1961 Couchiching conference; Sovereignty and international control
From Geneva park on Lake invite you to hear now a part of the Thursday evening session of the 30th annual coaching conference. The conference is a summer symposium on national and international affairs arranged by the Canadian Institute on public affairs in cooperation with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The theme this year is diplomacy and evolution and tonight's topic sovereignty and international control. Now to introduce the speakers here is the chairman of this evening's discussion James George high commissioner for Canada in Salon. Mr. George. This is the sixth. And next to last day of the Christian conference and already the concept of sovereignty is taken quite a beating. I don't know how it will look to us after Mr. CB Marshall and Mr. On that I think need to get through with it this evening. But in case you're afraid that a discussion of sovereignty and international control. Is going to get too philosophical.
Let me underline the subtitle of our discussion theme the CD the politics of interdependence. You can think of it that way if you prefer to. When we were discussing the politics of Independence on Monday evening Mr. John Holmes made the point that especially in these days it is not so much sovereignty that should preoccupy us not that is to say the negative role of defending our national sovereignty against all comers though that is very important. But the positive question of how we can make the best use of our sovereignty for our national and international purposes. To that I would add perhaps unnecessarily that it is not our sovereignty but our freedom. That is the essential. We may even find it in the highly dangerous world conditions described by speakers on
previous evenings when no nation can go it alone economically militarily or politically. We may have to contemplate in the future more delegations of sovereignty than we have found necessary even in this past 15 years. For instance if there is to be even a limited arms control agreement involving mutual inspection. We may have to accept this because the alternative curling up on ourselves like a porcupine under attack may be a good deal more distasteful to us and a less effective way of achieving our national goes. Diplomacy is a means it's an instrument. Diplomats don't make international conditions. We just try under instructions to cope with them. War any kind of war is a failure of diplomacy in
these new conditions. A high proportion of the diplomats time and energy is spent on what we can call multilateral rather than bilateral diplomacy. Most of my professional life has been on that kind of work at the UN or NATO and in Salon. I still have many multilateral questions to handle such as comparing notes with the government of salon on how to move on the Congo situation or some other problem before the UN or a forthcoming Commonwealth meeting on the Colombo Plan Council. It's that kind of word. Many of our urban population who used to have their own houses and gardens now have to live in those collective security arrangements against the weather that we can call apartment houses where diplomacy used to be concerned with keeping the neighbors
off the lawn. It's now often applied to getting the best terms we can for a self-contained unit in the co-operatively own apartment building of our choice. We might still prefer a private house but we can't afford it and it was a lot more trouble anyway. Neither Mr. Marshall nor Mr. on the Hill need any reintroduction to the conference audience who has the respect and admiration they have both won in large measure these last evenings. But for those of the radio audience who have not been with us before tonight we can promise you a fine performance from both the speaker and the commentator. Very different in style and approach. But both have high quality based on a rich and very practical experience. Speak to CB Marshall. Has enough government in
Washington to speak with knowledge and authority yet enough out of government to be free to say what he thinks. From 1950 to 1953 he was a member of the State Department's policy planning staff where the ideal is supposed to get married to the feasible. Then after a tour as advisor to the prime minister of Pakistan he has since 1957 been a research associate with the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research. Those who have read his book on the limits of foreign policy will relish the way in which he lends his punches on some of the favorite cliches of our times and members of this conference will also remember him as a born raconteur with a story ready for every occasion at any time of the day or night. Our commentator brings us the point of view
of a French socialist who has had long periods of ministerial car during the resistance and up to 1952 since 1956 he has been professor of comparative social politics at the University of Paris. He has written and lectured and traveled prodigious Lee and those who have taken him on in relays during this conference can bear witness to the impossibility of tiring him out. His vigorous assaults on our microphones have been good for all of us and a real contribution to the thinking of this conference. I hope Mr. Phillipe will not allow us tonight to rest in our North American preoccupations and perhaps he will help us with the question left over from Mr. Kissinger his remarks and Tuesday evening as to whether the European Common Market with or without the United Kingdom can be considered as a stepping stone
