Crocker Snow Reports From Germany; Atlantic Treaty

Greetings from West Germany. This is Crocker Snow speaking from the studios of Radio Deutsche Welle, Cologne, the city with the world-famous Gothic cathedral. September is the month of Munich's famed and beery Oktoberfest, a beguiling misnomer somehow characteristic of the robust capital of Bavaria. While the Oktoberfest was in full swing in the city, so, too, was another more serious occasion. The 12th annual congress of the Atlantic Treaty Association. This is a kind of 'friends of NATO' organization. It was first activated in the mid 50s to alert public opinion to the fact that NATO was, and remains, more than simply another military alliance. The delegations from the member nations, private citizens with no official capacity, try to keep a close and hopefully influential eye on NATO developments. The recent meeting in Munich was the 1st ever held in the Federal Republic.

A large part of the week's discussions, general sessions, and working group meetings, centered upon the French withdrawal from NATO, which has taken place over the last 18 months, what the delegates tactfully refer to as the 'French initiative.' Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, addressed the delegates on this problem during the opening plenary session in Munich's spacious Maximilianeum. Immediately afterwards, in the crowded chambers, I asked the NATO Secretary General if he considered the so-called 'NATO crisis' at an end. "[Brosio]: It depends, very much, uh, the answer, on the idea one has of this, uh, crisis. What do you--one--one means by 'crisis of NATO.' If, uh, by 'crisis' one understands the consequences of the French decisions, we should say very practically that, uh, these, uh, consequences

are not over, because the other nations have not yet taken all the measures necessary to face them. Uh, further measures have to be taken in the future, and I am sure they will be, but it will take some time. SO in this limited and clear and very practical sense, I would say that the process of evolution and adaptation of the alliances, which is a consequence of the French, uh, moves, is not over. One of the ?contrary? thinks of a--of the crisis in a deeper sense, uh, connected with the--the general political situation, the purposes of NATO, its, uh, eventual ends, and so on and so forth, I would answer, simply, deny that there is a crisis at all, I--but, ah, asserting very strongly that there is this process of adaptation and evolution, which is a healthy one, is the necessary process of all living bodies, and NATO is a living body. Yet the French uh, uh, actions,

uh, in a way, while certainly not, uh, strengthening the alliance in general because, I said myself, that one shouldn't deny the effects of the French moves, has, uh, spurred the other countries to activate, uh, a process of re-thinking and also of re-strengthening of the alliance." Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO. Another official present at the opening day of the Atlantic Treaty Association meeting, was Joachim Jaenicke, a German Foreign Service Officer on loan, so to speak, to NATO, where he is Assistant Secretary General for political affairs. Speaking in fluent English learned during 12 years of studying and teaching in America, Jaenicke recited the background and effects of the French action. The speech raised several interesting points. "[Reporter]: In your speech today, you dealt at great length with the question of the sovereignty of nations of the

14 nations now in NATO and--15--and you dealt with this and I got the impression that you were, perhaps, regretful, but at least realistic that nations still demand this sovereignty, and that, uh, they require it. Is this a correct assessment of what you were saying?" "[Jaenicke]: I think so, because, uh, the fact is that NATO is, uh, an alliance of 15 sovereign states and the word sovereign by definition means that there is no authority above the sovereign state. Therefore, whatever a state--uh, member of such an association does, does out of the full strength and, uh, plenitude of the power, which it possesses as a sovereign--sovereign state. And therefore, uh, it is possible for each state, uh, to follow if it so wishes. A selfish policy. There is no principle, which, uh, hinders it. Except, of course, the principle of enlightened

self-interest and the principle of, uh, restraint or the recognition that if we are all, uh, all selfish and pursue our national aims regardless of other interests and needs, uh, that we, in the long run, do harm to ourselves. Uh, the principal, however, is still the one prevailing in international relations. And as I pointed out, there is an attempt now being made to pool this sovereignty in a very particular experiment, namely, the experiment of the common market, uh, in Europe. But it presupposes that the nations participating have a high degree of similarity of interest and cohesion, uh, among themselves. And I think that the NATO member states are too diverse to achieve, uh, this cohesion, uh, at this point in history. It would take longer, and more has to happen in the development of

