Ten O'Clock News; Edward Kennedy

One. Charge the charge basically was to review all of our strategic forces and to try to solve the problem of the ICBM force which had become such an issue in American politics. So basically it was to try to solve the problem of the ICBM but in the context of all of the strategic forces. There had developed Charlie it had become a problem because there developed an impasse between the executive and the Congress. Over the need basically for a new ICBM. But basically on how to deploy it

and the Reagan administration had rejected the Carter administration solution for it and had proposed various other. Deployments. None of those turned out to be satisfactory to the Congress. And so by the end of 1982 when the closely spaced basing recommendation of the administration was rejected by the Congress there was an impasse between the two branches. And the commission was suggested really. By the Congress as a way to resolve the problem. OK first question what was the charge really was to review U.S. strategic forces and to find a way to to resolve the issue

of the ICBM force and its modernization where. The Reagan administration came into office they rejected the proposed deployment of DMX missile that the Carter administration had proposed and they came up with a variety of different suggestions for deploying it. None of which were acceptable to the Congress. So by the end of 1982 the latest recommendation for closely spaced basing was rejected by the Congress. A commission seemed the only way to resolve the impasse between the two. But there are a variety of different attitudes on the Congress. A number didn't want TMX at all. A number wanted

to abandon it for a different kind of missile and others thought we needed nothing at all. Others supported TMX very strongly. So there were a variety of attitudes on the Hill. One of the problems was that we were asking a lot of a new missile that it had to do everything for everybody and every proposal which was made had some kind of a flaw in it. It was not perfect not perfect in a way that the Minuteman 3 when it was first deployed seemed to fit seemed to resolve all of the issues. It was accurate enough that was survivable enough. It had good command and control all the things you would like. The

Minuteman 3 had. We were looking for a substitute for that something which would solve all of our problems at once and it turned out to be very very difficult. Well the basic problem was how to make it survivable how to make it something that was not supposedly a first strike weapon. Also to make it big enough to carry a number of accurate warheads to make it cheap enough that it could be deployed. All of those things went. This. Well the the theory was that if it was not

survivable if it could be destroyed by an attack from the Soviet Union then there would be pressure in a crisis to launch it first so that it would not be destroyed. And that that that would be destabilizing. My personal goal I guess when I first when I first agreed to do it my notion was that the task was to find a decent burial for the max because I was dubious that a solution to the problem could be found. But then gradually as we got into it it didn't look quite so hopeless. And then the goal became how to end the impasse and ICBM force and to move ahead with a modernization program and also to more

closely integrate weapons systems development with arms control. The whole chair just just get here first. Is there anything about that. Well I know I'm not the best and I thought that was that was probably the best one could do under the circumstances that the impasse. Between the Congress and the president was. So deep so strong that. No. No resolution of it was possible. There was

no I don't I don't think I don't think there was any particular point at which you can say yes we found a solution. It gradually developed in the course of our analysis of what the problem was what the attempts had been to solve it before and so on. It was a gradual development. Of a consensus on how to deal with it in the background of this process. Well.

One of the first things we tried to do was to work with the Congress the attitude on Capitol Hill after the collapse of the closely spaced based basing. Proposal was very bad. There was. A feeling of rancor toward. The Defense Department and so early on we sought the views of influential congressmen and sought to give them the sense that they were participating in the process. Other thing we did in that commission itself was in as much as we had people with varying backgrounds some knew a great deal about the issues some not so much was not to start right out saying all right what do we do but instead to go back over to review the history of U.S. Soviet strategic force relationships of arms control of previous attempts to solve this problem. So on some of them very highly technical go through all the

intelligence that we took. We spent a lot of time simply understanding why we were where we were with me and. In meeting with people like Congressman Aspin and dicks and numbers senators and so on what we what we saw was to see what the limits of acceptability may be. On Capitol Hill. What sort of ideas they had and a number of them are very knowledgeable in this area and how we might be able to craft a solution which both met the strategic needs as we saw them the United States and also the political requirements of acceptability on Capitol Hill.

