied defense
lies outside Europe and other places where these little pinpricks can gain ground for the communist brothers very rapidly without a big war but it is British defense policy to be a loyal ally of nater and at the present time we contribute a highly efficient small deterrent force which the Russians cannot ignore the fact that we might be destroyed in the process does not influence us any more that it influences the Americans. Thank you for next question. I'd like to put a question to the panel rising out of the comments on a very important matter of international peace force which I think you said was a requisite. He said I think that both the Russians and the West for a final solution. SIMON I'm speaking about the Imus of course. I think he said that. Such a key slice would have to have nuclear
weapons and the means of their delivery. My question my first question is that whether it's so exactly how the panel did not think that the Cricut doctrine which the doctor mentioned in another context would not make it very difficult to have a workable international force that is with the Russians not insist on a command structure involving the top one with still one communist one west and could have a workable force with such a command structure. And my second question I think we have to take one question from the press. I would like to ask about the force and whether it should have nuclear weapons or not. So Jeffrey any comment on that and the other general observations you care to make. Well you give me the opportunity really to sum up what I was going to say the beginning if I may you was asked a question which is the end product of the reaching agreement on the general disarmament plan. That's to say the
setting up of a super national government plus an international force. And if anybody knows how to set up an international force and the machinery of Contro. He is going to be rather a brilliant man because the moment it's that it's not the force itself to disobey. It will be so much you can probably get loyal contingents. But what you cannot get amongst dissident disagreeing POVs is a machinery a committee any better than the present security committee without the power of veto. Amongst the disagreeing possible and that is the crux of the problem. But it is right beyond the discussion on disarmament which we've been having this evening. The only thing I'd like to say at the end is that having discussed very usefully the practical aspects and the possibilities of disarmament non-controlled under the present system and say and having to admit as I do that we have reached a very low point on the graph.
I would like to give you what I think is the reason Floyd why the Russians appear to be so disinterested in practice and design at the present moment and I believe you've been listening to a part of the Wednesday evening session of the 30th annual cooking conference coming to you live from the conference hall on the shore of Lake Ching Nira Radia UN Terrio. The conference is arranged by the Canadian Institute on public affairs in cooperation with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. SESSIONS continue tomorrow and Friday and to morrow evening the session and the broadcast will begin at 8:00 Eastern daylight time at an hour later this evening. Transcripts of the discussions will be available about two months after the conference ends and may be obtained by writing to the University of Toronto press Toronto five Ontario prices $2 demotivating the topic of discussion will be sovereignty and international control and the principal speaker will be the marshal Bob Wilson speaking this is CBC Radio the Trans Canada network. From the fourth Vancouver International Festival the CBC brings you a concert by Soprano your
god. Seyfried with the festival chamber orchestra and chorus conducted by Nicholas Goldschmidt. The concert is being presented in the Queen Elizabeth Theatre and on this recorded portion of the concert will be hearing works by Bach Ricard Strauss Mozart Handel and Percival to open the program the chorus will sing Bach's can Tata number one 18. Oh yes you creased mind Levens least. Of her. Oh.
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1961 Couchiching conference
Realities of disarmament
Producing Organization
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Canadian Institute on Public Affairs
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University of Maryland (College Park, Maryland)
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Episode Description
The fifth episode of the conference focuses on disarmament.
Series Description
The 1961 Couchiching Conference, a summer symposium on national and international affairs put together by the Canadian Institute on Public Affairs and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, assembles for its 30th annual meeting. The theme of the 1961 conference was "diplomacy in evolution."
Public Affairs
Media type
Host: Wilson, Bob
Producing Organization: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Producing Organization: Canadian Institute on Public Affairs
Speaker: Peers, Frank W., 1918-
Speaker: Bourne, Geoffrey
AAPB Contributor Holdings
University of Maryland
Identifier: 4989 (University of Maryland)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
Duration: 01:30:00?
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Chicago: “1961 Couchiching conference; Realities of disarmament,” 1961-08-09, University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed July 13, 2024,
MLA: “1961 Couchiching conference; Realities of disarmament.” 1961-08-09. University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. July 13, 2024. <>.
APA: 1961 Couchiching conference; Realities of disarmament. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from