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More in cooperation with the Maryland Center for Public Broadcasting and Johns Hopkins University. Present the annual undergraduate student project the 1971 Milton Eisenhower symposium. An 11 part series of featured speakers formal addresses followed by informal question and answer session. This year's topic Soviet American relations dilemma is of power on today's program a panel discussion of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. At Harvard University and Richard M. of Johns Hopkins will discuss the United States. The USSR and China. Members of our panel Dr. Eisenhower LADIES AND GENTLEMAN Good afternoon and welcome to the Milton as Eisenhower symposium. The United States and the
Soviet Union. The dilemmas of power. On July 15th President Nixon announced that he would visit communist China. He stated that the purpose of the trip would be quote to seek normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides. And of quote in the past few weeks the president has also announced his intention to visit Moscow. The purpose of today's panel is to examine recent developments in relations between the United States and communist China and to assess the effect of these developments on U.S.-Soviet relations. The members of our panel are well-qualified to deal with this difficult subject. Professor Herbert S. Stein received his bachelor's degree from the City College of New York and both an M.A. and a Ph.D. in history from Harvard University. He was a staff member and head of the Soviet section of the RAND Corporation from 1050 to 1066.
He is presently professor of Soviet studies at the School for Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University and is an associate of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. Professor Denis dye is the author of a number of books the latest of which is titled 50 years of Soviet foreign policy. Professor Samuel P. Huntington received his B.A. from Yale University in 1906 as M.A. from the University of Chicago in 1949 and his Ph.D. from Harvard 1951 was associate director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies. Columbia University was chairman of the Southeast Asia Development advisory group from 1987 to 1969 is coeditor of the Quarterly Journal foreign policy which might be described as the most innovative in its field. Professor Huntington is currently Frank R. Thompson professor of Government at Harvard University. Professor Richard M. pepper received his B.A. from Yale University his law degree from the Harvard Law
School and an M.A. from Harvard and East Asian regional studies in 1070. He received his Ph.D. in government from the Harvard political science department. He is the editor of no more Vietnam the war in the future of American foreign policy and is currently an assistant professor of political science at the Homewood campus of the Johns Hopkins University. As for the format of the panel each participant will give an opening statement. This will be followed by an informal enter panel discussion and a summation of the major issues by each panel member. Lastly questions will be taken from the audience. Dr. Huntington thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. Amid the growing burden that driving our fellow panelist Ladies and Gentleman our product today as I understand it is China. The Soviet Union and the United
States at the Paley tall order and you know what I had to deal with this subject. I would like to expand the topic a little bit. And to address my remarks two or even more general themes one model of and reality. Two and restrained three arms and diplomacy and for the United States and the world. Let me start quickly. We are all prisoners of our perceptions and misperception. And for a good part of the past quarter century American perceptions of the outside world have been shaped in large part by
what might be called a bipolar a Cold War model of world politics. This model implied that the dominant feature of global politics was the existence of two superpowers the power of which exceeded that of any other power. To a very high degree. This model also implied that the two superpowers were roughly equal in power that they had conflicting interests that each dominated a bloc made up of a substantial number of client governments and that the client government of one superpower were by and large not a client of the other superpower. Clearly a triangular model of world politics. I liked an important segment of international reality but it does not encompass all of international reality. And for the future that may well be even less comprehensive as a model of global politics
than the bipolar model was 20 years ago. If the world was something less and something more than bipolar in the 1950s it assuredly will be something less and something more than triangular in the 1970s. There is quite obviously the obvious bilateral relationship between the two global powers. The Soviet Union and the United States they are global powers because they are economic and military resources. They only exceed those of any other country and because they alone pose that. A credible second strike strategic forces. And thirdly they alone Prozac or are capable of advancing a global military intervention capability. It seems to me this puts the Soviet US relationship in a very different category from the relationships among other powers. And I would suspect that this
bilateral relationship will continue to be the most important special relationship for each of the global powers. And I think it could lead to some monstrous errors in judgment if this bilateral relationship were subsumed into the next order down what is the China Soviet Union U.S. a triangular relationship now that clearly is an important set of interactions. But it clearly encompasses a variety of issues and problems and relationships which differ it seems to me quite significantly from the U.S. soviet union relationship. Quite clearly the overall world balance of power system has been incomplete during the past decade because of China's absence in large part as an effective participant. Chinese isolation has now apparently come to an end a low how firm and
