Dateline: United Nations; 6; Disarmament

[long beep] [short beeps] [short beeps] [music] The following program is from N E T, the National Educational Television Network. [music] [music] [Fleming]: Good evening, I am James Fleming. This is proving to be one of the most important weeks of the current general assembly session. First there's the business of settling the perennial issue of a seat for Red China, or at least settling it in so far as this year's concerned. And a second matter, which is equally important, but which has been overshadowed by the violence of the China debate is the UN's first positive action on disarmament in several years. For two weeks the assembly's big first committee

had been arguing over several drafts of a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union had each submitted its own version. In many respects they're alike but with one great difference: the Russians are determined to include language that would bar the creation of a mixed force nuclear weapons fleet of the kind that the United States wants to include in NATO. But one major change was evident in the Soviet approach this year: usually the Russians drag in every issue they can to brand the United States as a potential aggressor. This time however, the Russian delegate, Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko, carefully stayed away from any reference to Vietnam, which he might've been expected to play up to the hilt. The Russians indicated privately even before the debate that the control of the spread of weapons or nonproliferation as it's called here was too important to them to allow other issues to interfere, so Ambassador Fedorenko confined himself solely to that and to the multilateral fleet question. [Fedorenko speaks in Russian]

[Fedorenko speaks in Russian]. [Translator:] The Soviet delegation would like to emphasize again that the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons should be singled out from the mass of the other questions and that every effort should be concentrated on the speediest possible solution of the problem. Everything should be done to facilitate, to simplify matters, but not to complicate the problem. Of course the agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an objective in itself. We heard statements here to the effect that the creation of a multilateral nuclear NATO force and other forms of avoiding West German militarist access to nuclear weapons would not be in conflict with the objective of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. Voices were heard here saying that within the framework of the nuclear forces of NATO, West Germany and other nuclear powers would be able to put their finger only on the safety catch of the trigger, but certainly not on the trigger itself, which would put these forces into effect. It is quite evident however that all these considerations

are supposed only to cloud the issue, to complicate it, to whitewash the real enough ?very attractive? essence of the policy of the United States. The United States' answer to that argument is that we have no intention of providing access to nuclear weapons to any nation not having them already, which would automatically bar West Germany. But the American proposals went much further than that; we called also for a stop in production of fissionable materials for weapons and for international safeguards to guarantee that action. Since the atmospheric test band treaty with Russia 2 years ago, this nation's gone a long way towards protecting those safeguards, and we've made it clear that the methods we've developed here could be used as part of a worldwide anti testing police agency. [music] The United States can and does monitor the Earth itself for evidence of underground testing through seismic research stations. This one is in the Wichita mountains near Fort Sill, Oklahoma, an ideal spot because the normal minute vibrations of the Earth are

unusually low in this area and do not interfere with the detection of signals. The shots caused by testing are recorded on graphs fed by seismometers, 21 in all, arranged in a pattern around the station. Wires leading out from the station are connected to each instrument. [music] The seismometers themselves are underground, covered with two feet of earth to isolate them from drastic temperature changes. [music] Each instrument is in a water- and pressure-tight vault with a frame anchored to bedrock. Periodically, they are tested to make sure they remain in ultra-sensitive working order. The

test recorded, the instruments return to their normal job. These devices can measure a vertical motion of the Earth as small as 1/50th the thickness of a human hair, and recorder frequency of about one oscillation per second. The readings maintain a steady check, and the station fulfills the conditions of a conference of experts, including both Russians and Americans, who began studying methods of detecting tests seven years ago. Satellites can be employed to check for testing in outer space. This one is the Vela, part of a system that's been in operation since 1963. It was designed to monitor radiation outside the atmosphere over the vast areas of space immediately surrounding the globe. [background rumble]. The first Velas were launched aboard boosters, specially instrumented for them

to enable 2 satellites to be placed in a pre-selected parking orbit. [continued mechanical hum]. Once the booster has reached its apex, the first half of the system goes into an orbit 50,000 miles high. The second satellite then is placed in a similar orbit, but at a different point of the heavens. Together, they can monitor a 140 degree area of space. Once in position, the satellites transmit back a steady stream of data on radiation levels throughout the area covered. Peacetime use of atomic energy also is covered in the proposed treaty. And the United States has developed safeguards here too, at a Twin Falls, Idaho testing station.

