Edward Kennedy Speaking at UNC

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... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Ladies and gentlemen, good evening and welcome to this program of the Carolina Forum.

After the main address, there will be questions from the floor as usual. It is the aim of the forum to bring national leaders of genuine prominence and interest to Chapel Hill, and this, I think we've succeeded tonight. Our guest is Edward M. Kennedy, the senior senator from Massachusetts. He is the son of Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy and brother of John F. Kennedy, the late president and Robert F. Kennedy, the junior senator from New York. He was educated at Harvard University, the International Law School at the Hague, and the University of Virginia Law School. In 1958, he managed his brother John Kennedy's successful Senate re-election and was co-ordinator for the Western States in the 1960 presidential campaign. In 1962, he was elected to the Senate to fill his brother's unexpired term, and in 1964, he was re-elected by the largest plurality in Massachusetts history. In the Senate, he is a member of a number of committees and chair several subcommittees, including those on federal, state, and local services, refugees and escapees, immigration, and employment and manpower, which deals with the draft. As a member of the Senate, he is highly regarded as being very conscientious and able, Senator Kennedy.

Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I am deeply honored and delighted to be here this evening. He wanted to come down here this evening, but he's in Washington waiting for a peace-feeler. But he wanted me to, you know, you've seen many, many bumper stickers these days that talk about Kennedy and Fulbright in 1968, and my brother Bobby wanted to say, this is absolutely untrue. It's absolutely untrue. He hasn't made a decision who he's going to run with in 1968.

But I saw the, just before leaving, we were voting, and I mentioned I was coming down here, and my brother Bob said, well, how long do you expect to talk? I said, well, I don't know how long do you think I ought to talk. He said, well, I talk about 20 minutes, 25 minutes. Then I saw the Vice President, and I asked him how long he usually talk. He said about 45 or 50 minutes. And then I took a look at the latest polls of Mr. Gallup and Mr. Harris on the matching Bobby against the Vice President. And I decided that I'll talk about 45 or 50 minutes. Well, it is a somewhat of a long voyage that we're both going on this evening, me to talk and you to listen. I hope you don't arrive at the end before I do. Let me say I am deeply honored and delighted to be here at the Carolina Forum.

Three years ago, I came to Chapel Hill with my mother to attend a memorial tribute to President Kennedy in Keenan Stadium. I learned then of the hospitality and the generosity of the North Carolinians. I learned too what this university has meant to the state and to the South, so I appreciate the invitation to return. I was very saddened last week to learn of the passing of Marion Graham, the wife of your former President. Frank Graham has been an outstanding and courageous leader in the New South. She was an inspiration to him, and I know that this is a loss to all the people of North Carolina. I have come here today from the Florida United States Senate where we have just finished what seems like our 55th day of debate and voting on the bill to finance presidential campaigns through tax check-offs. There has been a great deal of obfuscation on this issue. It is really quite easy. Bobby does not want Lyndon to get all that money in 1968.

And Lyndon does not want Bobby to get it in 1972, and somebody else proposed to compromise. Every candidate must pay the bills from his own pocket. I think it was Nelson Rockefeller. President Elliott of Harvard used to say that a university is always a great storehouse of knowledge, because each freshman brings a little in and no senior takes any out. I don't know how much this is true at North Carolina, but I do know that to those who thought you have been a hotbed of liberalism, it came as some surprise to know that you are really a haven for the CIA. Over the last year, I have visited a number of university campuses. I have talked to students about what they feel is important, about the kind of lives they want,

the kind of world they want. For a man in public life, this can be an exhilarating and a disturbing experience. Exilarating because this is undoubtedly the most talented, the most involved, the most idealistic generation of our century. Disturbing because there is a great and growing gap between what you think important and what many older Americans think important. Sometimes I fear we have two generations living in the same land, often in the same house, yet not really talking to each other. I stand an age halfway between the student generation and the one that runs our country. I have tried to understand these differences. The student generation of today is the first to be brought up in affluence. It is the first in many years to have grown up in a period of relative peace. The pursuit of money and of comfort vital to most older Americans is not enough for you. Yours is the generation of movement, of the jet plane, of the half-rate student airline fare.

No longer are you moored to the city of your birth, or the occupation of your father, or the concerns of just your own country. Well, the older generations are citizens of the United States. Students today are going to be citizens of the world as well. They see a young man's obligation as military service. Students see it as a broader national service. They are uneasy with the scent. You welcome it. Their attitude towards communism comes from the war in Korea, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the brutal revolution in Hungary. In your experience, communism is a movement divided against itself. Most communist countries are no better, but probably no worse, than the dictatorships we aid around the world. And thus... And thus, students ask whether the old ways are enough.

