Great Decisions 1967; 7; NATO in Crisis: Will the Atlantic Alliance Survive?

August 25, 1944, the Liberation of Paris and the beginning of the end of the war. The joy and relief expressed by these Parisians swept Europe in the following year as the Nazis were defeated and forced to surrender. In victory, the Allies were optimistic about a permanent peace, but their optimism was short -lived. The alliance between the Western Russia, tenuous throughout the war, finally shattered under the menace of Stalin. After Soviet troops overran Eastern Europe to drive out the Germans, the Red Army remained to forge a block of satellite nations. Western Europe wets with apprehension, fearful that Soviet ambitions hadn't yet been satisfied. The United States watched, too. Twice in this century, America had been pulled into World War's originating in Europe. After the first, this country had withdrawn into isolationism. This time, America determined to defend Europe in peace to prevent war. Thus, to preserve stability and keep Europe from Soviet aggression became construed as fundamental to America's national interest. To achieve these objectives, the United States embarked on an historic

course to protect the nations of the Atlantic world. National Educational Television presents Great Decisions 1967. This program discusses NATO in crisis with the Atlantic Alliance Survive. Your reporter for Great Decisions is Milton the Orst. After World War II, Europe was a fragile survivor. Exhausted by years of fighting, there was little strength or energy to resist outside pressure as well, there was the monumental task of literally rebuilding a civilization. The United States watched with concern, and Russia moved to take advantage of a vacuum in power. America's resolve to support Europe was first tested in Greece, 1947. Communists led guerrillas fought a savage civil war to topple the anti -communist government. It seemed as if the communists might win a major loss to the West. It was then that President Truman enunciated America's new policy of

containment. The United States, he said, would support free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure. Military aid went to Greece and to neighboring Turkey. And this expression of American foreign policy, the Truman doctrine, became the basis for American intervention to the present day. With American aid, the Greeks defeated the communist led guerrillas, but America's pledged to support free peoples involved more than military assistance. The United States developed a martial plan to ease human misery in Europe and assist in the reconstruction of the continent. Between 1948 and 1952, the martial plan funneled over $11 billion in economic assistance to the shattered countries. But despite America's demonstration of firmness, the Russians weren't deterred. In 1948, communists seized the government in Czechoslovakia. And in the same year, 1948, the Soviets made their most daring, most defiant gesture, bringing Europe and America to the brink of a Third World War. The Russians blockaded Western traffic into Berlin.

They calculated that the Allies would abandon the cutoff city. Instead, there was an immediate and dramatic reaction. President Truman ordered a massive airlift to be initiated to keep Berlin alive. Finally, after almost a year, the Russians lifted the blockade. This was a decisive round in a victory for the West, in which was now known by everyone as the Cold War. Within Russia, Stalin pursued harsh policies. And outside Russia, he continued pro -being and searching for weak spots. The West moved to strengthen its defenses. On April 4, 1949, 10 European countries, Canada, the United States, signed the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance was later expanded to include Greece, Turkey, and West Germany. The treaty pledged the United States formally as Europe's protector. Any attack on any country would be considered an attack on all. The Alliance was a notable precedent -breaking venture for this country. For one thing, this was the first

important security pact with European Nations since the French Alliance of 1778. Furthermore, this was the first time that this country pledged to go to war in support of allies before an actual outbreak of hostilities. This, then, is what NATO has been, a fundamental innovation in American diplomacy. And it was America's concern over Russian adventurism that led this country to its historical presidential break. NATO is still our most important partnership. One year after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1950, communist North Korea invaded the South. Clearly, Russia was actively involved with aid and encouragement in provoking that war. With the Soviets doing something outrageous in Asia, Europeans feared for their own safety. To strengthen Europe's defenses, still more, an integrated military command was set up within NATO. Since Europe's defense was predicated on America's possession of the atomic bomb and superior military power, the

head of the NATO forces, the Supreme Allied Commander, has naturally been an American. First, General Eisenhower. Then, General Lars Norstat. And now it is General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. The highest military authority is its shape, the supreme headquarters of the Allied powers in Europe, which was located outside Paris. An elaborate system of installations supports the troops sent by NATO countries. Germany was allowed to rearm only within the tight framework of this integrated military command. Many feared to rearm Germany, but it was maintained that if German rearmament took place within the interdependence of the NATO system, Germany could not embark on aggression again. By any standard, NATO has been a success. It protected a shattered Europe while the continent revived.

