Eyes on the Prize II; Interview with Carl Stokes

We're going to begin with one question in 1965. What made you decide to run in 1965? How did you know then that the time was right for a black person to run as mayor of Cleveland? I don't know. The time was right as much as it was that I felt that it could be done and it was a kind of natural aspiration of mine since I had been elected countywide to the Ohio legislature and in a county that had only 8% in black population it obviously indicated my ability to put together the white vote that would be needed in a majority white city and it's a natural evolution of one who's in a profession to look toward the next echelon in addition

to which the city of Cleveland was rapidly distinguishing itself as one of the worst examples of the urban crisis that was sweeping the nation and black people here were undergoing perhaps certainly by degrees greater deprivations than in other northern cities in the United States and consistent with my own historical understanding about the evolution of minority groups into the mainstream of America that the next place for us to be was to be at the helm of one of the major cities and I saw all of these factors coming together and decided that I would run. Can you talk to me a little bit about Geraldine Williams and Jean Kaper's approach to run?

Could you just recount that incident again? While I was in the legislature, Geraldine Williams or should say really Jean Kaper's who was a controversial politician here, counsel person who had served some three terms in counsel and then been defeated, had converted her party and had been active in pursuing political goals of her own, she with Geraldine Williams and a group of other people began circulating petitions to draft me to run for mayor. I had told them that if they got a certain number of signatures that they would consider. Could you tell the story of Jean Kaper's and Geraldine Williams approaching you to run for mayor Cleveland?

The administration of Ralph Loker had been particularly punitive toward the black community in the city of Cleveland. We were faced at that particular time with a thrust from those of us who had been in the civil rights and in politics of where to go and there was a great deal of speculation as to the next step. In the process of all of this, former counsel woman, Jean Merle Kaper's and a small group of people began circulating petitions, calculated to draft me to run for mayor. I was not willing to respond to the particular draft by the Kaper's group, but this had been one of the things I had been considering and talking with people about and people had been talking about my doing. That however served as an impetus from the number of signatures that were gathered to make it something for me to seriously consider and it had that purpose and effect.

Okay. When did you really feel that a successful run in 67 would be possible? In 67. All right. Would you have been doing in 1966? Well, in 1965, about 320,000 votes cast, I had lost the election by less than 6 tenths of 1%. So it was obvious that it was a doable thing and so in 1967, it wasn't a question of whether a would win but by what margin or who I would have to ultimately defeat in the general election. That confidence was born out by the fact that in running a head to head with the mayor, incumbent mayor in the primaries, I defeated him by 20,000 votes, which was a clear victory and it justified the optimism we had had.

Okay. How did you pull together the different elements of the black community as well as the white community in putting together a campaign? How did you and Kuzerl, such as different folks and black nationalists, their political leaders, how did you pull people together to support your candidacy? Well, in 1965 or in 1967 elections both, you must remember, was it merely focuses of the political and civic and civil rights activity I had been involved in for 15 years. And the groups that had been of assistance to me, Americans for Democratic action, organized labor, NAACP, Urban League, the different civic and community street clubs, all had been part of my elections to the Ohio legislature and in 1965 I refined the process and then in 1967 I was refined even more.

Black nationalists as well as liberal whites and blue collar white labor class people always had been part of my campaigns, which were at large campaigns and it was just in my own case it was just a question of sharpening and focusing them upon the mayoral election. Okay. Among some people in the business community there was the feeling that electing Carl Stokes would ease racial tensions and would in a way might buy fire insurance in a more negative way to look at it. Did you think you could deliver, did you think that you could keep, you know, you could alleviate some of the tension and some of the feeling of misery in the black community? Did you think you could keep Cleveland cool? No, I never thought that I could keep Cleveland cool. I mean, after all what was happening, the social phenomenon that was expressing itself in the rioting throughout the United States, all of the factors that were basic to that

were more than present in Cleveland and in many other places. So there was never any realistic reason for me to believe that, but from a standpoint of being able to evidence to the black and the poor people of Cleveland that I could do what they most wanted to do and that is to have a concern and interest in it and to apply the resources available to doing something about them. This is what I knew that I could do. Obviously, the white business community never understood the sociological factors that, socio-economic factors that were going into the conflagration of the cities and the only thing that they wanted to do is, is there somebody who probably will stop Cleveland from going up in flames, no matter how often I told them and others told them that electing Carl Stokes isn't going to stop riots.