Whether the old arrangements, fashion for a former time, are still valid. The issue can be the operation of a university, or it can be the justification of a war. Whether in human relations or foreign relations, students today are looking for answers, which make sense in terms of their own experience, which are relevant to their own new world. I don't think, for example, that any group in the nation questions the war in Vietnam as deeply as the young men and women in colleges. They do not lack patriotism. They are not afraid to fight. The questions reflect the fact that the basis of our commitment in Vietnam to hold the line against communist expansion is not relevant to the experience of our young people. To them, communism has neither been as menacing nor monolithic in recent years as it was in the late 1940s or 1950s. They cannot believe the China of today, torn by civil war, resented by all the nations of Asia, is the same menace Russia was 10 or 20 years ago.

The same holds true with the widespread student criticism of the draft. Students and young people oppose the present draft laws, not because they feel they owe no duty to their country, but because these laws passed at a time when only half as many men reached the age of 18 each year, and almost all able-bodied men had to serve are inefficient, unfair, when applied to today's situation. Above all, I feel students today are looking for ways to involve themselves in something that is more meaningful. Over 250,000 college students today do tutoring in poverty areas. The only government work that really turns them on are the problems like Vista and teaching and the Peace Corps, which I understand is recruiting here at North Carolina this week.

Young people look ahead to a new time and new challenges, which are going to be theirs. They are willing to show a more expansive spirit than we have known before. Seven years ago, President Kennedy offered as the theme of his campaign, leadership to meet the challenge of the 60s. Many of these challenges have been met. The recurrence of recession, the deficiency in defense, the indifference of our government to health and education and civil rights, in other areas we have fallen short of what we hope to do. Now we must begin to look ahead to the 70s, a new decade, with new problems and new possibilities, to a time that will see growing affluence and growing congestion, greater education and greater automation, and changing patterns around the world. The man who has elected President of the United States next year must begin in his term to deal with the challenges of the 70s. He and his successes must be in touch with the young generation of today.

By 1975, half the people in this country will be under 25, and 40% of the voters will be under 30. No one will be able to fully serve the public without understanding the young. For it is their world and their responsibilities that will be coming to the fore. So in this spirit, I would like to look at some of the critical problems that will face us in the next 10 and 20 years. Tonight I would like to look at the continent of Asia, and the policies we should pursue after the war in Vietnam is over. I do not mean to avoid Vietnam. I understand there was a debate here on it last week, and I have stated my position many times and be glad again in the question and answer period. My position is not the position of our government as regards to negotiations and bombing or the mix between the military and the civilian effort. One of the reasons we are in Vietnam today is because we have not looked ahead. Our Asian policies have had no clear set goals for the United States, no clear pattern of action to reach them.

Our actions in Asia, since before World War II, have been a jumble of ad hoc responses, economic assistance, military intervention, moralism, bravado, and hope. Three times in the last 18 years, American troops have gone to fight on the Asian mainland. I realize that the situation in Asia will be affected by the duration of the war, by its outcome, by the possibility it might spread to other countries. None of these can be predicted, but unless we develop new Asian policies different from what we have had so far, we could find ourselves fighting there. Again and again. What should our goals in Asia be? We would like to see the people of Asia living in peace and developing their own countries for their own people. We want the people of Asia to run their own affairs, free from coercion or terror or aggression.

We want them free to follow their own cultural and religious traditions. Their government should be responsive to the people and sensitive to personal freedom. But it is not our job to try to bring our forms of democracy or the great society to Asia. The Asian people have their own institutions rooted in their own culture and political experience, which is different from ours. We are not interested in the form of political development they choose, but the whole world has an interest in making sure that no government threatens peace by policies of aggression. The real issue before American foreign policy is whether these goals can be more effectively pursued if, over the next 10 years, we increase or reduce our own involvement in Asian affairs. Today we are probably more deeply involved in Asia than in anywhere else in the world, including areas where our national interests are far more direct and immediate. Besides Vietnam, we support one of the factions in Laos.

We pay the armies of Thailand and Taiwan and to a large extent South Korea. We protect Taiwan from red Chinese invasion. We stand God on the 38th parallel in Korea. Our 7th fleet controls the coastal waters of East Asia, and we back these operations with over 60 military bases in the Pacific area. There are over 5,000 Americans working out of our embassies in Asia and an undisclosed number of intelligence personnel. All of this adds up to a truly massive, official American presence in Asia today. Nor am I sure that this presence has always advanced our national interests. In small and weak countries, which lack strong and political traditions, we have identified ourselves far too closely with specific regimes. Their continuance has become an American responsibility. Many of them, such as the regimes of Sigmundray and Korea, General Fwami, Nusofam and Laos and Ziam and Vietnam, had little support among the people. Yet we paid and trained their armies, taught their police to put down demonstrations.