sustained its participation in world politics will be would appear to depend upon what are to me at least the Farrelly mystifying current of Chinese domestic politics. At the third level the other major powers which are neither superpowers in the Chinese sense nor a global power like the Soviet Union and the and the United States enter the scene and here quite obviously we have Japan and the principal countries of Western Europe they are powers with major regional interests and some trans regional ones. They have vital military relationships with the United States having developed their economic and political position under the US nuclear umbrella. But that coverage may well become considerably less significant in the future than it has been in the past. And consequently a major question I think to make concerns the extent to which these powers may play an
independent political and diplomatic row. France and Germany have already if they had such role Japan may well be on the verge of doing so. Finally there are of course the local balance of power in the five regions of the world which lack indigenous major powers. Here I am thinking of Southeast Asia South Asia the Middle East the North Africa sub-Saharan Africa and South America in these areas. The decline in the day and of the bipolar confrontation and in the role of the United States has produced an intensification of diplomatic activity in recent years on the part of the local powers for the first time since before for World War 2 for and then international politics is taking place in Latin America. The possible emergence of Brazil as a preeminent local power has led to a spate of diplomatic consultations and
understanding among her small neighbors. At the same time the possibility of the Soviet Union and the European powers becoming more active in Latin America is something which is very much on the horizon. A similarly active local diplomacy can I think can be seen in Africa with South Africa playing a leading role in parts of the Middle East and Asia and increasingly in Southeast Asia with Indonesia assuming a leading role there are likely to emerge enjoyed it seems to me in each of these regions local international balance of power systems which will interact and confusing and an amazingly complex ways with the relationship among the major powers over the years of the Soviet Union and the United States did come to be that they had neutral interest in avoiding direct confrontation with each other.
The rules of the game to maintain a system of complex balances will be much more difficult both to understand and to implement. But we obviously have to begin somewhere. And in that humble spirit I let me suggest for a rule of restraint adherence to which by the major powers may well be necessary to maintain this complex balance of power system of rule one pertains to the global powers and is in effect an inherited rule from the last days of the bipolar world. It states simply no global power shall acquire a first strike capability against another global power. Since we've already defined global power the power which had an invulnerable fly can fry capability. This rule template I provide that no global power will attempt to deny that status to an already established global power.
Rule 2 applies to the super powers that lead to the triangular relationship. It provides simply that no two superpowers will form a hostile coalition designed to upset the status quo as so as to challenge the vital interests of a third of the third superpower. This simply means that each superpower will agree that it is in its interest to keep the triangle of mount an operation. There will be no ganging up operations in other words and that the norm for the relation of any one superpower to another 550 going to have to be a ambiguous one at half frightened and half. Oh. Rule 3 which apply to all major powers that no major power of will and food in a hostile fashion in the buffer zone of a superpower. Some people have argued that the policies of great powers should be going related in terms of the as an
influence. I don't think one can can really add here to that doctrine today. Nonetheless it seems to be a superpower status that one dominant role is recognized at least in some small countries directly by joining the superpower if necessary I think we could let those countries rule for confirming the role of major powers in those five regions of the world which one indigenous major powers in the past the United States is active thought Demonio power in some of those regions at the present time the Soviet Union appears to be significant significantly increasing it the influence in the Middle East. So much for the rule restraint. The nature of this world which I've just described
in which in effect a major power will not develop for a strike capabilities will not engage in ganging up coalitions will not penetrate the buffer zones of other major powers or try to establish a regional monopolies is obviously an extraordinarily complex one. And I think it will see in the future we will see in the future that the implementation of these rules or any other comparable code of behavior will require a much greater stress upon diplomacy and the nonmilitary elements of policy than has been the case in the past. This approach means a redress of balance between the military and the and diplomatic. Branches in our own government. And it also means thinking about the world in terms of this rather complex model and trying to follow a rather subtle guidelines for keeping the balance of operating Americans as you well now have a starkly preferred more clear cut definition of their interests.
