1961 Couchiching conference; Realities of war
This is the 1961 coaching conference the Tuesday evening session coming to you live from Geneva park on Lake kitching near really Ontario. The conference is an annual symposium on national and international affairs arranged by the Canadian Institute on public affairs in cooperation with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The theme this year is diplomacy and evolution and the topic tonight. The realities of war. And now to introduce the speakers. Here is the chairman of this evening session. The vice chairman of the Defense Research Board of Canada JP keast and Dr. Keith. Will. Ladies and gentleman Our purpose of this session is to gain information and wisdom regarding the realities of modern war unthreatened law so that we can better form our own impressions of the impact of war on the tasks of international negotiation. After several sessions which are focused our interest mainly on the problems of the uncommitted
Nations tonight we direct our interest to the problems of the committed nations and how committed specifically of course it is the balance of military power between the Soviet and the natal group of nations that we should be studying since the closing phases of World War 2. We have witnessed with dismay and alarm the growth of ever widening differences and conflict between the two groups of nations of which Russia and the USA are the major powers. The conflict so far has a description of Cold War but this period of Cold War has seen a buildup of tension between these east west groups to a level that looks frighteningly close to the point at which it might influence the restraints of human reason. And on loose the dogs of war. And with what a cry of havoc. Where witness many attempts to negotiate arrangements for arresting this continued heightening of East-West tension. But none of had effect. Why has diplomacy failed for 15 years to arrest this growth of tension
which is a prerequisite to being able to stabilize a peace. When we ask ourselves this question we cannot fail to be impressed by the fact that the same 15 years of diplomatic fruitlessness have seen the birth and growth of nuclear weapons which represent by far the most powerful instruments for applying military force or threat of force. The world has ever known. Powerful a military instrument as they are. My own view for what it is worth is that the nuclear weapons have up till very recently had much less impact on the failure of East-West negotiations than is popularly attributed to their existence. Whatever may have been said often with a great profundity of hindsight about the mistakes of America's postwar foreign policy there's little doubt in my mind that history will overlay it with an enduring tribute to America for having refrained from applying her nuclear power to the persuasiveness of her diplomacy during a period in which she has had attempting the great military advantage over her rival
nuclear advantage so far has been allied with totally an aggressive purpose. But it is not too difficult to forsee that an alliance of nuclear superiority with aggressive international aims could have a revolutionary impact on diplomacy. Nor the close balance of nuclear power acts to the advantage of the international blackmail. The primary cause of failure of East-West negotiations is surely that we in the West have sought to negotiate towards some state of orderly co-existence with Russia. Why Russia has approached negotiations primarily as a medium for introducing an instability and in and into the international scene that will tend towards western disruption or demoralization. The question has to be faced. How can we more successfully prevent the Soviet from continuing to pursue their political policy of chiseling away at the foundations of our freedom. Reason an argument alone seem unlikely to suffice and will lead to take a fresh look at our weapons both in their quantity and
their kind. Not only nuclear but conventional and also at our military strategy of course. The issues involved in considering the kind of weapons we should provide for Western defense and the circumstances in which we should or may have to rest conventional or nuclear war made us into a complex problem exhibiting so many military strategical technical political economic and psychological assets as to seem to defy rational analysis and interpretation. Among the few who were shown themselves competent to come thoroughly to grips with all the intricacies of this vast problem is Dr. Henry Kissinger who we are so fortunate to have here as our principal speaker tonight to explain to us some of the realities of war. In his two great books nuclear weapons and foreign policy published in 1957 and the necessity for choice prospects of American foreign policy published a few months ago Dr. Kissinger has brilliantly studied analyzed and
interpreted the realities of modern war and his interaction with diplomacy. His studies have doubtless already had influence on the United States government policies and they certainly have influence public opinion both within the USA and in other countries. Dr. Kissinger is associate director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and has experience in university and government service embracing many distinguished appointments currently. A great deal of his time is taken up as a consultant to many branches of the United States government. However the one entry in his biographical or in his biographical outline that gives me most envy is the fact that he was born as recently as 1923. Following Dr. Kissinger to comment and to add to our enlightenment we have the ideal complement of the analyst and the person of General suggest reborn who has had a most distinguished
