200 Years; Relationships Between the American Executive and Congress
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from communication center the university of texas at austin this is two hundred years in the year nineteen seventy six the american republic celebrates its two hundredth anniversary as a part of the us bicentennial program at the university of texas at austin two hundred years explores the past present and future dynamics of history's longest living democratic society this as rex we're for two hundred years this week we will be talking about the relationships between the executive branch of the american government and the us congress with the storied are an assistant professor of government and the rest of texas at austin dagmar hamilton assistant professor of public affairs and universities lyndon b johnson school of public affairs and richard chuck also an assistant professor of male bee jay school of public affairs at ut austin because began by establishing what we include in the american executive branch well they say their branches probably a good deal larger than most people tend to believe we tend
to view the president really is representing most executive branch or as natural to have recalled that the executive branch is composed of a number of departments and agencies the regulatory commission's of the raucous essentially and when we look at the executive branch i think it's helpful when make some distinctions between the present on the one hand and raucous and another big mama how does the us constitution the family should jump between the congress and executive like to a really interesting things about the united states constitution is it does not really defined the relationship between nintendo sony executive declaring that the constitution has very few provisions that deal with that relationship between the two although of course it is congressional branch several of whom are some exceptions but that the constitution provides for the veto power and the impeachment power and the more power andy grove
confirmation by the senate of presidential appointments but these are exceptions basically the constitution does not speak specifically twisted relationship between the two on something that's really evolved truly to end it is the rare american history as a basis of the body experience and disturbed and growing relationship between two branches so often changing larry has a relationship expend in order to meet the essential needs of a functioning government in ways not the fine under the constitution and that was it just acts no let that moore says the relationship was largely undefined to begin however to the extent that there was a definition of relationships it related to congress and the presidency and the competition did try to specify the two provisions into the impeachment process and so forth some ways in which the president and congress could relate to another and check one another for the competition with really silent temper we have really
witnessed the great evolution and change in the past few years regard to congress and uber awkward see what the founding fathers really did not envision a large bureaucracy and consequently did not specify any constitutional provision that congress could employ in trying to constrain and guide the bureaucracy so congress has especially in the last century as the bureaucracy has grown and as a national problem to become very complex congress has had to find ways to deal with that and so for example congressman last month for decades have created dr hamid veto provision congressional veto provisions whereby they will write in a certain laws statements that before the bureaucracy can undertake specific acts those actual have to be reviewed by congress and are subject to congressional veto that kind of action has been taken on a second major theory of evolution in a
budgetary process a hundred years ago when the nation was fairly simple and congress and the president could we're together corporate fairly simple basis it was not difficult to draft and constrain guide the budget now but it is the sinful policy document of the country and bureaucracy and the president in the last eighty years to gain control of that and at the current time and what i consider the most important single act in congress and the sentry congress is attempting to regain control of it or across the three new in town and budget control act and that is i think very clearly a reaction to the growth of executive power although you've pointed out that the deterrents formulation is probably the central policy formulation in the country at the present time does though where was policy formulation designated under the united states constitution you covered part of that but
i was expelled out there was a well you can read the constitution didn't spell out there and be as they delegated area in which congress can act and every delegate and specified in the constitution and that revenue legislation so we can be brought about in congress are their worst as occasions of the precise areas in which legislation could be so so interesting too to note as you go back and you look at the constitutional convention that when those people sat down to write the constitution that they were very much afraid of executive authority and originally in may when they're for a sudden and delivery and they were thinking in terms of a free man chief magistrate said that is to say it took them a month and a half before they could agree on a compromise of having a single person as chief executive i found the lotion some research for the impeachment that engagement may very well below the trade offs that among the people who