Government standards regulate protective clothing used by workers around nuclear reactors. Special measuring devices have been developed to detect the amount of radiation they absorb. Disposal of waste from reactors is carefully supervised under government standards. For the most part, radioactive waste is buried at isolated spots. Well away from inhabited areas, and double protected by specially designed concrete-lined containers. Air contamination in testing centers or nuclear plants also comes under close regulation in this country. Beginning with stacks in a minimum of 250 feet high to carry off possibly contaminated gases.

Release of the gases is governed by weather conditions and, when permitted, is constantly monitored by other equipment. These air measuring devices check radiation. Radiation and air passing through a tube at precisely the rate of normal human breathing. A further safeguard, a radiation monitor checking airstreams and clouds for radioactive content. Another fallout safeguard, continuing checks on animals, in this case, rabbits, who would reflect contamination of the desert plants they live on. A device to measure radioactive content of the thyroid, a natural depository. Also, a continuing analysis of radioactive content in the bones of animals in the areas of reactors. Here at the UN, the debate has centered not so much around the safeguards and inspection

issues, but on the proliferation issue. 59 nations spoke out, every one of them in favor of putting a stop now to the spread of nuclear weapons, even though their own nations do not possess those weapons. But one point kept coming up again and again: no matter what sort of treaty proposals are worked out here, Red China would not be a part of them, and China is obviously the most dangerous member of this exclusive nuclear club. She's given no intention that she intends to stop making weapons or even possibly distributing them to her allies. This possibility was very much in the minds of diplomats, especially those whose nations feel the danger closest. Sir James Plimsoll of Australia expresses that feeling. [Plimsoll]: The authorities in Peking show no repugnance for nuclear war and in fact they flaunt, before the other countries of the region, their capacity and their willingness to contemplate nuclear war. Leaders of the regime in Peking have said that every country should have its

own nuclear weapons. In other words, they, unlike almost all members of this committee, do not accept the very conception of an agreement for the non proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now one has to be realistic and accept the realities of power and accept the fact that some countries are stronger than others and some have nuclear weapons and others don't, but the realities of power do not consist solely in the recognition of the strength of any particular entity of any particular power. It consists also in what the reaction is and the relations are of other powerful countries. And, I would say, and i think in saying this I reflect the views

of most of the countries of Asia and the Pacific, we cannot concede to Peking the role of Spokesman for Asia. [Narrator]: The debate ended the way most of them do, in a compromise. The resolution finally approved in committee made no reference to the NATO force dispute between the United States and Russia. Instead, it called for a treaty as soon as possible to stop the spread of weapons, and sent the whole matter back to the 18 nation disarmament conference which has been meeting off and on in Geneva over the years. That committee will be meeting again in January, and the 2 treaty drafts submitted by Russia and the United States will serve as the basis of its work. This time, there's considerable hope that the committee will get somewhere. The American representative at Geneva is Ambassador William C. Foster, who has headed the United States delegation at disarmament meetings for 7 years. He was here at the UN for the debate on proliferation, and just before the assembly acted he discussed with us the prospects for a treaty in January. Mr. Foster, at the

first committee you said that in your view this is an opportune time for a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. [Foster]: Well, I think it is, Mr. Fleming. In the first place, uh, all of us understand better why it is important to achieve this progress. Uh, secondly, I think that time is, uh, running out when we can achieve such, since if we wait very much longer there will be a number of other nations that might make the decision to go the nuclear weapons route. In view of those, that combination of factors, and in view of the better understanding of this, I think it is a good time, I think there's a real chance that we can achieve agreement, Not today, not tomorrow, probably not here in New York. But there is a very good chance, and I am optimistic that it will be achieved. [Fleming]: Mr. Foster, in the assembly debate we've had two versions of non-proliferation, The Soviets' and our own. Where do we differ? [Foster]: Primarily, and really only, in the fact that we insist on

leaving open the possibility of a European, um, multilateral force, allied nuclear force, some participation by the NATO partners in the nuclear policy planning, in the decisions for the use of nuclear weapons if the need arises. The Soviet Union is firmly opposed to any, uh, change in the present relationships which in their opinion might lead somehow to access, so called, by the federal public of Germany to nuclear weapons. Our treaty is designed to make sure that there is no such additional national nuclear access, uh, or indeed is designed to prevent the creation of any new independent nuclear entities. The Soviet Union claims that our treaty does not do it, and they have written a, a series of treaty articles which might make it even impossible to continue

our present nuclear arrangement. [Fleming]: So in effect the Soviet Union might have a difficult choice. On the one hand to maintain their view about nuclear weapons and West Germany; on the other, uh, to accept proliferation of weapons. [Foster]: Well, this is really why I think we will come to an agreement, because we mu- both must have a common interest in preventing the further spread. I think no nuclear power, the UK, France, ourselves, perhaps even a nuclear capable power such as China, wants to have a further spread because with each additional nuclear power or entity, uh, the chances of some disastrous accident are substantially increased. And you recall President Kennedy's statement that he, uh, hated to think of a world in which there were 6, or 8, or 10, or 12, or 15 nuclear powers where this great destructive force might be in the hands of a government, stable, unstable, responsible, irresponsible, even in the hands of a madman.