career in the British Army and since World War Two a number of appointments of great political administrative and military importance responsibility and difficulty and some of the world's hotspots such as General Officer Commanding the British sector during and after the blockade period. Director of Operations in Milan during the troubled years of 1954 to six commander in chief of the air embracing the Persian Gulf Aden Cyprus and Libya India 957 Harter that he was commandant of the Imperial Defense College where he dispensed his military and political knowledge and wisdom to the claim of Senior Service officers and civil servants drawn from the British Commonwealth last year on retirement from military service. General Bourne became director general of the aluminum not aluminum Development Association but is a gentleman. I gave you our principal speaker Dr. Henry Kissinger to
it. Thank you Mr. Chairman. So in Chapter 8. Ladies and gentlemen for the sake of peace in but balance of the American Embassy in Ottawa I would like to make clear that I speak here as an irresponsible Harvard professor and not in my capacity as a consultant to various governmental departments. In fact they are people in the United States who would argue that after one has identified oneself they say but Professor the adjective is quite unnecessary. My style so say that I am getting a little pause by the fact it said Jeff rate comment may cause I was exposed to him a few years ago at the Imperial Defense
College in the United States but I had spoken very frequently at military colleges on the conclusion of slimes talk. It is customary or usually said that this was superb one of the best talks that ever had and so forth. When I was finished in London said Geoffrey got up and gave me the highest praise I've ever received which was not half bad kids in general. I have I'm afraid air out unpleasant subject to disguise the problem of war and peace at this period. I would like to make clear at the beginning that there can be no
debate within the free and there's no debate as far as I know within the United States about the desirability of peace. The only sensible debate concerns the best means of how to assure peace. It is also worthwhile to remember that many of the problems that the United States confronts today are due to the fact that within a very brief period of time we have been projected into the center of world affairs and we have had to assume worldwide responsibilities. As late as 1939.
If the safety of the had depended on the American understanding of the nature of security and on the nature of the danger. The aggressors would have overrun Europe. It was because we were fortunate in 1939 that there were other countries willing to commit themselves that we could afford the luxury of non commitment. Now this sudden transformation of the United States into the center of early affairs their sudden assumption of responsibility has inevitably produced a certain and Evelyn's and certain strengths as late as
1939. It was very customary in the United States to criticize Great Britain with many of the same arguments that are now reads in some British journals and in some journals of other countries in other parts of the. Among my fellow soldiers in World War Two it was considered quite axiomatic that short sided balance of power considerations in which Great Britain seem to specialize were among the contributing causes of divorce. Best of it to which Europe had been exposed. Now we find that the country that has the responsibility for security has many a serious psychological hurdle to overcome for the country
which has a major burden of responsibility is in the position that on its decisions very often the safety and the freedom of hundreds of millions of people depend and therefore it cannot make what the luxury of trying out some theories that may be eloquent that may be plausible. But which if they fail would be disastrous. The difference between those who have responsibility and those who merely have to take positions is that those who have responsibility can afford only a single experiment and they cannot then go back to their laboratory and say they'll try again. This I would like to say as a background to the
American concern that we have had to sue reluctantly but the problem of military security. I will not in the limited time available debate but in fact a threat. I will simply say that it would be a rash statement who would make the survival of his country dependent entirely on the people who arrested the leaders of the Hungarian revolution while negotiating an armistice with them and who executed them despite a promise say Kunta. There is no debate. I repeat. About. Using will to change the status quo.
No bond in the free world would be so should be so ratch. And no responsible person in the United States would advocate using war in order to transform the international situation. The only time the question of war in peace arises is when we are threatened and their whole free world this threat a bit. But they use a for was to achieve diplomatic objectives. And in those circumstances if we do not want to surrender we must address ourselves. Distasteful as it may be to the problem of military security and we must address ourselves to that also if we are serious about disarmament negotiations which will be discussed in greater detail tomorrow. As someone who has sat on many planets dealing with this question I
have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to frame a responsible proposal in this field. Other than slogans. If one does not know what the elements of security are. Because otherwise one is engaged either in propaganda or in propositions which one doesn't know whether they add to security detract from security or are irrelevant to security. Now the problem of military security in this age is complicated by a number of factors by the destructiveness of the vector by the rapidity with which they can be delivered by the speed with which technology changes and by the very novelty of the problem then weapons can destroy a whole set is and when they are in transit between continents for less than 30 minutes the whole problem of security takes on a new connotation.
