Raw Footage of Henry Kissinger on Foreign Affairs in Oregon

[garbled] So you're happy. Apparently ...your latest peace mission in the Middle East and in lieu of what appears to be growing skepticism it's home about detente. [garbled] would you tell us how you feel today about detente, whether you are satisfied that it works or perhaps disappointed by the interpretation in Moscow. Detente has become almost a slogan in a public debate and I think it is important to summarize again what it means to the United States. Then there the policy of relations with the Soviet Union and of attempting to ease the tensions between the two great nuclear superpowers derives from the conditions in which we find ourselves.

The United States and the Soviet Union have the capability of destroying humanity. Their conflicts therefore are different from the conflicts between nations throughout history. They have a special obligation to conduct their affairs in such a manner that the risk of war is minimized if there is at all possible. It is this conviction that has led successive administrations in attempting to find a relationship with the Soviet Union less prone to the dangers of conflicts that can arise sometimes even without the direct intentions of the two countries. Now this attempt to ease tensions takes place at several levels. It takes place on the level of the control of arms, especially nuclear arms, and in that connection the Strategic Arms Limitation

talks. The agreement that has been concluded and the agreement that we are attempting to conclude are of prime significance, and it is the problem of the nuclear arms race is a problem that must be dealt with that will be solved some time, and the sooner the better. Secondly, we are attempting to bring about restraint in areas of direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union such as in Central Europe. That has been reasonably successful. Third, there is the problem of conflicts, disagreements, tensions in areas where there is no direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, such as the Middle East. In such areas, the conflict can develop as a result of the tensions that are inherent in the area, the lack of restraint of the superpowers, and other factors. In the conflict in peripheral areas, the process of

relaxing tensions has not made us much progress as in the area of control of armaments and in the areas where there has been a direct confrontation. In those areas. Further efforts at mutual restraint are necessary. We do not believe that relations with the Soviet Union are idyllic. We are ideological opponents. We have conflicting national interests in addition to the ideological differences. Nevertheless, we believe we have an obligation to attempt to ease tension, if only to demonstrate to our own people that,if there is a conflict, we have done everything in our power, honerably, to avoid it. So, on the whole, we believe that the policy of relaxation of

tensions is essential. That we are we are going to continue to pursue it. It can be done only on the basis of reciprocity. We will not give up vital American interests. We will resist attempts to exploit it, but we will cooperate on the basis of reciprocity with any effort that can ease tensions on both sides on the basis that the process is a two way street. With regard to this easing of tensions in the Middle East, like you say that the United States won't give up any of its vital interests and presumably the Soviet Union won't give up any of its vital interests. In peripheral areas such as these is it not possible that what is considered progress by one side may be considered dangerous provocation by the other and thereby have an adverse

effect on your general picture. Of course, when you assess vital interests, you also have to remember that in order to vindicate them you have to survive, so that the definition that both sides have of a vital interest must take into account the realities of the contemporary period. I believe that it is ... [interupted] ... I'll come to your question in a minute or in five minutes [laughter]. In the Middle East, I do not believe that the essential interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are in any sense incompatible. I do not believe that the recent agreement between Egypt and Israel is in any sense detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union or a unilateral advantage for the United States. The significance of the agreement is that it defuses the tensions in the area. And, if it is

implemented properly, will open or can open a door to general peace in the area. And if we consider that every war in the Middle East has involved the danger of confrontation of the two nuclear superpowers, it is in the mutual interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the tensions of war. The United States seeks no unilateral advantage in the Middle East. The United States recognizes that in a final settlement in the Middle East, a Soviet draw will be important and, therefore, we are debating now certain procedural questions about the Soviet role in the reasoned negotiations rather than a unilateral advantage gained by the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union. Mr. Secretary... have been saying that there is no military role that can be played by the two hundred American civilian technicians

in monitoring the agreement that could not be played by either airborne or satellite intelligence. Can you say apart from the Can you say apart from the political or psychological effect of having these Americans in the Sinai passes whether there is any monitoring function that is essential to their being there - in other words that they have to be physically in the passes? Well, these Pentagon officials have not shared their judgments either with me or the President and therefore I don't know who they are and on what their opinion is based. The monitoring that is going to be done in the limited area in the Sinai, that is the area that is geographically bounded by the Gidi pass in the north and the Mitla pass in the south. It's about a distance of roughly 20 miles. The monitoring has two