as a barrier to greater cohesion and cooperation among the Atlantic peoples. But I mustn't exceed my role as chairman. You know asking questions and I wish now to call on our speaker Mr. Marshall. With anyone. I. A few months ago I met in Washington with cement identified with the social and physical sciences. Some of them referred to the Cold War in the past tense anxious to get ahead to a tidy safe organized world. They also declared nation states obsolete. But all of these things abolished. They had an easy time of it and after a weekend of endeavor retaught could be bought off just about all of the solutions to just about all the world's problems. Please do not expect me here in 20 minutes to equal the performance of
that last weekend. If you do you call the wrong man. I not only believe the Cold War is still with us and expected to persist a long time. I did hope it will because under present conditions the only alternative. To it open to us. Is to relax submit. Give up the contest and I am against that. The nation state remains as a unit of decision. And sovereignty is not yet an obsolete concept. It is a troublesome word likely to obscure problems rather than to clear them up. And I have a point here only because it's in the titles selected for me by my hosts. I am not one of those polled to believe in the X in the accessibility of a happily put the whole of peace in order merely by
abolishing national sovereignty. I think the word sovereignty merely as an abstraction standing for a capacity to make and to give effect to public decisions. The attribute enabling regime is really to govern. Embracing the power to elicit the BDA by binding and conscience. Identity between those in authority and those subject to it and the power to bring effective penalties to bear on those recalcitrant to authority. In large part the world's problems arise not from the existence. Our excess but from a deficiency of these attributes. And this is especially so in a time when the world stage is crowded with entities with the title of state and a claim on being treated as such. Yet without having generated the attributes summed up in the term sovereignty instead of a simple and resolving
solutions here I hope to bring only a few perspectives to bear on my difficult topic. I wish to speak for a moment about that summer forty seven years ago when the fabric of a World Order's suddenly came unraveled. The summer that produced world war one which marks the closure of a great age of diplomacy. We can go back to the time of the Treaty of Westphalia and that proceeding epoch the political world was centered on Europe. To what degree so maybe a less created by the simple circumstance. That in that tragic summer of 1914 no one of the European Chancellor Rees busy with the baleful series of miscalculations gave a moment's thought as evidenced in their notes declarations and memoranda to the possibility that any factors beyond Europe such as the United States for example might count
in the conflict then emerging into prospect the government's disposing the power of great decision in world affairs. In that box shared not only a general location but also to a remarkable degree a common view of history toward her moody regions. They did tend to apply the inequality Terry and usages of an imperial colonial order and they often contended ruthlessly for possession and other advantages in such regions but in relationships between their homelands they were restrained by shared concepts of legitimacy. Their quarrels were over marginal issues. They're not over questions of the pattern or of the right of existence. I stressed the limit in this of the net work of diplomacy and its equalitarian assumptions. Now point very easily overlooked by those in astrology for traditional diplomacy and prone to
see in a simple return to its usages. The answers to the world's present problems anyway. That structure of relationships definitely began to come apart in 1914. The general war which was both a cause and an effect of its collapse was not intended by any one of the participants in the tragic affairs of that summer. The crisis arose from what we might call a local issue. The principal powers had hugely invested prestige in the rivalry is involved. The situation was indeed touchy for a time. The deliberate cautious sedate instruments of diplomacy handled it and then suddenly events were moved beyond their control. The requirements of technology took over in that instance. The technology of transportation. War plans have been geared to the enhanced speed made possible by the
then still modest development of surface transport brought about by modern Paris. Industry. It had come to be of high importance to avoid being forced stalled by an adversary's mobilization and therefore of high importance to get the jump on him. At a certain point this calculus of anxiety and mobilization schedules big game the reigning consideration. Now here I need and I have only time enough to remind you in a hugely oversimplified way of the Syrian forces and changes brought on by that war and to recall how these interned were enormously magnified by the second of the two world wars and have developed even further. And the disturbed circumstances of its sequel. The first is the erosion of the Europe centered imperial colonial order which in former times handled relationships among lightly separated highly diverse
peoples and areas. The second and one closely related is the extraordinary proliferation of states especially in recent years with the end not yet in sight. You know a short time ago I noted a press item regarding an application for membership in the United Nations as independent states. Above filed by two Indian tribes on a nearby Canadian reservation. I do not predict their excesses but the fact is that self-determination has become a political absolute of our time and there is no telling how far it may go. What is so extraordinary is not military not merely the burgeoning numbers of independent states but also the circumstance that erstwhile colonial areas are confirmed as independent states and projected onto the world stage to exercise their franchise. As a matter of inherent right and with scarcely a regard for the capacity to pull the status.