were afraid of having too strong a central executive finding one along with him on the grounds that he it would be unthinkable and going out into the idea that growth and the president and the growth of the executive to include the bureaucracy at the level that it was julian bond that simply says simply could not have been foreseen in the nineteenth century in terms of national policy the national news for a restricted to a few constitution to find areas of most of the policy action or activity was in the states are in matters of health for the public welfare tr large extent education all internal problems and always in the twentieth century as a number of these areas which formally will probably does in the states shifting really to the national level in terms of policy of formulation which i think makes it more important that this notion were discussing the day of the relationship between congress and the executive in the roles they play and the polls are making process rather give me realize that that
boris and they were afraid of executive power they're actually afraid of government power generally and the whole design of the constitution was to make government power power and difficult undertaken to use as possible which created some of the problems we have today in designing a system or rational system of executive legislative interaction in an age in which we have a very powerful government because the competition did not prepare the country for a powerful government family values and a bureaucracy that would have to be constrained then guided by the iraqis is small it was almost i think inevitable that since chen's one man can govern more effectively them plural congress that the executive would only decades come to take one more poem to itself and i see the fight i see the high watermark of that as being me nixon years in life i hope that was the only other hand i i also am concerned that we not
overreact to the nixon presidency in terms of trying to weaken the executive branch but i'm now looking at the executive from the top of a lot we say perhaps at the beginning with maybe theodore roosevelt of the term the century up until the nixon illustration there was a gradual increase your increment in their presidential powers of the city the congress and that the day we may be kind of a second historical stage with the pendulum may be swinging back to some extent from exactly toward congress yes i agree i think it's a mistake however to you the rise and executive in the twentieth century so in terms of the executive being able to find new sources of power i do believe that to an extent it had it had been unhappy occasion by congress owing to certain problems problems and internal structure within congress said began to occur at the beginning of this century and from my own perspective the real
key to finding the necessary talent executive with their relations life not so much in congress finding new mechanisms of controlling executive congress could invite hamstring executive totally buy enough mechanism of control i don't think that's really what we want i think that the real solution to some desired balance of congressional relations lives in congress constructing a new system internal power or by congress can coordinate and discipline self and that the strong congress in turn when able to act in a fairly rational fashion and budgetary matters and so forth will go along way to providing the balance between congress and the executive that we need without congress having to have annual authorizations on every piece of legislation is designed and without congress writing and congressional debate are provisions and every bill with rhythm how am i reading into what you're saying where you're talking now about congressional some yarrow to congressional committee structure
except for being an unwieldy process in today's government well i think that for my own perspective in that war and it needs a groupie i believe that the congressional committee system is a very important system that by the kind of expertise and specialization that we have to look in the system we can have investigations and oversight of the state agencies what i think is unfortunate is that in the past at least are powerful or clean provided with in those congressional committees without an over arching budgetary committees an over arching party leadership they could bring some coordination to those various committees and i think that the test is going to end years or so is whether this new biometric process can work to coordinate these disparate committees and whether we have an emerging party leadership in congress they can provide some help and of coordination
between comedians and you're just an ef in the budgetary i have hope i five telling you know if you again if you can think of all those of all the legislation was curious first at the end of the sixties and the early seventies which could not have been more specific in which you have an executive looking at animal fact arming its nose at the congress and saying i'm not going to spend this money in way that congress has appropriated in western read an executive who sometimes we'd use well after venice had said the main mission the spine surgeons a joy recently many refused to spend but spend it actually did demolish the program mike riojas which congress had it's kind of ironic that in fact were and i have discussed it's early for some extent the tipping of the balance of say the presidency they say the congress has partly come about because congress has given the president a certain powers and checks of the
bureaucracy such as the budget procedure set up back in the nineteen twenties a such as executive officer the present which was in nineteen thirty nine created to devise a mechanism for court nation a bureaucratic activities some of these same mechanisms at assessing turned around and played against the congress on behalf of the present apropos the a budgetary procedures and this is one of the reasons that congress has seen fit especially to try to take back into its own hands some hours of budgetary formulation and to set up a kind of congressional budget office as a counterpart if you will the awesome it was written in the president's office i think we also in responding to and emerson we also have to consider why nixon was actually successfully to empowerment and my my own view is that he was successful precisely because congress did not have an internal budget or a process whereby they could unbalance revenues with appropriations and so forth and consequently they had given him a
