Martin Agronsky: Evening Edition; 42

Oh From Washington this is evening edition. Now here is Martin Agranski. Good

evening. The United States has 42,000 troops and an undisclosed number of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. Over 13,000 American soldiers sit just below the Demilitarized Zone which has separated the two Koreas since their bloody war 25 years ago a war in which over 50,000 Americans died. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has just visited South Korea and he says it's unlikely South Korea will be attacked again but he strongly reaffirmed America's commitment to defend South Korea if it is attacked. Tonight on evening edition a look at the likelihood of another war in Korea and the nature of the U.S. commitment with South Korea's ambassador to the United States. His excellency Pyeong-jun Han and Al Horton, military affairs analyst for the

Scripps-Harrad newspaper alliance who accompanied the Secretary of Defense on his Korean visit. Mr. Ambassador let's look back for a second. Last time you were here with me, South Vietnam you remember was nearing its final collapse and there was a tremendous amount of concern at that time that if South Vietnam fell other countries in Asia might also and I remember asking if you felt like a domino at that point you said you didn't. You feel like a domino now still? No and I am quite happy that we are not going to be in a sense the falling domino but there is still a concern that the repercussions or the aftermath impact of Vietnamese disaster is still in a sense being felt particularly throughout Asia and but fortunately I think through the strong reaffirmation of

the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea. You said the Secretary of Defense is just made. Right. As well as earlier reassurances even including President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have made in a sense threat of another war on the Korean Peninsula that much less and we are very happy about this. You know Mr. Horton Al you were with the Secretary of Defense on this trip and everyone here was whether curious as to why this Secretary of Defense chose this moment to go. Well really it was behind this this reaffirmation again of the American commitment. How did you say? Well in fact Martin the decision to make the trip was made long ago it was made shortly after Vietnam fell and it was made when the at the time the South Korean leadership was very very worried that the North Koreans would take the U.S. pull out of Vietnam as a

signal to invade South Korea. Which they didn't. And it turned out time erased some of the need for the trip but it was scheduled anyone anyway and even so it turned out to be a very positive and rewarding trip I think for a slessinger and I'd like to kind of turn the tables on the domino theory just a little you know with the ambassador by saying that it seems to me that the fall of Vietnam rather than hurting South Korea has helped South Korea it has strengthened American public opinion not to give in one more place it has also strengthened the position of Japan and getting American help and support. You see it that way do you think we may even have a reverse domino effect here where we are more committed to Korea now in this country than we would have been had Vietnam still been viable commodity. Well I think it just a matter of sharpening the focus I think the U.S. commitment was there even before the fall

of South Vietnam but now of course that the U.S. is particularly the U.S. public as well as international public opinion is focusing the on Korea as far as the U.S. commitment is concerned but there what I was concerned about is the shall I say Korea is one of many shall I say countries which were trying to have anti-communism or non-communist alternative as their policy objective now as far as Korea is concerned the fall of South Vietnam is inimical and damaging to our security rather than helping and this is what I'm concerned particularly in terms of long range. Let me follow up Alice point in another way I think you raised an interesting thing here I understand that in diplomatic community here in Washington that is among ambassadors like

yourself and particularly from Asian countries there is a very real concern about the capacity of an American president to fulfill an American commitment in the wake of Vietnam war powers act of course which is intended to circumscribe the power of American president as one indication and I've heard diplomats describe their concern about American policy is in this way that there is a foreign policy for the Congress and there is another foreign policy for the president now to put it very very crudely and brutally do you think that the American president would be in a position to make good on this commitment to South Korea if the need were to arise well as a representative of South Korea that I would like to say yes you would like to say yes I would like to

say yes but the problem with the US commitment toward Korea is not so much how for example South Koreans perceive it as much as how the North Korean communists look at and evaluate the US commitment to different South Korea now here comes the problem and as you pointed out among my diplomatic colleagues here there is open concern that there are two foreign policy-making organizations in this government and they seem to be conflicting in many situations and so that the problem is that we as ambassadors here cannot really predict how the US as a state going to react or act in such in certain circumstances but coming to your point more specifically I think the North

Korean communists might be taking this into account in terms of the kind of technical options they are looking for in dealing with the North Korea. Don't you think the the military positioning of US forces makes a North Korean attack very unlikely under almost any circumstance one can hardly foresee as Martin pointed out to at the top of the program US forces not becoming involved almost immediately because of the way they are deployed and also I think another strategic point to remember is that the capital city in the heart of South Korea Seoul is just 25 miles south of the demilitarized zone and south of the main corridors where the attack would come if it comes and so I would think that the pressure for immediate application of American firepower would be very very great and that all that leads up to the question

do the North Korean intelligence analysts really believe as they have said to me and others in the past couple of weeks in Seoul that a North Korean attack might welcome this winter starting November December yes and you know without trying to you know disagree or detract from what you said that is that the you know given the presence of US troops that the North Koreans would not likely start another military trouble but I have to point one other fact that is that when you are talking about the North Korean communists who have a tremendously fanatical so-called commitment to revolution and national liberation I think we are dealing with an entirely different kind of people and group of people and the style of decision-making now the problem of