Nonetheless, they believed that, and since they were so disenchanted with the incumbent mayor and saw no other reasonable alternatives from the other candidates offering themselves, they found it easy to accept me with that very primitive reason. You campaigned in the white community, in the white ethnic community. What kind of response did you receive there? Obviously, having defeated the mayor by 20,000 votes in the primary, I got very good response. Could you just re-frame into the program? When I ran against the incumbent mayor in 67 in the primary election, where the choice was between me and him, and that campaign took us into the white ethnic areas, I had every confidence that they were going to respond to me because of the fact that they had been as deprived in the white ethnic areas as the black people had on the east side

of Cleveland, and they did respond enthusiastically to the extent that I was able to defeat the mayor by 20,000 votes. Okay, the night of the primary, one of the television stations announced that Locke had won the election. Do you remember that night, and what was your response? Describe the scene to me. Where were you? What was your response when you heard it? What did you do? We were at our headquarters downtown Cleveland when watching the television, and I recall Hugh Danesaw from Channel 5 coming on, and projecting that Ralph Locke was going to be the winner. That was about 9 o'clock in the evening, and this was during a time that we had paper ballots. The Hugh Danesaw, and I guess the rest of the media did not understand the history of printed ballots in relationship to the black community because almost never do the ballots

cast by the black voters, arrive at the board of elections early in the evening with the white areas. In addition to which, we were carrying at that time a precinct by precinct report to us about what in fact the vote was in that precinct, and we were keeping it running summary. So when we heard Hugh Danesaw, it was a source of great amusement to us because we knew that he certainly didn't have the information that we had, and shortly thereafter hearing the broadcast, I just went out and told him that our own projections are that we would win the election by 20,000 votes, which was greeted by the media there is that we must have gone off our bonkers or something because the information available to them was that we were losing badly. Either that might around 1 o'clock, in fact, our prediction came true. Okay.

We're now moving into the general election. Were you surprised by the amount of, I don't know if I can call it backlash, but the amount of white crossover vote for TAP once it was announced that you had won and TAP was going to be your adversary, the Republican. Now we were not surprised at the white voter crossover in support of TAP because he was an acceptable kind of person to that a white voter who didn't want to vote for Carl Stokes could with some security be able to vote for TAP. His record in the community was an excellent one, he himself was an outstanding member of a long time political dynasty and I had no, no, I was not in any kind of way surprised at the narrowness of the general election despite the fact that the city of Cleveland is overwhelmingly Democrat.

The in addition to which, of course, throughout the campaign we had been tracking voter attitudes with polls and so we knew before the November 7th date that the election would be very close. Okay. I want to ask you that once again and they just a little bit true. Were you surprised by the white backlash or the crossover in the white community once it was a fact that you would be in looker and set TAP your Republican was going to be your adversary? I was not surprised at the white backlash or the crossover of normally Democrat voters to support the white Republican in general election primarily because TAP was entirely a different creature from Mayor Loker and those whites who were reflecting their own racism found it comfortable to vote for a Seth Taff because he was an outstanding civic and community figure.

The member of the long time Taffed political dynasty in this state. Okay. What was it like going out to the streets of Huff and Glenville going out on the black west side while you during your campaign? What was it talking about the feeling of exhilaration, what was going on in the streets? Well the maybe the most pointed little thing yet was when we were in a motorcade coming down East 55th Street and my wife Shirley and I were sitting on the back seat of the convertible and a little black kid that was maybe eight years old probably came up to us as we were stopped at a traffic signal and he said are you Carl Stokes and I said yes and he just gave a little leap in the air and ran down the street clapping his hands say he's colored,

he's colored, he's colored, he's colored. I thought that sort of caught the kind of thing that was coming since pride and the historical aspect at the moment that I felt as I went through the black areas in the city of Cleveland. Also very sobering I might say to you because so many of the people were expressing in different kinds of ways about the confidence that they had, both that I would win and that when I won that I'd be able to correct all the wrongs and the problems that beset them and when you realize that people have that sort of feeling about you that you're going to be some sort of savior from their dilemma it's very sobering because it imposes a great responsibility upon you and I felt that quite keenly through that period. And the night of the primary election, the night you won the primary, can you talk about