Giving the impression we agreed it was more important for these governments to control the population than to serve it. We have often seen the regimes run in more and more trouble, governing either because of their own incompetence and corruption or because of the inherent difficulty of governing poor and demoralized countries. Sometimes, because our very support gave their opponents a powerful issue against them. As their troubles increased, their setbacks became our investments. Their futures became our responsibility. We felt obligated to become even more deeply involved. A, then led to military supplies, which led to military advisers, and then to planes, and bombs, and soldiers.

Vietnam is the classic case, but it is not the only one. Asia is a continent in turmoil. It is going to see disorder and insurgency for years to come. It is vital that we learn to draw the line between disorder that is part of the natural process of change and nation-building and disorder that is sponsored and used by outside aggressors. I am not advocating disengagement from Asia. I do not believe that our military presence can be considerably reduced and our political efforts be channeled in better directions, more in tune with the great forces sweeping of Asia today. A review of the present situation shows no justification in my judgment. For American military intervention, once the war in Vietnam is over. Except for Vietnam and Laos, Asian countries have not had a bad record in handling their own insurgencies.

Malaysian insurrection, which began 20 years ago, has dwindled to a group of a few hundred guerrillas fighting part-time and farming part-time in the high jungles on the border of Thailand. There is any government activity in Burma, but it takes place in portions of the country over which the central government has never been able to assert authority. Whatever communists are involved are badly divided among themselves and largely overshadowed by tribal rebels who have nothing to do with communism. The Huck rebellion in the Philippines, which was forced so effectively by the late President, Magsaysai, may well be on the rise again in the center of Luzon. But its roots are domestic, not external. And the Magsaysai strategy of combining military counteraction with social reform is still available if the Philippine government can use it. We have heard a great deal recently about the communist patriotic front in the north of Thailand.

It is said to be developing as the NLF did in Vietnam a few years ago, and we seem to be embarking on the same course of military assistance. But Thailand is not beset by the national regional and religious divisions which rack Vietnam. It has a long-rooted monarchy and a national allegiance which Vietnam does not have. It has a history as an independent nation, almost all the peasants in Thailand own their own land. The patriotic front has only been able to obtain a foothold in the northeast portion which most resembles Vietnam. That portion is very small. In short, most of the nations of Asia, which just a few years ago were a week in insecure, had been gaining in health and stability. This trend will continue. And as it does, we should treat them more as equals and less as wards that we must save from a danger.

There will be other insurgencies in Asia. Despite the favorable trend, there are still too many unstable governments and unsound systems. Too many unfulfilled hopes and unresolved conflicts. Too much basic poverty and discontent for these movements to dry up. Gorilla movements, despite their use of terror and violence, or for discontented people a purpose of faith, an organization, and a way of life. And it is not our business to suppress them. It is not our mission to make Asia safe for the mandarins and the landlords. Even when such an insurgency has come, even if it becomes a revolution, it is by no means inevitable that it will fall under communist domination, any more than most of them are today. Nor is it inevitable that even the communist insurgents will be obedient to Moscow or Pei King.

On a continent as poor as Asia, the social rhetoric of Communism has a considerable appeal to the discontented. Former President Sikarno of Indonesia, long before he allowed Communists to gain influence in his government, preached this brand of socialism because it caught the deepest yearnings of his people. For Communism, in the sense of an extension of Chinese or Russian power, offends other Asians. It offends their desire for national independence, for freedom from foreign interference. The most powerful force in Asia today, and the best ally against communist expansion, is the Asian desire for national independence. Time and again nationalism has frustrated or modified communist efforts. We saw this in the bloody Indonesian counter-revolution last year.