A third circumstance is the establishment of great power and scope on the part of revolutionary world communism. But it's a certain total claim on the future of every political society. And it does this position to exploit every weakness every faltering of authority in areas beyond its control. A fourth great circumstance of our time Rights is from the character of modern invention. Reminding us of Alfred North Whitehead his reference to the invention of invention as the greatest of all inventions. I say that here only in relation to weaponry particularly to the redundancy of destructive power in modern weapons their instant readiness for use and the mounting pace of obsolescence. The first characteristic. Best them with lethal capabilities vastly out of balance with any rationally conceived political purpose in war.
The second keeps the major powers possessing such weapons in a sort of a chronic state of mobilization. The effect of the third is that anxiety about being militarily poor cools by permitting one's adversary to get the jump applies not only to possible employment of weapons but also to the actual and potential invention and production of new types so that invention itself has become the mother of unrelenting and hugely expensive necessity. These four circumstances combined to present with huge magnification of scope persistence and intensity iconic problem like the one which overtook the nations and baffled the assumptions and approaches of traditional diplomacy in 1014. The point of local tension and rivalry have multiplied enormously mean time and so have the numbers of the entities capable of raising the occasions of
crisis. The stakes are now not merely those of national rivals restrained by a shared concept of legitimacy but involved a conflict between a total revolutionary purpose and every outlook aim and purpose disposed to stand independent of it. The great lions of policy to deal with this situation are clear enough first to strive as practicable to create in succession to the eroded imperial colonial structure a world order reflecting collaboration among juridically free and equal states buyable in Independence. Second to develop point to a community of Outlook interest and purpose among and which is the emergent and necessitous States to forward them however one can along the way to becoming growing concerns politically socially and economically. Third defend all at least to minimize prove their preemption of position by the communist powers.
Work effectively to counter the military threat posed by the communist powers to the degree practicable deterring war of whatever scope and level of destructiveness and avoiding incalculably destructive hostilities with the principal communist powers in particular to seek some mutually acceptable stable definite way out of the dynamic of anxiety and invention now pervading relationships between the principal antagonists. All of these purposes are exigent now all would require unremitting effort for an indeterminate future. The first two however can be realized only gradually and in a long range of time whereas the last two must be realized every moment. If success in the first two is even to be approached. The adversary has an opposed set of purposes he wishes to create an order of his own kind to take the place of the old imperial colonial order.
His intent is to make the emergent States going concerns in his own pattern. He wants a system to hold on to what it has and to expand outward from it as opportune. He too wants to prevail without war and especially to avoid the dangers of a warning getting out of hand and rising to incalculable levels of destruction. Against this background let us try to evaluate the relevance and usefulness of the structure of authority scrutiny and verification mediating between adversaries and independent of them which is what I take the phrase international controls to mean. I do not want to fall off the intricate and manifold problems by calling for a world state or the oblation of sovereignty or the world rule of law or a permanent international army or any of these rolling formulas presupposing as a condition precedent. An end to the very conditions which they are supposed to correct.
