An interview with Deng [Xiaoping]

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From Blairhausen, Washington, an interview with Dungshell Ping, vice-premier of the People's Republic of China. I'm Paul Duke and a few moments Jim Lara of public broadcasting and three other network anchorman will question Vice Premier Dung in his first nationally televised interview with American journalist. The questions will be translated into Chinese and Dung will respond in Chinese with his answers translated into English. The first question will be asked by Walter Cronkite of CBS. Well, thank you, Mr. Vice Premier for this opportunity to meet with you, to interview Mr. Cronkite of CBS. Please let me first say a few words. If you wish, please. I'll go ahead and ask you a few questions. I'll go ahead and ask you a few questions. Please let me first say a few words.

A few words. I wish to thank the three major American television networks and the public broadcasting system for giving me this opportunity to meet the American public on TV. I want first of all to extend my cordial greetings to the great American people. The Chinese and American peoples have always been friendly to each other, and I want to speak Chinese and American people have always been friendly to each other.

Now that relations between China and the United States have been normalized, good prospects are in store for promoting exchanges and cooperation between our two countries. The interests of our two peoples and of world peace urge us to develop a relationship of friendly cooperation. I would like to thank the two peoples and of world peace and cooperation for providing cooperation with the United States to our countries.

I would like to thank the two peoples and of world peace and cooperation for giving And here I have threefold mission, firstly, to convey a message of friendship from the Chinese people to the American people. Secondly, to get to know the American people. To learn about your life, your experience in economic development and absorb everything of benefit to us. And thirdly, to have a wide-ranging exchange of views

with your national leaders on ways to develop bilateral relations and to maintain world peace and security. I can tell the American people that the results of my talks in the last two days with President Carter and other American leaders have been satisfactory. And the President and Mrs. Carter have accepted premier Hwagofan's invitation to pay an official visit to China at a time convening to them. There will be a warmly received in China. Now I'm ready to answer your questions. Thank you, Mr. Vice Premier. In your interview last week with the headly Donovan of Time Magazine, you suggested a pact between Japan, the United States, and China, to curtail Soviet Germany or aggression, which is also called.

Have you formally presented that proposal to the United States leadership? And if so, what was the reaction? I did not raise such a proposal. I just said that we must deal down to earth way with the Soviet and Germanists.

We are trying to achieve independence of China That in order to oppose her Germanism and to safeguard world peace, security, and stability, the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and other third world countries should unite and earnestly deal with this challenge of a danger of war. We do not need any kind of a pact or an alliance.

We need what we need is a common understanding of the situation and common efforts. Let's premiere in your statements made here, their public statements, and frequently to visitors and be king, as well as your predecessors, have made statements indicating that you do not feel that the United States understands the real nature of the Soviet threat. I wonder why it is you feel that you have a better understanding of that threat than the United States leadership has. Mr. Fu, in your statements here, you have always been in Beijing's statements and your predecessors' statements. We feel that you feel that the United States understands the real nature of the Soviet threat and the real nature of the Soviet threat.

I want to ask why you feel that the United States understands the real nature of the Soviet threat. That's an American problem. That's not for me to answer. But we do hope that the United States will adopt more effective measures, more strong measures to deal with the challenges posed by her feminism. Mr. Vice-Primier, does China plan to go to war over the Cambodia situation with Vietnam, which is backed by the Soviet Union? Many people have asked me that question. I can tell you all that for the weak Chinese people,

many people say counts. Any action taken by the Chinese is through careful consideration. We will not take any rash action. China always adopts a firm position, a firm attitude. China always adopts a firm position, a firm attitude. I can at the same time tell you that in addition to attacking Cambodia with great numbers of armed forces in a frequent way,

the Vietnamese are also creating a great number of boundary incidents along the sign of Vietnamese border, and the support of incidents are still further developing. I take it then that the answer is yes, China is prepared to go to war over the Cambodia issue. The position of supporting Cambodia is firm and unshakable. But as to what measures we will adopt, as to how we shall deal with this problem, we will still study it.