So they played a very important role. Well I don't know that they set limits. But what what gradually developed was what we ended up with and that was a kind of. Three part solution to the whole problem designed to. Appeal to a variety of interests not all of them. Most of them overlapping but not all of them are similar. The first to deploy an AirMax for those who felt it essential that we have that sort of thing to recommend the development of a small single warhead missile. For those who. Felt that the Amex was was was a mistake that instead our strategic forces ought to move clearly in the direction of small survivable. Systems.

And lastly as I said to integrate arms control with with the modernization of our strategic forces so that we got in a political sense people who. Supported the AirMax would accept the small missile as a way to get the max. People who didn't like TMX but liked the small missile but would accept TMX because of the small missile and people who perhaps didn't feel any modernization was necessary. But in order to get the Reagan administration active in arms control would support a strategic modernization so that from a purely political sense it was that kind of a combination which got a variety of different coalitions together. Within the administration with what

Judge Clark and with. Bud McFarlane and Secretary Weinberger basically. Were. As we got along we also had had a couple of good meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Question. What. Was their reaction here. Well it depended. Judge Judge Clark was was very supportive very helpful and didn't try to steer the boat if you will. Secretary Weinberger had had some very strong feelings and. We didn't always we didn't always see eye to eye about him but he and I met frequently and there were always amicable meetings. But he had his own

views and we had our own sense of the imperatives if we were if we were to solve the problem. He was a strong supporter. Secretary Weinberger was a strong supporter of closely spaced basing of a full IMX deployment and that's the way he saw the problem. He was. Not particularly. You know he was not enthusiastic about about a small missile he was worried about the development of two missiles rather than one the expenses. And he felt that it was not the best way to go. Before. This. Guy. He said.

What we did is divide the problem. Into two parts and and rather than try to find one missile which solved the whole problem. We divided the problem up and part of the requirements. We gave to the max and part to the small missile for the short term. We felt it was very important to deploy a a. Moderate number of highly accurate ICBM warheads. That for. Perhaps a period of a decade or so. That. Those missiles in silos. Would be sufficiently survivable because while the Soviets with their test

missiles could conclude they had enough accurate accuracy to destroy them that was far different from actually mounting an attack with operational missiles with all the problems and so on and we felt that perhaps for another decade they were adequately survivable than if we for our long term survivability went to a mobile. Single warhead missile that was fully survivable. That when that was developed that also would lend survivability to the mix in silos because the Soviets would have less incentive to attack the silos if they knew that there was a large number of missiles they could not successfully attack. So that was the rationale behind it. Well that window of vulnerability was a slogan and it really

developed for very different reasons we didn't deny it. Nor did we accept it. We said no one can calculate what the technical as well as the strategic vulnerability of silo based weapons is whatever it is it's going to get greater as time goes on and Soviet missiles get more accurate. Therefore the problem has to be solved. We felt that our solution which took advantage of time and got us a deployment at the earliest possible moment as well best aided stability. Yes I think so. They accepted their response completely. So it would be difficult not to be happy with it for sure.

Weinberger Oh I wouldn't want to characterize his reaction to it. He accepted it. He announced publicly that he supported it. There was a lack of enthusiasm which has remained to this day in part of the Defense Department about the development of the small missile there's no question about that. But I think in fact what we did is allow the strategic modernization program to go forward. And that was important to everybody. The Congress and the president and therefore I think yes they were happy with it. Oh of course I think well there's several things that are unfortunate. I think the small missile while it while

there's no question it's very expensive. I think it is still a very important direction for the United States. I think it's also unfortunate that that. Our recommendations came when they did on the eve of an election year because the coalition that was put together in support of our recommendations. Really didn't survive the elections of nineteen Eighty-Four. It broke apart and the Congress failed to failed to approve a hundred Air Maxes. And the administration at least made noises about backing away from a small missile each accusing the other of bad faith. Well for the Congress that's true. As a matter of fact the administration

