Washington Straight Talk; James Schlesinger

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger credited with shaking up both the Atomic Energy Commission where he was chairman for 16 months and the CIA where he was director for six months. Now as head of the Department of Defense oversees a $79 billion budget and the national security. Tonight on Washington Strait Talk, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, economist and administrator, who has held three top jobs in the Nixon administration in the past two and a half years, answers questions, put to him by columnist and Washington Bureau Chief for Time Magazine, Hugh Cytie. Mr. Secretary, none the less or a person of no less stature than Mr. Nixon has ruled out World War III that several years ago.

If you take Vietnam in the old traditional Yankee way, it's no profit, no whim. It's kind of a bookkeeping loss. Look at the Middle East War. The worst thing that came out of that was not the actual military fighting. What occurred was that when they turned the oil off, this caused the greatest crisis. I wonder if this doesn't cast in doubt the future of war as a viable means of competition between men or a way to settle disputes. What's your feeling on it? Well, I believe that to the extent that we can achieve stalemates and make war unprofitable, that that is a major purpose for maintaining a defense establishment. We certainly wish to avoid war, and one of the ways of being able to avoid war is to make it unprofitable for somebody who might plan aggression against the United States or one of its dependencies. Can you conceive of a situation wherein the Soviet Union would actually move in to say Western Europe,

if indeed it was reduced to a certain state of weakness? I can conceive of such a situation. I don't think it's very probable, but more important than the actual thrust of Soviet military power into Western Europe. If the military position of the NATO alliance is so weak, that the Soviets are able to bring political pressure to bear against Western Europe, they may achieve their political objectives without having to use military power. The mere absence of employment of military power does not necessarily mean that it is without use. Well, isn't this somewhat in contrast with the President's own ideas about the top? You seem to suggest you can't trust the Soviets, Mr. Nixon seems to suggest you can. Well, I think that the positions are quite consistent.

The main point that we should keep in mind, that if we keep our power to dry, and if we maintain the communications that have been established with the Soviets, and the lowering of political tensions with which have been a result of day-taunt, that we will be able to avoid the kinds of cataclysm that you refer to. But an essential ingredient, as the President has repeatedly stressed, is that we maintain a military posture that permits a worldwide balance. Don't we come into conflict today, particularly as we face the energy crisis? We have to reorder our priorities, we have a nation that's frightened at this point, having to change its way of life, and just how far can we go? How much longer can we maintain this establishment, indeed? I believe that the United States can maintain a defense establishment, as long as it isn't necessary for the protection, not only of the United States itself on the North

American continent, but are important interests overseas. There has been a substantial reordering of priorities in these last four or five years, as compared to 1968, our real expenditures on defense are down by one-third, that's reflected in the decline in the number of men under arms from 3.6 million to what promises to be 2.1 million in the near future. There has been a major reordering of priorities, we are spending 6 percent of the GMP, or half our effort in relation to the total national effort, is about one-half of what it was in 1968. Well, isn't the competition really turning to economic matters? I mean, doesn't the nation that comes up with an energy sell or learns how to gasify coal or extract oil from oil sands and that sort of thing stand to profit much more than

than the nation with a large standing army? I think that's true that if one can thrust the burden of defense onto some other nations and maintain adequate security, that it's obviously in the interest of any particular country. The problem for the United States at the present time is that there is no other nation in the world that can barely burdens of the United States of theirs. There is no other nation that can carry the torch, can pick it up from us, even if we have grown tired. So we will be forced to maintain a major effort in defense, which balances primarily the Soviet effort. We must recognize that there is but one other superpower, and that the Soviet Union and the United States have available to them military capabilities that are truly unique. We do not wish the Soviet Union alone to possess that kind of unique military establishment.

But isn't it the nuclear umbrella that still is the, in other words, brinkmanship, isn't that the thing that prevents war? Certainly, I've heard a great deal of testimony from your own people that if there were war today in a conventional matter, the United States could not survive, and the fact that there hasn't been any wars comes right back to just this basic nuclear threat that we pose. Why then great standing armies? Why tank pours and infantry units and the rest of that that proved unworkable in Vietnam? Well, I'm not sure that it proved to be unworkable in Vietnam. You mentioned before what the balance sheet was and that there was no profit. We have to recognize that there were accomplishments in Vietnam, and the price may have been very dear. But there is a society which we chose to protect and still survives at the present time and hopefully will for the foreseeable future.

