Forum; An Examination of U.S. - Morocco Relations

Thank you for watching. This is Olive Graham. This week, foreign features expert on North Africa, Dr. John Davis. If you lived in France or Spain, Morocco, North Africa would often be on the front pages of the newspapers. But in this country, the Middle East tends to dominate the Arab-Israeli-question, the Persian Gulf problems tend to dominate. Our friendship with the Kingdom of Morocco this week on Forum. From the Center for Telecommunication Services, the University of Texas at Austin, welcome

to Forum, I'm Olive Graham. If you lived in France or Spain, Morocco, North Africa would often be on the front pages of the newspapers. But in this country, the Middle East tends to dominate. The Arab-Israeli-question, the Persian Gulf problems tend to dominate. And some of our staunch allies like Morocco, you simply never hear anything about. So, I think it's worth remembering that there's a close and useful relationship with Morocco. It is a trusted ally and it has a lot of interest in common with the United States that Americans ought to be aware of. Dr. John Damus, political scientist and recognized expert on North Africa. The discussion on Forum today centers around a relatively placid area in U.S. Arab relations.

The Kingdom of Morocco has had a long history of friendly relations with the United States. Dr. John Damus is an expert on this northern African country and has served with the State Department as a foreign affairs analyst and as a consultant on the region. He is currently a visiting professor of government at Harvard University. Dr. Damus explains how Morocco was actually the first country to recognize the newly established United States of America. Dr. Damus. It was largely a question of circumstance. And that is, there were various shipping problems in the part of the Mediterranean where Morocco is and what the United States at this point had just declared independence in 1776, wanted some guarantee of protection and wrote letters to the King of Morocco and it was in response to that series of negotiations that the Sultan of Morocco in December of 1977 recognized

in replying to these letters the fledgling United States of America. And it's now been clarified that that made the first recognition. There was some question was France the first and in fact this letter of December 1777 predates the French recognition by several weeks. So it's clear in the historical record at this point that Morocco was the first country to recognize the United States. Before the 20th century were there any significant aspects to the relationship? In terms of importance in American foreign policy probably not there was a treaty signed in 1786 called the Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship or known as the Treaty of Marrakesh which regularized the rights of the United States boats to do shipping without having to

pay ransom, etc. It's all part of the Barbary Pirates problem of the early 19th century. And the significance of that is that it became the longest standing treaty between the United States and any country in the world it's now just over 200 years old. But apart from that there were no significant issues between Morocco and the United States. The United States had some interest in commerce keeping an open door but apart from that Morocco does not play prior to the 20th century an important role in US foreign relations. How did Morocco lose its sovereignty? It staggered through the 19th century very much weakened disunity internally and was fairly easy prey to European colonizers and the only reason it lasted as an independent country as long as it did was because of rivalry among various European powers.

In particular the French were ready to move in from neighboring Algeria but the British preferred because of their rivalry with France to keep Morocco independent. And this went on until the very late 19th and early 20th century when with the rise of Germany to power the French and the British buried their differences became allies against the rising German threat and signed an important agreement in 1903 which gave Britain rights in Egypt and French rights in Morocco. And within a few years in 1912 the French moved in and forced the king of Morocco to sign a protectorate treaty which made Morocco a protectorate kind of disguise colony of France. So 1912 is the year when Morocco formally loses its independence. What is attractive about this particular piece of land was it just another chip on the African playing table?

It was both strategically located that is at the western end of the Mediterranean and for French interests it was an extension of a growing French presence in North Africa. The French had been in Algeria since 1830 and then in 1882 they moved into Tunisia and then French merchants, French commercial interests began to want to expand markets moving across from Algeria into Morocco. And so it's partly a response to the export urge of French capital to expand their ongoing operations in North Africa. So it's both an extension of a longer standing French position in North Africa and a rather critical piece of real estate at the western end of the Mediterranean. Did the Spanish have anything to say about this? Well the Spanish had, as you can imagine, right across from Morocco definite interests in the territory.

And when the protectorate was imposed upon Morocco the northern tenth of the country became a Spanish protectorate, including the present city of Tetuan, a little enclave around 10 jeer was made in international city. And then in the south of Morocco a rather barren area was made another sort of Spanish zone. So the Spanish had bits and pieces at the north and the southern parts of Morocco which they had agreed with the French to divide up. So they definitely had an interest but they weren't strong enough to oppose the French control over the bulk of the country. Which lasted for what, 48 years? It lasted from 1912 to 1956, so 44 years. What's going on at that time? During the protectorate period the Moroccans slowly begin to wake up to the fact that they've been overwhelmed by a superior force in terms of military organization in terms of advanced scientific knowledge.