looked at the midget man as a way to get its max. By and large not the Air Force but. But the Defense Department as a whole and the Congress by and large viewed the max as the price one had to pay to get to mention it. Well we already have or will have 50 axes. That much has been approved. The question is whether or not we will eventually get. The midget man and the other 50 axes which the administration wants. Do you want. Oh yes. Yes I think they are important in some ways. First. Prestige

get why it wasn't done for a variety of reasons. I think the basic one is the strategic reason that we felt that we did that. There was a strategic imbalance strategic imbalance in fast fast flying accurate warheads and that that imbalance could be important in a crisis situation where the Soviets could make miscalculations based on on their superiority in those quick quick reaction warheads. Therefore we felt that we had to take steps early to rectify at least in part that imbalance the image of man was a long a long ways away in development and therefore we felt that a limited deployment of TMX was a very important

move. I mean. Yes that always was a possibility that as I said before that developing two missiles was expensive and that there could be an argument that when we had DMX we really didn't need the magic man but we felt that risk was. Was worth trying it was worth running in order to get. All of our strategic problems dealt with the way we felt that the two missiles did. It. Yes. Give it a little.

More. Precarious. Well I think he I think he and others Democrats who supported our recommendations came under fire basically for supporting the administration and it was less the specifics of it than it was the general idea of supporting the administration. I think it was a partisan political heat not not grounded fundamentally in. Strategic differences by pushing for. Yes in part one of the real problems of course with the with the survivable basing mode was that the administration the

Reagan administration rejected the multiple protective shelter of the Carter administration. And while that was not a grand solution to the problem it did it was a reasonable. Approach. So. With that gone it made it very very difficult without going to a very esoteric kinds of deployments. To get reasonable survivability. That's probably my shoes. I won't. I will creep on cross my feet and then I will creep Coquet for you. First of all the president. First.

Yes I think it was a mistake. OK I think it was a mistake for the Reagan administration to turn away from the multiple protective shelters. It did have some flaws but it was a program which had been accepted on the hill. I think the Reagan administration could have said well it isn't what we would have chosen had we been starting afresh but the program is already underway. A lot of work's been done. We'll go ahead with it whether or not they subsequently regretted not going ahead. I doubt because they have maintained an opposition to anything resembling an MP s deployment down to nearly the end of the administration I think. Yes I was. I guess it was

that decided fire. And there was a year to decide what was. The mission of the town's panel was to find the best technical deployment for the next not not to deal. It was a much narrower charter than the later Commission had. No. No. Not directly disturbing. No it wasn't a disturbing experience. We were widely widely split and

we had majority and minority reports. But no it was it was an interesting spring. And and what the basic the basic recommendation of the first towns battle was for a modified deployment which was rejected by the administration. The majority the majority recommended the deployment of x in silos but in such a configuration that if we did not get arms control for example the Soviet Union it could be expanded into an MBA system. No it was I wouldn't say it was repressed it was ignored. Pretty much.

Yes. And the administration then proposed I think to put 40 and in the tightened silos temporarily and they looked dead at an airborne system which hits the town's panel also suggested looking into. And then they finally came up with closely spaced based highly. Closely spaced basing as a highly technical solution to the problem of survivability technical and probably unprovable as to whether or not it would actually work because it depended on theories of fratricide that is of one incoming warhead destroying others for its success. And one really had to

come to judgment based on experts analyses which would put differed greatly as to whether or not that would work. So it was it was too technical too difficult a deployment to try to explain and to get accepted because it was really beyond the ability of a layman to satisfy himself that it would work for you. Well that made it quite clear that the administration was for a variety of reasons not going to accept any kind of solution.

I think a because it was. A recommendation of the Carter administration be sure the MP s solution I think was rejected by the Reagan administration both because it did have some flaws if there were an arms control the Soviets could just build enough warheads to overcome it. And also because it looked like an arms control gimmick it looked like it was being devised by arms controllers and the Reagan administration came in with a kind of an antipathy to arms control interfering with weapons developments. And I think they developed this attitude toward peace which remain as long as Secretary Weinberger was was in office.