World involve involvement in the path has always been shaped by the need to deal with a distinct enemy. This is the case in World War Two World War the Cold War and in this then it is perhaps fair to say that we have yet to thaw the problem of excessively participating in world politics on a sustained basis in the absence of what appear to be clear cut challenges from obvious enemies. And in this respect it is perhaps fair to say that the American entry into World Politics is really only about to begin. My. Next speaker will be Professor interest on the. Hill. JAMA not by members of the panel.
My notes here are thought out with saying that it's become a commonplace to talk about the relations between China Russia and the United States as a triangle. And I was going to show why that was wrong. Now Rob I find that maybe I'm in the position of playing a dead horse or it may be that only the members of this panel realize that it is not a triangle but I don't think it's worthwhile to examine as I had intended to show why it is that we have a notion of a triangular relationship between the United States Russia and China because I think we lay bad. What I think are the reasons for this erroneous conception. I think I have some idea of how how it may be resolved or the problem may be resolved.
Well it seems obvious to me on the face of it that you can't call this a triangle or at least an equal lateral triangle at most you can talk about and saucily triangle with two Radel odd size and one small side but yet the image of a triangle is found everywhere. And I think the reasons for it should be sought both in the Soviet Union and the United States. We have tended both of us to see China as larger than she really is. By almost all the rules of how you establish the size and magnitude of a power China doesn't figure there's a great power by the usual standard of
large Croppy lation small GNP China is a small problem. By the standards of a military establishment that can go beyond its borders. China is not a large problem. If you take all the projections of industrial development if you take with the Chinese themselves say about a future it's not a great power. Then where did we get the idea. Let me deal first with the Russian the roots of the Russian exaggeration of China. And I think they are three in nature. One is a Soviet tendency to think in rather crude geopolitical terms. That's a pretty obvious one I don't think I believe much explanation. The second is less obvious and I think will require a little more examination. And that is the considerations of the legitimacy of the Soviet government
and the further is the role of China in Soviet domestic politics. Let me deal with the first one first. I don't think it's saying anything particularly critical or singling out or to say that Soviet political leaders think in crude geopolitical terms but when you read the Soviet press or you talk to some of the acquaintances not all of them but most of them give you the impression that somehow they're in China. There are 700 million people. All of them omg with a small atomic bomb and waiting for a chance to do terrible things to the Soviet Union. Now to this group do this in Russia is added the ingredient of a kind of racialism. And I use this word carefully because there are as many
kinds of racialism as there are nations perhaps more. So I'm not trying to say that the Russians have the same attitude toward the Chinese as the British had taught a lesser breeds or is that we in this country have had and do have toward blacks it's a special kind of racialism but it's very genuine nonetheless. Secondly the Russians feel like many other people who dislike other races or other people but the Russians unlike many of the others feel that the Chinese are superior. They feel that the Chinese are smarter than they are and they're certainly shrewd. And of course more hard working. So it's. It's a feeling that these people are avian but any one of them can outsmart three
simple peasant lads a Russian peasant lads. They're wily. They're numerous they're determined they're organized and this is put on top of this crude geopolitical attitude and it contributes to other Russians feeling that you know that but China is bigger than it really is. Now I second totally different consideration. It's one that doesn't seem to have much meaning when you first state the word and that is the thought of considerations of legitimacy. Leaders of a Soviet Union view it as something more than the successor state to the Russian empire. If that successor state can be governed successfully by any standards that you set up that in the eyes of the Russian leaders it is not a sufficient claim to legitimacy
they've made another condition and the condition is that the Soviet Union be the leader or. Perhaps even a leading member. Of a group of revolutionary socialist states all of which then the whole world in that one point will become socialist. Now even though they may have postponed the imminence of that great day for 50 years or 100 years they view progress toward that goal as a necessary justification for their rule. They have said so so many times that they've convinced their own population of that. Now they haven't done so splendidly in in making the Soviet Union a model socialist state in terms of providing creature comforts for their own population. The