And a question like that is not something to be decided by us alone. Mr. Vice Premier, great changes have taken place in China in the last few years. You yourself, sir, have reached a venerable age. You have been deprived twice of authority very suddenly. What assurances does the United States have that you will remain in authority and that your policies of modernization will endure this new outward look toward the West cooperation with the West? Mr. Vice Premier, we know that now in the last few years, China has developed a huge change. You have been deprived twice of authority and that your policies will endure this new outward look toward the West?

You have been deprived twice of authority and that your policies will endure this new outward look toward the West? The guarantee for the continuance of a correct policy is not decided by the factor of a single individual. The crucial thing is whether the policy is correct or not. Whether it is approved by the people, whether it is supported by the people, whether it is good for the people, if the policies are correct, good for the people, and supported by the people, and that is the fundamental guarantee for the continuation of the policy.

I may say so, sir, though. There are those who help to assure whether the people approve the policies. And are there not people in the leadership of China right now who perhaps have reservations about diluting the purity of Chinese society by Western influence, Western industrialization? But the people who support the policy of the people, whether it is supported by the people, whether it is supported by the people, whether it is good for the people, if the people in the leadership of China are trying to protect them, I can tell you clearly that on this point, not only the central leadership, but also our local leadership, and the people throughout the country, are unanimous of this policy.

Within our leadership, there are older people, like I myself, an older person, and then middle-aged persons, and younger persons. And since the policies were carrying out or correct, since the principles, policies, and measures were adopting or correct, I can say for a matter of certainty that they will continue. In the first half of Patron'sğlumilали, in 20 years from now, most of the people began to

travel on the merged and early stages of the Chinese-Growling. I was at first instance organisms in their high Soviet Union. That was as if they were in a war trade, I had guessed that it was their enemy. That's how I competed against nuclear theory in my life. I meant that the Soviet Union didn't stop fighting in the Soviet Union, itfire the response. I did not mean strategic retreat, but that for a long, for quite some time now, the Soviet Union is on the offensive, whereas the United States is on the defensive.

And proceeding from such an assessment, it has been our contention all along that the only two countries capable of launching a World War are the United States and the Soviet Union. Now because of the changes in position, the main cockpit of war now is the Soviet Union. Well in view of your previous answer about China, the US, Japan, and Western Europe coordinating their policies toward Russia, how might the Russians react if they feel they are being surrounded and ganged up on? If they feel they are being surrounded and ganged up, how would they react? They will not be able to disregard the opposition of the people of the whole world.

There is always been my contention that in order to deter and to restore what we need is not this or that treaty or that resolution, but solid down to earth united action. It is necessary to engage in negotiations,

to scientists or that agreement, to conclude, to pass this or that resolution. But we cannot depend upon such things. We cannot seek for security in such things. Let's take a specific case in point if we might and see how that sort of an arrangement of unification against Soviet hadgemony might work. Can I assume that you, Mr. Vice Premier, are concerned about the situation in Iran, possibly resulting in benefit to the Soviet Union? We are concerned about the situation in Iran.

The strategic position of Iran is extremely important. So, as for China, as for China, we can only morally express our points of view. We cannot do very much because of lack of ability there. I believe that those countries who are in a position to do more should adopt a very serious attitude towards

the question of Iran and adopt more effective measures to help bring about a solution of the problem there. Well, under the assumption that the United States is deeply concerned about Iran, and you are deeply concerned about Iran, under your proposal of being united in preventing Soviet hegemony, then would you not propose that we do something together to try to prevent Soviet aggression in Iran? But I just said in this particular field,

our ability to do something is very, very small. In fact, we might be said, we are not able to do anything. If we are able to exert a little strength there, we will certainly do so. Mr. Vice Premier, your remarks about the Soviet Union since you have been in this country have been interpreted as an attempt by you to undercut President Carter's position on salt too. Was that your intention? No, it was not my intention. I had just said that whether it be negotiations