And you begin to see within Morocco movements which grow up first to reform the religion, to modernize so they can deal with western challenges. And then by bit you begin to find that those Moroccans who trusted the French to become part of France, to become associated with France, to reform Morocco and along the lines of the protectorate treaty, they become disillusioned. And by the late 1930s, the early 1940s, you have the beginnings of a nationalist movement committed not to reform of the protectorate but to the achievement of outright independence. And that takes you through about 1943 through a struggle which became increasingly militant and finally in the mid-1950s produced independence. So it's a situation of a gradual awakening of Moroccans until they confront the French and finally put enough pressure to make the French reconsider.

It wasn't that they drove the French out but in the mid-1950s the French made a basic choice that they would draw their line at the Algerian border and hunker down for what they hoped to be a permanent position of Algeria and then abandon both Tunisian and Morocco. So it's in that context that Moroccan independence was achieved. Otherwise their treatment of the country was very little different from the way they treated the rest of their African colonial empire. There are nuances. Because they were in Algeria for what they considered the long haul, there was more long-term investment, there was a heavier French presence in terms of numbers, just the fact of being there a longer time had a much more thorough going impact on the country. They came to Morocco and the French found a rather traditional power structure which they reinforced in order to facilitate their rule.

In other words they ruled indirectly using Moroccan intermediaries and so when they left Morocco in political terms not too much had changed. The same the rural notables and urban wealthy families continued to be in a position of power. The French had left some economic infrastructure, roads, ports, particularly Casablanca, educated a small number of people but had not produced a revolution in terms of social classes as they had in Algeria. So the cases do have a great deal of variance. Morocco has been considered a friend to the United States over the 20th century anyway, whether or not the French were involved. What really is the basis of the lack of hostility even between the two countries since it's obviously apparent other places at the other end of the Mediterranean? There are several things at play here. In the early drive for independence the Moroccans looked to the United States as a source of

inspiration and support against French colonialism and part of this goes back to a famous meeting which was held in Casablanca in January of 1943, was attended by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and the French representative and at the meeting since they were hosted by the Moroccans there was a separate meeting between President Roosevelt and the King of Morocco at that point, Muhammad the Fifth. And at that meeting President Roosevelt encouraged the King of Morocco to look toward an independent era of his country when the United States could provide a good deal of aid, encouragement, etc. And in retrospect that seems to have been quite an inspiration to the King of Morocco to look to new horizons. The French weren't the lords and masters of the horizon as they appeared to be. And it began an association with the United States as an alternative source of economic

aid, a political inspiration, etc. In the post-independence period, Morocco was a convenient place for the United States to have military bases and you now get into the era of long-range bombers, the SAC period, the Premala Air Command. And the United States negotiated first with the French during the protectorate period for the construction eventually of three major air bases from which U.S. planes could stage long-range raids against the Soviet Union if necessary. And that began a presence in a military sense that lasted up until 1963. The Moroccans weren't too happy about it, but when they became independent they honored these agreements. And then there were negotiations for the eventual phasing out.

And it was all fairly harmonious. There was certain pressure among political parties in Morocco, but the United States saw the handwriting on the wall, President Eisenhower visited Morocco briefly in 1959, and they reached agreement to withdraw all of these forces, which they did by 1963, and turn over the air bases to the Moroccans. After that, you get into the era of the present king, King Hassan II, in which there has been a similarity of views of the world, which goes a long way to explain why the United States and Morocco have had friendly relations. What I mean by a similarity of views is that, like the United States, the Moroccan government sees the Soviet Union as an aggressive power in Africa as a threat to stable representative governments, etc., and tends to line up in world politics on the same side on many of the issues.

The Moroccan government has been friendly in terms of port visits by United States forces. So there's a similarity in world outlooks, which goes a long ways toward explaining this friendship. Are they a member of OPEC? No, they're not. They're not an oil-producing country. They are very heavily dependent on oil imports. They have phosphate wealth, but no oil. What else drives the economy? They have agriculture, in particular, they export a fair amount of citrus to West Europe, although that has been now somewhat compromised by the joining by Spain and Portugal to the common market. Spain and Portugal are competitors to Morocco. So now, since the beginning of 1986 with Spain and Portugal in the common market, it has been more difficult. But agriculture and citrus are other large parts of the Moroccan economy. They have some revenues from tourism.