that night with the feeling what you saw on the outside and also in the downtown area this, it happens that we're near the high level bridge and this is a very wide open business area and I don't know there must have been 10,000 people down there and as we came outside they had heard the news and people were laughing and literally dancing in the street and hugging one another and crying some of them from the emotion of the moment and when I came out they just all closed in on me and it was sort of a scary moment but you just realized that this was an outpouring of love and affection and happiness at the moment. Extraordinary time I often tell people the only, just spontaneous demonstration like that

I had seen in my lifetime was when Joe Lewis defeated Smelling and the second fight and the black community just turned out just so happy everyone had identified with that struggle between the, the exponent of Hitler's Aryan supremacy in this black American. Okay, let me spoke on the phone you talked about how you resisted Dr. King in a number of major national black political leaders when they wanted to enter the campaign. Why did you not want to portray yourself as just or just a black candidate? Why did you resist there, their involvement in the campaign? The reality of being elected mayor of the city of Cleveland in which the population of the city was only 35% black and the remaining 65%. What did you resist the involvement of national black political leaders in your campaign?

The realities of being elected mayor of the city of Cleveland which was 35% black at that time and 65% white and white Eastern European ethnics was that you couldn't run a civil rights campaign here, you had to run a straight political campaign in which you blurred or eliminated the racial distinctions as much as you could. We had come through a primary election in which the white community had managed to put aside the racial issue and now as we came into the general election with a Seth Taft in which we knew that white people would find it much easier to vote for Seth Taft and that we must to the extent possible, not inflame their basic prejudices, it meant that you couldn't have a civil rights campaign there and the sloganeering about black power

etc. Otherwise you may well have a cause that has gotten a great deal of publicity but you would not win a political election. In that regard of one morning we received a telephone call, I'm sorry we didn't receive when we started over on that. One morning when we were reading the morning paper there was a nationally syndicated story that the civil rights big six had met in New York the day before and decided that they would come to Cleveland to help Carl Stokes. I did not invite anyone to come to Cleveland to help me and I knew that if we had such a group come here with black sloganeering and whatnot I could forget about being able to capture the needed white votes that I would have to have to win the selection. It's a consequence my campaign manager Dr. Kenneth Clement and I contacted Dr. Kenneth

Clark who served really as the advisor to the major civil rights organizations arranged for Dr. Clement and I had to go to New York City the next day. We met at the airport hotel with Dr. Martin Luther Cain, Roy Wilkins and WACP Whitney Young of the Urban League of McKessick of Corps, Soakley Carmackle from Snick and by it rusted representing a fellow Randall. At that time we explained to them the political realities that if they came there they would certainly upset the delicate balance that we've been able to affect and that we were sure that what they wanted us to do was to win in Cleveland, not turn it into a media event for black power demonstrations that would result in a political defeat. Although there was some resistance from Stokeley Carmackle by rusted and Dr. Cain prevailed

and they agreed not to come. Now we're moving into the general election and there are a series of debates. The first debate from what I've read you did very well and then the second debate at it was John Marshall High School on the west side there was a little bit of a controversy based on a statement you may bring supposedly bringing race into the campaign. Could you just talk about that night as you remember it, Louis Selser is the moderator and your Seth Tath, your opponent is next to you. What happened? How did it happen? Few people recall from the night of the debate at John Marshall what preceding information there had been about a conversation that Seth Tath and I had had at my law office the day of the debate in which Seth Tath had come to me and had entered into a discussion

about whether or not I would either want to wait a minute, I want you to hold it a minute, let me recollect that because it may not be a f***ing speech anymore. Okay, we're at the second, there are a series of debates, we're at the second debate at John Marshall High School on the west side. Why did you bring up the subject of race at that debate? The debate at John Marshall occurred in the area of the city which is a hotbed of hostile or racial attitudes and anti-black experiences. The audience that night was about 98 percent white and drawn from the John Marshall High School area during the course of the debate for whatever reason it is today, I can't recall, but I recall saying to Seth Tath, Seth, you've acknowledged to me that as a Republican who