with the Soviet Union, or to sign this or that agreement with the Soviet Union, it's not something which we are opposed to. In fact, we might even say that someone for this necessary. We cannot play too much of a restraining role on the Soviet Union. The columnist this morning asked the question as to whether or not you, Mr. Vice Premier would be willing to have President Carter come to China

and criticize China's policy toward the Soviet Union. If his criticisms are correct, we welcome it. We have not criticized American policy here. And what I have been saying here are not anything new as being said by Chinese leaders over the past many years. Mr. Vice Premier, if the people of Taiwan, the people and the government of Taiwan, refused voluntarily reunite with you,

the United States continues to supply defensive weapons to the people of Taiwan even after the expiration of the mutual defense treaty. What alternative do you have for reunification except force? Mr. Vice Premier, if the government of Taiwan and the people of Taiwan refused voluntarily reunite with you, if the United States has said that the United States continues to supply defensive weapons to the people of Taiwan. We will try our very best by peaceful means to bring about the return of Taiwan to the mainland

and to complete our reunification. Is there any doubt in the Vice Premier's mind that if he should abandon peaceful means he would be resisted by the United States with force? Now, the question is, if we are to commit ourselves to not using armed force at all,

then that will be equivalent to tying up our own hands. And the result then would be to have the Taiwan authorities absolutely refuse to negotiate with us for a peaceful reunification and that could only then in the end lead to an armed solution of the problem. Mr. Vice Premier, aside from friendship and goodwill, what did you most hope to accomplish on this trip to the US? Through this visit and principally because of the normalization

of relations between China and the United States, we look forward to broad prospects to the development of political, economic, scientific, technological, culture and other fields in the development of such relations between us. Do you believe you can maintain the traditional Chinese culture while importing all of this technology from the West? It is a matter of certainty we will maintain our traditional culture. Mr. Vice Premier, we're going to learn very shortly

of the agreements you have made here. You're going to sign some protocols at the White House. What have you disagreed about in your discussions with President Carter? Our method is for each side to express his own views without trying to impose one's views on the other. And precisely because of that, that our talks have been very cordial.

You say just what the principal dangers are to this continued, euphoric honeymoon period between our two nations? I see no danger. The honeymoon will continue. But this interview will not, Mr. Vice Premier. Our time is up for all of us. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. So concludes today's interview at Blair House with Deng Xiaoping.

This is the final day of the Chinese leader's visit to Washington. Again, it's a full day of activity to be climaxed by a final meeting with President Carter at the White House to sign three agreements to foster scientific and cultural exchanges. We'd like now to discuss what Deng said today and to assess the overall visit. Joining me for an analysis of this interview is Jay Matthews, the Hong Kong bureau chief for the Washington Post, a man who has been covering the historic developments in China. The syndicated columnist Robert Novak, who recently returned from a trip to China and Robert Oxtam, a Chinese scholar with the Educational Group, the Asia Society. We just heard a moment ago, the Vice Premier say that the honeymoon will continue. But did he say anything significantly different today from what he has been saying about relations with the United States or any other particular issue?

Bob? Paul, I don't believe he did. Incidentally, when he said that the honeymoon will continue, that was the first spark of the Deng Xiaoping charisma that I detected when I interviewed him and that I've seen in other cases. I think he seemed a little tired or perhaps the foreman. I didn't think that in this interview, the American public really got the real flavor of the man. As substantively, I think he's been saying the same thing. Perhaps he said it a little softer this time that the Americans had better be more resolute in dealing with the Soviets. That is his position. He's not saying that they should buy a Moscow tomorrow. He's not saying they should dismiss the Saul talks. I'd say his position is about the same as Scoop Jackson's. Not the same as the old Chinese Communist position. Jay, you've been following him now for quite a while. I was, Bob's absolutely right. There's nothing there that strikes you on the face