international relations before we realistically can, uh, expect, uh, nations to give up the principle of sovereignty. It is not too soon, however, to limit, by your own decision, uh, this full use of the sovereignty and, uh, to apply restraint." "[Reporter]: Of course all of this applies to France and the French action, the 'French initiative,' as it has been called, in withdrawing from the military and of NATO. And this is behind a lot of the discussions here at the Atlantic Treaty Association meeting. Now, I'm interested in your point during--that you made during your speech--that the French really acted within this framework of--of national sovereignty within a framework recognized by all of the other member nations, and the fact that--that they did really act in a legitimate manner as--as the thing has developed, that this is really what is--what has frustrated and is frustrating the other member--member nations." "[Jaenicke]:

It is frustrating to the other member nations because the other member nations have been willing, for the past few years, not to use their rights to the full extent. And it is precisely the policy of the present French government to use, uh, sovereignty to the hilt, uh, regardless of the, uh, present, uh, international situation, which to my mind is a situation which, due to technological, economic, and uh--uh, physical reasons demands an ever-increasing degree of interdependence--or rather of the recognition of interdependence--so that we are no longer living in an international situation where the full, uh, use of sovereignty can be, um, applied, uh--can be enjoyed--uh, without doing harm to one's partners." Certainly one of the real virtues of the Atlantic Treaty Association is the

opportunity for an exchange of views; to trade perspectives. For example, Gordon Hawkins, head of the Canadian delegation at the Munich meeting, speaking about the special Canadian angle toward the French question. "[Hawkins]: It is perfectly true that one hears here, very often, the remark that Canada has, of course, been pro-French and its general attitude because of Quebec. and it's very legitimate to say that because of the, um, difficulties between French Canada and the rest of the country, and because of the increasing amount of bilateral relations that Canada's been establishing with France, uh, we have been prone to take a different attitude towards French actions in the last year or so. But this, I am perfectly convinced, is only a very small part of the explanation of why we--and I talk both of the Canadian government and, I think, of the civilian group that make up this delegation--um, take a rather more

cautious view of the situation. It--it seems to us that any arguments about, uh, advancing the European community or even, um, advancing the Atlantic community, must be very bizarre and unnatural if you are not going to prepare the way at every conceivable point for close French participation, and that to encourage or commit yourself to a line of policy that, uh, excludes them more firmly then need be from discussions and new arrangements, uh, this seems to us to be a rather unprofitable one. There's a figure of speech, which I think has a German origin, that if you're going to pull out the plug in the situation, at least make sure that the wall socket maintains--is maintained in good condition. And I think this is the kind of commitment that we feel. Now, as I say, I think this does inevitably spring, to some extent, from our special relationships within Canada

and as between Canada and France, but much more basically than that is a conviction that there is no point in talking about Atlantic Alliance, Atlantic assemblies, Atlantic communities, unless you prepare the way at every stage for the greatest possible involvement of France, eve--even allowing for the range of political and military difficulties that exist at the moment." "[Reporter]: We've both heard a lot of talk here about the fact that the so-called 'French initiative' has caused quite a reassessment of--of NATO and its objectives, and that it has necessarily meant that NATO should develop into more of a political role than it has hitherto, and yet I, for one, have not heard any concrete proposals at all. I wonder if you have." "[Hawkins]: No, I haven't, and it seems to me very hard to think of the ways in which the Alliance can assume more concrete and purposeful political structures without France, um, and the sheer geographical and historical and economic fatuity, ah, of thinking of it in this way seems to me to be