[Fleming] If we leave aside the differences about West Germany, NATO and so on, Russia, the United Kingdom, and ourselves are more or less in agreement about non-proliferation. But China is not a member of this group. What about China, Mr. Foster? [Foster]: Well, it has been, uh, informally suggested that China do come to the 18 nation disarmament meeting in Geneva. Uh, they, without being formally invited, turned down the invitation. I don't think this is, uh, really a, a good start and if China were to come, certainly there would have to be other changes in the 18 nation committee to balance the acquisition, the accession of China to it. China's position, all through this, has been that they will not even talk to people interested in this situation unless, and until, perhaps they are members of the security council across the street. Uh, they have

been very aggressive in their statements, they have gone so far as to say that they thought it would be useful if many nations had nuclear power, since this would make all nations more equal. I don't think there's much, uh, hope, really, of uh, any progress of this sort, and I would think that the accession of China to a well-functioning negotiating body might destroy the real opportunity which that body provides to make progress in this field. It is because of the fact that i think we will return to Geneva shortly after the first of the year. [Clears throat] Excuse me. That i have hope we may get agreement on a non proliferation agreement. If China were to be added to it I think it probably would be broken up. [Fleming]: Mr. Foster, nationalism survives as a very strong force in our world. Are these non-nuclear nations really willing to go along? [Foster]: Well, Mr. Fleming, one of the great advantages of this, uh, committee one discussion is that perhaps a hundred

nations have expressed their viewpoint on just this problem. I think almost universally, each of them has said that they believe that the non-proliferation, uh, philosophy is very desirable indeed, and they certainly subscribe to it. Now, they go further than that however. They say that, in their belief, it is also essential that if a non-nuclear nation accepts a self denying ordinance then the nuclear powers should also accept some limitations, and they suggest a number of things, primarily being a cutback in the inventories of nuclear arms in the hands of the nuclear powers. And we agree that this is reasonable and we have proposed a series of measures which would accomplish just that, if matched by the Soviet Union. [Fleming]: And in the first of many debates you've described some of those. Uh, are, are those

essential to our agreement to non proliferation or just -- [Foster]: No, we have said that these are related measures. All or any part of them, in our opinion, would be a desirable thing to achieve and would make progress toward our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. The measures, if I may take a moment on them -- [Fleming]: Yes, by all means. [Foster]: I think think they are importantly related. We have suggested a freeze on the further development of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. A freeze on both numbers and characteristics, to be verified of course, and if accepted by the Soviet Union, we have said that we would also accept a parallel reduction in the present amounts of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. We have said that in the field of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, we would like to have a complete cutoff of the further production. We have achieved certain agreed partial cutbacks in this

field. Uh, by '68 we will have cut back production by 60%. The Soviet Union, in a parallel announcement in '64, said that they would accept a cutback which was of the magnitude approximately of 20%. We have gone further than the cutoff and the cutback. We have said that if we can get a cut off, completely with verification, we would transfer substantial quantities of the material in our present inventories to peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards. Now this means real disarmament, because you cannot cut off production, transfer present production, present quantities, and destroy warheads without a substantial reduction in the nuclear capabilities for destruction. We have also, of course, suggested a comprehensive test ban, which would include underground as well as atmospheric tests, all of these things are consistent with the desire of the non nuclear nations to feel that the nuclear

nations are also accepting limitations. [Fleming]: At this particular time, eh, is it your feeling, Mr. Foster, that the Soviet Union is more willing than before to discuss a non-proliferation treaty seriously? [Foster]: They are indeed willing to discuss this and of course as you are aware, at Geneva we've discussed it with the Soviet Union on a daily basis, these major problems. There have been interferences with perhaps the most rapid, uh, progress in this. Vietnam has obviously made it more difficult to discuss certain things, but nonetheless we have continued these discussions, they are meaningful. It would be my appraisal that the discussion in Committee One, for the last, uh, two weeks and a little more, has been about the most thorough and constructive discussion of these broadly related measures, which I've just outlined, that I've had the opportunity of participating in. Now this doesn't mean that we will negotiate agreements, uh, at New York. It does mean that there has been a lot of