Today, Europe is strong and prosperous, no longer dependent on the United States. The United States in turn no longer has a nuclear monopoly. There are many doubts about the value of the alliance and the view of this changed the world. NATO's severest critic is General De Gaulle, who has maintained that NATO needs drastic reorganization. Last year, when no reorganization was forthcoming, he withdrew French forces from NATO's military arm. General De Gaulle also ordered the removal of almost all foreign military troops from French soil by April of this year. Since NATO's installations centered in France, this has caused a tremendous upheaval. Anormous convoys of men and materials have rolled out to Brussels, Belgium, and the NATO headquarters hastily being built there now. But more drastic are the upheavals taking place over the concepts of NATO.

The French withdrawal is forcing reappraisal of the value and structure of the entire organization. Dozens of considerations arise in evaluating NATO. Many of them large issues outside the immediate range of the Atlantic Alliance. There is, for example, a growing bond between East and West. What role does NATO have now as an alliance designed originally to deter Soviet expansion? Fundamental to considerations about NATO's future is the question of how political power will be distributed among the members. How the decisions will be made that affects Europe's defense in its very future. The United States maintains its military and economic superiority, but Europe is no longer weak and dependent. The complicated issues around NATO are being debated by statesmen today. Future courses are being charted. And the question is now being asked, will the Atlantic Alliance survive?

We thus to discuss this issue are three newsmen who have chronicled the course of NATO as its stabilized Europe and who now record its crisis. Adelbeur de Caglanzac, Washington correspondent for Francois, who during the war was a pilot for the Free French. Peter Lysogor, the Chicago Daily News, the Bureau Chief here in Washington, and Voner Imhoff, correspondent in Washington for the Noya Zodakritsite Tongue of Switzerland. Ziggy, what is general of the world's principle complaint about NATO? Will you explain that? Well, I think very briefly, the main reason is that NATO was created into period where the Russians hadn't got the atomic bomb, where the pressures from Russia were very different to what they are now, where Europe was weak, where America was all powerful, and the basic fact is that NATO has changed considerably since it was created. Today, Europe is powerful economically, Europe is capable to build its own weapons, the British have atomic weapons, the French have atomic weapons, the Russians have the balance of terror with the United States, the credibility of the

United States using the weapons, the atomic weapons to defend Europe is in doubt in the European mind. And therefore, for the goal, NATO does not represent any more today, what it should represent in the face of the changes that have happened. What he wants exactly, he hasn't made at any point very clear, except that France feels that nobody in NATO was ready to make any changes, and that therefore France felt that for its independence and freedom of action, to ensure its defense in an independent way, which it couldn't do inside the framework of NATO, it had to move out, this in a nutshell would be there. Well, you have fair to summarize the position by saying, the goal doesn't like the decision -making process in NATO, because he feels it is still concentrated in American hands. This is one aspect and the other aspect, I think, he feels also that there's no decision -making, because there's too many powers, and that there's too many betraying, and the very few decisions have been taken. And that, in fact, is the reason why NATO has not moved, since it's been created and remained exactly in the same form and in the same shape. Very

well, you've been watching this scene for a long time. Tell us how the rest of Europe, perhaps apart from France, sympathizes or disagrees with the ball. Well, I would say, first of all, the method he used a year ago when he ordered the Allied forces out of France and the French forces out of NATO, of course, where all of us thought to be a little rough. As far as the basic issues are concerned, however, I think with the exception of Germany, many other countries in Europe shared his basic concern, namely that the United States was too predominant in the alliance, particularly in such things, as, for instance, the nuclear issue. The MLF attempt had failed, and they were all in search of some new position with the United States. Europe, as SIGI just said, had changed, and they felt that a redefinition of the relationship was

in order. For Germany, this raised a very serious problem, because NATO, for Germany, was really the basic, it was the organizational structure into which German rearmament was built, and when that structure was weakened to that degree, it became a serious matter for them. Peter, do you get the impression that in the power centers of Washington, the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, there is the recognition throughout Europe that perhaps there's some objection to the way to the United States leadership? Well, of course, there is a melting, and I think that the US position could probably be described best as one of frustration now, because it schemes and plans for Europe, for an Atlantic partnership, have at least been put in a bans if not gone by the board. I'd like to take issue, however, with SIGI, about something he said about the American, the credibility of the American role in Europe. I think that the goal

must feel that the American protection is still pretty substantial, and I think it was, it's under that umbrella of American protection, that he manages to throw the shoe as he did, because it must be certain in his own mind that the American credibility in Europe is substantial. We still have 225 ,000 troops there, so I don't believe that that credibility can be seriously questioned, but we are in a dilemma here in Washington so far as I can make out, Milton. We want to keep the alliance intact because we believe, and I think rightly, that it's a reflection of the reality in Europe. That is, we have our common traditions, common origins, and common concerns. At the same time, we're moving in new directions now, trying to build a bridge to Eastern Europe, and the thing has gotten very complicated now, because the Europeans, the Western Europeans believe, wrongly, I think, that the United States is about to make a deal with the Russians at their expense. I think this