very apparent. And that if you're going to talk about the possibility of common political institutions to make, uh, the nuclear threat equ--continuously credible, and so on, uh, you--you must talk about this with--with France in mind and with the possibility of France returning. And that if you are going to move on from NATO being a military alliance, which I think it still should be, to something more, uh, imaginative and, uh, contemporary and attractive to the progressive mind, then I think you must move into the economic rather than the political sector. You will recall that after the last Brussels meeting there was within the communique an agreed statement that NATO Council and its committees should consider. Ways in which, uh, more enlightened and, uh, valuable relations with the east in economic terms could be found and explored. I gather this is going on slowly, that there are a lot of

difficulties in it, but it seems to me that if one could, while continuing NATO as a military alliance, use it also as a base from which to consider the possibilities of, um, of détente--of some détente--in economic terms, uh, that, uh, one would give to the Alliance, uh, an attraction which it certainly doesn't have for, uh, the generation that's 35 years and younger at the present time." Gordon Hawkins, head of the Canadian delegation at the recent Atlantic Treaty Association meeting in Munich. His temperate views concerning the French withdrawal from NATO were not particularly popular ones at the meeting. Generally speaking, the French action was panned. Even the French delegates hastened to pledge their firm commitment to the Alliance and to disassociate themselves from ?Le Grande Charles?. They were, of course, representing no official French views, only their own. One highlight of the conference was an

address by West German Defense Minister, Kai-Uve von Hassel, on the subject 'Security Today and Tomorrow.' A man in a precarious position at the moment, due to the recent resignations of 3 top-ranking Bundeswehr generals, von Hassel touched briefly on this and his government's determination to allow non-NATO French forces to remain in Germany. The theme of the Atlantic Treaty Association annual meeting was the present state of the Atlantic Alliance and the nature of the communist threat. Aside from the obvious preoccupation of the various delegations with the French withdrawal from NATO, precipitating as it did the NATO crisis, this theme was an appropriate one. The meeting served as a sounding board for the different national interpretations of the alliance today. Although the body itself, the ATA, has no actual voice in NATO affairs, it does have an important function to fulfill. Joachim Jaenicke,

a NATO official, explains just what that is. "[Jaenicke]: NATO feels that the function of these associations is to enlighten public opinion and, uh, our feeling in NATO is that as an association of democratic states, uh, these states, and thereby the Alliance, need the support of public opinion. And, uh, you cannot have this support if people do not understand the problems and the complexities of a modern defensive alliance. And it's the task of these association to provide this information to the public." "[Reporter]" Now, I believe you also made the point in your speech that the--the other member nations other than the United States should make some sort of an effort in the future to offset the overbalance, as it were, of both American troop commitments and American economic commitments to NATO. Could you amplify this a bit?" "[Interviewee]: The fact is that the, uh, United States, uh, carries the lion's

share, as it were, of the defense burden in the NATO Alliance. And, uh, the, uh, Europeans who are always asking for more say in the direction of the Alliance can really only support this claim if they are also willing, at the same time, to increase, relatively speaking, their share in the economic burden of the defense costs of the men put into the field, and of the part of the gross national product devoted to the common defense." "[Reporter]: During your conclusion, you implied--in fact, you stated--that the communist threat, which really necessitates NATO and has necessitated NATO will be as great as ever in the future, in the--in the conceivable future, discernible future, but that--that it will probably be harder to discern, particularly for public opinion. And this is perhaps a bit contrary to much of the academic and the so-called enlightened opinion in America at the moment, the, um--

as you probably know, there's a great feeling that we really can work with the Russians at the moment, if--if the Vietnam conflict would resolve itself and so forth, and I wonder if you'd--you'd talk just a little bit more about this--this, uh, ever-present communist threat." "[Interviewee]: For various reasons, the intentions of the present communist leadership are friendlier, or less hostile, let us say, toward the West than in Stalin's time. But as we know, an intention is something, which can be changed overnight. It can be changed by a change in government from one day to the next Mr. Khrushchev disappeared without anybody knowing about it, ah, beforehand. Or it can be changed by the government itself. Mr. Khrushchev was making great efforts in his day to win the friendship of the public opinion in the West. And yet, while doing so, he faced a mortal threat against the United States by