Congress Mr. Gransky brought up is very relevant here suppose the North Koreans said that sure we'll get entangled immediately with the US troops but North Vietnamese communist could defeat US military power then the question is why couldn't the North Korean Communist do the same this is of course immediate relevant question the next question is that how long can the US public and the US Congress could hold out if a kind of a drawn out war of attrition type of guerrilla warfare developed on the Korean peninsula just so that the clear-cut decisive victory in a short period of time is made impossible by the United and so that the US public would have to live with another drawn out situation so then there comes the question of in spite of the

determination of the executive branch of the government US government maybe the public opinion and the Congress might again try to contradict or even cancel out why would North Korea turn to this drawn out military tactic that you refer to and I think you would agree there's no way they could blitzkrieg South Korea into the ground in a short period of time and the best they could hope for would be this drawn out kind of a conflict you're talking about why would they do that with all the gains they're making diplomatically around the world now the both by keeping South Korea from becoming a member of the non-aligned nations by thwarting South Korea's attempts to win friends and non-aligned nations all around the world and picking up more and more support from even some of US allies well it's a getting the matter of how patient you are that is when you think that your your revolution or your victories within reach can they

say that well let diplomacy work itself out because we have all the time in the world or would you try also the other option the military option or the more violent revolution struggle type of option to speed up shall I say the demise of South Korea and this is again the mentality we are dealing with the mentality of North Korean communists and that's the reason why I'm saying that the how the US public including I'm digging talking about the US Congress would behave faced with another situation in Korea that concerns us and that's the reason why we were very gratified again to have as much and as strong every affirmation and reassurance from the US as possible and all the secretary of defense right and also maybe mr. Horton ran into some of the US Congress I think I ran into the whole Congress in Korea is this a part of the South Korean strategy to invite congressmen there and

take them to the tunnel the North Koreans dug and so on and so forth and convince them that they should be on South Korea side is this a massive campaign on South Korea? No it isn't so much the campaign it just happened that the congressmen on their own decided to make trips to Asia and I'm glad that they included South Korea in it but we do believe that you know seeing is very important right on the spot rather than just having a kind of second-hand information about what's going on in Korea and therefore we did welcome them as much as possible you know mr. Ambassador you do raise the question that there is a doubt in your mind and obviously in the mind of your government despite the very specific language of the US South Korean mutual defense treaty that we would make good on it now we we don't regard treaties as scraps paper we regard a treaty as a commitment

secretary of defense dealt with the constitutional implications of it and indicated the war powers act in no sense and nullified the prior commitment of the treaty where does your doubt arise you really think that if there were to be the kind of a struggle you're talking about you know the states would walk away from it no and mr. Gransky what I was trying to say is this as I said South Koreans including myself do not have any doubt or suspicion about the US commitment toward us but what I was trying to say is that we have to take into account how the North Koreans communist would be interpreting and looking at your commitment don't you have to take something else into account that is datant after all the major communist military strength lies in communist China and it lies in the Soviet Union there is every indication

that neither the Chinese communists nor the Soviet Union wish to see the North Korean communists involved in a war with South Korea at this point doesn't that make you feel any better well I know what you believe it okay I would grant that the datant is important particularly among big powers but can for example Chinese and the Russians tell the North you know tell the North Koreans just give up national liberation I don't think any communist party could say to so-called fraternal communist party to give up revolution they can tell them to cool it and have I haven't they well let's hope so but then they let's have another scenario and here maybe you may think that I'm just too paranoid here but the when you deal with the national

security policy what you do is that you take the war possibility of probability as 100 and prepare for it hoping that by preparing for it that the probability of war would diminish rather the increase and that's the reason why we have to take every contingency into account suppose North Korea did start the war against the express objection and opposition of both China and Russia would the China China and Russia say then to the North Koreans as that would tide of war turns against North Korea say that you know you disobeyed you did you know express it against our wish so we won't help you or would there still be a competition to help North Korea out to develop in this kind of circumstances because it's a great scenario you have no but this is an important scenario and this is also geopolitically ordained factor we have to take into consideration when we talk about the national security of Korea well would you be annoyed with me if I raise another

scenario you know every time we have a defense budget request here in in Washington every year the defense department marches up on Capitol Hill and tells us that our you know our military strength is in jeopardy that the Russians are out building us with this that they have more of that than we have and generally they always put on a kind of a big we have to have the money to build up our strength etc or the security of the United States will be jeopardized some would say Martin that that's saving the truth until just a certain time a year that's right now the scenario that I raise is perhaps South Korea wanting military aid from the United States and more than they're getting might be doing the same thing might be saying and affect the North Koreans are stronger than we are which they are not by the way I believe you outnumber them in terms of

ground troops certainly but they are power and naval power they outnumber them they outnumber you and in terms to and in thanks to but do you think that perhaps you are representing your position or overstating your position to put it politely a bit to get a bit more than right that prepared to give you yes and I think that's a very important point and that of course bothers us too that is if you state your defense department is lying for example that is the Russians are not continuing their build up then I can understand the Yomis giving about the defense department position but Russians as well as North Koreans are continuing their build up they are the ones who are taking the offensive against us in the name of revolution now we are not making up our external threat or their revolution in commitment because if you