standard of living and the level of satisfaction in the Soviet Union on that is not very high. But they still have a residual claim to being a first revolutionary state and even though everything isn't perfect in that state. Still socialism is better than capitalism and the socialist with all their imperfections and everyone has imperfections. Ah the wave of the future. Now if China claims to be more revolutionary it makes that claim good. Then they claimed legitimacy of the Soviet leaders is diminished. Furthermore. If the worst should happen and socialist states should fight him on the job and it should go beyond the border skirmishes which characterize their
relations in recent years then they should be actual long term military operations. Then that proves the bankruptcy of the idea of the socialist world. Now a third element in the in the situation that makes the leaders see China bigger than it is is they interpenetration of Soviet and Chinese domestic politics. To put it briefly try to imagine how bad a Franco-American relations would be if the American president or the French Premier had the power law to threaten the other in his tenure of office. If Nixon could lose his job because of the gall the Pompidou or vice versa.
Well that's what the Russians and the Chinese have tried to do to each other. They have played factional politics in each state. I think it's sufficient to make my case to remind you that they Chinese have claimed the credit of a dismissal of truth Joff from office. Now I want to talk about why the United States sees China larger than it is except to remind you that China and the China question played a major role in American internal politics in 1951 in 1952 and that presidential election. It played a major role in the Democratic justification for a war whose purpose they continually redefined and it has played a major role in American domestic politics. And then Mr. Nixon's eyes still does.
And it's no derogation of the utility of bringing China back into the family of nations to say that it's also good politics for the elections in 1972 and in the manner that I have left in me I just want to. Raise another question in that and that is that although. One can view the relationship between these three powers as basically an equal because you know I Station this over you know I so much strong and essentially want to damages when it comes to inter interactive diplomatic interaction. Then the United States is in a unique situation because neither the Soviet Union nor China fears or has feared for
quite a long time an attack from the United States or the initiation of indirect was not a very controversial statement. It needs a lot of what you're saying but I won't have time to do it. I may have a chance later. But that means that in the manipulation of the diplomatic arrangements. Between this trio the United States is in the driver's seat because the Soviet Union and China fear each other and neither fears the United States. And I say this despite the fact that we've had many many years of a very destructive war. So I will close on this note having opened up some questions and not really having having done them justice. Thank you.
Thank your home fans. There's a kind of as I say intimidating quality to the structure of discussion a kind of expectable content and focus. I for example assumed as you undoubtedly did that I was here largely to present the main course to analyze of the meaning of the announced forthcoming Nixon a trip to Peking. How it affected a Sino-American Sino-Soviet and Soviet US relations and perhaps the desert even to analyze how it affected Japan's role in the world. And I also presume that the entire discussion would be within a vision of world politics as a power struggle in part among the great powers of the great and super in the global powers and impart between the great powers on the one hand and the vast majority of the rest of the world namely the poor on the other. And moreover that implicit in that vision or framework involving as it does a conceptions of the kinds of jockeying for benefits and
losses that goes goes on in the power struggle in the international arena. Implicit in that framework would be the ideas that the US is constantly threatened by other powers. Say the Soviet Union that the US for the most part responds reasonably to these kinds of threats and implicitly that the US normally only acts defensively rationally and pragmatically. I think to some extent that is at least at the base of some hunting's analysis if indeed these are the implications then more concretely the main issues for discussion in Sino-American Soviet relations become ones like how are we to domesticate our more irrational adversaries. How are we to learn how to communicate better. Our rather decent intentions to foe and friend alike. And how can we play even more effectively the balancing game of power politics. It was in fact to commemorate this expectation of mine that the discussion would tend to gravitate to this level a level in which we all know who the good guys are and who the bad guys are that I decided to wear my patriotic hand.