political weapon very responsibility that he could then used to justify is unconstitutional action impoundment and it and not myself at all certain that and about your process is going to work i found certain however that it is the essential key to a return of recruitment and govern america and it doesn't work then the long term future of congressional regulation very bleak i think it means a sworn in congress about the kind of tool that it needs to plan and normally it's supposed that you know you haven't mentioned say the investigation should be the arm ms warren a series of resolutions the way back yes which i think also has had a lot to do with the focusing of attention back when congressman and violating the reason this school should let the fbi and cia are related to the light i firmly think we have not gone far enough in the year you know of war powers and congress is not really
confronted the basic problem in fact the war powers act may have credit to the president's some power of competition does not by recognizing his emergency powers in the short run i have a feeling confident have to go a great deal further than the war powers act to find some solution to the ability of the legislature to constrain executive in europe of war for example congress might consider a committee parallel to the national security council within congress' composed of members of congress that would be expected to me just like the national security council with the president and carried emergency after all the president has not by himself make any decisions on war in a fire ten minute here is that historically the last fifteen years without the internet security council and other advisors there's no reason that congress cannot provide a parallel <unk> in congress to meet with him before he made before they jointly approved final decisions so i think in both of the deterioration and
the war making theory of rowing do the experiment in the next ten years and the state of both areas i think thus far it's not at all clear cut capacity that is the lie in focus for a moment on something that many people sometimes overlook and that is what about the impact of the bureaucracy signing executive and what kinds of checks does the president and in congress have to exercise over after all most of the ordinary american citizens and for that matter i mentioned world citizens probably come to contact much more often with bureaucratic organizations instrument tell these exchanges going on applying for a driver's license everyday work or sending your money to internal revenue service these are the agencies that muslims face week we voted on occasion but we don't really interact as much with you the court's most of those lovely half or whittier or with the present obviously or with some these other congressional committees i thought we might spend a lot on the answer that will question about to what's wrong
bureaucracy and what we do about it only my colleagues have some reaction this would have given you can find reasons but it seems to me you know it's unintelligible and administration which show congress has laid out a policy in very general terms we shall have saved those little have saved jobs and then in an essence has turned its back on it has not given adequate staffing has not given probably appropriate funding and has put a good garden mr schram a situation where he has to rely on the very interested supposed to regulate since relying in part one the drug companies stress as the weather should encourage or shape them i think you're getting into i'm at the confinement the average citizen deals with bigger suppose the average citizen and times long as non reaction when john bullard will the us in this area others no doubt that congress during mr newman i'll on capitol hill you
can obtain an agreement to that statement from almost any member of congress that congress have been remiss in oversight of the bureaucracy and trying to guide and constrain the bureaucracy that it's a very difficult problem to unlock for example members of congress and committees of congress do not have themselves at stats and they're very afraid i think unjustly so creating a larger staff they already have because they're afraid that they themselves would come the servants and attempted to one of their own staff and not be able to get through that staff to the bureaucracy itself and we may have to go back to the very structure of government in this country into whether or not representative government has curly designers countries is totally appropriate to a bureaucratic age and i myself have some doubts on life much of it and i don't see alternatives to the current structure is kind of what churchill mention about democracy it's worse for the mix up for any other income beijing and one of the most often heard criticisms
of individuals as we needed to the bureaucrats out are there any alternatives where you can get most bureaucrats out because they are the civil servants who have tenure and removed only for certain specified causes actually there are a number of civil servants were dismissed every year from the film roxanne that there are there are great minority are in fact it was congress who fought in the aging eighties provided for a professional ice civil service served under the civil service commission the panel can act and essentially this has had a lot to do with providing the caracas economist little base because once you have a lifetime career with tenure an organization you tend to rely upon for the rest of your life and make sure some to some extent a little insensitive to a presidential appointee for example who really can't far you can transfer you to a long bator to nova scotia oh or to alaska but he can't really far you can use on your