In such instances as Kashmir the Sinai Peninsula the Congo for example is international controls have been of some utility not in solving and removing the causes of crisis but in dampening it down and responding the danger of spreading the conflict and raising its intensity in a way likely to lead to the direct involvement of the great ruler antagonists. No transcending of sovereignty has been involved in the measures taken there with the consent of the proxies directly concerned the force employed in each case has not been in the pattern of a soup brand national army but that of collected national forces serving at the pleasure of and under the discipline of contributing governments. In each case the breadth of international auspices has probably made it easier for the parties directly and controversy to back away and to postpone the issue.
How much more use can we expect from this sort of safety device. I do not know that communists have made clear their intent. If possible to put a stop to the notion of impartial control the achievement so far realized in this respect. However modest any and impermanent in comparison to perfection. It is notably large and solid in comparison to what has been achieved in the matter of establishing international controls and mediating between the major antagonists in this Pramer relationship. The need has been perceived and the effort pursued to establish some system of controls to dampen down the dynamics of anxiety and invention operating between the major antagonists. Facing each other with armies have enormous destructive power each an uncertain of the measure of the danger he faces. Neither are really experienced in using the weapons which he goes on inventing and storing in the hope of deterring the dangers he confronts by increasing his already vast
potential to damage his adversary in terms of the 914 experience. The successes have been confined to putting limits on the crisis potential of local conflicts but not on the compulsions which modern technology imposes on great military rivals and which may come tragically into play if and when the stakes ever get out of hand in any contest of purpose. To put the matter another way in matters involving trust between the major antagonists it has not yet been possible to build a structure of international control. I do not mean to indicate that the situation is therefore wildly hopeless and that danger is completely off its leash. The great powers are still restrained by considerations of prudence and the calculus of danger. Yet each must be live basically on estimates and assumptions about the other. In calculating the ratios of danger and the probable responses of the untag And as to every
move. No system of inspections and verifications has been worked out to mitigate the inherent risks though the negotiation has been protracted and intensive. We do not have have to go into a labyrinth in explanation. Our side in the confrontation has been unwilling to accept limitations without a system of inspection and verification capable of operating independent instance. Our adversaries terms are that he must maintain control of its operations within his own realm response probably to the requirements of a closed and totalitarian system on the one hand. There is a great inhibition affecting the conduct of foreign policy under the conditions of democratic accountability for that matter it affects the conduct of authoritarian governments to governments are inherently most fearful of disasters consequent from their own actions. It is vastly easier to render an accounting for a disaster that overtakes one then
it is from a disaster brought on by one's own acts. It is easier to render an accounting on the possible baleful result of facing in a play kibble enemy than for the possible tragic results of having trusted him. I do not mean that we should disbelieve our adversary on his repeatedly expressed awareness of the incalculable dangers of thermonuclear war. The trouble lies in what else he says. He stakes his peace and his future on a view of history. He sees his history as operating under laws which are deigned the eventual claim of his outlook purposes and interests to the exclusion of every contest in Outlook interest and purpose. The future is all he uses as he sees it and he is not about to share it. If he can help but legitimacy is all he has to as he sees it and he is not about to concede any element of it to adversary interests
peace at. An order based on legitimacy means in his view that situation which besides being free of conflict forwards his own interests to the exclusion of others who stands opposed to this is against peace and for war. This is our moment as a measure of peace must be calculated to this end as he sees it. Disarmament are the limitation of armament is not a way of eliminating or reducing the dangers of armaments as circumstances collateral to the contest of purpose. It is a way of using them to manipulate the prostration and defeat of all who oppose it. I am not just construing is view this is how he puts it himself. This line of thought and purpose it seems to me rather than the old obstructions about sovereignty constitutes
the greatest barrier to the sort of controls needed to arrest and contain the contest in invention and to restrain the dangers inherent in the great rival armories of the thermonuclear age. I am not rejoicing in this view of the matter. Please understand me and to me your ratties praise them is the conditions that prevail. Thank you. Damis The conditions Mr. Marshall thank you very much. Would you like to comment. First observation would be the sovereignty. Sovereignty has been defined in the 19th century. Right a German jurist competence competence which is a possibility for a state to establish the