doesn't live in the city of Cleveland, the primary thing you rely upon in being able to win this race is the fact that you're white and I'm black. At that moment there was a great outpouring of protests from this audience I've described to you and when the moderator was able to get the society a little bit, Seth Tath, who we subsequently learned had been well-coached that if some state been like this was made, retort it well, well, well, well, curl. So now we really have the real issue out on the table. It's not fair for me to talk about race, but you can talk about it and of course there was once again a great reaction from the white crowd there. The next day the news media focused entirely upon that reaction and termed that I had to inject it race into the campaign.

Did you lose hope? I mean, the polls were beginning to close in and really towards the election it looked like Tath might actually be taking a little bit of a lead. Did you ever lose hope? Did you ever think that you were not going to win? I'd never had any question but that we would win. Now as a professional politician I'm always prepared to lose because I have both one and lost races but everything that I knew about the way in which that campaign was going and the information we were getting from our polling told me that we'd win narrowed the way it might be we would win. Mark six. Okay, after that second debate and you made the statement, how did your staff react the next day when you came back into the campaign headquarters, what happened? Dr. Clement who was a campaign manager and I had discussed this was not a spontaneous

statement. It was because of several things too extensive to go into here. I had decided I was going to say that that night. Dr. Clement had been opposed to it from the outset. The campaign press secretary, Phil O'Neill Astro, had believed that it should be said and so Astro and I outvoted Clement's decision, turned out that Clement was right of course. Insofar as what the reaction was, not to the accuracy of the statement but the subsequent media reaction to it, vindicated Clement's belief that we should not have made the statement. But when you went back into your office, probably your campaign workers, you brought up the subject of race the night before. How did they treat you? Did they make any comments?

Do you remember going in that morning and talking to the people in the office? Of course. We didn't go in that morning and talk to people. We went back to the headquarters that night and discussed it. We had to agree with Dr. Clement that it was an untimely remark and that the reaction that we had received was one that we should have avoided by not addressing the issue even though the reasons for it were plausible, just wasn't politically sound. Do you remember election night, I mean this is the night of the general election of November 7th, where were you, what happened, how long did it take before you found out about the victory and then what was the feeling afterward, just to talk us through that night? We were at our suite in the Cleveland Sheraton Hotel on public square and I guess there were probably about 35 people there, some business people, others who's work had been

done and were not in the street work that day. We watched the evening go by getting reports, not just on television, but also reports that were being phoned in to us from the precincts and as we came down through the evening hours after the polls closed at 7.30 and 10 o'clock came and he was quite far ahead and 11 o'clock came and taff was still ahead and then around midnight we began closing the gap and at about 1.30 in the morning it was when our information came to us that we were, all of our reports were in and we were just a little bit ahead and about half hour later the Board of Elections announced that all of the precincts were in had been counted and I had won

by a small margin, about two o'clock in the morning, of course we were all exhilarated and we were all congratulating Clement and all the different people who had participated in the campaign and then we went downstairs to it, obviously hysterical crowd and thank them for their help and inviting them to the inauguration which would be only a week away. Then we were pleasantly surprised by Seth Taft and his wife Franny who arrived at the celebration. Franny had a box of roses for surely which I guess that they had had just an event that the thing went that way. We had very cordial few moments with them and appreciating Seth for the kind of positive campaign he had run and then I don't just remember the rest of the night just goes into a blank because we were just euphoria

and I don't know what all we did. What do you think your election symbolized? What do you think your election meant for Cleveland in that day? November 7th or really in the November 8th, 1967? My election on November the 7th, 1967, had a great deal of meaning to America because this was a city first that was in which the black population was a distinct minority of the city. At a time in which cities were a hotbed of racial animosity and hostility and literal conflagration where there had been over 300 cities within a three year period of time all that had gone up and flames including part of the city of Cleveland. It illustrated the ability of white people to vote for a black candidate for mayor. To black people it

