At Issue; 6; State Department Briefing

Governor Michaelidentally who is us batter man those eight Department in Washington major attention is focused on critical events in the far east the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs a key figure in the formulation of US policy during recent events in Vietnam he is in constant contact with Alan Whiting director of the State Department's Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East in the State Department's Operations Center highly classified reports from American outposts are received, evaluated and forwarded to the Secretary of State and the White House for Decision and Action this is the nerve center for the Department of State

it is the setting for tonight's special State Department briefing on the Far East National Educational Television Presents at Issue, a commentary on events and people in the news at Issue this week, Far East Policy a State Department briefing by the assistant secretary of state for Far East a State Department briefing by the assistant secretary of state for Far East and Affairs Roger Hilsman and the Director of Research and Analysis for the Far East Alan Whiting questioning Mr. Hilsman and Mr. Whiting will be Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post dispatch and Spencer Davis of the Associated Press I want to welcome you to the Operations Center of the State Department gentlemen I think the events recently in South Vietnam have focused attention on Asia

and I am grateful for this opportunity to put this all in a broader perspective of Asia as a whole I think we might begin by taking a look at the map here this is a map of Asia, a great arc from Korea and Japan in the North down through India with Southeast Asia as a salient cutting this great arc in this area shown in this map live half of the world's peoples I think the United States stake in this part of the world is very great not only because of the population but because of the enormous economic resources this part of the world is one of the richest in the world at least potentially I think strategically our stake here is obvious and I think politically and psychologically it's important I think for us to prosper as Americans, for us to develop our potential

we need to live in a context of a broader world and of a productive world now the problems of this area are manifold most of these people desperately desire to develop, to modernize they want to do this but they want to preserve their own way of life the essence of their own culture while they do it there are rather highly developed countries in this area with stable political institutions such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines and I could name others the rest of the peoples as I say want desperately to modernize and yet to preserve their own culture the problems that you have here are the problems of nationalism, of modernization, of development but that also must be done in the context of a threat the threat of communism which is in some places as in South Vietnam has organized a systematic and deliberate terrorism in others are trying to turn nationalism and the desire for modernization

into destructive rather than constructive channels for their own communist purposes all of these are under the threat the source of this threat in principle and basically is communist China and here we have Mr. Whiting as you know I'd like to ask Kim to speak on this particular problem when we look at the threat from communist China I think the first manifestation of it we see is the Sino-Soviet dispute with the Chinese challenging the Russians to win control of this international communist movement and the destructive potential that carries with it peaking sends out a journal called peaking review in French, Spanish and English all over the world this particular issue has Mao's call for further armed struggle in South Vietnam they send out their cadres, they send out their broadcasts, their brochures, they send out money, they send out arms and munitions inciting discontented groups and communist nuclei to carry out the arms struggle that Mao led for 28 years in China

in his bloody rise to power it's more than an ideological challenge however it's a military challenge that as we can see again if we look back at the map as manifested itself in the overt aggression against India particularly last year if you move down from India toward Laos you find covert aggression where advisers and military supplies and political incitement seek to whip up the pot that Lao and to further armed action in violation of Geneva Accords a marginal threat present time is the economic program whereby communist China offers aid to countries on its periphery such as Nepal and countries that are distant such as Algeria and Cuba but the so-called aid is a means of further subversion, further indoctrination and ultimately they would hope domination of the area now this is not a passive threat, the Chinese do not see themselves in some economic race with India

whereby the victor will win on his own achievements but it's an actively promulgated threat it's not an expansionist threat, the Chinese recognize that while they have 700 million people and the largest continental country in Asia they are vulnerable, they are weak in a sense they might be called a crippled colossus so they seek to magnify psychologically and politically their sense of power so as to dominate the countries on their periphery and declare by self-definition themselves as a great power finally it's not a cataclysmic threat, for all of their brave talk they seem unlikely to trigger World War III and to bring about that nuclear holocaust which would leave them the most populous nation on earth rather it's a pervasive persistent political military threat that threatens the countries in their immediate area and if they have their way would threaten the safety and security of people throughout Africa and Latin America

now I realize that this covers a vast expanse of the world but I think that we can get at least a sense of the highlights in this approach to the Chinese threat Mr. Whiting you mentioned Vietnam as an example or an expression of this Chinese threat I wonder if that's strictly speaking true, we know that the Viet Cong, the guerrillas in South Vietnam get their supplies as well as their recruits entirely from within their country was very little if any assistance from outside why don't you consider that instead a domestic situation, why do you say that it's an expression of this communist threat the key cadres who are leading the insurrection and insurgency in South Vietnam have been infiltrated there or were implanted there by North Vietnam and follow the maxims of Mao received munitions and supplies from North Vietnam which in itself is backed up by China