limits of its own competence. I soon as the external rules laws and something to which the state has got to a baby is obliged to obey even if he doesn't want it. There is no more sovereignty. I would say that in the present situation the world I see three groups of countries. USSR has got to proceed and the will to use its national sovereignty and this will we see very often by the use of the veto in India national meetings the USA has got a possibility but not the will is very often accepting to be limited to its own activity by the advices of us and by the rules of international organization and order
may have the wish of sovereignty but absolutely no possibility whatsoever. Because there is no possibility of national defense anymore and there is no possibility of economic expansion inside of a smaller national state. You will remain back walled behind protected fences. Oh you will depend of the lows of the encounter national market practically of a big corporation whose seat of power is really outside of its own body. So that I may venture to say that the state the national state which came in his story idea 18 Centuri is about to disappear at the present time and the ones who have got sovereignty are not national states. They are both of them pretty Raj States the United States of
America and the tragedy of the new countries is that they come to a conscience of dare I tell you a decreasing underneath 50 of the international isolation. I did time when national aspiration cannot take place anymore through a national state and we have to have at the same time to win or turn me in and to get together in order to create something which will be the nationality. This brings me to my second observation which is I think the necessity of separate nationality or country. Now if we want to create a state we don't put together a gate of
ministration of town councils because they did a gate of every town comes here will fight cost but interests of peace city village and quite rightly so you know to have an Oregon to express the common good of the nation. We have to find a way of having a gun nominated or elected on the level of the nation in order to be responsible to the whole of the nation and to be conscious of the good of the whole of the nation. If we feared that the nation now is too small and if we want to create the word all at least a rage you're not gonna say shouldn't we have two new mean eight or eight elect people. On a level where it will be possible for them to become countries of the common good on the level where they are and I don't think it is possible to do anything with. Did he get a
national government. I say that we some experience because since you know I am head of the French litigation I've gotten a lot of Taare for negotiation and I must say that when I am negotiating and I'm trying to squeeze out of the other as much as I can and not to give anything to them because that's my job as a national delegate and easy job as national delegate So it's very difficult to come to an agreement we finally come to some compromise. But after quite a lot of time. And even there was a possibility to watch some people respond to WADA who were of the body. You know not to try to plan a car if police people who were all fodder beginning for Europe and are responsible only for it. I venture to say that it's certainly much more effective and
that quicker results can be a key. It is what we are trying to do under present time about Europe. Now we are not trying to build a Europe of the six we are trying to appear dissect brand nationality and we want to I mean as loud as possible and we began with six because a six were the only one who were accepting a separate national authority. People independent from the national government to take some initiative and make some proposition and the problem of our British friends is now not a toll as as he's always ceded their entry into the Common Market. But the entrance into the yard and community. Because the Treaty of Rome is building up a European community whose aim is to establish between the Sikh's country the rate of economic progress through different devices amongst the
common market but also a common agricultural policy but also very common. She's like a very socially she's Asian policy but also a common help on money matters and so on and so on and so on. I dis We want to do with the greatest number of friends possible provided that we have a really common courtesy and provided we create the garden of expression of these government bodies. And then last observation I must say that I've been feeling toward a discussion of the last days which very much interest an elite Look the feeling of reality. I think that he's nice to have a balance of power indeed military security. I think it's necessary to try to fight for these armament you know order to have these balance of power with the lowest possible cost. But the real problem in the years to come is the fight which is going to be
between us and a Russian backed traction of the good will of the people I believe is the place where the real fight is going. And here the problems are economic and psychological. If one side you still go on seeing a rate of economic progress and production of 7 8 percent per year and on the other side of 1 or 2 percent per year ending with EPs and with unemployment with a lot of money wasted in spending for publicity you know to compel people to buy what they don't have the will to buy your coal as long as you'll have this. I venture to say that very quickly we will be defeated without a wall and the Russians won't need a wall because they know that I've got all the possibilities of winning is to bring to the people two new people and also to the population of our country.