stations, one by Israel and one by Egypt and under American American custody, and there will be Americans stations. And secondly, three tactical warnin- three manned tactical manned tactical warning stations. In the over several weeks that we participated in, neither we participated in, neither of the parties thought that these stations, that either of these types of stations, were dispensable. Now I might also point out that there was a unanimous vote in the National Security Council before I left, which included the participation of the Defense Department that said that, that as a last resort if it was necessary to make the agreement, we should go ahead with the American technicians. [Interviewer] Of the risks that may emerge as a result of the PLO spread the Palestine resolution regards the U.S. military presence in the Sinai as an enemy target and should be shot by every struggler and every nationalist

in our Arab nation. How do you plan to come out of that. [Kissinger] Well, there aren't that many strugglers in the Sinai because it's an substantially unpopulated area. And the American warning stations are located in an area between the two armies in an area that contains several thousand of the United Nations personnel and in which there is no civilian population of any kind. Secondly, we believe that once the immediate passions have died down and the various Arab nations and various groupings look at the agreement, they will realize that it was the only step possible towards peace that could now be taken and that compared to the alternative of a stalemate it was the best cause for all of the parties in the area. So we believe that - that

when a more sober calculation is undertaken, that all of the parties in the area will have returned to the realization that the process of negotiation, It's the only road by which peace can be achieved. [Interviewer] There's a good deal of backing and selling going on at the Hill about the issue of what is classified and what is secret and how to handle it involved-involving the U.S. commitment. And there does seem to be some confusion about secret or classified commitments made by the United States either verbally or written, in the interim agreement. And I wonder if you could clear this up with answering two simple questions. First, will the American people know every detail of any U.S. commitment to the parties. And will all of Congress know these commitments in Toto, or will full disclosure

be made only to committees or to certain members of certain committees. [Kissinger] We have made an unprecedented effort to put before the Congress any American undertaking to either of the parties. We have gone not only through any written undertakings that may exist, but through the entire negotiating record to extract from it any undertaking of the United States. We have put those before the relevant committees. Let me finish- and I'll answer both of your questions. We've put those before the relevant committees. In addition, we have gone over the negotiating record with other members of the committees, in order to make sure that their definition of what constitutes an undertaking does not differ from ours. Now with respect to, and if there is a

disagreement, we will work it out. Now with respect to what we consider to be undertakings, we are now working out with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and we will work out with a House International Relations Committee a form ]in which these undertakings can be made public. The difficulty being that if you are not really undertakings in the strict sense, but general diplomatic statements of intention. But any undertaking that will be put before the entire Congress and before the public in a manner agreed to between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, and the administration. [Interviewer] Get from that that there is a portion of what the diplomatic intent that is not going to be made public under any circumstances. [Kissinger] There-- any undertaking of the United States will be made public. There is

however, an area of diplomacy that no country has ever made public and that does not involve undertakings, commitments of the United States. We will go to the absolute limit and we have made an absolutely unprecedented effort in making available documents that have never been made available to congressional committees before. We will then work with these committees on an agreed method of publication and it will be the fullest disclosure of a diplomatic record that has ever been made. [Interviewer] Mr. Secretary, have you told these Committees of Congress that the United States will pay for 55 to 75 percent of the oil supplies of Israel for years to come? [Kissinger] First of all, that is not a correct statement. [Interviewer] What is the correct statement in regard to what we will be paying for Israeli oil for years to come? [Kissinger] May I answer the first question? We

have put before these committees. And no doubt we will make public any commitment, any undertakings of the United States with respect to the oil supply of Israel. The United States has not committed itself to a spe- to a separate funding of the oil purchases of Israel. The United States has agreed that it would take into account in its total aid package the additional sums that Israel has to spend for foreign purchases of oil. There is no precise sum. In fact there is no sum attached to this general proposition as will become apparent when documentation becomes available. [Interviewer] Mr. Secretary, you had said (inaudible) that the momentum now (inaudible). What does that mean in a specific