You asked earlier about the drift towards economic competition. I think that that is an important element that we want to direct the effective forms of competition into the economic area, to the best of our ability. But security for ourselves and the rest of what we may legitimately call the free world relies on the prerequisite of defense. It is only so long as we maintain a worldwide balance that we will be assured that much of the competitiveness that is natural to man will drift into the area of economics rather than into open conflict. In reality, is there any area of the world that we could introduce conventional forces into at this time? For instance, there's a great deal of talk about a renewed offensive from North Vietnam. Is there any conceivable set of circumstances where we could

go back in there or would? Of course, the administration is limited at the present time by the legislation that was passed by the Congress last summer. I believe that if the North Vietnamese were to choose without provocation to launch an all-out offensive of the sort that occurred in May of 1972 and if the president requested from the Congress the authority to use US tactical aircraft in support of the Vietnamese that that authority might well be forthcoming. It is something that the North Vietnamese certainly should not count on that authority would not be forthcoming. Would the request be forthcoming? Almost certainly. I believe that the request is highly likely to be forthcoming under the circumstances that I've mentioned. What about the offensive itself? Is it likely? I think that the probability of that is less than 50 percent. So that there has been a considerable

improvement and a higher degree of stabilization in Vietnam that might have been anticipated even a year ago. Do you see any other source spots in this world? In other words, where else might there be conflicts of this nature where indeed our presence would be needed in some way? Well, you mentioned Vietnam as a possibility for conventional war and I wanted to stress that Vietnam is rather unique. Think of the conditions that have existed in Europe over the past 28 years. There has been, as a result, I think, of the US presence in Europe, a degree of peace in Europe that has never been known historically and it is in large measure due to the American presence. Along the Elbe, there are approximately 800,000 ground forces of the Warsaw Pact in about 700,000 for the NATO nations. We have something approaching, a rough numerical balance. We are a little bit

weaker than the Warsaw Pact, but we have certain other compensating advantages. Now, we want to maintain that balance in Europe so that the Warsaw Pact is never tempted either militarily to move against Western Europe or to bring to bear the degree of political pressure which the West Europeans might succumb to if they did not feel that they had sufficient military stamina. The conventional capabilities in Western Europe are important for the preservation of a free society in Western Europe which is very important to the United States. When I you suggest, still, or if I read you correctly, correct me if not, kind of a basic philosophic thrust of the Soviet Union that hasn't changed really from early days, do you feel that if indeed there is a power vacuum or the suggestion of weakness that the Soviet Union and their allies would want to move out? I don't quite understand the

practicality that they would want to absorb other nations with all of their internal problems, with their difficulties with China. Is that realistic? That is something that we cannot rely on. There is some possibility that the Soviet Union and its allies have become utterly benign, but until such time, as they prove to be benign, it is necessary to maintain a military balance. Now, it is significant to note that in the period since 1969, the Soviets have been strengthening their forces in East and Europe. Their defense budgets have grown at approximately 3% a year in real terms. While we have reduced our military manpower from 3.6 million men to 2.1 million men, they have increased their military manpower from 3 million to 3.8 million. So they obviously see some utility in investing a substantial fraction of their resources

and military capabilities. We hope that through the process of negotiations, which is associated with Datant, that we can reduce the burden of armaments on both sides, but it is unwise for the United States in view of its worldwide responsibilities unilaterally to reduce particularly while the Soviets are growing. Can you see in specific terms just how the weight of this military machine of the Soviets affects our diplomacy or affects our condition in the world? I must say that I'm a bit vague about that. I don't see how it changes the equation as yet, despite this massive buildup. Quite right. As long as we retain a balance, which the Soviets respect, we are not tempting them. You mentioned earlier the question of a power vacuum. I do not think that the Soviets have behaved imprudently. In recent years, our conversations with the Soviets have improved in terms of civility, and that is all to the good. But armaments should be reduced gradually by both