From the purely military point of view. Forces in being and surprise have. Assumed enormously added significance from the political point of view. There is now a beret great consciousness of risks and we have to consider that some of the rigidity of diplomacy is also due to the to the fact. That whatever. However unpleasant the status quo it has at least the advantage of familiarity and any change bears with it to the minds of many of those who have to carry it out. A very undue risk of catastrophe from the moral point of view it as led in many western countries to various forms of pacifism and in any case it
has resulted in an enormous reluctance to resort to force. Now because of the moral convictions of the Western countries the problem of military security has taken on the technical side of what is called deterrence. That is the effort of the Western countries has been directed not towards the problem of how to win a war. But towards the problem of how to prevent it. And this has carries with it a serious psychological obstacle because there is a lot of it is that deterrence is tested negatively by things which do not happen. You can never prove in a rapidly changing technology that the
efforts you are making are in fact necessary. You can never prove that the theories on which you are basing your defense are in fact the only correct ones and indeed all the conventional wisdom all the military expertise. Verge against the adjustment to new conditions. One of the great problems of our period and I hope Sir Geoffry forgives me is the fact that this scale of expertise of many of our military men was formed at a time when weapons were quite different and that the experts of one period can sometimes become the obstacles to understanding of another period. Then this becomes apparent if we look at the various stages through which the nuclear
age has gone. There was a time to which our chairman has referred which ended around 1951 when the United States possessed a monopoly on atomic weapons as well as on the means of delivering them. There was a second period which ended around 1956 1957 when the United States no longer had a monopoly on weapons but it had a monopoly on the means of delivering them to all practical purposes a monopoly. There was a third period which may now be ending in which the United States possessed a great superiority provided it launched the first blow. And this of course we never consider. And then there is a period in which we are now entering in which in the nuclear field the strategic forces may become
reasonably invulnerable. That is neither side can wipe out the other without F. without accepting unacceptable losses except during the first three periods of the nuclear age. This rebuild was in effect protected by the American strategic superiority during this period. The main concern of most of our allies was to commit the United States to day at defense. We often accused of being too trigger happy but the fear of at least as many people is that in the new conditions we are not going to be trigger happy enough. This is at least one of the reasons why many European countries now want to develop nuclear weapons of their own. During the first three periods of the nuclear the free world was
protected by the danger or by the fear rather of the Communist leaders that if they attacked any part of it the United States but retaliated and that in retaliating would win. In the period which now begins the notion of victory in a general war has lost much of its significance and in these conditions it is at least possible that the communist leaders may believe that they can run risks which would have seemed foolhardy to them a few years ago. If you analyze Mr. Khrushchev's comments about Berlin you will find that he constantly emphasizes that now that the Western powers and the Soviet Union happen equality in power it is possible for what
it is necessary for the Soviet Union to obtain some political gains. It is now possible for them to make threats which in 1956 were not made and Berlin in 1956 was as I'm pleasant to them as it was in nineteen fifty eight. The argument that Mr. Khrushchev has made is not a moral but it is a strategic one. He is the man who has said that conferences reflect in their decisions an established balance of forces resulting from victory or defeat in will or from other circumstances of a similar nature. This he said as late as 1959. It is because of these changes in the strategic situation that in the United States there has been an increasing concern
that a change in the military strategy that they've asked should pursue. This concern is produced also in order to harmonize our diplomacy with our military policy in the present period of an all out nuclear war involving such vast losses. The only way that the West could prove that it will in fact resort to it. Would be to conduct an essentially irrational diplomacy. It would have to demonstrate to the Soviet leaders that in certain circumstances the question of cost will not be asked. The West would have to behave recklessly. However we know that their West cannot and given its moral convictions should not act recklessly.