For surely such a discussion focusing on the so-called pragmatic questions the great powers face concerning its up with the various scenarios about future developments is that once a patriotic fantasy and a fantasy that is all too real to the rest of the world such a discussion at once provides insights into the way we think and behave in fact in the world and also a nightmarish Evasion of what those patterns of behavior in thought have meant to the world. The United States is precisely what this question is in terms of power politics tend to obscure the United States is the most dangerous threat to world peace with the Soviet Union perhaps generally running a distant second in most areas of the world. Most of the world does not feel threatened by China nor does it feel China is particularly irrational or exotic in its foreign policy. Certainly no more rational than the United States. Instead it is America and the Soviet Union not China who threaten the world not withstanding the fact that America's threat is the skies the mystically by presenting the world so differently to our own people at home.
It is worldwide organized counter revolution with the United States as its leader rather than of the mystically based revolutions that pose the international threat to peace. Further if we are trying to evaluate the relative threats that China or the Soviet Union in the US most of the world. We must ask what country has more bases in fighting men stationed abroad than any other country. What nation has greater foreign investments. That must be militarily protect protected in the final analysis than any other country in the world and most crudely and directly what nation is directly responsible for killing more people beyond that shores than any other nation in the world. The answer is sadly obvious it is the United States. By contrast it is China not the United States nor for that matter the Soviet Union that most consistently has identified with the impoverished masses of the world. It is China not the United States of the Soviet Union that keeps its troops at home. It is China. Ironically in light of our stereotypical view of China as aggressive that has the
most consistent record since World War Three of the three powers were non aggression. It is China not either of the other two who declares that if problems involving non great powers are to be resolved through direct negotiations that the nations whose fate is being decided I should participate in the negotiations and that the fate of the world should not be decided ex-cathedra by the super powers or the global powers. And on the other hand it is not trying to particularly the US an increasingly even the Soviet Union that have built up worldwide investments and vested interests which give them a stake in preserving the status quo even if that means maintaining corrupt and undemocratic governments around the world. And finally it is the Soviet Union and the United States not China that maintains a system of client states and satellites around the world and there is little evidence to suggest that as she gains more power China will try to emulate the United States in the Soviet Union in these regards. That is the facile assumption that people usually hold and I'm willing to grant as amount of them himself frequently does that she is far from perfect or selfless.
She makes mistakes. She also acts at times in the narrowest of self-interest. For example most recently with regard to Pakistan the point here or rather is that if one is the talk of the dilemmas of power for the Soviet Union and for the United States one must begin by realizing what one is talking about. And I submit that shorn of the mythologies. Of American and Soviet beneficence and shorn of the jargon about balance of power what one is talking about when one raises this issue is how the United States and the Soviet Union jointly it competitively and uneasily at times how the United States and the Soviet Union going to rule the world. That is the issue the dilemmas of power then for the Soviet Union for the United States. Our first how to make relations between them sufficiently amiable that they do not lead to direct confrontation as each tries to best the other in the power game in which the rules of the game increasingly are jointly determined and accepted. Second
how within that framework can each maximize the use of his own power to beat out the other and any other challenger like Japan or Europe or eventually perhaps China. And third how would the Soviet Union and the United States to maintain the domination of the haves over the have nots of the world how to keep the lid on events abroad and how to keep their own populations comfortable enough that they do not wince too vigorously at the thought that their comfort is built in no small part on the discomfort of others. The issue for me as an American is how to stop Americans worldwide counter-revolutionary behavior how to facilitate the seizing of the power to determine their own lives by the hungry of the world. And any symposium that does not face up to these realities and to these values I believe is doomed to evasion to fantasy and to self-justification. Thank you.