The idea of common white society in which all of the economic development will be organized and planned for the good of the whole of the population with the participation of everyone. We don't need to have to put under forefront of big corporations big interest while making the unanimity against them but try to present really to the people the ID and the common when it where men feel free because they have got responsibility. That is the way of winning the present struggle between East and West was. Thank you very much Michel Louis Philippe.
I think you and Mr. Marshall have got is off to a wonderful start and that we are now ready for questions from the floor. It's just emotional. I would if I might like to ask you to comment on this your Phillipe piece is in these terms it's generally agreed and quite obvious that the Soviet Union has a what has been referred to as a transcending sovereignty on the communist side. The United States has something approximating this on the western side. If the European community develops in a supranational way along the lines suggested by Monsieur Philippe This
will obviously lessen the trends and trends ending authority of the United States on the western side. Do you think that. This would be a good thing in in a combat ng aggressive maneuvers Soviet Union would be harmful to Russia what was the it in that. May I get it that last part of the question What was the antecedent of it. I didn't quite get it. When I think the European community develops in fact as a force able to carry out independent political decisions of some importance why I should think it to be the thing I should take the stronger development of institutions of collaboration among the Europeans and with Europeans is a very desirable thing from the standpoint of an American.
I would question one question in the question you put to you to do the ascendancy of the United States in this part of the world with the ascendancy of the Russian state in its part of the world. This came as a considerable piece of news to me and I. But if it is true I think certainly that ascendancy of the United States should be is shared just is rapidly is possible but I don't think it is too. I don't think there's anything like a satellite relationship between the United States and any other country I think. There is a faulty premise of I ME HIZO respectfully in that supposition. But in answer to your question yes I think the one thing I've caught so much in my discussion with people at this conference is a feeling that the
overweening position of the United States is altogether too great that of the United States is accountable in your minds for a great many circumstances in the world circumstances which my from my point of view are really beyond his jurisdiction. Now I should think you'd be better just as much as we can so that in the minds of Canadians and Englishman and Continental's in Europe can get over the notion that somehow or other the western world is a United States concern. It must be a United States concern but by no means exclusively United States concern no one in which the American point of view with American outlook is the determining an overweening when I'm sure that this is one which the vast majority of Americans would concur with me. Yes if we could stay with this question just a moment longer I'd I'd really like to get Mr.
Phillipe to say if I'm right or wrong I took from what he said in his commentary that he did not really think that the formation of a federally united Europe would be a barrier to transatlantic cooperation of a looser cond. Is that correct. Addressed On the contrary. First even if we hide it completely united Europe is free to get a brazen dime. Be strong enough to organize a European defense. I have been fighting in the past for a European defense community but even now scheme of a European defense committee was inside of the Atlantic defense because we know that even a united Europe would have independence but not sovereignty and no possibility for independent
defense. The same thing we believe and we are making the experience already now that by uniting we are increasing our economic strength and he's very very important for us to realize that already now when we begin our unification we have got the rate of economic progress which is nearly to one up Russia so that may be a rush hour windy day meeting that they will become as important as United States. But we united are more important than Russia and we remain Most important than Russia because we are progressing at least already now. Peace means we want to be friends.
Perhaps we lose some. But quite a lot of good we do quite a lot of stuff. I do want to get back to questions but I think Mr. Marshall wanted to comment on this right away. Yes I want to refer to something my learned friend said and to concur in it strongly. The question it seems to me the critical question is not power is between the United States and European counterparts or other members of the free world. I take power here in the sense of the capacity to achieve intended results. I think it is a question of the total capacity in the West to achieve intended result to what to the adversary situation we find. I simply wanted in passing to concur strongly in and especially in the latter part of his comment.