China hoping to hide behind a proxy so as to shield itself from any punishment that might come should this escalate into a larger area of aggression I think also Mr. Dudman that although you're quite correct in saying that the bulk of the supplies, food and so on and so forth comes from within South Vietnam it is the training of agents and of sergeants and officers that is important and also direction, overall direction, orders are coming from North Vietnam Let me pursue that one more step, you consider Hanoi, North Vietnam, a puppet of China or is it not true that Russian influence is very strong there too Over the last six months Hanoi has tended to get off the middle of the road position it held in the Sino-Soviet dispute and is speaking ever more like Peking It's not necessarily a puppet of Peking but it's taking the Peking line and calling for greater militancy and greater armed struggle against the United States and the interests of the free world

Going back to the question of China being a crippled colossus, a very nice term that you use Do you necessarily accept the Chinese statement that will be some time before they can detonate a nuclear device of some kind There has been considerable preparation of the countries that live on the periphery not to be frightened In the event that the Chinese explode a bomb, they have been told it will take some time before they will be able to deliver such a device But what is the potential that they have, how do you see the threat as a nuclear power? To take your first question of course the Chinese know more about their program than we do So if they admit that they are lumbering and limping along toward this nuclear capability I might take it at face value certainly from what they have told us about their relations with the Russians The pull out of Soviet technicians in 1960 must have been quite a blow

But the detonation is a long step before a capability If we look at the low state of their technological background and their material support base, electronics industry, aircraft industry We certainly wouldn't expect them to have a meaningful capability in the nuclear field much before the latter path or the end of this decade I think one thing you have to say on this is that it's possible for them to explode some sort of a nuclear device by taking what fishable material they have been using in experimental reactors say and having an explosion But I think the important point is that if they do this, though they're capable of having a single explosion, this will slow down their overall program Now they might do it for psychological or political purposes but if they do it too soon it puts their program out of phase I think it's also important to say that is Mr. Whiteing did It's a long time before you get a nuclear capability and even longer before you get a delivery system where you can deliver them

On the same problem of the crippled colossus, what about their birth control program? Doesn't this run counter to their views that this is not a Marxian process? The Russians I'm told have tweeted the Chinese about the fact that they are going into a non-Marxian endeavor when they have been such religious supporters of women Well the Chinese communists are pragmatists and have come to recognize that their population prospect is the most horrendous future in terms of developing the country Because if the population continues to expand at a faster rate than agriculture, they'll never get out of the mire that they're in now Being pragmatists, they finally have learned to live with this and tried to promulgate a birth control program of sorts But it probably will not have any visible impact in this decade What is your estimate of the baby's born in China? I think the figures are astonishing

We think that they're growing perhaps at 15 million a year Mr. Hillsman now that we've gone into the nature of the threat briefly, what is the United States doing about it? American policy has been consistent in its broad terms since the end of World War II over several administrations I think I would describe this policy as having two major parts, two major themes One is dealing with crises, deterring and meeting aggression The key here is to maintain free world strength in the Far East We have American strength there, we have helped our allies through our aid program to build up strength of their own And free world strength, both that of our allies helped by our aid program and our own, is very impressive in the Far East I'm sure that it has its proper effects

We deal with these crises, crises such as Laos or Vietnam, aggression by the communists such as Korea We meet aggression and we deal with the crises I think we have always got to try to deal with these crises with our eye on the long, long future With our eye on the constructive side so that we handle them appropriately for the long run The second major theme of our policy is the constructive side What we do behind the ring that we have protection and of helping other countries who want to maintain their independence This is the constructive side, I would characterize this as a nation building Helping these countries to develop, to modernize Helping to build a system of cooperating free and viable nation states This has been going on consistently since the war and it has had some remarkable successes Though these successes are not ever over what night or dramatic ones

But we help the Japanese, for example Now the major credit belongs to the Japanese themselves, their ability and energy But we no longer have an aid program there because the Japanese are prosperous They have developed politically and economically So much so that through their reparations they are the fifth largest giver of foreign aid now In the same general nation building goal that we are pursuing There are other successes throughout the Far East That foreign aid reparations, well it is a form of foreign aid It is under their reparations program but it is foreign aid and it has the same effects This has been a very good thing There are other successes, look at the Robb public of China and Taiwan There are economic problems, we are severe They now have the largest growth rate and standard of living and national income of any of the nations there The Philippines and there are other successes Well this is the constructive side Now on this constructive side there are going to be problems here too

That are going to cause trouble that need to be handled That are related to the communist threat but others that are not The problem is to get nationalism into constructive channels rather than destructive channels And there are times and we will have problems of this nature There are also problems of divergencies of interests Where particular groups may become in a country more interested in maintaining their own power than in building viable political institutions for their country So just to sum up there are these two broad themes of policy That of dealing with crises where we maintain our free world strength And all that goes with this and encouragement of the Asian peoples to pick up responsibilities of their own And this too has gone forward and then on the other side are the constructive policies of nation building a viable system of cooperating free states May I follow up on that with Senator Men's Fields remarked just a few days ago that we should guard very much against the war in Vietnam becoming an American war