In any crisis and Berlin is again a good example. The tendency of the West will be to prove that it is calm that it is collected that it is willing to negotiate. In short its tendency is to act precisely in a fashion to reduce the credibility of its willingness to resort to all out nuclear will. I do not say it is is not desirable. Indeed this is the policy that we should conduct but it this is the diplomacy we want to conduct. We must be willing to pay the price for it and the price for it is that we must have other options except surrender or general nuclear war. The United States has therefore attempted in the past few months to do three things.
To improve the invulnerability of it strategic forces. The reason is that there is will remove an incentive for surprise attack and in critical periods it will remove any temptation an aggressor may have to attend. What is technically called a preemptive attack which is an attempt to wipe out a retaliatory force of the United States before it is launched. The second that the United States has said it is to improve the civilian and political control over its nuclear forces. Many of the measures that you read about in the press happy days precise go that the civilian leadership of the United States can keep control of its nuclear establishment. Not only before hostilities
started which is now already in good control but also during hostilities. And thirdly there is to go of establishing of creating more courses suitable for local effects. It seems to us essential that the Freebird not be in a position where it must ask itself at every stage. Where did this particular objective is that tens of millions of casualties of an all out nuclear war. Wherever possible they're free to attempt to defend itself by happening means at its disposal in they spelled out in this change of emphasis.
We have face some very contradictory argument. Some people have accused us of being too concerned with military fact that other people have accused us of inviting a communist attack by downgrading the. Retaliatory forces. For every argument that one hears about the United States trick a happiness one has heard other arguments about expressing doubts about his to stand by out on the continent of Europe. France has begun to develop nuclear weapons of its own partly with the argument that the United States cannot be relied upon to defend it in times of crisis.
Now I would suggest that the safety of this river and particularly the safety of the North Atlantic group of nations cannot be assured by the various components of this area trying to make each other militarily dispense it. Nor can it be assured by the various components of this area attempting to adopt a strategy which shifts the risks and the prudence of the defense to some other nation in Europe. When I visited there in May I heard the argument that the United States was conducting was adopting this new policy in order to shift their risk of war away from its territory. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The security of the free world. It seems to me to be in the interest of all of its members. There's a cure it can not be achieved by each member trying to develop the whole gamut of weapons nor can it be achieved by any member opting out and thereby shifting the responsibility to somebody else. They solution seems to me to be in a closer political cohesion so that the various members of the North Atlantic group have the political confidence that any pressure on the vital interests on any one of them will be taken seriously by any other member expat or with them sects. No one
should be in the free word debate. But our concern is security or economic development or political cohesion or gain in moral stature. We must be sure that the options we pose for ourselves don't paralyze us. We do not have to choice between concentrating on the things we like to do and the difficult tasks of and and essentially negative tasks of military security military security cannot be an end in itself but without it we cannot achieve any of the positive week cannot. We do not have to choice between economic development
military security or political cohesion because if we cannot do all of these things we will not be able to do any of these things. Now it isn't gentleman to comment supplement the remarks of Dr. Henry Kissinger. We have a general subject for a bomb today. Mr. Chairman Dr. Kissinger ladies and gentleman it's very pleasant for me to be sitting here alongside Dr. Henner guessing once again in spite of the story he told your first meeting with a very pleasant one. And so that I find it difficult to do what I'm instructed on the sheep to do namely to comment on Dr. Kissinger's talk because I agree to every word of
it. And it's a wonderful thing for me as a retired soldier to be sitting alongside two professors and two doctors who are in full or active career. And to try and keep up with them. Dr. Kissinger has written not only written books with but a close de argued thesis from cover to cover. But he is apparently able to convey convey the sense of it to you in a quarter of an hour. And I envy him that. Now a couple of points however which I think I could perhaps take up usefully to supplement his talk. The first one is this business of the United States having suddenly taken over this they have a responsibility for leading the Western world against a strong communist campaign. And one angle
of this that occurs to me is this business of the discussion inside nature which has been going on the last year or two as to whether NATO should not have a. It's I don't know. Atomic strike power under its own command and control. There's been a terrific debate going on about this. What kind of weapons. How much will be controlled in a lot of really very difficult detail. And this goes on in my country and I've taken part in the discussions and I just like you to know as Dr. Kissinger raised this point about the United States responsibility. But I have to be one of those people who think that the security of nater the defense of effective defense of nater is better left in with the atomic strike power in U.S. hands. I think