agitates the Germans, and I think the French must be concerned about it. We must, of course, distinguish between the alliance as such, and NATO, the organization of the alliance, which was created later during the Korean War. I think as far as the alliance is concerned, which really means essentially the American commitment to defend Europe. Nobody quarrels with that. Everybody in Europe wants it because they know it's needed. But you feel that NATO, as a political structure, is the essentially known as an organization, I think, has been sort of ugly. Well, this is the great difference. This is the point of the French. The French say, we're still members of the United States, of the NATO, we're still members of the alliance as such, but we aren't members of the integrated organization anymore, because anyway, the integrated organization is not an organization which was planned inside the agreement of NATO. The integrated organization was set up later, later date, and today we consider that it doesn't represent a necessity anymore in the face of a lesser danger of a German attack, and we also feel

that the German attack is not going over the surface of the attack. That shows how much Germany is on the lines of the French. One of the objectives of the integrated command, as I understand it, was to provide some framework that could keep Germany under control, to provide some guarantees that Germany wouldn't be tempted to embark on a new course of aggression. Isn't the Gaulzig perhaps making a mistake by allowing the command structure to be dismantled, which may then perhaps liberate Germany to get adventurous again? Well, he doesn't seem to feel that way. He seems to feel that Germany is with the new new spirit, the new mentality, that there can be a rapprochement between France and Germany, which he has started, that there can be closer relations with Germany, and that this Germany linked with Western Europe, linked in friendly terms with Eastern Europe, can be better held in that way than by a stronger hand over it, which in fact it will respect. Do you feel that Germany is facing the frustrations of which you spoke, and those are the national

disunity, and there are border grievances, and we still have the whole problem of the sudaken Germans, and dozens of other, not the least of which is that the possibility, however, remote it appears at the moment, that there may be an economic crisis, could you generally live comfortably with a Germany that is free to act as it chooses to? I don't think anybody would want to live with a Germany cut to drift and frustrated and floating. I think everybody would want to see her tied down, as indeed, I think many of the best German forces would want to be the case. The Germans at this point, I think, are in the process, painful process, of redefining and reassessing their role in Europe and in the world. A quarter of a century, after the second world war, they are suddenly awake now to an entirely new situation. They were really

protected by the United States in every sense up to now, and now they discover that they have to take their responsibilities. This is the difficult process. I think myself that chances are relatively good that they will work it out on a rational basis. The great fear, I think, here in Washington, Milton is that American policy being somewhat deflected now by its preoccupation with Vietnam is tending to ignore or neglect problems in Europe, and that Germany may, in fact, look away from the United States. I think this is a genuine fear here, and there's an effort now to try and keep wrapped into the Atlantic alliance through the use of our troops there, and the way those troops are paid for, this is a detail about policy now, but we're trying to satisfy the Germans at the same time. We're not paying too much attention to the problem in my view. Do you get the feeling that the possibility is

strong that the United States might somehow get sucked into going to bragging for German grievances, such as those I mentioned before, because France has let NATO go, and the general command structure has fallen apart in the United States, and Germany may be the two most stable forces from the American government. Well, this was more true back in the 50s during the period of John Foster Dallas, and it was believed that a Washington -Bahn axis really was in the works, or in the making, if not actually having already been made. I think there's less danger of that now. I think that the United States is probably just as concerned now about a detente with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as they are about what is happening in Western Europe. This may not be a good thing, but the general view, President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk has taken, I think, is that the Europeans now must think through their policies, and they must finally decide for themselves for this time at least, what their role is going to be, and further what the United

States' relationship to Western Europe should be. Now, it may be a bad time to take initiatives, and this may be a wise policy. I think we'll only know after the results are in. Ziggy, Vietnam is, I think, more than a distraction for United States attention to the problems in Europe. It also seems to raise certain questions about whether Europe ought to continue following American leadership. Europe seems to be quite unhappy about America's position in Vietnam, as the goal tells us with considerable frequency. Give us an idea. Will you of what kind of impact Vietnam has on NATO's future? I should think quite considerable, because Vietnam has occupied the United States so much in the last two years that Vietnam, that the United States has been incapable to look at Europe and to take an interest in Europe. The result is that the goal has taken advantage of this situation, and that he has, in fact, taken the leadership that we like it or not. Is there anyone who's been doing

things about Europe in pleasant, one pleasant way, to question the discussion? And therefore, by your simple absence, you've let the goal take over the lead, you've let NATO, in fact, be disrupted, and you've let the goal move towards a much close relation with Russia, with also efforts to try and settle the European problems with other United States with Russia, come back to the point, traditional point of holding the Germans through France, Russia, if not the lines, at least, neutral understanding, and therefore, on the actual performance of NATO up to now, the end of the Vietnam asset and influence. And I think it will have an influence, because I don't see the United States really looking very seriously at Europe until the Vietnam War is over. But have you had the impression that Europe is afraid of getting pulled into American wars, that it has absolutely no interest in by remaining inside a NATO alliance framework?