read their own advertisement they will tell you that that's that's their commitment now the problem is that what is the best ways to diminish the probability of war do you unilaterally disarm or do you keep on diminishing or decreasing your defense expenditure is that the way to shall I say achieve peace or isn't really the detent based on the balance of power because if you tip the balance in their favor we call it the balance of terror okay then balance of terror so what we are in for is that it's a very uncomfortable position that is we are in a sense compelled and forced to keep on increasing our own armament now you know Korea South Korea is a capitalist system in that capitalist system nobody likes to spend much money for guns they would

sit in like to spend more money for television set or refrigerators things like the particularly when they're like to but they still manage to spend more for guns no but the point is that how do we really justify this kind of approach now the point is that we know that economic improvement is as important as military shall I say improvement in combating the communism and deterring another war on the Korean peninsula so that we have a very serious dilemma here but the problem is just coming right down to the realistic level can we really say that the best way to avoid another war on the Korean peninsula is to you know diminish keep diminishing our defense expenditure or do we say that keep increasing our military strength sufficient at least to deter the North Korean attack then that is the in the sense the best insurance Mr. Ambassador let me

get specific on that President Park as I understand it is proposed a five-year program of defense improvement something in the order of three billion dollars over five years which general brown of the chairman of our joint chiefs of staff says maybe a little bit optimistic now how much of that three billion dollars will will have to come in the form of U.S. credits credit to buy U.S. weapons well the credit part I don't have the exact figure credits and grants total how much how much grant there won't be at least I will say there won't be much grant involved because even the so-called modernization program which was studied in fiscal 71 which is only about two-thirds finished has been turning increasingly into the credit sale for U.S. item credit purchase for our side rather than grant but when we talk about our own effort raise two or three billion dollars

to shall I say modernize our own equipment this will be entirely separate from what we were trying to get from the United States in the form of military aid now how much of that extra program of our own would be in the form of credit I do not know but it won't be any kind of special credit accepted will be more like a commercial kind of credit sale let me let me turn that to another question Mr. Ambassador that I think has troubled many of us who've visited so in fact practically the day I arrived I picked up the English language Korean newspaper which said that the opposition party leader had been arrested literally two days before Secretary Slesinger arrived this is one of several of the primary opposition people both clergy political and others who have been booked arrested sometimes not indicted sometimes held in limbo for a long time as part of

what it seems to us outsiders to be a concerted effort to stifle political dissent now if capitalism is working so well in South Korea and if South Koreans are so anti-kind of communist and so bent on defending themselves why is it necessary to practice this kind of political repression well first of all let me make it clear that the opposition leader was never arrested the term booked was misleading in a sense that the police began the investigation and without bothering me at all and so that was a little misleading but about the arrest he is not detained in any way moves about in the streets for sure he's still and he's making all kinds of speech born not to be very careful what he says obviously no no no it isn't that he even criticized again government for the you know wrong kind of foreign policy in the sense of our effort to gain membership in the

non-aligned conference but it's again the problem is that sure you look at the Korean domestic situation as if Korea is in a peace time situation without external threat now our problem is this when you are placed in a wartime footing for shall I say 25 years without interruption and continuously yet and you not only have to continue in the direction of liberal democracy which for which your country is established and also capitalistic form of economy it is not an easy thing to do now the problem is that you said that the downtown soul is only 25 miles from the frontline and the given the kind of missile missiles and guns North Koreans have they don't even have to cross the DMZ to really destroy so it is in this kind of circumstance the problem is

that what do you do with the thing called war emergency powers of the chief executive this is the problem and they people tend to say that maybe this is just something peculiar to present park because he was a former military man therefore you see this style of government I don't think so you know put any civilian or even the most lovely lady politician in the position of the presidency you have madam Gandhi in mind I mean wouldn't you still have to take certain measures to deal with the the very serious problem of national security well here comes the question but always hears that you know every time a dictatorial action undertaken or as political repression as practices always done in the name of security and not jeopardizing the national welfare and all the rest you know it's the classic argument always to justify and Americans don't accept it

I know but you don't have for example a frontline around the dollar's international apple and it is it this kind of problem that is maybe our situation would be more like your own civil level let me ask a practical question then I if we with since we can't come to a philosophical agreement perhaps on that obviously you've got the United States Congress already restricting USA to Korea because of human rights problems with holding 20 million with holding 20 million dollars in fiscal 1975 how do you sell both at the same time sell Congress on more aid and still continue the repression well I don't know the only thing we can do is that we have to really protect our national security as best as we could and hopefully that the US public including US Congress would come to understand the problems we face it is just a matter of some mad dictator

you know power hungry and all this thank you mr ambassador thank you all good night for evening edition funding provided by public television stations the Ford foundation and the corporation for public broadcasting this program was produced by impact a division of GWETA which is solely responsible for its content