They have workers abroad who send remittances back, and along with phosphates, those would be the major elements of the economy. Do they have trade agreements with the United States? They have a commercial, or I guess it's called, the Joint Economic Commission, which tries to regulate and encourage investment, particularly by the United States in Morocco, but I'm not aware of specific trade agreements. There hasn't been a problem of trade, except that it's not very large. That is, what Morocco produces most, phosphates and agriculture is not of interest to the United States. It's probably not widely known, but the United States is the world's largest producer of phosphates, not exporter, but the largest producer. So the U.S. has no need for Moroccan phosphates, and the U.S. is the largest exporter of agricultural goods. So what Morocco has most to sell and export to the United States doesn't need. So there's not a natural trade relationship there, so the amounts are fairly modest,

but it's not a troublesome one either. As I think of where Morocco sits at the top of that continent, it's also on the top of the Sahara Desert, is it not? It is indeed. But it still makes it, they manage to be an agricultural nation? Well, a good deal of the central and northern part of Morocco is encased or surrounded by a couple of mountain chains, and from the Atlantic, there is pretty good rainfall. So unlike a lot of Arab and Middle Eastern countries, there are fairly large areas of fertile agricultural producing land. It's when you get to, say, the southern half or the southern third of the country, past Marrakesh that you begin to get into these step regions and then finally the Sahara Desert. So there is some Sahara in the south, but also there is a fair amount of rather good farmland in Morocco.

How does Morocco fit into the rather large arena of Arab countries around the Mediterranean? In political terms, you would put it on the moderate or middle range. It has never been in the forefront of the hard line Arab states, which refuse negotiation over the Middle East question. The Moroccans welcomed the attempts by the Egyptians and the Israelis to solve their disputes through negotiations. In fact, prior to President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the Moroccans arranged a couple of secret meetings between the Israeli Foreign Minister and the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister, which set the stage for the Sadat visit to Jerusalem and the Sadat Bagan meetings. And after the Camp David agreements, the Moroccans were initially quite receptive and it's only after the Egyptian-Israeli treaty when all of the Arab states really fell in the

line and reached a consensus on putting pressure on Egypt that the Moroccans backed off. But they have been generally moderate. They're much more receptive to opening ties and talks with the Israelis than any other Arab state with the exception of Egypt. And there was a lot in the news in the past year when the King of Morocco received the prime minister of Israel, Shimon Perez, not for secret talks, but for quite open talks about two days of negotiations, which was a kind of breakthrough because apart from Egypt, no Arab state had been willing to do that. So I think you put them, I would say almost on the forefront of the moderate states, willing to recognize the reality of the state of Israel and to push for a negotiated solution to that conflict, still at the same time maintaining the rights of the Palestinians. What was their response in 1948?

It was still a protectorate, so it didn't have an independent government. And I couldn't tell you specifically, but there was a relatively large Jewish community in Morocco of 250 to 300,000. So they had a lot more familiarity with Jewish communities than did some of the Arab countries. And there wasn't an immediate, massive exile or departure of that community. It took time and over the years, it has thinned down. But I couldn't specifically give you the reaction. I do know during the independent period in the wake of the 1967 and the 1973 wars that the government of Morocco has gone out of its way to make sure that the Jewish community was protected was not the subject of reprisals, etc. What was its response a year ago when Reagan sent bombers to Libya? At the public level, this was very unpopular, as you can imagine.

At the official government level, there were some negative things said, but not strong outright condemnation. That's my recollection. It certainly didn't approve it, but it didn't go out of its way to chastise the Reagan administration either. But on the popular level, that is the man on the street popular opinion, this was viewed quite negatively. You mentioned that Morocco is at the forefront of a moderate group. Is this just a list that can be made or is this an actual working organization that the United States can use diplomatically? It's more a list. It is not a formal organization. It manifests itself in meetings, for example, of the Arab League, where the moderates, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, will push for a more middle of the road comprehensive solution, which doesn't rule out negotiations, plums for an international conference, etc.