trying to smuggle his rockets into Cuba. Now, there would be one very, uh, reliable test of the good intentions, if these good intentions were accompanied by a real and visible reduction of military capabilities. Because military capabilities take years to build up, and, uh, once, uh, they are there and they are maintained, ah, it means that they pose a potential threat. Ah, however, if the Soviets wanted to prove their good intentions, all they had to do-- reduce their capability. There is nobody in the Western world, ah, no military authority, which would deny that the military potential, the rocket arsenal, the

naval power, the conventional power, the satellite power, the armament's quality is being reduced behind the Iron Curtain. On the contrary. And the Soviets and their allies boast about the continuing build-up, greater efficiency, greater modernization, standardization of the armies of the Soviet Union and of the Eastern European nations. If, uh, these capabilities were sensibly reduced, then we could take this as proof of the good intentions, because capabilities once reduced cannot be restored overnight. It takes, in modern armaments technology, years to rebuild them. And this is also, at the same time, the reason why we cannot afford to reduce our defense capabilities, because should intentions on the other side

change overnight, we would not be in a position to restore our own capabilities equally in equally short, uh, time." Joachim Jaenicke, NATO Assistant Secretary General for political affairs. His notion of the continuation of the communist threat was consistent with the general attitude at the Munich meeting. There was little starry-eyed idealism floating about as outgoing president of the Association, Lord Gladwin, made clear during his valedictory address. He disposed of the theory that Russia is no longer a threat and that if America goes home, a peaceful and united Europe will result, with the words:" "[Gladwin]: Of all the neutralist illusions, this is perhaps the most absurd. Where will be the center of the strange union? Are we all in Western Europe culturally more akin to the Russians than to the Americans? Do we really find Lenin more

sympathetic than Benjamin Franklin?" The American delegation was the largest at the meeting. It was composed of professional diplomats, academics, businessmen, and financiers. General Lauris Norstad, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, was present at the start, as was Neil McElroy, one-time Secretary of Defense under President Eisenhower. "[Reporter]: Mr. McElroy, here at this, um, Atlantic Association conference that we've been attending for the last few days, we've heard much about the so-called communist threat. It's been redefined and so forth and I'm wondering if you--how you recognize the communist threat of today in comparison with the communist threat posed when you were Secretary of Defense." "[McElroy]: I think that in relationship to NATO, the communist threat is really the Soviet threat, and it's the belief of most of the people here, and it includes myself, that

the Soviet objective is not different today from what it was 10 years ago, even though the degree of strong-arm pressure being used by the Soviets at the present time is on a reduced basis. It seems clear to me, and it seems to be the opinion of the other Allied countries who are represented here, that the citizens of the various NATO countries must not be deluded into believing that the threat is substantially reduced." "[Reporter]: Mmm-hmm. Now, what difference do you recognize in both the present status and the future concept of NATO--in relation to this communist threat, of course--with the time--with the period when you were Secretary of Defense under President Eisenhower?" "[McElroy]: Well, my time was between '57 and '59 and it included the Sputnik period

and its, uh, sequels. And Mr. Khrushchev's, uh, table-thumping period with his boot. Ah, the, uh, changes--the significant changes-- would, uh, be largely in the area of those connected with the withdrawal of France from NATO. I don't believe that anything major has happened in the meantime, ah, in addition to the withdrawal of France, with the exception of the fact that the, ah, conduct of the rulers in Russia has changed from one of extreme aggressiveness to one of reasonableness in the terms in which they construe that term." "[Reporter]:

I wonder if you would perhaps explain, if you could, the apparent preoccupation of the various national delegations here at this conference with the American role in Vietnam." "[McElroy]: Well, I think from the standpoint of the, uh, countries other than the United States in the NATO Alliance, the, uh, the interests, uh, their interests in, uh, the United States activity in Vietnam are twofold. Uh, first, there is the obvious possibility, uh, that, uh, the--the requirements on the United States in Southeast Asia, and perhaps even in China, depending on developments there, would lead to a reduction of the proportion of the United States effort, which can be applied to Western Europe. Ah,

of course beyond that, and I think quite properly. The NATO countries, being worldwide powers themselves in a somewhat lesser sense than the United States is, must be concerned with the threat to peace anywhere in the world. It would be difficult in--in, uh, any occasion where 2 major powers came into serious conflict, for the rest of the civilized world to stand aside and not be involved in some serious way." [Announcer]: Former Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, now the president of Proctor and Gamble, while at the recent Atlantic Treaty Association meeting in Munich. The conference itself was essentially a passive one. The Association has no actual authority. The delegates act in a private capacity as interested and influential observers discussing present and projected

Atlantic Alliance problems. The association is not without problems of its own, however, as the head of the Canadian delegation, Gordon Hawkins, points out. "[Hawkins]: The problem is that, um, when you've been doing this for twelve or thirteen years, if you are a founder- member, as many of the present individuals are, you still feel very loyal to the organization as it was originally brought into being. So that, in a sense, NATO itself can undergo some pretty vital changes and look to new direction in its own life and yet rely upon support, in such an organization as this, upon those who took the view that NATO was a great thing 12 years ago. I'm personally of the opinion that if an organization like the Atlantic Treaty Association is to continue to serve a useful purpose, it must itself come up to date with NATO, in a sense, because my rather foggy perception of the whole scene is that, uh,

within the closer councils of NATO there's a great deal more thinking about possible new directions for the Alliance than there is among many of the civilian groups that support it. And until we bring those 2 into the gear again, I'm afraid that the Atlantic Treaty Association is going to look to the outside world as a slightly antiquated thing. And I say this out of no kind of disrespect for those who have been mustering public support for a great period of time on a subject about which you can't really get a great deal of warm blood stirring, uh, and they've done a noble job of the public opinion forming. Nevertheless, we've got a new function, I think, to perform within the association." "[Reporter]: To me, having observed the first 2 days, I get the impression that the--the group and what it advocates is--is quite conservative by, uh, the contemporary use of the word. I've heard a lot about the so-called communist threat, how it may be different but it's still the old threat. And this runs contrary to the--or against the grain of

much of American academic opinion at the moment. Um, and in general I've gotten the impression that it's a fairly conservative outlook on both the nature of NATO and the nature of the world within NA--which NATO finds itself. And I wonder how you feel about this." "[McElroy]: Uh, to me, who have been observing the same activities over the past 2 years, I find--I draw exactly the same conclusion as you do. A, this, I think, springs partly from what I've just said, that inevitably there is a sort of, um, heritage that one's living with that the attitudes that first supported these organizations--this organization persists while the direction of the organization is changing. And I think one's going to live with that and one mustn't be over depressed and certainly not too caustic about it. At the same time, I do agree that there doesn't seem to be written into the purposes or the activities of the organization an awareness of, uh, of the changes in--in

the possibility of new East-West relations. Uh, you're not allowed to say 'détente' here because this this means you're putting too optimistic, uh, a--a--a term to a difficult situation. But you don't see written into any of the forms of discussion or the decorations and so on the view that we must consider in detail the way in which new approaches might be made to East-West relations in economic terms, for example. The--eh--the supposition is that the possibilities are not great there. And I agree with you, I think the prevadent--prevalent, thoughtful views in North American and indeed in parts of Europe are that there are imaginative possibilities here, which we ought to be looking at while maintaining all kinds of proper suspicions about what lies behind it." Gordon Hawkins, head of the Canadian delegation to the Atlantic Treaty Association Conference held in Munich. Although his views about the Association were not prevalent, they were pertinent. The organization,

set up 12 years ago to support the NATO concept, is beginning to discover that it, just like its big brother, needs to adjust and adapt to a changing world. This is Crocker Snow speaking from the studios of Radio Deutsch of Cologne West Germany.