We saw it when the Chinese military intrusion into India galvanized a normally pacifist nation into an extraordinary military efforts. We see it when communist North Korea defies and denounces communist China. Probability is that nationalism will be a far more effective and will be far more effective in containing Chinese expansionism than any amount of armed intervention on our part. But Asian nationalism is not an American weapon. It reacts against any attempt of any outside influence to impose itself on any Asian nation. We must be cautious, last, through our own attempts we do too much in Asia, and we turn that continent against ourselves. The only other possible justification I can see for our military involvement, aside from insurgencies, which I have discussed, would be if China were to pursue territorial expansion or aggression,

or if she were to give such vast support to Asian insurgencies that the nations could not respond to them alone. In the past we have justified heavy American involvement in nations with no strategic significance as necessary to halt Chinese expansionism in Asia. This justification no longer squares with the facts. We have assumed that China would move into Southeast Asia just as the Russians moved into Eastern Europe after World War II, unless we move to counter them. But the Soviet armies already were in place in Eastern Europe, and their presence affected all political developments there. China has not tried to move her troops into Southeast Asia. China has mighty armies, but their strength is in defense. They cannot move across long distances, nor across the mountains and seas that separate them from most of the Asian lands. The Chinese Navy and Chinese Air Force, both quite small, could not transport these troops, nor supply them during a prolonged war of aggression.

China was able to send troops to Korea because supply routes, including a railroad, ran from Manchuria across the Yalu River. But if she has not sent troops to Vietnam, despite the importance of the struggle there, despite her desire to outdo the Russians, she would hardly send armies over the mountains to Burma, or Thailand, or over the Sido-Indonesia, or Malaysia, whatever verbal encouragement the Chinese might give to Asian insurgencies, or counts as what she does. She has not committed her troops to wars of liberation in other countries. When Lin Powell said in his famous speech of September 1965 that henceforth, so-called wars of liberation, must be indigenous, he was warning non-Chinese guerrilla movements that were on their own. This is not to say China will not exert political pressure, or try some version, or take advantage of her dominating size in Asia, but she is too imbalanced militarily, too preoccupied with her internal problems, to give these movements the help of her own military resources in the foreseeable future.

So we need not pour our men into counterhers. How about the nuclear threat of communist China? Secretary McNamara has estimated she will have medium and intercontinental ranged missiles within 10 years. Her capacity will be very small compared to ours, and could certainly be checked by our deterrent. Nuclear weapons could be another means she could use to influence the policy of other Asian nations, to her own advantage. But the world is backing away from the use of nuclear weapons to settle international disputes, to threaten weak countries with nuclear power is a risky business for any country. China has shown no interest in either the test band treaty nor the non-proliferation treaty. She has pledged not to strike first in any war. We cannot really rely on her word, but if she engages in the kind of aggressive diplomacy that could only be backed by breaking that pledge, she would be inviting action by other major powers unilaterally or through the United Nations against her nuclear capability.

And so I do not think the greatest threat to the future of Asia lies in insurgencies or in Chinese expansion. It lies rather in the growing poverty and hunger of our people. In the next 10 years according to the most guarded estimates, the population of Asia will rise by another 450 million people. The same kind of food crisis that has halted economic progress in India will face other countries. As long as the capital needed for development must be spent on imports of basic food, stability in Asia will be precarious and peace uncertain. As long as economic conditions are desperate, there will accumulate in these nations an urban proletariat with a potential for violence and a rural proletariat responsive to insurgencies. Given this assessment of the situation, what new policy should the United States adopt?

The first principle of our Asian policy ought to Vietnam should be restraint. We must honor the commitments we have made but be very careful about new ones. We should hold ourselves back not because we do not care what happens in Asia, not because we are impatient and want to get out, but because our power is limited and can often do more harm than good. We must always remember that we are aliens in Asia. Any colonialism is still a mighty force in almost all Asian countries. Our presence stirs memories of humiliation of years of colonial rule. We were not the leaders of colonialism, but to the extent that we use our influence to shape Asian governments and their policies, Asians naturally deem us the successor to the colonial powers. This was the basic reason why nations like Burmer and Cambodia, despite their desperate need for our economic assistance, found it necessary to renounce it. We cannot take it, they said, and maintain our dignity and our independence.

We should not allow ourselves to become so identified with any existing regime that its continuance in power becomes our responsibility. Whatever our real intentions, nothing looks more like a colonial domination to the Asians than the United States perpetuation of a regime in power. The leaders come to power who clearly reflect the sentiments of the people and they ask our aid we should give it, but we should not impose it. It should not obligate us to help them with their political troubles, and we should break the habit of supporting reactionary military or civilian governments merely because they are anti-communists. We must have a much greater understanding of conditions in Asia. Many of our worst mistakes have been the results of poor intelligence.