Well, there is, in certain places, there is this concern. However, I don't think one could say that this is a general feeling. The Europeans cannot, of course, have it both ways. On the one hand, they complain about the predominance of the United States. On the other hand, they now complain that Vietnam is distracting all executive attention in Washington. I think myself that this may have been beneficial in Europe to a certain degree, in the sense that Washington did not actively pursue and push policies, sometimes misguided policies such as the MLF. And therefore, allowed to Europeans to come more and more to the fore and develop their own policies. So, to that extent, I think it was beneficial. Peter, just sum up, give us an idea of what you think American policy will be over the course of the period from now to 1969 when the NATO alliance expires. What we will do to preserve what we think are our interests in Europe. Well, if it follows its present course, I think it will be waiting for

something to turn up as Macauber did, because we now deplore the growth of old nationalisms in Europe. Well, it seems to me we are promoting it by standing aside. But I think the next two years will show really this effort to build bridges to Eastern Europe to be paramount, while Western Europe continues to try and work out its own problems. Thank you, Adelbert de Cervozac, the French War of Paris, Peter Lisogore of the Chicago Daily News, and Werner Imhoff of the Noia Turekred Zaitong of Switzerland. In 1969, the North Atlantic Treaty celebrates its 20th birthday, and the charter must be renegotiated. To most minds, at least in Washington, there's no doubt that NATO and the Atlantic Alliance will continue, but it will surely be adapted. And the question is, what format will take? We spoke about this with General Lars Norstead, Supreme Allied Commander for six years until 1963, and now Chairman of the Atlantic Council. We asked him how NATO countries should react to Francis withdrawal, and how he envisaged the future of NATO.

Well, they certainly shouldn't throw France out of the Atlantic pact, and we should not take the initiative in destroying or weakening any of the ties and the very strong ties that we have with France. So we should move forward, the 14, doing the things that we reasonably can do and should do, but we should not, in my judgment, take what is the really childish position of trying to punish or discipline a country which is showing a certain amount of independence, even if we don't agree with the independence, and even if it's clearly clear on the face of it that independence is not constructive, in fact, maybe destructive at the time. Of course, in the first place, we know that the United States would live up to its commitments to NATO. It is true that many Europeans have raised this question, and have raised it to a really over a

period of 10 or 12 years. My reply has always been that we have given clear evidence of our faithfulness to our commitments in all of our actions in the Far East and in Southeast Asia over a period now of some six to ten years, depending upon the incident that you're taking to measure it. If we are as faithful as we have been, at great cost to our people, in the lives of our people, in these remote areas in the East, is it reasonable that we should be less faithful to an area, to the people of an area where we have these close ties, and where we have a commitments that are deeper, that are greater and more comprehensive,

and that are longer -term. General Nostat, what would Europe be like without NATO? I can't really envisage a Europe without NATO, because if you take the label NATO away, you still have to have some organization or some relationship between the European countries and the European countries and the United States. I have felt, for certainly for 12 or 15 years, that the idea of a neat packet of European states on one side of the so -called dumbbell and North America and on the other side of the dumbbell will not be satisfactory from the European standpoint, whether it's satisfactory to the American standpoint, simply because the European countries, particularly the small European countries, like the idea

of sitting around the table of 15 with the United States and speaking directly as equals to the United States and with the United States. This is something I think they want. I think whatever happens in terms of a further integration of Europe, which is certainly most desirable, will come really within the shelter of this broader arrangement, which gives these people a real feeling that they are influencing their destiny, that they are discharging their sovereign responsibilities. This broader arrangement of the Atlantic world will most certainly have to reconcile several realities. First, the United States shows no signs of relinquishing its control over its nuclear arsenal. Second, any broader arrangement that includes France will have to satisfy that country, as well as the rest of Europe, that it can control its own destiny. Yet it is difficult to see what alliance could both appease France and the United States, allow the United States to keep its own controls. Any future alliance will have to deal with the growing ties between

Eastern West, with the apparent diminishing of the Soviet threat. In the most intricate way then, the future of the Atlantic alliance is involved with events the world lower. It will be expensive for the United States to continue bolstering NATO. Part of the cost may be the loss of some national prerogatives on our part. The question for the United States is whether it will adapt policies and make the sacrifices necessary to maintain the Atlantic alliance. On that issue turns the great decision will the Atlantic alliance survive. Great Decisions 1967. This program analyzed NATO in crisis, questioning its foundations, will the Atlantic alliance survive. Next week, the war on hunger is the subject of Great Decisions. This program is presented in conjunction with the

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