practical way (inaudible). [Kissinger] We have maintained, and indeed it is part of the agreement that the agreement between Egypt and Israel is not a final peace settlement. The agreement states it is considered a significant step towards peace. It is not a final peace agreement. It has always been understood that a final settlement must involve the question of frontiers. Must involve the question of reciprocal Arab commitments to peace. It must involve some solution of the Palestinian question. And it must really involve international guarantees of some sort. And this can be pursued either by step by step policy, for example through negotiations between Syria and Israel. Or

by a reconvening of the Geneva conference. Or by both efforts being pursued simultaneously. The United States has repeatedly stated that its commitment to promote a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We will be prepared to help the parties either in a multilateral framework or in a bilateral framework. And we believe, and we believe that the parties agree, that the process towards peace cannot be arrested. [Interviewer] What is your (inaudible) Syrian and Israeli interest in another step along this process? [Kissinger] In the immediate future, Israel and Egypt will have to negotiate the practical arrangements involved in their current agreement. That will take some weeks. Then the process of implementation will have to begin.

But somewhere in this process if Syria and Israel are prepared to start negotiations and if it is their judgment that the United States can be helpful, we will be prepared to play a role. [Interviewer] Mr. Secretary, has the Arab agreement had any visible effect on other areas of U.S.- Soviet relations? And in addition to that - whether it has or not, could you give us an assessment of the current state of SALT negotiations in particular, what obstacles there are if you can tell us, what the prospects are for the visit by Mr. Brezhnev to the United States. [Kissinger] As you know, foreign minister Gromyko is going to visit the General Assembly and on that occasion he will pay his customary visit to Washington. I expect to meet with him several times while he's here. The president will meet with him for an

extended review of the situation. On that occasion we will certainly review the situation in the Middle East. And I think the - at least from our side we will make every effort to overcome whatever misunderstandings may exist. As far as SALT is concerned, the basic issues of principle were settled at Vladivostok. Several other issues of great consequence have been settled in the meantime. We are now down to two or three issues of great importance on which agreement has not yet been reached, but in which if agreement were reached, a big negotiation could be concluded within six to eight weeks after that. We expect to discuss those issues with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he's here and we still expect to receive the general secretary in Washington

before the end of this year. [Two Interviewers talking at once] [Interviewer] If I may Mr. Secretary, that time table would seem to run awfully - awfully late into the year if possible. You say six to eight weeks after a breakthrough. What is your estimate of a foreseeable date even if all things would go - [Kissinger] I don't want to give an estimate of a date but I have said that we still expect to see Brezhnev here before the end of this year. [Interviewer] Mr. Secretary, did the somewhat unprecedented intervention of your African desk when the governor of Delaware, on behalf of two members of ZANU - an African terrorist group without U.N. diplomatic credentials - did this have anything to do with the widely reported resignation of Ambassador Davis? [Kissinger] No, because I don't even know what you're talking about. [Interviewer] It was reported on page one of The Star and The Post, Mr. Secretary. You don't read those papers, or - [Kissinger] I don't want to offend the press, but I regret

to say that I am not familiar with this particular incident but I will be within 15 minutes of leaving here. [laughter] [Interviewer] Mr. Secretary, some months ago the administration announced there was a policy reassessment taking place regarding the Middle East. Are we ever going to hear of that again or if we're not, can you give us some tentative conclusions that may have been drawn as the result of this months long reassessment? [Kissinger] The reassessment, two aspects: had the aspect of the diplomatic framework within which progress towards peace could be pursued in the Middle East in the wake of the failure of the March shuttle. And secondly it had the aspect of the aid levels that were requested for both Israel and some of the Arab countries. Both of these issues were clearly related to each other.