We reacted to dangers that did not exist, because we knew too little about the culture and the ethnic groups, the historic factions and tensions in Asian countries, and how they would react to events and policies. Our personnel in these countries must end their dependence for intelligence on the elite groups, who did not see or not sympathetic to the people below their social class. The great masses of people in Asia are gaining in political power. They can no longer be ignored. We must also make sure that our own hands are clean of colonial practices. It is hard to convince Asian leaders we want their independence, when we rule one million people on the Ryuku Islands as a military protectorate. These islands have an important military function, but we do not have to rule a country to keep bases there. We maintain bases in several Asian nations through voluntary agreements, allowing them to rejoin Japan, which is their wish, would make it easier for us in the rest of Asia, and we can meet our military needs by negotiating with the Japanese. The same problem arises in a more subtle way as American business begins to spread over Asia.

Some of our companies have a larger net worth than the Asian countries that they are in. On their own, they could easily impose a brand of private colonialism, as the mining interests did in the Congo. This would stir grave resentment against America. It would ease the task of anti-government elements. Most Asian governments today recognize the need for foreign investment. They are trying to work out ways to make it more acceptable to their people. We should not object if they choose to impose reasonable controls and profit sharing arrangements and remove some of the special protections our business now has. There is no more than we would do if we were there. It is our own self-interest. For if such adjustments were resisted, private American enterprise could easily become the symbolic issue, which could sweep a truly radical government in and our business people out. Another principle of the new Asian policy after Vietnam should be that the leadership in Asian political security and economic development be taken by the Asians themselves.

We should welcome the growth of a sense of Asian political solidarity and of regional political groupings, in which each nation has a political stake in the security of the others. The first stirrings of this came just last year in the new association of Southeast Asia and the meeting at Seoul, in the Mafalindo proposal, and in the call of President Marcos the Philippines for a regional alliance as the only effective counter to the strength and influence of China. This would be slow to grow. For most of the nations are still too new to their own independence to embrace political union. We should be ready to assist in this growth if we are asked. An ultimate goal might well be the establishment by the Asians themselves of an old Asian peacekeeping force able to prevent aggression by one nation against any other. We should welcome this and assist if it is asked. I would not exclude the possibility of the Soviet Union assisting. Once the Vietnam war is resolved, her successful mediation of the Kashmir dispute shows she is interested in playing a groter, greater, and perhaps a constructive role in Asian affairs.

We should also encourage the formation of an international force of volunteers, primarily Asian, to work in the fields of health and education and agriculture and development. For once men from other lands could come to the Asian countryside not to make war or extract tribute, but to help people live better lives. An increasing amount of our foreign aid should be channeled through the Asian Development Bank and the Mekong River Coordinating Committee, which are under UN sponsorship, but are controlled by the Asians. This would end the resentment that comes with bilateral aid. It could also extricate us from a serious foreign aid dilemma we face after Vietnam. That country north and south will need vast sums of reconstruction, probably more than the five billion dollars we gave Korea for that very purpose after the Korean war. But other Asian countries need aid too. Those which stood with us in Vietnam will want priority over equally needed nations which did not.

In 1947 we told the European nations to decide for themselves how to divide up the money of the Marshall Plan. It would be easier for us politically to let these hard decisions on who gets what to be made by the Asian Development Institutions themselves. After the war in Vietnam is over, we will also have to reassess our network of military bases in Asia. Each presumably serves a military purpose, but we must ask ourselves whether in peacetime, when we have quick air lift, capability and case of emergencies, the value of some of these bases is outweighed by the impact they have as imposing symbols of American stewardship and intervention. In short, our Asian policy after Vietnam should stress economic and political solutions rather than military solutions. Asian solutions rather than American solutions. This is the best way to reach the ends we truly want.

We should not withdraw where our presence is essential to stability. But in many ways, we can be less involved, less overbearing and encourage substitution of Asian initiatives for our own to achieve long-run stability. One reason this will be possible is the probability of greater involvement in Asia problems of nations like the Philippines, South Korea and especially Japan. In 22 years, Japan has recovered from the war to become the third industrial power of the world. Japan is by far the strongest, richest, most stable and dynamic nation in Asia today. She is the best illustration to Asians that they can achieve prosperity without losing freedom. Japan has a natural reluctance to assert political leadership in Asia. Her last foray in international politics was disastrous. But she is beginning to move out of her shell. She is sending her own young volunteers to do peace-call work in Asian countries.

Her decision to fund the Asian Bank indicates she is beginning to realize that. For her own sake, she must help in the critical problems of Asian development. Japan conducts six and a half billion in trade with other Asian nations each year. She is the closest industrial country to what is potentially the richest market in the world. It is in her interest to involve herself fully in Asian stability and development. Japan can play a leading role in Asian solutions. She can be a bridge as well between communist and non-communist nations. She and the other nations I have mentioned, which have overcome the most difficult of development problems, can take over the role of providing educational and technical assistance that the nations of Europe had to decay. They can do it more easily than we, because they do not have the white man's burden. As their close friend and ally, we should encourage the emergence of Japan and South Korea and the Philippines as Asian leaders.