clearing away of the underbrush which hopefully, at the negotiating forum in Geneva, could well lead to agreements. [Fleming]: The test ban treaty was successful because we'd found the technical means to, to check tests. Uh, Mr. Foster, how are we going to police non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? [Foster]: The major policing that needs to be done in a non-proliferation treaty is that which will cover the peaceful, uh, activities in the nuclear field. In other words, we have felt and our treaty does call for a clause, in which the participants in the treaty would cooperate, in facilitating the application of peace guar- of uh - safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities. Under the international atomic energy agency or a similar setup, the real danger the real thing to protect against would be the diversion of the products of peaceful reactor development on a clandestine, uh in a

clandestine way to weapons purposes and if one accepts these safeguards, these products could be accounted for and could be prevented from going to nuclear, uh, ends. Now, the nuclear powers obviously don't need any such supervision because they have the weapons and the proliferation is already in being, so to speak. What one needs is to have the application of these safeguards to peaceful reactor developments, and there are many more peaceful reactors around the world, almost month by month. [Fleming]: And, and you feel that the international atomic energy agency of the United Nations, uh, has a formula that would work in this instance? [Foster]: Well, they are, oh, they're in business. They're, they're, we have shifted 12 or 14 of our bilateral, uh, nuclear assistance treaties to the IAEA. Uh, we have offered to put certain of our own reactors under their

safeguards supervision. We have a large power reactor at Rowe, Massachusetts, the Yankee Reactor, which is being inspected in this fashion. We have some smaller reactors being inspected in this fashion. The UK has submitted one of its large power reactors. They have a staff, they are in business, they are leaning, they are expanding, and the board of the IAEA, which includes some 85 countries, including the Soviet Union, has agreed by their decision unanimously in the Tokyo meeting which has just, uh, concluded, that these safeguards should be applied on a broader and broader basis and that this is a way to prevent the dissemination of these materials to be used for weapons purposes. [Fleming]: Despite the optimism that many people feel, how much time do we really have before these weapons will proliferate themselves, will spread? In other words, how soon must this treaty be passed? [Foster] Well, one can never be

precise on this, I think it is perfectly clear that a political decision, to go the nuclear weapons route, might be made within weeks or months. The actual production of nuclear weapons, of course, is a matter of good many months and a good many, uh, dollars or investment of great resources in this. Uh, the science of nuclear energy is much better known, it's, it's uh, now in the, in the uh, general state of the art, and any nation with great industrial capabilities and with major scientific knowledge could make nuclear weapons so that this could happen in a matter of a very few years, and that is why it is important that we do this soon, to prevent this kind of spread and that time is running out because the spread of peaceful reactors, if not policed, the pressures of, uh,

prestige, watching other nations go this route, all of these are factors that unless we somehow check this in the course of a very short period, this may get away from us, and once it gets away from us, one cannot get it back. You remember again Kennedy's statement, "Once the genie is out of the bottle it's impossible to get it back into the bottle." The genie is still in the bottle but there are indications that the cork may be a little loose, and I think we have to do something very soon. [Fleming]: Ambassador William C. Foster. It's already evident the Russians share the American viewpoint in that respect, and most observers here feel there's a good chance for a non-proliferation treaty sometime during 1966. The UN resolution has a clause saying the treaty must not have loopholes permitting the spread of weapons, and the Russians say they're satisfied with that language. But undoubtedly they'll use it at Geneva to try to knock out the possibility of a NATO multilateral force. The United States' approach is optimistic, and the Soviet attitude right now indicates some sort of

negotiation may be possible. The irony in this situation is that the force pushing the United States and Russia closer together here is Red China. The Russians don't like the idea of Peking having heavy nuclear weapons any more than we do. But the fact remains, the Red Chinese have made a substantial start toward these weapons and are in effect thumbing their noses at any attempt to halt their spread. This doesn't mean the treaty would be a hollow mockery. At the very least it would be another step toward disarmament, and after all the UN has been trying to work in that direction for twenty years. This is James Fleming for National Educational Television. Thank you and good night. [music] [music] [beeps]

[music] This is NET, the National Educational Television network. [silence]