it's slightly undignified having all this discussion in public. In Paris and Oslo and all these places. It has to be done I realize that in a Democratic Alliance. But I think it's likely undignified having all the discussion in full view of world opinion about whether NATO shouldn't have its own European deterrent under its own control. You cannot imagine that sort of a discussion going on on the other side there. They don't have those discussions. They have one effective nuclear strike force just like we have at the present time and they're content with it. And I personally in the interest of simplicity and also because I believe in the wise and strong direction and possible use in emergency of that terrible force is better left in the hands of the USA. That is not to say that I advocate immediately the
abolition of Iran UK new cast strike force which though small is at present sufficiently modern to create very high damage and acceptable damage to an aggressor. I don't advocate that at the moment. But I don't advocate a change towards nature or direction of atomic strike because I think it would be terribly complicated. The expression 15 fingers on the trigger is not just a joke it's a real thing and it's a very difficult thing to manage. That's my first point. I second point arises from. This business of the nuclear power being a new thing. And Dr. Kissinger mentioned that defense is not talked of very largely in
certain terms of the word terrorists. Now of course he's quite right. But I would like to remind you that there are two new features of the strategic passage ration in the world as it is today since World War 2. The first thing of course is the advent of these terrible weapons with the awful words mutual destruction actually meaning what they say comes under the heading of the terror. But the second thing is that also a new development and that is a system of alliances right across the face of the earth. And if you were a man in a moment and looked down you would see for the first time since this last World War Two a strong dividing line not just the Iron Curtain in Europe but continued right across the Middle East and Southeast Asia. And
that line is held by three alliances NATO which has been going successfully for 11 years has not lost one millimeter of ground. Center in the middle in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. And then if you wish to continue the dividing line you carry on a little bit further into the China Sea and Japan and around that area where the line is firmly held by the forces of the United States. And there's no need for an alliance. Another point I want to make is that this is a new feature of the world political scene. We did not have it before the war. It's true we had alliances inside Europe and Europe being in the position of owning very large chunks of the earth's surface over seas had excessive power and the center of gravity of power was undoubtedly in Western Europe. But the fact remained the dividing line. And the forces
involved were primarily German and French and if you look back you find they look very small indeed compared with the situation today where we have literally hundreds of millions of people of people lined up in these defensive alliances. And I for one think that if you accept as I do of Dr. Kissinger's remark that the top kind of war general war is no longer a logical act of policy and that it's unlikely to take place if stability is maintained then the importance of the alliances which contain these hundreds of millions of human beings assumes rather greater importance. And my last point before we open the discussion under our chairman is that although our eyes are turned to Europe at the present time very much because of the threats and the
excitement over Berlin which I dare say we still have an object of discussing. The real threat over the last 10 or 12 years has not been in New York. It has been in the Middle East in the Southeast Asia and jumping over or under whichever expression you like to use into Africa and even to South America. In other words the Cold War. And the reason I'm particularly interested I have a personal reason for being particularly interested in the cold war is because I've been putting a gate in it for the last 12 years or 14 years in various places I've never been able to get away from the Cold War. And I think I'll leave it at that except to say that my reason for being there was as a single unit in the British army which is in fact alongside its allies of course took a rather prominent part in a number of local actions. Indeed it's never been out of action. The British army with its allies for the
last 12 years in the Cold War. And I think that's enough to say to promote a little discussion I hope I didn't. Thank you very much Jeffrey. Sure they say should open to questions from the flaw microphones of being taken down the aisles and if you raise your hands with the questions of the man who introduced the term limited war into the American vocabulary and I'd like to ask him this question. And in the age of the nuclear impasse he's appointed to that one requires a wider range of options. And this is really the ability to fight a limited war if one chooses. But it's not enough
to be able to play that one must be able to hopefully to control that and to end it on acceptable terms. And there is the additional and more than this one wants the ability to bring this capability to bear. As a resource of Western diplomacy in relation to actual negotiations in a wider context now this creates two various severe sets of political and diplomatic terms. Firstly peace of the the Russians and secondly within the Western alliance in order to maintain a sufficient political consensus. I wonder Dr. Kissinger would comment on this essentially political and diplomatic side of that. Firstly in relation to U.S. leadership. Secondly in relation to the political organization of men no. And thirdly perhaps in relation to the form and substance of Western diplomacy.