introduced a whole new echelon of political power that now instead of having to go and ask the white mayor for a job they could go to the black mayor and expect a job that in looking at a police department now they would know that they were police departments were no longer without someone who would have some say over what they did in the black neighborhoods it now they'd have a black mayor there. To black civil rights people who had arrived at the summit by achieving the 64 civil rights act and 65 voters rights act this represented now the next plateau for them to arrive at and that is the involvement in the political process which then would enable a system to going into the true economics of the country. So there were a lot of reasons like that and the historical significance that black people

in this election had indicated that their involvement in climbing the ladder toward ultimate participation in the mainstream of American society was following the same process that had been gone through by the European immigrants that came here beginning in 1850s and that we too would ultimately be involved in every level of political economic power. Okay. Could you talk about some of the coalitions that you put together nationally as well as locally? Some of the local leaders, some of the campaign? In the campaign. This is prior to the election night. The coalition that came together and some of the support that you received that helped. In the 1965 and 1967 election there was no involvement of national groups in the Cleveland election. We were very careful to keep it that

way and the process was done here through leadership from the NAACP, the Urban League, the plane dealer, I'm sorry not the plane dealer, the Colin Post which was a black weekly that was run by man by the name of William O. Walker. Okay. Let's just start that once again. I was wondering about any national leaders like Gilbert Humphrey, I mean people who really were supporting your candidacy, as well as local groups, you know, Colin Post. There wasn't. I just told you that there weren't any national groups. Okay, but I thought people would meet each other. Once again, what was the national and local support that you received or offers that you received for your campaign in 1967? In 1967, the election which had caught the attention of people around the country because of the close race in 1965. Resulted in offers of

aid and assistance anywhere from- It just happened to happen to you. No, they've used the sign. Mark 7. Okay. Once again, could you talk about the offers that you received nationally and locally in to support your campaign, the coalitions that were forming or that tried to form around your campaign in 1967? Well, in 1967, there were many people and groups around the country who wanted to be part of the Cleveland election, most of which we had to refuse because of the fact we could not see that it would fit in with the way that we had organized and charted the course of the campaign here, balancing the white and black factors. So, where persons, for instance, such as Hubert Humphrey, who was the face president of the United States

at that time, a long-time friend of mine, had wanted very much to come here. We felt that it would not be an interest to have him here. The national civil rights leaders who wanted to come, we did not. Who is that? Okay. During your election in 1967, a number of national leaders and local leaders offered support in this campaign. Could you talk about that? Could you talk about the coalition that came together and people that wanted to be part of your campaign and how you looked at it? Because of our very close race in 1965, the eyes of the nation were focused on Cleveland in 1967 with what seemed to be now to them, a probable win here. And there were many people who wanted to be part of it and they arranged anywhere from Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who volunteered to come here or very charitably also said that he would understand if we didn't want him to come, he would either endorse

me or oppose me, whichever one would help me. And we told him to do neither, but we did not let him come. Similarly, the national civil rights leaders who recognized the great importance of this election to the whole fight for freedom and equality had wanted to come here. We necessarily rejected them also because in the delicate black white balance we knew that anything representing the black power movement would cause a detrimental political effort. There were a number of people who otherwise were involved in civil rights activities other than the organized groups as such who we did, who volunteered help in whom we did go out of the city and received their financial aid and assistance. Here in the city of Cleveland, however, we organized the campaign utilizing the local components of the persons that we

did not use in the national level. First is organized labor members, NAACP, urban leg, those who were within the black power movement, we didn't have a black panther organization here, but we did have a black Afro set. They were very much an integral part of the campaign worked very closely with us. Most important, I think, of all of the components of the winning campaign here was the black clergy. They came down out of their pool pit and made each of their churches a veritable political organization of itself and provided the real winning thrust, I believe, to the whole campaign effort of 1967. Just very briefly, could you just talk about those local organizations Afro set? You began with organized labor Afro set in the black clergy. Could you talk about the local groups that came together in coalition to support the campaign at 67?