Thank you doctor. We're going to have an inner panel discussion right now. I would like to start this discussion by asking our participants to answer the following question. What does it seem to you to be the major assumptions that American foreign policy operates of and. Particularly Could you refer that to our new position because of the China. I'm going to start off with Dr. Huntington. Well. I think the major assumption of. American foreign policy are probably changing in so far as one can I judge you have from. The outside it seemed to me that we have in the past operated to very much on the
assumption. That. The Soviet Union and China were major threats to us. And. That Communism generally was a threat to us. It seems to me. That our behavior at least would suggest. That. That assumption. I no longer underlies our policy. I do the same extent that it used to. There's been relatively little interest shown in the third world problems and it seems to me the entire. Rapprochement if one can use that word maybe once read between the United States and China is very easily understood in terms of Chinese fears of the Soviet Union particularly during 1969 and early 1970. And. The US desiring to put itself in this
much better position which I think Dr. Stein very well described as the driver's seat in this triangular relationship doctor going to start you know it's very difficult to. I characterize the policy of a government which spends all its time characterizing as policy and doing it in different ways so it's very difficult to say what the American policy is toward China. Because we get this a superabundance of evidence about it. And conflicting evidence from from a spokesman. And this leads me to believe. That this is one of the rare cases where our political leaders are truly cynical. Most political leaders are quite able. To convince themselves that what they think is in their political interest
is also true. So I think this is one of the true cases of a kind of a cynical. Change of attitude now. Why why has this government decided that China isn't so bad after all. I think the reasons are immediate and political. But again who cares about motives. I think it's quite clear now that when Mr Nixon came into office he decided that the war would end by the half year before election. He made some assumptions which are not coming true. He made some assumptions about North Vietnamese cooperation in that endeavor which I think are not well-founded. Now I don't say this in a tone of
deprecation. I think there's a lot of showbiz in all policy formulation and probably will lead to a very welcome readjustment of international relations. But my my my gas years and the buttressed by long examination of the behavior of governments in the past is that this policy has not been very carefully considered. Dr. Pepper do you care to comment on that. I'll just give my simplistic vision of the major assumptions of American foreign policy. And I don't think they've changed what I think has changed as I think Sam Huntington suggested in part was the way we try to deal with them. I think the major assumptions are that there are enemies out there. And I think. As he also mention that historically we
have not been able to operate very well in the world without external enemies. We keep imputing that the China we keep saying that China really needs external enemies and himi that China really needs external enemies. But the fact seems to be somewhat in agrees that we are the ones who have needed external enemies. And if you look to the question although China may indeed also need them that remains to be shown to be proven. And if you look to the record of our economy it seems to me fairly clear that it's going to be extremely difficult if not impossible for our economy to operate without external enemies. The primary reason for going to China or at least the reason in terms of this change of complete and complexity not necessarily primary the primary maybe showbiz for the next election. The reason in terms of this change in terms of our use of complexity is the attempt I think now to co-opt China into the establishment of forces with the hope that she will agree to a certain kind of position in the hierarchy namely third or fourth in the hierarchy. And for that pay the price of giving up
all of her stated ideals. Most of the things she says at least that you've been fighting for namely the support in one way or another of the revolutionary movements around the world. One of our problems I think in understanding Chinese foreign policy is that we tend to try to evaluate that foreign policy is either radical or conservative. And that's very misleading for us I think because Chinese foreign policy has elements of conservatism and elements of radicalism. China feels and I think all countries do this to some degree that you can deal with certain kinds of states say even like Pakistan in this case without committing itself to an alliance with Pakistan unless other intervention interventions occur and still maintain its own identity as a leader of the revolutionary movements in the world that's increasingly difficult in the case of Pakistan where she is I think desecrating her own images. Would you give a two to three minute summation of what you think the United