Quite a question. I say I don't think this is an excessively restrictive question. Now I don't think it is. First of all let me say that I have not used the word limited war in this particular discussion there's evening but I would be glad to comment on your question. Anyway the reason I didn't do was it was because. Discussion of a few years ago there was a distinction made as if they were a genus of war called limited. And another kind of war called all out and only those two kinds of conflict existed. In fact with modern weapons the gradations infinit and and the distinction the simple distinctions of a few years ago I would no longer make
even if I contributed to that state. Now the question however calls attention to a very important problem of the political control of military action. Again I'd like to call your attention to the manner in which the problem of military actions will arise. Nobody is advocating that we start a war. The military problem will arise only if war is forced upon us. Then if we are reluctant then if we doubt the possibility of limiting it in in some way we will have only the choice between surrender and all out war. And those who question the possibility of gradations of power also have an obligation then to say which of the other two alternatives they would recommend
surrender or all out war now. I admit that the problem of political control is going to be extremely difficult. I cannot guarantee and no response of a person can. That if we resist aggression that the communists may not expand until it becomes all out. If we assume that they would rather destroy tens of millions of people rather than settle for the status quo this is in fact what will happen. I'm assuming that we can have both on a bed a bed we can escape the dilemma of both surrender and and this kind of gender war that I describe Now with respect to the political control we in the United States are now trying.
As I indicated in my talk to improve the political mechanisms controlling the military forces. More importantly it seems to me that the North Atlantic Nations as a whole have an obligation to create an ever closer political community. I see no way by which we can escape the problems we face today and go on from there to do bigger acts of construction without also overcoming the narrow division of the North Atlantic area into into self contained sovereign entities and the kind of military strategy that I've recommended has as its corollary a much greater degree of political cohesion amongst the nations of the North Atlantic community.
I think you know Kissinger might I add a word of a certain amount I had a word about limited war on the military side although it may have gone out of the discussions rather recently. I personally feel that it's still with us because it is the weapon which the communists are like to deal with. In fact if I could add to that every military conflict that has occurred since 1945 had been a limited military conflict. There hasn't been any of that. I entirely agree with that. The point about limited wars is that they start with a limited object. The calculation is done beforehand as to price. As to area is limited in area it's limited in price it's limited in weapons and the object is to get a limited object. Now if the Western
world is like General north that has always said about Europe can manages to contain that aggression whether by conventional forces or by conventional plus a little atomic science support. If the aggression is held then the aggressor the enemy have a choice in front of them. They can either call it off and surrender or they can raise the price and there is an automatic price mechanism I believe which operates in these wars. In fact it has in fact operated in every single limited war for the last 10 or 12 years. And the interesting thing about this price mechanism to my mind is that the person who raises the price is not necessarily the person who fires the first atomic weapon but is the person who fails to get his objective and fire the bigger weapon in order to get it raises the price. Risks escalation and risk mutual destruction.