Barnes. Stage. The stuff it was it was a hard fight. But yes yes. And by October of 83 the administration had significantly modified its proposals for strategic arms control. And made a real negotiation possible I think. So yes the administration didn't do everything that perhaps some of us would have wanted. But they fundamentally changed their approach. Here.

What did the administration give in on. Well initially they gave in on the image of man on building the image of man and they also agreed to be more forthcoming on arms control and also to look at arms control more closely integrated with our strategic programs rather than as something one does off to the side. Well I was very pleased with the outcome of the report. The fact that it was a unanimous report of the commission and that was about five years ago now for four and a half years ago and I'm still very comfortable with with the conclusions despite the

changes in the strategic environment in the interim. I still think the recommendations are very sound. It's hard to hard to be had in this field. The thing is this is a consensus there. It's in it's in a state of disarray if it hasn't if it hasn't broken down. The Russians seem to be moving much more along the recommendations of our commission than does the United States. The in the Defense Department not in the Air Force but in the office of the secretary. There is only lukewarm support for the image of man especially under the bed budget pressure switch which are coming now and it is quite possible that could

be funding could be withdrawn for that on the Hill. Of course. The DMX program has been cut from 100 to 50 and I think that getting the other 50 funded is going to be a very very difficult job. So yes there's been it's only been a while it hasn't been a success so far. Well the Soviets since the sensor Commission Report have have come out with with two new ICBMs both of them are going to be mobile. And I think that you know at the heart of our recommendation was to move toward

mobility as the best assurance for survivability. And that doesn't really need to be as yet. Do you think that it should be. Would it work. It would it would work but it would not be survivable. And while it would be relatively more expensive to destroy it than than the value you'd get from destroying it. It. Still doesn't accomplish what we felt which was to make an attack on it not remunerative and as long

as the Soviets have ample warheads and right now they do they can afford to attack each silo with a midget man in it. If arms control got down to the reduced numbers to the point that each warhead was very valuable then putting them in silos would be very would be fine. And if each side only had single warhead missiles and a relatively equal number then there's no need for mobility. But we're a long way from that. Do you know that knowing what's different here. This is your second strike force. Where does it begin here.

Well we you know we weren't working on the Soviet force structure in a sense but we did feel that the overall efforts. Both in strategic weapons programs and in arms control should be to improve the stability of the balance so that the character of the weapons systems themselves should not be an incentive to turn a crisis into a conflict. In other words you should not have vulnerable systems and those that you had to worry about if you didn't use them first they would be destroyed. And we felt that was useful on both sides. It would not end it would not end the chances of having a conflict. But it would reduce the chances of having a conflict.

Neither side wanted. Now the administration was not on that same wavelength at least in the beginning although I think I think it is more generally accepted now than than it was at the time. I think they still did admit the administration's approach. The administration's approach was not focused nearly so much on arms control as it was on developing a force structure which. Either matched that of the Soviets or was adequate for the missions that the administration felt. Now we did the same thing

but our focus was to do it and accomplish other things as well. I think that's the principal. Difference. Between the two. Well. I think that the administration was less interested in integrating the strategic systems in arms control and trying and focusing on if you will the issue of stability as a goal for both. And instead they were focused on the symmetry if you will between the forces of the two sides and focused on reducing that symmetry by the development and deployment of the max missile defense is a

this is a first strike force. No I don't think so. I don't think so because I think the rationale that we used to do it and we deliberately recommended a number of which was not adequate to represent to give us a capability for a full first strike against Soviet ICBM force and therefore you know what we wanted to do was worry the Soviets but not to scare them so that in effect they thought we did have a first strike force and were going for it and would have to take compensatory measures that would have defeated what we were what we were trying to do. So we wanted to do it. We wanted to worry them we wanted them to know that we had a force capable.