States policy ought to be towards communist China. Dr. Pepper. The first thing we have to do is to recognize that Peking is the only government of China that in principle is part of the Chinese People's Republic that automatically will terminate our mutual defense treaty with Taiwan that automatically will mean that we withdraw our forces and bases from Taiwan. The second thing and picking is not in a bargaining mood about this. The wording may be open to bargain but the reality is not open to bargain and they have made it very clear that there will be no normalization in any real sense of relations between the United States and China even at the diplomatic level until something is done about this. The second thing is that we must withdraw totally and unconditionally from Indochina that it seems to me is so simply in our own interest. So patiently in our own interest that it is hard to explain except by conspiracy and devil theories while we have not done that on our own. Thirdly we must
stop supporting and stop encouraging is Melvin Laird and others have done the remilitarization of Japan. Thank you doctor for the move to Dr. Stein. Really not not sure that I know what the answer is. I think the answer will have to come bit by bit. But certainly we can't have normal relations with China as long as there is a war in Indochina and that means all American troops withdrawn and no possibility of reviving the war again by air power or sea power until that is and that is not going to be very much in the way of close relations with China even though the Chinese may be indifferent to the fate of in though China as even the Chinese probably feel they can't
take that position publicly. Lastly Dr. Huntington certainly and we have been involved in a very unnatural place and in a very unfortunate experience in Southeast Asia. And clearly if we are going to carry on any thought of. Normal relations not just. Possibly with China but with other countries in the area we are going to have to reduce our and eliminate our military involvement in Vietnam. What extend this also means that we. Should. Eliminate our involvement elsewhere in Asia. It seems to me is. A rather difficult question. Clearly. We will not have any sort of regular
formal. Relations diplomatic relations with China as we support the government on Taiwan. I suspect however. That. That support will gradually decline over the coming years and I'm inclined to agree with my colleague John King there Bank that. It will not. Be beyond the ingenuity and with them of the Chinese both on the mainland and on the island to work out a relationship between the two. Thank you Dr. Huntington. We'll have our question and answer period questions may be directed toward any participant but all kind of members will before you comment. Will alternate comp. I'll please do not touch the microphones and please limit yourself to one question. Thank you.
Three powers co-equals in the military and economic power. When you mention the triangular relationship you ever hear that within the parameter ration ship United States should have a special bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. I wonder if you can guarantee the survival of such a relationship. I mean the triangular relationship given that relations between the Soviet Union. Well I think there's clearly going to be a very very difficult set of relationships to deal with. But the fact of the matter is that the Soviet Union and the United States. I think we have all agreed even on this panel are. Powers of a distinctly different order of magnitude from from China and in particular at this point they have. Very directly confronting them problems and the regulation of
nuclear weapons and problems in the deployment of conventional forces overseas which gives them a very directly different relationship from. Their relationship with either one of them has with China. But I think it's that type of global interaction which distinguishes the US from soviet union relationship relations which both of those powers have with China what either of you like to comment. OK we'll move back over here to dinner. How do you feel the United States should. Act toward Taipei Now if it's to develop relations with communist China. Well. That's an awfully difficult question. Because you can view it anything
and anyway by the historical way. It is true that in 1948 the United States was quite prepared and the words of the secretary of state to let the dust settle. In other words to let Taiwan become an integral part of China whenever it became a part of China and the Korean war intervened and that was changed. And Taiwan has become our client. I think it would be better if if we would say we have for Taiwan whatever happens and if Taiwan then is invaded by China and we say we can't do anything about it. Lose a valid way or say we withdraw or all the support of Taiwan I think either way would be better than the middle way but. One thing that hasn't been mentioned on this panel I think all of us are aware of it is up about the present administration thinks and
believes that the right wing of its own party has a veto on its behavior. Now it's very difficult to know how strong the right wing of the Republican Party is how much Mr. Nixon has to worry about and that's not the kind of thing that you can quantify and figure out. But we do know that because he said so in public. We do know that that is a thought that preoccupies him very much and therefore if I were going to make guesses I would guess that he would try and keep those people in his camp and that would play a larger role in his Taiwan policy than might otherwise be indicated purely by the by the canons of logic and and. Judgment about the balance of power. I magine Dr. Pepper you have something you'd like to say.