Finally, there will be no long-run peace and stability in Asia, unless China can be reintegrated into Asian and the Pacific community. This will be, of course, the most difficult problem of all. But as long as China is poor, resentful, paranoid, Asia will be insecure. Our own policies toward China should be a reflection of what our true allies, such as Japan and Korea and India, think about her. For they understand China, they are closer to the dangers involved in their development than we are. And they could better serve in interpreting our policies and our attitudes towards the leaders of China. Serve an effect as our window to China. We should offer China the options to rejoin the community of nations and to enjoy mutually beneficial relations with the nations on her borders. After Vietnam, the Mekong River development could create a surplus production of food, which could be available to feed China's hungry people as well as Southeast Asia.

Through our policies in the United Nations, the exchange of newsmen and others, we should take the generous first steps. The world should know that by refusing our office, it is the Chinese who are isolating themselves. All of these proposals are elements of a new Asian policy. It is basically a policy of patience and restraint. Grounded on the prediction that the natural forces in Asia, operating by themselves, will serve our long run interests. It will not be an easy policy for Americans. Asia has always stirred great emotions in our people. Our natural inclination is to rush in with fire brigade whenever things may not be going our way. Two philosophers have offered maxims that could guide us. First, the medieval monk, Thomas Acampus, who said,

Be not angry that you cannot make others as you wish them to be, since you cannot make yourself as you wish to be. I think this is the right attitude towards the Asian people. And then Alexander Smith once said, The great man is the man who does a thing for the first time. This applies to nations too. It is easy to base a policy on past conditions, past fears and dangers that no longer exist. It is hard to strike out in new directions, but it is the mark of greatness and nations as it is in men. In the case of the United States and Asia, it may also be the way to lasting peace. I thank you for your time.

I thank you for your time. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. N곾이 42 3 57 � 1 57 hold. Mongrel 0 41 38 Ausw prayed – Under his grandfather. In the end, I went down. I talked to this group and talked to him for a few minutes. After I finished talking, I said, oh, are there any questions? And before I'd even gotten the words out of my mouth, he hand informeth the back of the room.

He said, I want to ask you, mr. Kennedy, how does your brother stand? A ninety percent of parity for wheat, uncontrolled acreage? All the farmer said, yes, yes, yes, we want to know. And I had absolutely no idea. …and then I remembered a story that happened to my brother when he was in the service before going out to the Pacific and the PT's who was in naval intelligence, he went to a factory, one place, talked to them about the dangers of espionage and sabotage and a factory. And he was pointing out to them that if they saw a fire in the factory, they ought to determine the origin of the fire and ought to determine how to extinguish it. The fire was made from wood, make sure you put water on it, oil and gas put CO2 on it, electricity put foam on it, but never put water on an oil and gas fire or water on electric fire because it just spread and have disastrous results. After he finished talking, he asked whether any questions, if we see a fire in the factory, how are we going to know just by looking at it, whether it's made from wood or oil and gas or electricity, so we'll know exactly what to put on it in order to extinguish it and what not to put on so that it's spread. He wrote about that and he said, you know, that's a very good question and there'll be someone here next week who'll talk in that very subject. So, in any event, we're delighted to be here.

Let me see, those lights are awfully bright, but are there some questions? That's all right. Yes, sir. Could I ask would your new policy nature include admitting China to the United Nations? Well, I think that we ought to support a two-china policy. I feel that China has stated, first of all, that she will not enter until the United States apologizes for Korea, until we pull the fleet out the guards for Mosah, until we evacuate the troops in Southeast Asia. I think that these are unacceptable, certainly, conditions, but I do feel that we ought to support a two-china policy that preserves for Mosah in the United Nations, and I would support, I think, that we should support it. If we do not, the various resolutions that have come up before the United Nations, the two China resolutions that have come up before the United Nations, have exclude for Mosah from participating in the United Nations, and they have come within a whisper.