Of use first if we had to. But not one designed to destroy their offensive capability what do you think. Rachel Garrison is a useful for puzzle as long as we understand what it is and what it is not. It is not a survivable basing mode in the sense that the magic man mobility is for example because it depends on strategic warning as long as the missiles are in their garrison they're highly vulnerable. Much more so than in silos in the Minuteman silos for the AirMax is now if one has ample warning and acts on the basis of the warning and gets the missiles out on the rail system then they are highly survivable. So that as long as one recognizes that

in any kind of a surprise attack or in an attack where we have not already reacted by putting them out they are very very vulnerable. Well I don't think they're substitutes for each other. I'd like to have both. I support the other 50 Maxxis in Israel Garrison mode and I would have no problem moving the current 50 out of silos into Interrail garrison but I think it's important if we do that to have to mention it man because we definitely need an ICBM force that does not depend on warning for survivability. No no.

To have stability on both sides of course. We think it's in the soviets self interest to do the same thing. Neither side ought to want to have its ICBM forces followable. And therefore and self-interest. Each side ought to move toward survivability and the Soviets in fact are are doing that. So it's not a co-operative effort even though we think that the results are beneficial to the strategic balance. Yes they do. They do have their principal advantage is that there isn't a problem. OK. The Soviets do have an advantage in mobility as compared to the United States in that they do not have to worry about the public interface. It would be absolutely impossible in the United

States to put missiles out on the roads on the railroads whatever in peacetime it simply could not be done the Soviets do not have that kind of a problem. On the other hand much as Soviet territory is unsuited. For. Big missiles over land there a real net is much thinner than that of the United States so it's not completely one sided but by and large the Soviets have an easier time of mobility than does the United States it's very difficult for us to deploy mobile systems very difficult which made it easier. No I would still go. With the single.

Warhead missile because I think that multiple warheads provide an incentive for attack. And while it's it's cheaper the more warheads you can put on one delivery vehicle the cheaper you can make it. It is. Conducive. To instability and therefore I think one of the major directions of both sides ought to go in arms control is to reduce. The merged forces on each side. Do. You miss. I certainly would. I'll will never do that because the non Murf. I certainly support cutting the merged forces in any arms control between us and the Soviet Union we won't start by cutting out the merged

forces because by and large they're the new modern forces. And the single warhead missiles except for the Soviets SS 25 are our old missiles. But I think in conjunction with arms control and modernization we ought to encourage modernization by developing non Merve missiles and then an arms control to reduce to reduce Murf weapons it's also arms control. In a sense yes you have control that they can then you have a situation very complicated case and then you have the patience for this in order to trade off for support for us. Well what.

What all of this says about arms control and strategic forces is that for too long they were handled and looked at by different parts of the executive branch and the arms control people were over here in the weapons development people were over here. And one of the things we recommend strongly is to bring them all together so that we looked at our arms control and weapons developments as part of an overall. Strategic. Policy. And one could not ignore the consequences of decisions in arms control like for example counting silos and therefore ending up forcing the weapons developers to put as many warheads as they could on the only thing that that counted which was which was the silo. Those were the kinds of things that we argued. Really ought to push us in the direction of integrating arms control and strategic force development.

Is that because the way decisions get made in this Congress. Yes it is we have made some progress but there's been an additional new element introduced and that is the strategic defense initiative. And that. Brings up all different kinds of calculations as to whether or not you need an ICBM force whether you can defend it with the strategic defense initiative rather than go to mobility or anything I just saw saw that we have not by any means solved our strategic problems. Your mission here. Yes we were yes we were. Where were you. Were any of you informed you

started to tell us if we were startled we knew about it. I think the day before the speech yes we decided that the only way we could do it at least for our initial report was to ignore. Were ignored because it was only a speech that had nothing behind it we didn't understand the rationale or anything so we did ignore it in our first report and dealt with it in a minor way in our in our last report. Was there something that may mean that it wasn't from us forces.