The combination of forces here that were most responsible for my election in 1967 was first the black clergy who had felt a front head by the way in which they had been treated by Mayor Loker and who almost unanimously, Baptist, Protestant and otherwise, combined to lead the campaign and virtually made each of their churches a political campaign committee of themselves. But they were joined by such liberal labor organization, such as the United Auto One. I can't remember what I put them on. Mark. Mark nine. Okay. Briefly, could you talk about the local groups, local organizations that came together in coalition to support the 67 campaign from here? The primary group in the campaign effort were the black clergymen of Cleveland, Baptist, Protestant and otherwise, who had suffered the indignities under Afro Loker and were really

the spearhead. They were joined by some of the liberal labor organization groups, such as the United Auto Workers. Then we had very strong support from the NAACP and the Urban League who at that time were very strong organizations in Cleveland. Part of all of this was a continuous weekly support from the black newspaper, the Colin Post, headed up by William O'Walker, their editor. Then of course, we had the black Afro set. Then such diverse groups as the mothers against the muscular dystrophy. Groups that I had worked with over the years in street club organizations, all of these kinds of groups with the exception of the Democratic and or Republican Party because the Republican Party was engaged with my Republican opponent, Democratic Party just was not participating and aiding and assisting me.

Okay. How did you get out the vote in the black community? You knew the numbers, but what did you have to do to get out that black vote? You could talk a little bit about the numbers that you knew you needed to get in order to win. Well, we needed every in 1967. We needed every black vote that we could get and the target at white votes and we had another objective which was to not excite certain white areas that we knew however many came from there. How would they have these things are on hold? Okay. You were talking about this three-part strategy, getting out the black vote, selected targeted white communities and not exciting certain the other elements of the white community. Once again, what was the strategy? What kind of, how were you trying to get the vote out of it? What was the strategy? What we had to do in 1967 was to maximize the black vote to bring out targeted areas of liberal or moderate areas of the city and then thirdly try not to excite the areas where we knew there

were hostile anti-black feelings so that they would not feel the need to boil out of their kitchen doors in order to go vote against stokes. In relationship to the first two relative to targeted areas of liberal or moderate whites and blacks, we utilized the churches primarily. The ministers were the most effective source. Each Sunday was devoted part of their services devoted to this campaign. On the Sunday before the Tuesday election, we had organized a citywide movement for the churches of directions as to exhorting people that day and providing assistance for people to go to the polls on Tuesday. Each church was given specific areas of the city to cover. Similarly, we were assisted by way of the clergy by a small group of white liberal ministers who were under a Protestant movement working on poverty matters here. They

helped us in those moderate and white income areas. The other thing that we avoided obviously was anything of a historical nature going out over radio or television that would tend to excite any racial feelings in the white areas. When you first ran in 1965, many of the black political leaders, as I understand it, did not support you. Did that hurt you and did they come around in 1967 and if not, did that hurt you again? In 1965, there was not a single black political elected leader who supported my campaign for mayor. Despite them, obviously, I came within just a hearse breath of winning. Again, in 1967, when we launched our campaign, every black elected official with the exception of one councilman by the name of James Bell

supported Ralph Loker. When I defeated Ralph Loker in the May primary, I defeated every black elected official in this city except Jimmy Bell. Their lack of involvement in my campaign went right up until September of that year when with all of the furor from the black community and total support of my candidacy forced them for their own political survival to join the campaign just about two and a half months before the general election. But their participation as creatures of the party and harnessed by the party did not stop in our electoral victory. Just one question that follows up what you began before. Was this more than a race for mayor? Did you see this as an extension of the civil rights movement? What I always understood as a

participant in the civil rights movement myself was that once that we had gotten the laws, then we had to get into what I saw as a next process, which was the involvement in the implementation and the next step of participation in the American mainstream. Historically, I understood that to be the political process. As a consequence, I came out of the civil rights movement combining that with the political movement and then took it that first step that I saw as the next part of the evolutionary process for us. Obviously, I brought to the political process in which I was never supported by either political party, the civil rights movement and the involvement of people who were concerned about the dealing with the problems of that day and not with the partisan political aspects of them.

Was it difficult to convince black voters to vote for you that you were qualified? It is always difficult for black candidates to convince his people that he's qualified for a new venture in politics, even though I had had the exuberant support of the black community and running for the legislature. In 1965, we went through quite an educational process and had we been completely successful, we might have gotten a narrow vestige of black support necessary to win then. But we did encounter that problem and we had to overcome it and in 1967, it demonstrated that black people had been convinced of my ability not just to get elected, but also to do the job.