And that isn't my reason is a purely personal view of this. For thinking that the Russians or the communists rather will continue their present method of nibble nibble nibble erosion and shape of things like that. Preferably as General Maxwell Taylor My Friend of Bill in days calls it bargain basement wars. That is to say fighting wars with other people's infantry and other people's casualty lists. Thank you for that. As a mother I think that the next speaker in front of Dr. Sutherland has put his hand up next. Mr. Chairman. Specific. One can do it in two ways One
is to think up political institutions which can speak for the whole North Atlantic. A group of states. The other is to do it empirically as problems. Now it's not so difficult to imagine devices. Constitutional nature which would represent the whole North Atlantic area. I myself do not think that that is the best way of going about it. I think the best way of going about it is to go step by step. Dealing dealing with a question empirically on a number of problems it seems to me that it would be highly desirable if they were negotiated with the Soviet Union. It negotiates but a single t so that there are not three or four separate negotiators but rather
one North Atlantic team of negotiators with a single position. And Chairman this would not be a radical innovation because in practice the positions are other closely coordinated anyway. I think also that there are a number of symbolic things we can do. I'm in favor of applying to Great Britain and other members of the North Atlantic areas of the same kind of relationship we have with Canada that is abolishing passports and instituting domestic postage. This would not mean a great deal politically but I think it would symbolize the fact to be considered as a unit and it is through measures of this kind that I believe that step by step we can make clear to ourselves and to anyone else that we
are not a squabbling group of nations trying to escape death but that we can that we are still capable of constructing new political relationships. I know this is sketchy and which I'd be glad to expand to Mr. the next atomic weapon. And I think generals Exactly. You talk about conventional weapons with a little plot. I wonder if I have the speakers could many the philosophical distinction between the nuclear weapons and talk to call weapons and is one of usable so-called conventional lawyers or just like an international force whose all forms of nuclear power wind
down. Basically the question is. Is there a philosophical distinction in terms of weapons or must the philosophical distinction numeric only in terms of objectives or interests. Who would you like times then to try. I'm confused by the word philosophical. But if I leave that would out perhaps I can make it clear my own views on the subject. The difference between an atomic weapon fired in the general nuclear war and one which is called a tactical atomic weapon is very considerable but it's not in the weapon it so it's in the target and the tactical atomic weapon to my mind is any atomic weapon at a tactical target. That's to say in the area of the battle.
You could go on about this but I think a bit of me because I think we'll leave that to that one gentleman in your speech you have the courage to project create a Panget a good US you also should refer to the fact that the USA did nothing. We found a few men in Hungary. The reason given is that the USA could not have released the nuclear RR. What a small country in Europe and indeed his argument is irrefutable. Yet today we are asked to face the risk of nuclear Iraq for Baron. Not so much WHAT ABOUT ME NOW squad because we must draw the line somewhere which appears to mean that the tallit guardians must be stopped before it reaches the shores of North America. These are to do it is even more pronounced in the theory of limited nuclear RR. According to leech the whore you wrote might be blown up to keep America free. You not Everard's American defense policy boys down to the principle that we should not be blown up for your freedom but you should be blown up for our freedom. Do you know that such a policy can be cardless
out socket size and carry detonation to defend the freedom of man. Or do you. We should search but I doubt that a nation of such a policy. Did you grasp it. I think I grasp the import of the question. Nobody is advocating no one in his right mind is advocating that Europe should be blown up. Only it concerns the question which General Boyan referred to in his last answer namely how best defend Europe or any other area. It is to believe of many that if order should be forced upon us that is communist aggression takes place
then whatever weapons are used. Better they are conventional or nuclear. That they'd be used in the most discriminating fashion possible. And as much on military targets as we possibly can. And I must say that the task in devising such a strategy is made very difficult not only by some military people who build it who refuse to accept the possibility of discrimination but also by some others. Who seemed to feel that if one creates any options we will we will rush into a nuclear war just to prove that we can do it. Now on the question of dead to specific question of whether and no one is advocating any kind of or limited nuclear or conventional in order to banish it from our shores and in order to devastate Europe.
- 1961 Couchiching conference
- Realities of war
- Producing Organization
- Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
- Canadian Institute on Public Affairs
- Contributing Organization
- University of Maryland (College Park, Maryland)
- AAPB ID
- Episode Description
- The fourth program from the 1961 conference focuses on modern war and its effects on society. Dr. Henry Kissinger is the featured speaker.
- Other Description
- The 1961 Couchiching Conference, a summer symposium on national and international affairs put together by the Canadian Institute on Public Affairs and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, assembles for its 30th annual meeting. The theme of the 1961 conference was "diplomacy in evolution."
- Forums (Discussion and debate)
- Media type
Host: Wilson, Bob
Producing Organization: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Producing Organization: Canadian Institute on Public Affairs
Speaker: Kissinger, Henry, 1923-
Speaker: Keystone, Jay E.
- AAPB Contributor Holdings
University of Maryland
Identifier: 4988 (University of Maryland)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
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- Chicago: “1961 Couchiching conference; Realities of war,” 1961-08-08, University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed January 24, 2022, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-930nwz73.
- MLA: “1961 Couchiching conference; Realities of war.” 1961-08-08. University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. January 24, 2022. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-930nwz73>.
- APA: 1961 Couchiching conference; Realities of war. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-930nwz73