In the wake of the March failure, we had to assess whether to proceed - whether the step by step approach was still valid or whether the more comprehensive approach offered the only possibility. I think that the diplomatic framework of the reassessment has been settled by the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel. Similarly, the problem of aid levels is in the process of being settled, it's been substantially settled and these will be submitted to the Congress in - before the end of the month I would expect. [Interviewer] To follow up in response to a question a while back, I got the impression that we still have not made a decision whether step by step from here on in is the preferred approach. Is that correct that we still - [Kissinger] Which approach is more if - which approach should be pursued

depends not only on the preferences of the United States, but on the preferences of the parties. And the issue was not only which of these should be approached, but in what manner it should be approached. I believe that as a result of this examination we had in recent months and the events of recent weeks, that there is now a much greater clarity of the limits and the possibilities that exist in moving the process forward towards peace. and of course we had the benefit during the reassessment of learning the congressional judgment of appropriate aid levels in the letter of the 76 senators, and in other approaches. And therefore, in assessing the aid levels as I pointed out previously, what one has to consider is the difference between what would have been submitted or voted

anyway, and what is being voted...and what is being requested as a result of the agreement. And we do not think that that is a very significant figure. [REPORTER]: Mr. Secretary, is there an intergovernment study underway now, concerning the recruitment of American personnel to be sent to the Sinai, and if so, will these personnel be recruited from the Defense Department or from any of the government intelligence agencies, or if not, will these personnel reflect that work experience, and will the organization established to administer the monitoring function in the Sinai be a private corporation, perhaps like the Vinnell Corporation or more like Air America? [KISSINGER CLEARS THROAT] [KISSINGER]: I'm not sure I quite get the implication of that last remark. I don't want you to explain it. [LAUGHTER] We are undertaking a study, on an urgent basis, of all of these questions. Our preference is

to recruit people out of civilian life. We have not yet made a decision as between a private organization or a governmentally sponsored one. It is clear that the personnel will not be under the Defense Department, because we do not want to give them a military role. The personnel will report to both sides and to the UN, as well as to the United States government. But the questions you ask, which are important ones, we will be able to answer within about 10 days. [REPORTER]: Mr. Secretary, you said that... [KISSINGER]: You have to remember, incidentally, that American personnel will not begin manning these stations for five months after the implementing protocol has been signed -- and that is about two to three weeks away. So, we have about five and a half months to work out all the details.

[REPORTER]: Mr. Secretary, I think you said that... [KISSINGER]: David... [REPORTER]: I think you said that... [KISSINGER]: Mr. Binder, first. [REPORTER]: I think you said that the, uh... [KISSINGER]: Mr. Binder. Then you. [REPORTER]: I'd like to ask you to evaluate the recent events in Portugal with regard to your earlier statements on that country, um, also with regard to the role of the Soviet Bloc in Portugal, and with regard to the possibilities for American assistance to Portugal -- economic assistance. [KISSINGER]: I've, uh, have made so many statements about Portugal, that I'm not absolutely sure which ones you're referring to. I was concerned, as were my colleagues, that events in Portugal might be dominated by a minority group, the Communist Party, distinguished

primarily by its discipline and its dogmatism, uh, against the wishes -- against the expressed wishes -- of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese people. And the United States, together with its West European allies, repeatedly pointed out its dismay at an evolution in which such a small minority would take over the effective control of Portugal. Now, recent events have reduced at least some of the manifestations of this dominance. We are not yet clear what will emerge out of the deliberations, both with respect to the formation of a new government, and with respect to the organization of the, uh, of the so-called...of the Revolutionary Council. The

Communist Party still remains a significant political force in Portugal, and probably out of proportion to its numerical strength. And we cannot yet fully assess what is taking place within the military movement. But on the whole, we believe that the events of the last two weeks have been encouraging. The United States supports the emergence of a pluralistic system there, reflecting the, uh, public views as they were expressed in the election to the Constitutional Assembly, and we are working in the closest harmony on this problem with our European allies. With respect to the Soviet Union, we have made clear our view about possible Soviet intervention in Portugal, and those views have not changed. [REPORTER]: Will it be a matter of United States policy, that any aid to Portugal

will depend on whether or not we still think that the Communist Party remains a force beyond its numerical strength. [KISSINGER]: That will certainly influence our judgment. This gentleman has been...[REPORTER]: You said the Soviet Union will continue to play a procedural role in the Middle East? Will it be just procedural? Could it be more than procedural, for example... [KISSINGER]: No, I didn't say the Soviet Union will play only a procedural role. I said that the Soviet objection to, uh, the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel, seems to me to have concerned procedure more than substance. And, I also said that in a final settlement in the Middle East, Soviet participation would be important, and not only procedural, but substantive. [REPORTER]: I meant to ask whether you could conceive of the