Yes at the back. Somewhat emotion of course. To Dr. Marsh. Why are there to be four millions of people. To have a voice in the world and given the definition of the question I did get a question I'm sorry. The more explicit Dr. Marsh of the north of us about the prospects of the members of the United Nations and it seems to me that
this sort of attitude if you like that some idea that millions of people because they do not seem to have what you have set up for the card to a sudden stop and should been denied a voice in it seems almost a sort of. Look I understand the question now. Thank you. If you detected a notable alarm in my voice I must have been over dramatizing there somewhere because I certainly intended no note of alarm. I I think I'm professionally inclined in these things enough that I look on the world about me where all these feelings of emotional response and alarm I tried to describe a situation is one which I do not mean to deplore by any means. And I think that's been clearly the policy of my government. It has
from the very its very beginnings been an exponent of the idea of self-determination it continues to be so and I was not the setting from that. I was merely trying to point out that the world which we find now in which we deal with is a very different world from the world of traditional diplomacy I was trying to point out if you please something relevant to the general title of this conference. Mr. Chairman I should like to ask Mr. Marshall if he would concur with Mr. Phillipe in that planning for cooperation on a general level is better than planning for competition in small units. All question put that way why a rational man has to say yes. But I'm one of these fellows to try is to draw away from the great
generalization like that I want to see what the situation is I want to see I think a foreign policy not in terms of a flow of abstractions but in terms of specific propositions for decision. And I but if you're asking what my general cast of emotion in telling these things yeah cooperation is one of these words that we can't respond to affirmatively. Blimey. Mr Marco has made a number of eloquent for recognition of the realities of the situation and has asked us to time get away from the obstruction side like talk and say whether he would consider a major step in the direction of recognizing these realities not to accord recognition to the People's Republic of China.
I suppose my distinguished friend is aware that there's been a very long and very arduous very intricate negotiation that is going on in Warsaw for some months before that it was in Prague about the conditions and the problems of political relationship between the United States and communist China. You are aware I have no doubt what the obstacles to the resumption of political relations are from the standpoint of the U.S. government. Let me say this that it is unquestionably feasible as a theoretic proposition for the United States to resume political relations directly informally with communist China and vice versa. What would the price be. The price would be to give up the Formosa position to go back on a set of guarantees of security with the United States is given to a bottle of a half million people in
that situation and let them and force them to submit to the jurisdiction of a tyranny and withdraw its guarantees from that position of it being quite clearly getting out of South Korea and letting the Korean Peninsula as a whole go under the dominance of communist China. It would mean a number of things of that sort the terms are very intricate I can't call them all up from memory but there are two the specific items and the United States in its own interest in what it views to be its obligations are not going to pay that price now can the standpoint I suppose I could say. Here is an outsider that if the Communist Chinese were willing to give up their position in the Korean peninsula and are willing to bring that situation to a peace rather than simply on an easy and often violated armistice and if they were to give up their
claims to the Formosa position and so on. But the I imagine the government Washington would be quite willing to receive an ambassador from that area. The plain fact of the matter is though that the obstacles the differences between them are ours. The two governments are very great and neither one of them is it under present conditions prepared to pay the price of reopening. Diplomatic relations the terms in which you put the question about place in reality I think of the false turns I think the United States has with held political relationships and withheld paying this price if you please out of a very very real and accurate regard for the realities of the situation. I think Mr. Wolfson was the next in this. Mr. Hay Mr. Chairman I wonder whether Mr. Felipe would
care to comment on those parts of Mr. Marshall's talk in which he spoke of the difficulty of establishing a relation of trust with the Russian Communists. I asked this question because we have had more than one difference of opinion expressed by speakers to this conference and I've been very close to him. Care to comment on that point. Now it's very difficult to make because first I don't think you can have diplomacy and a BS of trust when you are negotiating with somebody between governments. It's very difficult to surrender something you have a good bite trysting the one we see facing you. Now if you are creating a community of course you need to have trust in the one with whom you are building up a new state while becoming course it isn't. But as long as you ask people in the entire government of negotiation I would rather