It's not clear to me that that the administration at the present time does have an overall strategic concept that relates offensive forces to defensive forces to SDI to arms control. That's not at all clear to me. Many people suggested that maybe that. Is. Acceptable. I think SDI did have its roots insofar as those roots come out of that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the frustration over this decade long attempt to find a survivable base. For our offensive forces. And I think part of the conclusion was that we simply could not continue to compete with the Soviets in the area of ballistic missiles. And instead we had to go in a different direction which was strategic defense

systems. Well they hadn't they had been turned down before because. Tech. Technically they simply were not far enough advanced that they could not be defeated by a much cheaper. Offensive force. They were too easy to overwhelm so that they simply didn't make sense to to use rather than mobility to to protect ICBM forces. But we in our commission we did recommand research into into defensive system to protect the ICBM force because especially with something like an MP s a mobile deployment you get a lot of leverage out

of your defensive forces. All I have to do is defend the areas where the missiles are. And since the Soviets don't know where they are they have to fire at. And a lot of empty empty holes so that you can use defense in a way which makes it gives you a lot of leverage. Oh I think it was extremely important he did. I think Congressman Aspen's role was was extremely important. There were others who also played a vital role but he was he was. Instrumental in in working with us in giving us a sense of what would work and what wouldn't work. And and also in carrying through

on the hill with his with his colleagues to try to support the recommendations of the commission then he and he still continues to do that. Have you had enough. Thank you. It's very interesting that. The Air Force was really interested in designing TMX I think we made a mistake at the outset and the Air Force in arguing for a more modern missile

thought that the simple and most persuasive way to get it was to say we needed a more survivable missile that the Soviet missiles were getting more accurate. In fact what they should have said is that the Minuteman is getting old and we need to modernize it. But by talking the vulnerability themselves then they had to solve the problem and it's a problem that turned out to be virtually. Insoluble at least with any single weapon system. That's that's where they went wrong at the outset. I think that because the argument for modernization is simply for modernization sake would be less persuasive to the Congress than if we were really taking a step forward and making the next missile and then a vulnerable missile. And therefore they thought that was the way the way to go.

And you know they had not really looked seriously enough into the problems of survivability and now a number of the basing modes that first looked to be attractive on closer examination turned out to have serious flaws. Don't you want to hear more. Oh that's part of it yes. Yes. There was a problem with a number in Congress about developing accuracy. Yes. That that was really a mistake that the accuracy was was important only for first strike. Forces. And we should not have a first strike force. Yes that was part of it was the.

There is no convincing that. Well. But the Carter administration inherited the problem of survivability when the Ford administration left office. The notion had been to deploy it in what was called a buried trench. And the missile would go along this trench and break up through the soil and fire whenever it needed to be. Then they found out that if a warhead a Soviet warhead hit anywhere in the trench that the trench actually magnified the the force of the explosion. And since we have found out ways to deal with that. But that

that deployment mode had to be abandoned and therefore the Carter administration was seized with the problem of finding a new basing mode early on for me. Yes. Well. What what we argued was that our strategy for the defense of Europe envisioned in some circumstances using nuclear weapons first. Now if we had no nuclear weapons which were adequate for attacking Soviet forces as opposed to cities and command and control and leadership then it made a mockery out of our strategy to use nuclear weapons first in defense of Europe if that was necessary

for whatever to use them against a military target system which is what you would want to do if you had to use nuclear forces in a defense of Europe. What we were talking about though is really basically developing this so that the Soviets would be aware we did have this force which could be used for that purpose and therefore it would reinforce deterrence in Europe. Oh the actual Nahda was not a substitute for having European systems not at all. But if the Soviets insisted on escalation then we felt we had to have systems which made sense in firing at Soviet military targets. And therefore something

less than an all out exchange which would destroy both societies because that wouldn't make sense. It's very difficult to develop scenarios. Remember what we're trying to do is deter the Soviets from acting. And the best way to do that is to try to prevent them from looking at any aspect where there may be a loophole that they could move through to successfully attack. And therefore we felt that having forces having strategic forces which were militarily useful and not that is against military targets not simply to destroy Soviet society would be an adequate and added deterrent. If all we had were big inaccurate weapons the Soviets would calculate we would never use them and risk the destruction of the whole United