possibility that the Soviets could play an actual peacekeeping role in the Middle East, in the same way we will be in the Sinai Passes? [KISSINGER]: Well, the role that the United States is playing is at the request of both parties. It is not...it was not proposed by the United States. In fact, I am giving away no secrets if I point out that we were not particularly anxious to play this role. If both parties should ask the Soviet Union in some other area to play a similar role, that is... that would be for both parties to discuss with the Soviet Union. I do not see that this is the most immediate foreign policy problem before us, however. [REPORTER]: Mr. Secretary, is there in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel any sort of formal commitment to consult with Israel on the nature of assistance, in the event it is attacked by an outside power? And if so, why is it necessary? [KISSINGER]: I...

the Memorandum of Understanding between us and Israel -- which is not, incidentally, unprecedented, because this has been concluded after many previous...many previous diplomatic watersheds -- has traditionally been classified. We will make public, as I have stated before, all of the essential undertakings, and I would rather deal with them as a unit than to deal with speculative clauses before the committees have fully considered them. But this, this, uh, will be fully discussed. [REPORTER]: Why, in your judgment, has the Middle East agreement been such a hard sell for you and the administration, especially in the Congress? [KISSINGER]: I...I think that, personally...

First of all, let me state my judgment of the agreement. I consider this agreement more significant than the previous two disengagement agreements that received much less...much less criticism. It may...if...it certainly gains some time for the peace process, and it may open the door to a general peace settlement. Now, why has it been more difficult to present? I think part of the reason is that it involves, in the year of the collapse of our Indochina effort, a commitment of some American personnel in a far-away part of the world. To be sure, the commitment is different from the Indochina commitment -- it is for a peacekeeping role, and not for participation in a military conflict.

But I think there may be a sort of a subconscious rebellion against this. Secondly, it coincides with our submission to the Congress of a substantial aid bill at a time when the, uh, when, our country is undergoing a recession. And it is...may not be fully realized -- first, that a substantial aid bill would have been submitted in any event, even without the agreement. And that secondly, the costs of a war have been demonstrated to be incomparably higher than any aid bill that will be submitted this year. So, for all these reasons, it has been a somewhat more complex case to make. And there may be the general attitude of suspicion that has befallen this town

as a result of Watergate and other events, but I must say, in fairness, that the questioning before the congressional committees has been very constructive. We have no complaint about harassment or negativism. I think serious people have made an effort to look into the implications for the United States of a major foreign policy move. And we think that the debate is, on the whole, a healthy one. [REPORTER]: Mr. Secretary, on a related, uh, part of the Middle East -- do you think there's a compromise possible between the administration and Congress on the projected sale of 14 Hawk missile batteries to Jordan? [KISSINGER]: First of all, the issue is not between the administration and the Congress, so much, as between Jordan and the Congress, in the sense that a compromise must be acceptable to the government of Jordan in order to be viable.

We are prepared to discuss with the congressional committees, whether we can find some formula that would ease their concerns. There are definite limits to what can be done, because King Hussein has pointed out on innumerable occasions that he will not compromise on the numbers. Now, whether any compromise is possible with respect to deployment, rate of delivery, or similar matters, we are now exploring with the congressional committees, in both the House and the Senate. And then, of course, we will have to discuss it with the government of Jordan. [REPORTER]: Is there any basis for a new German-American offset agreement, now that the deficits and the American balance of payments have disappeared? [KISSINGER]: Well, I think it is no secret that your

chancellor is not an unqualified admirer of offset agreements. We have had some discussions on that subject, and we have not yet reached any conclusions. [REPORTER]: ...the prospect for normalization of relations with Cuba, especially in view of the recent forum being held in Havana for the so-called independence of Puerto Rico? [KISSINGER]: We have pursued a policy with respect to Cuba of moving, by reciprocal steps, towards an improvement of relations. This policy has shown some progress, and we are prepared to continue this policy. At the same time, the meeting in Havana can only be considered by us as an unfriendly act, and as a severe setback to this process, and as a totally unwarranted interference in our domestic affairs.