throw out throw stones in the censure negotiation I am defending my interest is defending its interests and Christ is the trench that he's clever enough to see is in Christ as I am trying to see mine. So if Christ thing is to have confidence in the Words of Direction chapter and not I know quite well Miss. To Gail some 9000 hours of discussion with him some five years ago when I went to a friend's dedication to write to Russia. I think he's a wonderful dramatist. I told him that he would be ousted and who would try to find a job according to his capacity to aim a pleasing differential or maybe maybe. You seem to be very proud of it. I think that the part
that you can't have a country didn't see and he tries at any given time to get as much as he can. All right we have to do the same thing. And you can have just one you have been finding it to our interest and it's a balance. And you can try just to keep it as long as these remain. Look we come back to me. I asked this question not pursue Mr. Marshall. I am interested in knowing whether there is really any basic difference in what they've said this evening. They have both acknowledged that sovereignty as has been
previously conceived exists possibly only in the extreme cases of two instances that in fact we have limited sovereignty limited either by the fact of an inability to exercise power or willing transference to other regional or supra national bodies. They've both agreed that the functions of these are to strengthen both political and defense positions in the face of oppositions and also to strengthen the rate of economic growth of their constituents and their group on their side of the fence. I gather even that they have agreed that Mr. Marshall has agreed that cooperation rather than competition is a desirable manner in which to achieve this growth and as a member of our planning center I imagine Mr. Marshall was also in favor of planning. Now in these circumstances and by the elimination even of the concept that Mr.
Marshall has no trust and has trust in point by point of fact Mr. Phillipe is as realistic as Mr. Marshall. May I ask the men seriously are there for political assessment differences in their views of sovereignty and international control. Or is it merely the expression in the phraseology of American and French tradition to Marshall. I was impressed by the great area of agreement between Mr. Andre Felipe and my self discourses. That is so far as it applied to the things that really count. I think we had a sort of difference over the question of sovereignty. I don't want to go deep into it because I might. Spent altogether too much time the poppet of neither of us
or the audience either. The definition of a servant. I caught it. Positive law definition of what we would call the Austen tradition. My inclination toward the definition of goes more to the thought of the treatment of used to do than all the modern and just now think that we spend the rest of the time here batting around definitions or sorry. But all the questions that really have to be cited the questions of policy. I'm sure that Mr Felipe and I are in agreement. Sovereignty I think is that characteristic of a government which really gives it authority the capable to carry forward on its intentions.
- 1961 Couchiching conference
- Producing Organization
- Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
- Canadian Institute on Public Affairs
- Contributing Organization
- University of Maryland (College Park, Maryland)
- AAPB ID
- Episode Description
- The sixth episode of the conference focuses on Canadian sovereignty and international relations.
- Other Description
- The 1961 Couchiching Conference, a summer symposium on national and international affairs put together by the Canadian Institute on Public Affairs and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, assembles for its 30th annual meeting. The theme of the 1961 conference was "diplomacy in evolution."
- Forums (Discussion and debate)
- Media type
Host: Wilson, Bob
Producing Organization: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Producing Organization: Canadian Institute on Public Affairs
Speaker: George, James
Speaker: Marshall, Charles Burton, 1908-1999
Speaker: Philip, Andre_
- AAPB Contributor Holdings
University of Maryland
Identifier: 4990 (University of Maryland)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
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- Chicago: “1961 Couchiching conference; Sovereignty and international control,” 1961-08-10, University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed January 20, 2022, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-mc8rgv29.
- MLA: “1961 Couchiching conference; Sovereignty and international control.” 1961-08-10. University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. January 20, 2022. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-mc8rgv29>.
- APA: 1961 Couchiching conference; Sovereignty and international control. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-mc8rgv29