And I think we could see very clearly that, unless we are more flexible, and we provide some greater leadership, that we could expect in the very near future, that China resolution, which will exclude for Mosah, and include red China, will come in and be debated in the past. I think for our own interests, and that is the preservation of for Mosah, I think, with regards to our moral responsibility as our leader, moral leader of the world, that we have this responsibility to demonstrate to the people who really wants to come into the world, community, and who does not. So I would support such a resolution. I guess I didn't repeat the question which the news fellow said, but I'll try to do that next time. Yes, Senator Kennedy, do you see any reason of principles or of political expediency, for which the United States government should not adopt the attitude towards the Greek fascist regime,

that it would adopt, had the coup that I've been executed by a communist group? Well, I would say that the question is whether the United States position, with regards to, as was termed in the question, the Greek fascist regime, that the United States position, I suppose, is the same today as it would have been if the communists had taken over, and what steps the United States should take. Is that correct? Is that, especially in providing the Greece as a member of the Western Alliance as a member of NATO? I think the United States ought to exercise every kind of influence that it possibly can to ensure a speedy return to democratic procedures in Greece. I know that we have, I've personally communicated to the Secretary of State, my concern about the political prisoners and my own interest, and the interest, I think, of all Americans. In their security, I think it was the direct intervention of the United States, which invited, had the military leaders invite the international Red Cross committee to come in and inspect the treatment of the Red Cross, and I think that we're obviously encouraged that they are secure.

Now, this does, we have seen, I've seen the stories that have been written this morning in the newspapers and the times where this regime has stated that it will return speedily to constitutional government. It's difficult for me to say that this is not true. I think that we ought to exercise and continue to exercise every kind of influence that we possibly can to ensure that it does come true. You know, we're starting tomorrow, the debate on the draft. The Senate, well, yeah. The Senate of the Kennedy, on May 16th, the university is holding a referendum on the war in Vietnam. I don't have a copy of that referendum, but as I recall, the alternatives are first to increase the bombing and correlating military activity in North Vietnam in order to force the North Vietnamese government to capitulate,

and to continue with the press policy, third stop the bombing, and increase efforts towards negotiation, and fourth to pull out all military commitments from Vietnam. But you can't make all those all right. Well, first of all, I think that you stated, though, as I was coming over this evening, some of the boys mentioned that this referendum was taking place. And I asked him for a copy of a two. I asked for a copy of a two. I'm going to tell you where I stand on the... What I would be interested in is for the radio and television audience, the question was that there is a referendum now being conducted here, will be in the next week, which poses four alternatives, and to try and determine the student attitudes. And this is one, the increase escalation of the war with the idea of military success and victory. Secondly, I would think would be a continuation of the present policy that has been followed by our government.

Third would be a succession of bombing with the hope of negotiations with the various parties, I suppose, including the Viet Cong. Fourth would be the withdrawal of the unilateral withdrawal of the United States. I'd be interested in finding out from this group those four alternatives by a show of hands, how you feel on this. Let's see, all those in favor of number one. Number two, that would be the present policy. And number three, number three, and number four.

I would say number, I'm a number three man myself. What question does your message get? Am I supposed to get another note? I understand, I'm getting all kinds of notes up here that will be a day of inquiry tomorrow night at 8 p.m. for two hours in Murphy Hall. I'm getting all kinds of notes up here, but I'm delighted to. I'd like to ask you a couple of questions with regard to the reunification of Viet now because it didn't come up at all at the beginning of the night. First of all, in 1956, the Goldinsium refused the whole election. And I'd like to know if you think his reasons were sufficient. And number two, I'd like to ask you what our policy is with regards to reunification of Viet now might be valid or by force.

Well, the question is, two parts, what are my impressions of the failure to hold elections in 1956 in Viet now? And what is my attitude currently with regards to the potential unification of the country? The question in 1954, the Geneva Courts provided that elections be held in 1956. Ziam refused to hold these elections, but so did Hull. He refused at the time to permit international inspection to come in. I mean, I don't think there's probably a great deal of question about who would have won the elections if free elections were held in that country at that time. We can argue a debate or discuss these questions. And you've had people who've come up and have been talking about those. I know in the debate, and rather than debate that question, I would just say that I think it's a pretty even kind of a situation is presented.

I mean, Hull refused to let inspections. Ziam refused to hold them. I don't know which you think is worse. I mean, you can have it either way as far as, you know, really is, I think it's regrettable that elections and free elections were not held throughout the whole country. Secondly, with regards to the attitude of the, my own attitude with regards to the unification of the country, I'm hopeful, very hopeful that this will be achieved and accomplished. I think for a variety of reasons that I think that it's, I think by culture and tradition and history, they are one country. They're certainly, they're destiny in the future moves in that direction. I would certainly hope that that can be achieved. How that is going to be done in the process by which it will be done, obviously will take all part of the questions of the negotiations. But I would certainly support and feel that that country should eventually be unified someday.