of it as terribly new. He said one thing and answered to Jimler's question about the possibility of a war with Vietnam that if one reads between the lines, sounds fairly interesting. The great disturbing thing that has been happening over the last couple of weeks is this great buildup of troops, Chinese troops on the Vietnamese border. There's also many Vietnamese troops just across in Vietnam on the Chinese, across from the Chinese border. And those of us who've watched this for a long time and who have studied previous Chinese border problems have been looking for some kind of Chinese statement, a stern warning of the kind that they issued to the Indians before the border clash in 62, the kind they issued to the United States before they went into Korea in 1950. And we haven't seen that, at least not in the last several weeks at the time in which American analysts have been noticing this buildup of troops, which led some to say, or to thank me included, that the troop buildup

was something of a bluff, a way to frighten the Vietnamese that they really had no intention of going in, that they really would, one would have considered that they'd still play the old game, they'd give them a warning before they hit them. And when asked about that, he did say what Chinese people say counts, which one could read as saying, in answer to this kind of question, we'll let you know. He also said that there had been a number of border incidents lately, you seem to emphasize that. That's right, and they've been having border incidents for six months and will continue to, after everyone they put out a boilerplate warning, and that's the last we hear of it for a week or two, until the next one comes up. So we're all wondering if they've changed the rules of the game, if they're just going to go ahead and go ahead and hit them without warning. But he also said that there would be no rash action. That's right, and I think this suggests, we can't really tell until something happens, it suggests that that's the way that things are going to work. He also may be likely that he would use this form

for such a warning, or would you say? No, it wouldn't, they'd put out some official statements, but we haven't seen that yet, and obviously he's telling us to wait for that. Bob Oxnum, what meaning did you draw from, from what, let me first off, agree with my colleagues and say what we heard today, was a rather careful, low-key, reasoned review of what Deng Xiaoping has been saying for the last year and a half. The rhetoric on the Soviet Union is strong, but that should not come as a shock to anybody who's visited China. That's what you hear in China. The shock is that you're hearing in Washington, rather than in China. Certainly the statement on Vietnam was a firm indication, but I'm not sure it was a statement that indicates a kind of policy decision, but nonetheless Chinese resilience in terms of their willingness to go to bad on that issue of press-hard enough. We heard on Taiwan the same statement about a hope for a peaceful resolution of it, and only a willingness to break out of that if Taiwan would not negotiate with the mainland. I guess what struck me in this whole thing is nothing that he said.

But rather that here was Deng Xiaoping, vice premier of the People's Republic of China, engaging in American press interview, and really with all well-known correspondence around him, it strikes me that now once again there is a Chinese with whom Americans can identify, and the death of Mao and Joe stripped away that older generation, and now we got something of the man's personality, something of his kind of low-key approach to dealing with foreigners. I think maybe that's the biggest message. But would you all agree that he seemed to handle these questions today with a very deaf touch? He's still of them beautifully. He always does that. The only point I was making is that sometimes he is a little raceier and a little more colorful than he was. I think he was under extremely good behavior being on national television in this country, and even I understand that some of the meetings he's had with the congressmen and the senators.

He's been a little more colorful than he was here. Why is he giving such emphasis to the Soviet Union and to what he sees is the dangers of Soviet expansionism? Because clearly he has seemed to go out of his way to talk about that on this trip. That's China. The Chinese feel that that is the major problem, the world. They see the future of the world is pointing toward an eventual clash with the Soviet Union starting it. They talk, it's Mao's view, and I think it's the view that people like Deng Xuelin sincerely believe in. They have this great geopolitical view as does Dr. Kissinger. They look way into the future. Does one feel that he has a danger to wake up America? Right. I think that was his main purpose in this trip, Paul, was to wake up America. That's where he is.

Really odds with the administration. Their purpose was to show this very charming, intelligent, likable man, and kind of soften the opposition to normalization, which whatever remains. I think the administration has achieved its purpose. Whether he has achieved his or not, I don't know. I would just like to slightly amend what Jay said. I don't think that I am a long way from being anywhere in my colleague's class as China experts, but I do believe that the old Mao theory was this sort of metaphysical, hagelian certainty of these two superpowers clashing. There's much less talk about that today. As I said before, the idea of an expansionist Soviet Union on the march in Afghanistan and the Middle East in Indochina and the Horn of Africa over Africa is hardly an eccentric Chinese view.