sides rather than unilaterally by one side. Otherwise, if there is a power vacuum, the Soviets and their allies might be tempted to move in. We have never tested the proposition that you made, which is if we had no forces in Europe, what would be the consequence? It is something that I would prefer not to test. I would like gradually over time for the relations between the two blocks to improve to such an extent that both reduce the burden of armaments on both sides. But we cannot forge ahead with that unilaterally. Otherwise, we are likely to suffer reductions in the protection of the societies, obesies, particularly in Europe, to which we have dedicated ourselves. What is the new book out by Solson Itzen? I suggest to you about the Russian nature. I'm told that you have been rather fascinated in these revelations of the great brutality and punishment

that went on from 1918 to 1956. Well, I was not fascinated by that. I've been fascinated by something else, which is that the fashions in the United States seem to change over time. Lately, a number of members of the literate community, particularly since last summer, and the treatment of Solson Itzen and Sakharov have made the intriguing discovery that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian society. I did not think that it would require all that degree of perception. We must recognize that although we are improving in terms of our relationships with the Soviet Union, that this must be a cautious process. Hopefully, they will evolve over time, but until such time as we see evolution in that direction, we should keep our guard up, not only for ourselves, but in terms of the worldwide collection of free states. We sometimes talk about Europe,

as if it had a good deal of independent power. Europe has relatively little independent power without the protection offered by the United States. These are small and medium-sized states that are up against a very formidable superpower, and without the backbone and the adhesive for the alliance provided by the United States, they would succumb, I believe, to the political pressures from the East. In your old days is the member of the Atomic Energy Commission. Maybe you remember that bullet in the Atomic Scientist. You used to have that clock show a few minutes till Doomsday. Can you give us a scale here at the start of 1974 about the possibility of war? Has it gone down a few minutes or has the clock been set back a few minutes? Of course, I believe that that clock has been set back periodically and that there is occasionally some chagrin that the end of the world has not yet come. I think that we perceive a far more

peaceful environment than we did say in the 1950s, and this is in part due to the improved methods and attitudes of the Soviet Union, that we are able to carry on relatively civilized discourse with the Soviet Union. As long as this is maintained, I think that we can count on no major conflict directly between the United States and the Soviet Union involving the territories of these countries. I do not think as long as we maintain our forces in Europe and maintain with the collaboration of our European allies sufficient military power to deter the Warsaw Pact that there will be a conflict in Europe. Won't there be a rising cry? In fact, you can even hear a few voices now from the business community suggesting that we simply colonize those Arab countries that all of that oil was meant for the rest of the world as well as them.

50 years ago that might have happened. They've simply moved in and taken it over. Won't there be an increasing demand in this country for many people? I think that that is a risk. I think that that is a risk. It is plain. I think that one should not tempt fate by pushing the concept of national sovereignty too far. But the United States is dedicated and has remained dedicated to the independence of free states and that includes the states in the Middle East. We should recognize that the independent powers of sovereign states should not be used in such a way as would cripple the larger mass of the industrialized world. That is running too high a risk and it is a a source of danger I think not only from our standpoint but from the standpoint of the oil producing nations and I believe that the alleviation of pressure represented by the 10% increase in

production announced earlier this month is an indication that the oil producing states recognize their common interests with the industrialized world. Therefore we won't come to the contingency that you mentioned in my judgment. What's your judgment of the backbone of the American people? We mentioned little early the fact that our priorities are going to have to be realigned. My suspicion is if indeed we don't find much more oil within our borders it's going to be a greater crunch as people experience more inconvenience. Isn't the cry going to be let's reduce defense expenditures more let's cut out airplanes let's trim down the army that sort of thing. I think that that is one possible reaction but I've heard it to a surprisingly little degrees. Matter of fact the entire evolution of the Middle East in conflict has been in the direction of making people appreciate more the reasons for which the United States maintains a defense

establishment. There was some disenchantment that resulted from Vietnam but the reasons for maintaining a defense establishment go well beyond Vietnam and we have moved in that direction. On the question of fuel of course the Department of Defense uses less than 4% of the nation's energy. I think that the American public is prepared to pay whatever price in terms of energy as well as resources that is required to maintain the national security and relatively free world. Have you cut as much as you can at this point? We have cut about 20% which makes us the pace setter in that respect. I'm not sure whether I'm saying that with pride or a certain amount of regret but we are the pace setter. Turning more to your kind of internal problems or the defense department are you gratified about the idea of the volunteer army I hear more and more criticism of that is that apt to survive? Well we've taken the position that we cannot guarantee