Well I think there are certain kinds of images that cropped up in that response which I disagree and which I think the disagreement at least whoever is right may be illuminating the idea of going back on one's allies is a very dangerous kind of idea when we're the ones who created our allies and we're the ones who prop them up. We can say the same thing about you. Should we go back on our allies. Should we sell out our allies or should we withdraw and stop this idiotic devastation and genocide in Vietnam. But the second point about should we say The hell with raises the question of what our expectations about what will happen if we admit in principle is a part of the People's Republic of China. My expectation is not that it will go to hell as a result of our statement. My expectation is not and I can certainly give good
evidence but this is not the easy answer to that is that you have no navy and Taiwan is 100 miles off the coast of the mainland government there simply cannot maintain itself in its present status and it faces the alternative of democratizing which is allowing the Taiwanese who are the best majority of the population to take over control of the government which it certainly does not want to do since it sees itself as part of one China or some kind of a deal with the mainland. The mainland the mainland government on Taiwan the mainland is there and will have to decide which of these choices is more amenable to them and I have no doubt they will decide to go with Peking because they will have leverage they can bargain at that point. And finally the question of us face. That we try to save face in the United Nations and I think. Her biggest thing is absolutely correct that were likely to do the same thing with the middle route and that the only sensible way to
save face when you're in a disaster situation is to cut your losses and stop standing around with your face exposed with all its scars on it. You're better off to get out of the out from in front of the mirror and close the issue off and then you don't have to stand there defending yourself all the time. Our last question if economic expansion is going to continue and tighter economic ties between countries appear to be the way of the future whatever. What hope is there that we will not end up in a completely militaristic situation. I soon that question is directed more doctors after a while primarily but like products from other people. I don't think is very much hope if there was some way in which we could abstract or extract economic development abroad from our own private cystic and
profit oriented interests we might have more hope. But that would require a surplus a country and there are very few if any selfish countries and united in the world and certainly not the United States. So as between a pessimism and optimism I certainly come down on the pessimist side in this in this case. Let me disagree on that. On the basis of facts of which I'm not sure but I can be corrected. It seems to me that in the statistics that I've read recently the tendency of American investment is to withdraw from risky areas which tend to be underdeveloped their areas and to concentrate in the developed world. Well you could argue that so part of a widening gap between the haves and the have nots. But you can't argue that this is the kind of investment which creates situations where you have to send the Marines in to protect it. Dr. Hunter Well it would seem to me fairly clear and
reason. Wave of nationalizations would have taken place and Latin America and elsewhere that if you generalize. To. Behavior that we're not going to intervene militarily in order to redact day an American corporation that's nationalized. We were allies we have in Latin America you bring various forms of economic pressure but of course if we do away with our aid program we're not left with much in the way of economic pressure to bring. It would appear to me as I think it might be you that the questions of foreign policy are expansive ones. Next week Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith will discuss the role of the Third World as it is affected by competition between the great powers. W BJC FM in cooperation with Johns Hopkins University and the
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Series
Dilemmas of power
Episode Number
5
Episode
Panel Discussion
Producing Organization
Johns Hopkins University
WBJC (Radio station : Baltimore, Md.)
Contributing Organization
University of Maryland (College Park, Maryland)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/500-0c4sns72
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Description
Series Description
This series presents a variety of lectures on Soviet-American relations. The lectures are followed by informal question and answer sessions.
Topics
Politics and Government
Media type
Sound
Duration
00:58:44
Credits
Composer: Schwartz, Donald
Producing Organization: Johns Hopkins University
Producing Organization: WBJC (Radio station : Baltimore, Md.)
AAPB Contributor Holdings
University of Maryland
Identifier: 5489 (University of Maryland)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
Duration: 00:58:45
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Citations
Chicago: “Dilemmas of power; 5; Panel Discussion,” University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed February 7, 2023, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-0c4sns72.
MLA: “Dilemmas of power; 5; Panel Discussion.” University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. February 7, 2023. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-0c4sns72>.
APA: Dilemmas of power; 5; Panel Discussion. Boston, MA: University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-0c4sns72