It's widely held in the United States. I might say it's widely held inside the Carter administration, not in the State Department, but by certain high officials in the Carter administration. One of the interesting bi-plays going on in Washington this week is there are a lot of people on Capitol Hill and in the administration cheering on Dung saying, go to it. Well, I believe our Secretary of State, Mr. Vance and some of his colleagues have been ringing their hands that he was going to confuse or make difficult they taught with the Soviet Union. Well, that leads to another terribly important question it seems to me, and that is in a very real sense, isn't he undermining President Carter? I think that just a step back for a second. I think one of the points that all of us should recognize is from a Chinese point of view. The whole day-taunt with the United States over the past decade has been premise primarily on a strategic outlook on the world, and it's this anti-Soviet view which I think was pushed Mao Zedong when he was around to greet Richard Nixon and to have that extraordinary

event seven years ago, and that this rationale has not changed at all. I think what has happened is that Dung Xiaoping has now picked up this rationale at a time in which we're trying to pursue day-taunt with the Soviets, and particularly Assault Treaty, and it seems quite clear that this is one area where after normalization we may realize that we don't have a coincidence of aims, that we may well want from an American perspective to pursue several different lines of negotiations at the same time, with Tokyo, with Peking, with Moscow, whereas from a Peking point of view, the terminology that we use some 15, 20 years ago, containment, kind of single-minded approach to the strategic world, is dominant. And here we may have some real tensions. I don't know the answer that he's trying to undermine Carter if any reasonable man reading the speeches of the President's National Security Advisor, Mr. Brzynski, would say that he's supporting the American line as far as Mr. Brzynski sees it.

They are rooting on Brzynski, they're rooting out on the retired generals, they're rooting on that part of America. If you didn't in that part of the opinion of Jimmy Carter, it sees a danger. But to go back to a more practical point, we have the Assault Treaty coming along now in a matter of weeks, presumably. That will be sent to the Senate. We know that there is already strong opposition. There are predictions that the treaty may not be ratified by the Senate. Now doesn't Dung's visit make it more difficult, or isn't it possible that it will make it more difficult for the administration to win ratification for the treaty? I don't think it helps, but there is a respectable body of opinion in this country, Paul, who thinks that's a pretty good thing to happen. And you mean that the treaty will not be ratified? That's correct. And it is not a radical fringe, and it's not a bunch of falling at the mouth, zealots. It's people who have some rational arguments on their side. I think the thing I would disagree with Bob to certain extent is when he uses the word

R, view of the world has diverged very much in the last few years from what the Chinese view is, I think that I would more closely define it as to certain elements of the Carter administration's view of the world. And Jay is quite right. I don't think Dr. Brzynski and Vice Premier Dung are very different from each other in their worldview. I thought it was very interesting the fuss that Dung made over scooped Jackson, Senator Henry M. Jackson in the receiving line. I don't think that was just an involuntary show of affection. I think he was giving a very strong message as to which Americans he approved of and which ones he didn't. Well, another thing we've been looking for, too, is some signal from Dung that he might soften his stance toward Taiwan, toward reclaiming Taiwan. Has he given any such signal on this trip? I don't think it's any different from what it was before.

The point is that there is no war or a modest sailing from China for Taiwan this morning and this evening and there won't be for some time into the foreseeable future. So it gets to be a theoretical question that isn't going to satisfy Senator Jesse Holmes of North Carolina and a few other people. But I believe that most Republicans who raise some devil about the Taiwan question are, if not publicly content, are actually content with his position on the issue. I was struck by how careful he was to avoid getting testing on that subject, which he could have done. I think Bob pointed out that the translator and one of these exchanges with the Senate when Dung was being asked about, well, what about this use of force? And I said, well, the chancellor said, well, he's already answered that question. And he has one line and he stuck to it. In the past, on occasion, you could get Dung's goat and get him to go out and say, well, this is Taiwan as part of our territory, there's no question that it's our responsibility