States to save Europe. The case before we get a man was moderate moderately accurate but not accurate enough. Now look. Here. That's that's the theory yes. Yes. Well theoretically theoretically and nobody knows what would prevent escalation. Theoretically they would be purely military targets like missile silos. That could be attacked without a lot of collateral damage without attacking

population centers really to demonstrate the purpose. Nuclear weapons. In the defense of Europe which would be to demonstrate to the Soviets how serious we were and that we would not allow a European aggression to succeed where. There would be a military force. Yes sir. Initially one would presume we would use we would use shorter range systems not Intercontinental systems. This was the last kind of backup. But yes we'd use smaller systems against Soviet military forces probably in Europe. Yes you would be going.

Hopefully never. It is the existence of that missile with its capability that we would hope the Soviets would take into consideration before they would attack. And therefore would be deterred from doing it. That's the whole principle of it. Your weapons would you say that again people are criticizing this thing in a way or else. Well those are the targets. Well surely one has to do it one one that you know the scenario that

that we were just discussing was one of Soviet conventional aggression in Europe where we would initiate the use of nuclear weapons. There are many other kinds of scenarios. Most other ones would involve probably a Soviet attack on the United States first. So that one needs both the accuracy for. Military purpose and also survivability to guard against the Soviet attack in an area where we are waiting for further escalation here. Couldn't they do the same thing we think. Where do we go. Of course what Remember what we're trying to do is prevent a conflict. The Soviets would not attack in Europe if they didn't have

some particular objective what the introduction of nuclear weapons does doesn't necessarily favor the defense the offense. We don't know what it does is to throw any calculations at the rational objective right out the window. The uncertainties are so great that it's not possible to calculate the consequences of an attack and therefore they would be less likely to attack. That is a theory and the more robust the systems arrayed in support. Of Europe the less the Soviets could calculate that there's any way that they could launch a successful attack. That's the whole that's the heart of deterrence strategy that would help your world help.

Basically basically what we felt was that the mix would be very useful in stabilizing crisis situations that in some crises there's sort of a game of chicken and if the Soviets knew that they had an advantage in these kinds of weapons and they knew that we knew it then they would feel they could take one step farther and we would have to back down eventually because we could not usefully attack them that we felt was a serious instability. Which could in fact turn a crisis into a war that if that if the Soviets knew we had this capability what TMX gave us they would be less willing to go into crises and less willing to dare. US because because we had this capability

continuing to force. Possibly one cannot omit that aspect from some crisis situations. Depends how or cry what the crisis is and how it develops and what each side wants to get out of it. But there's no question that in some crises one side or both sides are seeking to gain some advantage. And one of the issues is who will who will blink first. And what we said is we should not have a force structure which forced us. Militarily to blink first. Well the Midgette man is last for that scene immediately and directly as a follow on

for survivability. Now the words it would do. It could do the same thing that the Amex did. But the reason you need the midget man in addition to the max is for long term survivability would you be doing research for this. I think you need I think you need both. But but the magic man could in fact play that role as well. Is it. It would be a highly accurate warhead. As well what happened goes in in 83 when we made these recommendations. The Major man was a decade away from from deployment and we felt that was too long to wait. Yes very I think launch on launch under attack

while we certainly ought to convey to the Soviets that we had that option and we might do it if they attack. I think to rely on it to have to rely on it as a measure of survivability is very very dangerous because it puts puts a terrible stress on on any president in terms of how does he know when attacks coming and so on and so it's I think it's very very dangerous way to go for his policy. Probably. Probably I wouldn't I wouldn't be surprised if after all that's his job and he was

comfortable with the recommendation. There's no reason he should have been happy about a commission moving in to do it. In fact however it wasn't doing his job for him it was a recognition of an impasse between the executive and the legislature. And what our job was to try to find points of conference between these two who had lost the capacity usefully to have a dialogue that was really what we what we did. Shortly. Very. Well he thanked me very warmly for the work of the commission