[REPORTER CROSSTALK] [REPORTER]: The Soviet Union's grain shortfall is estimated by U.S. government agencies as anywhere from 20 to 50 million tons, and there's already been considerable opposition to shipping the 10 million tons that they've purchased. How do you see the Soviet grain deals relating to our foreign policy and détente, as you've described it this morning? [KISSINGER]: Well, 50 million tons is a wild exaggeration -- I haven't seen any estimate like this. But, we...at this moment, we are not undertaking any new contracts for sale to the Soviet Union, until, until the market...until the crop returns for October are in. We are also interested in discussing with the Soviet Union, the possibility of a

long-term agreement, which would avoid the fluctuations and the sudden invasions of our market, and which would enable our farmers to plan over a more extended period of time, which would then put a minimal impact on our prices. All of these are now under consideration, and they are not directly related to détente being discussed on a general level. [REPORTER]: Mr. Secretary, the administration has called consideration being given to a long-term agreement which would involve a trade-off for oil, or other Soviet resources? [KISSINGER]: There has been a very general discussion on that subject. There are no negotiations on that subject going on right now. In fact, there are no negotiations going on either about a long-term agreement, or about a possible use of,

of Soviet resources. But if a long-term negotiation should begin, that is one of the factors that might be considered. [REPORTER]: Mr. Secretary, the Church Committee claims to have evidence that the CIA violated a presidential directive on the destruction of biological toxins. What are the diplomatic consequences of this? And when did you first learn about it? [KISSINGER]: Uh, frankly, I first learned about it on television this morning. [REPORTER]: Ambassador Helms apparently has been recalled to testify tomorrow. [KISSINGER]: That's right. This does not mean...I would assume that there has been some discussion between the White House and, uh, the Church Committee on this subject, but I've been away for, in recent weeks. I'd have to know the quantities that are involved before I can make a judgment. We, uh, committed ourselves by treaty to destroy biological warfare agents. [REPORTER]: Mr. Secretary, you have talked an awful lot about the momentum, of the need for momentum, and certainly the Egyptians are discussing the need for momentum. On the other hand, the Israelis,

in all of their public statements since the agreement, have indicated they have virtually nothing more to give -- Premier Rabin talked about a few hundred yards, uh, in the Golan. In this case, have you, perhaps, simply postponed the inevitable? Or, do you think, perhaps, the Israelis are posturing at this stage? [KISSINGER]: Well, I don't want to speculate about a negotiation that has not even been agreed to in principle, at this moment, and in which I have not heard the detailed position of either side. Inevitably, somewhere along the line, there must be further progress towards peace. And therefore, any progress that has been made, even if it gains only time, permits time for the peace process to occur under conditions of less

pressure and less tension. What will develop in the Syrian-Israeli negotiation, I would have to leave to the beginning of such a negotiation and I don't want to pre-judge it now. [REPORTER]: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. [BOB ZELNICK]: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger concluding his press conference. It ran for approximately 43 minutes. Most of the questioning dealt with the recently-concluded Middle East agreement between Israel and Egypt, although a number of other areas were discussed, ranging from détente to U.S.-Cuban relations to developments in Portugal to the SALT negotiations and a number of other matters. Reviewing what the Secretary said, it strikes this observer that the really big question remains unanswered to this time, and that is exactly what other agreements, other than those

formally in the signed document, exist between the United States and the two Middle Eastern parties? The Secretary did indicate that the entire agreement plus the diplomatic record supporting it, is currently under review with the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in an attempt to sort out the undertakings of the United States, the formal commitments of the United States, from statements of diplomatic intent and understanding. We can conclude from the nature of the Secretary's comments, that the former -- the formal commitments, the undertakings -- will be made public in package form, at which time they will be discussed again by the Secretary, while the diplomatic statements of intent and understanding, may well remain secret, at least for the immediate and foreseeable future. Thus the Secretary concludes his press

conference. It was carried live on National Public Radio, and the presentation was made possible by funds provided by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. For National Public Radio at the State Department in Washington, this is Bob Zelnick. And this is NPR, National Public Radio. [SILENCE]