I suppose it's difficult to set a time schedule as it is with regards to the proximity of negotiations. Yes, sir. Sir, the question has come up recently that the draft laws might actually be unconstitutional in the profession of the 13th century. I want to refer that to Sam Irvin. He's a great reconstitute. Let me just say that I have reviewed that. I've been interested in the problems of the draft and the reviewed that every constitutional authority that I can find that, and I've really made quite a, really don't place a great deal of stock and the fact that this is involuntary servitude. I mean, you can find the, although it certainly is, but within the Constitution, I mean, you can say that the articles of the Constitution provide for the raise and the support of the armies are clear and they've been supported and they've been defined and interpreted and they're clearly overriding. I don't think, and even looking back into the history of the adoption of the 13th Amendment, the debate in the Congress, we could possibly extend its interpretation and include the draft.

So I don't think that that is, I think it's going to be, it's going to be with us for a ton. Yes. Upstairs. Senator Kennedy, you've stated that you've voted for a proposition, three, which is to possibly stop the bombing and escalate the negotiation. I can't see. I can hear you're coming back. If this is the way that you and presumably other senators deal, why is it that there's not more debate about this in the Senate? Why isn't the pressure put, where pressure ought to be put from this issue? Well, I think the question is, and the question is, if I support this proposition, three, that we refer to, why isn't pressure put, where it can do some good? I think that the members of the Senate have a responsibility under the Constitution in foreign affairs and foreign policy. I think they've spoken out.

I mean, I've spoken about this, my own position with regards to it. I think that the, my own feeling with regards to the making of decision is that the, I believe that about February or March, there was all sort of kinds of flexibility. There was in the air at this time with regards to the Vietnam situation. You had in the late January, you had the interview of Ho Chi Minh with Wilford Brashet that was very, very revealing interview. You follow this with Cosegan's visit to London about this period of time, the declarations of the, of the Pope during this time. Mr. Pornier, the Soviet Union's statements about these times. You had the, and you had it, see, appeared that there was a great deal of discussion and debate in the United States as to which direction we were going to move in. It was at this time you had the appropriations debates, bills coming up before the Senate and the Congress.

I think this was the time when many people spoke out in the pro and con and they expressed their attitudes. I think this was an extremely important time. I think sometime in March, definite decisions were made with regards to the course of the war, regards to the bombardments of the coast, mining the rivers, bombing the airfields, which really had demonstrated, I think, to us that certain decisions were made by the administration along certain lines and they were given to be our policies. Now, I believe that there's a sort of a cycle in the affairs of Vietnam. You see, it moves along in a certain direction, then something happens or something comes up and it's a determination made by a country, either by the United States or the other, the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, as to what action is going to be taken. I think this is the time when it's most effective for members of the Senate to speak up. You can speak up each day but with regards to what I think was genuinely expressed in your question and that is how you really influence opinion and how you can have some kind of an effect on policy. At the present time, I think we're in one of those times when we're moving the administration's made the decision, the determination, the course is going to follow. I think until there's some other kinds of changes or I'm not completely satisfied that how often we do speak will have an effect on the policy itself. That's my own personal feeling.

Yes. I'd like to follow that problem because, though I know members of Congress sometimes now feel that the President has gone on power, at least in the making of foreign policy, I'd like to ask you, suppose you were president, and wanted to get your kind of policy and nature, impressed upon the State Department. I read somewhere that when Jack Kennedy was president, he found out the situation on the State Department, he felt like setting out the separate State Department of his own because of the entrenched opinions of the China Robby and some of the older members of that Department. Suppose one even had president from authority, good one, get a new kind of Asian policy, the State Department, how would you look at things out there?

Well, the question is, how does a President really guide policy or can a President really guide policy facing the entrenched interest which exists in the State Department? And I suppose what exists in other policy making decisions which are outside the Department, but still are helpful in the formulating American policy. As I say, directing my response along the lines of my earlier comments this evening, I think that it's a mandatory that we do certainly try and find new directions in Asia. I feel that a President can through his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense can work and make the overriding and long-range policy decisions with regards to the United States. I don't think that the interests themselves are so entrenched within the Department where a President cannot do this.

I'm convinced that the expressions of the United States policies are policies that are very sincerely and deeply embraced by President Johnson. And I mean, I don't think there's anyone that questions his sincerity and his approach on this, I believe. I don't think that there's any really kind of, I think that this is held by the President, the Secretary of State, and those that the prime areas of responsibility in our government. I don't think we're faced with that particular dilemma at the present time. But I do feel a strong President can work his judgment on the matters of policy in our country. Yes? There's been much debate on campus about the possibilities of conscientious injection of military service for a specific war. Could you comment?

Well, this is the question comes, my attitude towards the conscientious objections.