the success of a volunteer army. We are going to make every effort to make it work. One can get into theological questions as to whether a volunteer army is the ideal way of volunteer armed forces is the ideal way to constitute one's armed forces or whether one should have some form of national service and those are interesting questions but the point that I would stress is that in the historical circumstances of a number of years ago that it was necessary to bring the draft to an end because it had led to inequities and disenchantment. We hope that the volunteer armed force will work. We will watch it carefully. We will make every effort to make it work but we cannot guarantee that it will work. In terms of your job, did you feel that you're in on diplomacy enough at this time? Is there too much Henry Kissinger and two little James Sleginger?

Oh I don't feel that way at all. Henry Kissinger is a superlative and instinctual diplomatist. There are some who doubt whether I am an instinctual diplomatist and I'm delighted to leave diplomacy in the main to Dr. Kissinger as in certain circumstances involving the Middle East and war where there was a large potential and actual defense role of quite naturally Dr. Kissinger and I work very closely together. Do you feel that you're in a weakened administration at this time? Is it a burden to have all of this kind of confusion at least and emanates from other parts of the administration? Does it hamper you and your job? I would put it more broadly that there is a problem with respect to the morale in the Western world as a whole and one of the intriguing questions that we must face is whether the

Western democracies have the appropriate degree of stamina to thrive in the years ahead. In some respects the conditions in other democracies are less favorable than they are in the United States. With regards to the Department of Defense however I would say that we have received careful treatment from the Congress that the attitude of the American public and of the Congress toward the Department of Defense has improved significantly within the last six months or a year. How about the American people? Supposing you had to do this in Vietnam. Supposing you felt you had to call for some American involvement. Could you depend on the political sport in the United States? That depends on the effectiveness with which the leadership of the United States in that particular contingency was able to win the support of the American public. Foreign policy in the democracy must come from the public and also any kind of foreign policy which involves

the use of military power. We can pile up weapon systems but without the will and determination to use them which depends upon the broad support in the populace defense establishment is of secondary importance. The important thing is what comes from the public. How about you personally? What conditions existed that a bird watcher, a former brand member, an intellect, a man who is known as somewhat of a gentle person could rise up to demand the most awesome destructive force and perhaps man's history? Well of course at Rand my primary mission was to analyze issues of national security and in particular the ones that involved our strategic capabilities. So I think that that was a period of time in which uniquely in our history the

intellectual community was fully meshed with the foreign policy of the United States and the purposes of the United States government. But regrettably there has been a decline in that degree of mesh between the intellectual community and the government in the long run that can be very costly. We know of course that the intellectual community I believe Irving Crystal made a comment to this effect has rarely been in support of national policy and particularly foreign policy saved during brief periods of national exaltation or national danger. We need to maintain in the United States sufficient appreciation of the risks that we face on a military side so that we can maintain a worldwide military balance in that way we will have peace. Our time is running out here my secretary just very briefly what would you like to leave in your tenure assuming you have a couple more years

at the minimum. What trends would you like to set if you can't accomplish it all? Would you like to see this establishment begin to diminish in size and see it reduced? That in some ways would be my preferred goal but that depends in large degree on our success in the international negotiations that are referred to before. If those negotiations are successful we may hope bilaterally to reduce our forces and that would be a desirable conclusion to the tensions between ourselves and the other superpower in particular but more important than that I would like to have a Department of Defense that is respected by the American Republic that the public understands what the mission of the Department of Defense is and that some of the weaknesses and the past will have

disappeared. Secretary, I times up. I thank you very much. Delighted to be here. Washington Strait Talk. From Washington and Pact has brought you Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger with Hugh Cidy columnist and Washington Bureau Chief for Time magazine. Next on Washington Strait Talk, William E. Simon Chief of the new Federal Energy Office with James Bishop National Energy and Environmental Correspondent for Newsweek magazine. Federal Energy Chief William E. Simon, next on Washington Strait Talk. The preceding program was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation. Washington Strait Talk is a production of Pact, a division of the Greater Washington Educational Telecommunications Association.