and rather not we use force or not, we won't discuss it anymore. And he's done that on occasion and this trip, he has stayed away from that. He goes off the line, well, you know, we need to keep the stick waving so that we can have peace from negotiations and he goes no further, he's very careful. I guess the only other thing I'd add to that is that what he has done is restated the points that he's made in Peking, the points that he's made in Tokyo in Washington. And so when he says that what we're now talking about is unification, not liberation. What we're talking about is our hope for a peaceful resolution of this and our expectation that the Taiwanese will negotiate with us. What he's saying is what's been said over the last three or four months, but he's saying as Jay Wright rightly indicates in a low key fashion to those who are most concerned in the world. And it seems to me the result has been for the most part in Congress of a relative degree of reassurance. And at the Kennedy Center party, after the Gala the other night, there were a number of very conservative Republican members in Congress in the Senate who had been highly

critical in public of the abandonment of Taiwan, so-called. And they were just owing and owing over what a terrific politician he is and it kind of confirms my view that Taiwan is going to even have a shorter life as a moving political issue than the Panama Canal. Jay, you've been traveling extensively in that area. What kind of impression do you get about the Chinese policy toward Taiwan and about the possibility that at some point they may indeed try to retake the island by military force? Well, I think they're campaign at the moment, which is extraordinary, historically, this great, friendly face, stopping the- I mean, the fact that they're now emphasizing peaceful reconstruction. That's right. I think the bombardment of the offshore islands, promising Taiwan, it can keep its social system, its economic system, even its army. It was one of the times the latest statements.

That I think is part of an overall grand plan to bore from it within. I don't think there's any question of Chinese at this point or any point in the next 30, 40 years, being able to conquer Taiwan by force. It's terribly well-armed island. Some military analysts once told me that in figuring the norm in the invasion, you needed a three-to-one advantage in troops. That means that the Chinese would have to come up with their entire army up against what Taiwan has at least a million and a half reserves. The Chinese army is barely four million people in order to take that by force. What they want to do is bore from it, and what they want to do is encourage people on Taiwan to believe that Chinese, at least formal Chinese government flag flying over Taiwan, would not change their lives, would not reduce their paychecks, would not reduce the freedoms they have. And that's aimed at both people on Taiwan and overseas Chinese to support Taiwan. I may ask each of you, what kind of impression has Dung made since he's been here?

Has it been almost all favorable? I think, Paul, it's been almost wholly favorable, I think, perhaps the Senator Helm's North Carolina was unhappy about getting cut off on his question, and I'm a little hard put to think of another unfavorable response on the hill or anyplace else. It was widely predicted that he would have a highly favorable response. I think as he goes on to Atlanta, Houston, and Seattle, he will continue to have one. I just would like to add, I think, that some of the older advocates of normalization with China are a little put off by his anti-Soviet remarks, so that he is more the friend of Scoop Jackson than Shirley McClain. I think that bothers some people, but I think, on a mass basis, it's been almost wholly favorable.

Bob, do you agree with that? Yes. And in some ways, I'm glad you mentioned the gala at the Kennedy Center, because that may be remembered as a kind of key moment in this trip. Not as much the portions where we saw performing arts from America, but rather when he went up on the stage afterwards, and where he, even though he's 4'11 or 5'2", depending on what figures you have, has a kind of towering presence when people around him and walking through the line of children and kissing each on the top of the head. And I almost thought I was watching a man running for Senator from Missouri, rather than that. And President Carter didn't seem to know quite what to do if he was being upstage in a little. I'm told that when he went to the space museum today, he was really struck by, by Lindbergh's playing, how small it was when he saw it, and he just shook his head and couldn't believe that this small plane, the spirit of St. Louis, had actually flown across the Atlantic Ocean. I'd love to know who his media adviser is, because every time he sees a camera, he waves and smiles.