demotion so in terms of this kind of political oversight from the present against individual of bureaucratic stuff but on the other hand alfonso my research a name i call it as well the notion that high marks of labor notion of the petit bureaucrats sitting behind a desk and shuffling papers back and forth and that accounting is paper clips just does not square with reality of that much what goes on in washington and that many of the individuals who hold the upper levels of the civil service somewhere socal submarines are extremely dedicated people a very intelligent very capable and i tend to think very often they provide a lot of the impetus for good government which may not always come from the executive or through congress would come back to the great irony to it and that is that we really do not want to get rid of bureaucracy we want the bureaucracy to service in this modern welfare state that we have to provide the social services that we want the question is can we use the bureaucracy through the legislature in the
elected president to serve the people in the ways that we desire to be served a farmer an elected president should fall i've noticed for example that when you start saying or what to cut up and if we're with a rice farmer john i'm an area of houston does he won't ever go through extension service removed know do you find anyone who wants to use a local airport federal aviation funds is an audience sizes are steaming toward and unfortunately many arcs around these days for example about cutting down the federal budget expenditures and you know there's a bill now on they'll perhaps at the white house assume power to set their ceilings on next year's expenditures which probably will not to go through the process but if you look at those areas and which people suggest one can cut there really aren't many aw about to three fourths of the budget is pretty well locked in every year basically through
such entitlement programs as they call him as a social security and welfare salary isn't pensions interest on the national debt and so forth that was all about twenty five percent of the budget which is considered to be flexible and which say the president and his office american budget advisors can really play with half of that twenty five percent is military which until today has been relatively well protected oliver sings ensures there and the other happens as domestic so if you look across a broad spectrum there are many major areas really torn can cut and default question maybe my colleagues would agree with me to some extent maybe congress by placing a lot of the budget outside of its formal process and by walking interviews and hileman majors maybe have been reacting against the president and say look here's a certain promos are setting up specifically which are not going to go to the normal process they're entitled problems that we funded separately that you may play with the additional twenty five percent why certainly think congress has been in that way and many other ways reacting to the presidency trying to find some way it can constrain evil the president to
use a bureaucracy against congress or a republican might see people question and i think you know i come back an earlier statement whether the keys to congressional bureaucratic relations as well as a congressional probe into relations lies within kong itself cannot discipline itself and that is the question i think of the last quarter of a century and while i suspect we're never going to produce a system in this country that would be perfect by a textbook but martin if congress can portray itself internally regained some control about your process find some way which two about the president for making power has been weakened perhaps muddle through oh that admonition but larry we're going to oppose this week's discussion about the relationships between the executive branch of the american government and us congress are published today have included larry died an assistant professor of government at the university of texas at austin mr hamilton assistant professor
of public affairs at universities lyndon b johnson school of public affairs and richard shot also an assistant professor in the lbj school of public affairs at ut austin this as rex we're for two hundred years two hundred years as part of the united states bicentennial program at the university of texas austin is a continuing series of weekly conversations about the past present and future dynamics of history's longest living democratic society two hundred years is produced by this is
- Series
- 200 Years
- Producing Organization
- KUT Longhorn Radio Network
- Contributing Organization
- KUT Radio (Austin, Texas)
- AAPB ID
- cpb-aacip/529-086348hj74
If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/529-086348hj74).
- Description
- Description
- Congress and Executives
- Created Date
- 1975-12-09
- Asset type
- Episode
- Topics
- Education
- Subjects
- Congress and Executive
- Rights
- Unknown
- Media type
- Sound
- Duration
- 00:25:05
- Credits
-
-
Copyright Holder: KUT
Lecturer: Dagmar Hamilton
Lecturer: Rochard Schott
Lecturer: Lawrence Dodd
Producing Organization: KUT Longhorn Radio Network
- AAPB Contributor Holdings
-
KUT Radio
Identifier: KUT_001373 (KUT Radio)
Format: 1/4 inch audio tape
Generation: Master: preservation
Duration: 00:25:00
If you have a copy of this asset and would like us to add it to our catalog, please contact us.
- Citations
- Chicago: “200 Years; Relationships Between the American Executive and Congress,” 1975-12-09, KUT Radio, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed September 11, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-529-086348hj74.
- MLA: “200 Years; Relationships Between the American Executive and Congress.” 1975-12-09. KUT Radio, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. September 11, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-529-086348hj74>.
- APA: 200 Years; Relationships Between the American Executive and Congress. Boston, MA: KUT Radio, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-529-086348hj74