So it's more a tendency within Arab politics than a formal grouping that the United States could mobilize or work with. One of the shocks to American diplomacy came in the summer of 1984 when Morocco, a supposed friend and close ally of the United States, entered into a Treaty of Union agreement with Libya. And as I'm sure lots of people are aware, the Reagan administration had spent several years trying to isolate Libya on the international diplomatic scene. And without warning or consultation with the United States, Morocco entered into an agreement with the Libyans, which tended to give prestige to Libya, tended to relieve their isolation. And this was not welcomed at all by the United States. And many people in the United States, including some in Congress, asked what was this all about?

And if King Hassan is such a good friend of ours, how could he do such a thing? I think the answer is that Morocco remains an independent country. It had its own reasons of state for entering into an agreement with Libya. It had some financial benefits to gain. It wanted to trade off on issues of Chad versus the Western Sahara. That is, Morocco was willing to turn a blind eye to Libyan involvement in Chad. If Libya would stop its support of the National Liberation Movement, which Morocco was fighting against in the Western Sahara. Within two years, the agreement ran its course, and the Libyans were beginning to make noises that were unacceptable to the Moroccans. And in particular, when the President of Syria visited Libya, there was a joint communique which soundly condemned Morocco for having received the Prime Minister of Israel.

And the King of Morocco used that as the justification for breaking off this treaty, which lasted about two years. So that put a certain strain that is the existence of this treaty on U.S. Moroccan relations, but it turned out to be short-term. The treaty is now broken, and Morocco is back to where it was before the treaty. That is, with rather strained relations with Libya, just as the United States has. Hassan is fairly young as a ruler, I think he's what in his fifties? He's late fifties, I believe. What is the future in terms of the leadership there? Is he standing on very firm ground? What are the factions around him and what might be next? It's a big question, briefly, Morocco has an ongoing war in the Western Sahara, which is a drain financially, although it keeps the military quite occupied and is a very popular

cause domestically. It has a variety of economic problems, which over the years have accumulated rather staggering current account deficits, that is, a lot more money each year goes out of Morocco to pay for imports, weapons purchases, etc., then comes in through exports, workers' remittances, etc. And over the years, this has forced the Moroccans well into debt. They have a very large public debt now. They've been forced to borrow an international market. And as the crisis deepens, there is pressure put on the Moroccan government by such agencies as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and they say to the Moroccans, if you want further loans, then you have to make reforms in your economic policy. And those will involve ending of subsidies on basic commodities, and when you do that, as Egypt found and Morocco found in past years, there's a social price to pay.

There are riots when the price of bread and rice goes up, etc. So the government has caught in a financial squeeze of a long term nature, and over time, that promises to probably produce more demonstration riots, etc. So over the long term, I think the king is in a rather difficult situation. In the short term for the next few years, I think he'll probably manage to weather the storm. He's got a lot of legitimacy to his monarchy. He dominates the political scene. He's respected as a religious and political leader in the country. The political parties don't have a lot of other options. That is, if there were military takeover, they'd be much worse off. So for a variety of reasons, the king is in control of the system, even though the problems are fairly great. And there's no fundamentalist faction, religiously, that at least monitors him.

There are fundamentalist groups, but they are small and number disorganized, and for the present period, that is, the next few years don't seem to pose any threat to the monarchy. Unlike a lot of Arab countries, the king has seized the high ground on the religious issue. He is a descendant of the prophet. He observes the holidays properly. He's seen during the month of Ramadan, giving religious lessons on the Quran on television. So he's a little harder to castigate or criticize on religious grounds than his President Mubarak in Egypt or President Burgeeb in Tunisia. So although there are fundamentalist groups, they're not very numerous, they're disorganized, and at least for the next few years wouldn't seem to be a potent threat to the throne. Dr. John Damus was a guest at the University of Texas at Austin through the auspices of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the College of Liberal Arts, and the Texas Memorial

Museum in conjunction with the exhibit Morocco, Fabrics, and Friendship. If you have a comment or wish to purchase a cassette copy of this program, write to Forum, the Center for Telecommunication Services, the University of Texas at Austin, 78712. Our technical producer is Martin King, our production assistant is Christine Drawer, I'm your producer and host, Olive Graham. Forum is produced and distributed by the Center for Telecommunication Services, the University of Texas at Austin, and is not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Texas at Austin or this station. This is the Longhorn Radio Network.