He did that terrific double take when he met the Harlem Globetrotors, he looks up again. He's entertaining. You know, here Jay is another point that I think is worth making, and that is this is a media spectacular in this country, but it's also a media spectacular in China. And for two reasons, there's a lot of television coverage and print coverage in China, but I think there are two real points here. One is that Deng Xiaoping has realized what American politicians have at the last 20 years that television can have an enormous impact on public opinion, and in an era which television is part of modernization, he's recognized this. Secondly, I think he also realizes that by projecting images of Deng Xiaoping next to very modern cities and now very modern plants in Atlanta and very modern space establishment in Houston and Boeing and so forth in Seattle, that he is going to create a kind of visual image of what modernization is like, and he is going to be associated with the image. I think it's extremely important.

In other words, a lot of this is really for Chinese home consumption. You bet it is. Justice is tripped to Japan was earlier this year, and to some extent, the Chairman Huago Fung's trips to Yugoslavia, Romania and the Iran. Our gala was more than an hour of TV time, was shown on all big cities in China the morning here after the night they did it. And what do you think the response is over there? Chinese are fascinated by this. When they showed the films of Japan, streets, full of cars when Deng was there, some Chinese asked foreign friends, how do they have space for their bicycles with all those automobiles in the streets? They are fascinated, and the Chinese media have been preparing Chinese for this, with a long series of glowing articles about American progress and skyscrapers thrown in, all also statistics about crime and prostitution and all they must get that in. But it's a much more favorable view, and Chinese are fascinated. Talking about his personality, he also seems to have a good sense of humor, because I noted

in the interview with Time Magazine, he noted that he had been named a man of the year by time, and then he laughed, and he said, well, you must have made a mistake, because Mr. Brezhnev said, I'm a terrible person. It's a great deal of self-deprecation, which generally is not the style of communist leaders around the world, but I think perhaps his experience, which is unique among all the world's leaders, has helped produce that style. But is there a danger here? Could there be a backlash at home against this trip? Because we know that he doesn't have total power. There are still arrival groups in China. I tend to think that it's rather unlikely that there would be a short-term backlash on it. Clearly, he is one of the strongest, if not the strongest advocate of this modernization program going so rapidly, and having so much contact commercial and other ways with the outside world.

I think that maybe over a period of years, particularly if Deng Xiaoping leaves the picture that this modernization program, going Pell Mellas, it seems to be right now, could come under some criticism, and there have been some who have suggested that he still hasn't reckoned fully with the ghost of Mao Zedong, and he is not still reckoned with that whole generation of Red Guards, who are now 25 to 35, sort of lost generation. I think that those are problems, though, that must be addressed five to ten years from now. In the short term, this is probably going to enhance, rather than detract from his power. And you know, you have to remember, this is a public pose to certain extent on his part. Those speeches of his that I've seen that purport to be his remarks in private to all Chinese audiences, and we're not sure the sources of some of these, but some of them seem to be valid, show a far different kind of statement about the United States, appointing out to in some cases that, you know, you cannot trust the capitalist.

They're going out after us for their own purposes. They want to make money off us. There's no way that they and we can ever agree on anything, but let's use them while they're useful, and we always remember that our system is different and that we must come out ahead in the end. So he covers himself, I think, in private with the Chinese. Just one more question I'd like to bring up, and that is, what do you think Dung's reaction is to everything he is seeing and learning and hearing in this country? I think that's a very difficult question. He seems to be enjoying himself tremendously, but I would really like to ask him that question after, next Monday after he sees a little more of Washington of the United States than Washington. I think he probably will be impressed by the technological skills, but whether his doubts about the will and character of this country will resolve favorably by this trip, I have

question. If I were he and brought up in the kind of career he had, I'd be astonished at how warmly I'm receiving in a country like this. Assistance is so entirely different. His life is so different from the leaders that he's meeting, and yet there's the popular response and a warmth that obviously he feels. My guess too is that just as American leaders must be thinking back over the mixed history we've had with China, he must think back over the mixed history of America and realize that to some extent this is a bit of a capstone of his career. He began as a student in France, became a communist there, has a very broad based view, and as a result of this I think that this is very important in terms of his life. Well, thank you all Robert Oxnum, Jay Matthews, and Robert Novak. I'm Paul Duke in Washington. This program was produced by WETA, which is solely responsible for its content.

Funding for this program was provided by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the Ford Foundation.