He said and called once again for a reappraisal of our economic and our military aid programs in Southeast Asia This call for a reappraisal was not new from Senator Men's Fields. He issued it last December when he returned from his trip there and as long before the Buddhist crisis Could you give us your reaction to this call for a reappraisal? Well, I certainly agree that the war in Vietnam, the battle against this organized terrorism by the communists is mainly and basically a Vietnamese affair We have advisors there, we have aid there but it is a Vietnamese war, it's a Vietnamese run I think it should be so. I certainly agree with Senator Men's Fields in this

I think this is the profound difference between what happened before 1954 and what's happened recently Some people say that history repeats itself that the French war that culminated in Dien Bien Fou and this one are the same, they're not the same Many of the people who were fighting on the Vietnam side against the French are now in South Vietnam fighting the communists The point was that before that time it was a nationalist attempt to remove a colonialism Now it is Vietnamese fighting against a communist aggression, we're there as advisors and that's what we should be I profoundly think we should help them, they fought violently against this communist aggression And I think they deserve our help but it should be help, they should continue to run the war as they have been Before the Ziem regime fell, wasn't the war in Vietnam turning into a nationalist war against Ziem as well as an anti-communist war? Isn't that what was really wrong with the Ziem regime?

No, I don't think so. As a matter of fact, we have been aware of both the assets of that regime and its shortcomings for a long, long time In general, Taylor would out in 1961 precisely to see if we could help there in response to the request of the Vietnamese But this political disaffection is existed for some time, I think an important point is that after May 8th, which was the riots in Huay in the town of Huay in the north of Vietnam about the Buddhist, where it was the beginning of the Buddhist crisis That between that time and the time of the McNamara Taylor mission, there was no visible, nothing that we could discover Uplat or letting off or downgrading of the war effort, the war effort was going on in spite of the Buddhist crisis Now I think this is a most significant and interesting

But excuse me, weren't the Viet Cong, the communist recruiting non-communist during that period? The point I wanted to make here was, you see, that Huay was there no let up in the war in spite of a Buddhist crisis I think it was because the army and most of the people in Vietnam were determined to keep the two separate, to keep fighting the communists on a high priority Now if the repressive measures had continued over a very, very long period, as General Taylor and Mr. McNamara said, then it would begin to affect the war effort by apathy on the part of the generals or the military people deserting and easier recruitment on the part of the Viet Cong That I would agree with, but I think it is important that the Vietnamese people, though politically disaffected, wanted to keep up the war And I think it's also significant that the military committee in their public statement said that one of the reasons they decided to remove the regime was because it was beginning to affect the war effort Because the repressive policies of the regime were beginning to lose the war and it would have this effect

Along these same lines I recall that when Vice President Lyndon Johnson made a special mission to Saigon some two years ago, he toasted President Jim as the George Washington of his country This is not a reflection on the Vice President's remarks, it is more a reflection I think of what the attitude was here in Washington at that time, what on earth happened, what caused the slippage in Jim's appeal with the people Well, this is a matter of speculation, I think I would say that the question would be more appropriately addressed to some Vietnamese who, you know, because after all this was a Vietnamese thing and somehow the Vietnamese lost faith in President Ziam and his brother And I wouldn't want to speak for them, I think it is perfectly true as we have all said many times that President Ziam in the early days of his regime did accomplish a great deal, land reform programs and other things

The repressive measures that were recently adopted I think were the source of probably increasing discontent on the part of all the Vietnamese and this apparently caused them to decide on this course of action You've told us two methods by which the United States is dealing with this China threat, one is the settlement of crises, the handling of immediate crises, the other is nation building, I think you'd have to include a third and that's the quarantining or isolation of communist China by keeping them out of the UN with holding recognition, barring any trade with them, what are we gaining by this policy of quarantine? Well, Mr. Dudman, I think that to the extent that the Chinese people are isolated from the West, it is to be laid at the door of the Chinese communist regime, it is a self-isolation, the United States has had long and deep relations and affection for the Chinese people, dates back for over 100 years as you know, I think this is a tragedy

But this is a self-isolation, it seems to me, the Chinese communist regime, for example, has refused to sign the test band treaty, which is clearly in the interests of the world, and it's in the interests of the world, if for nothing else than to reduce the fallout for the health of children, it's also in the interests of the world as a step in the right direction, though it's only a very tentative step, but they're refused to do this We have negotiated with the Chinese communists at Warsaw and the talks between our ambassadors to try to get newsmen back and forth, to try to open this up a bit, and the Chinese communist have refused to give visas to newsmen, to American newsmen, so I think this is a self-isolation There appears to have been some softening in the propaganda tone coming out of peaking toward Moscow and Moscow toward peaking.

Is there any indication that an effort is being made to paper over the dispute or to really get to come to grips and solve it? What is the belief here? Mr. Whitey mentioned the sinusoidal dispute. I think I'd like to elaborate on it a little bit in answering your question. I think that the dispute is a very fundamental one. There are some basic forces that are pushing them apart, but I think there are also some basic forces that are keeping them from going too far apart. I would conclude, and I'd like to hear Mr. Whitey's judgment on this, that they're going to be ups and downs, they're going to appear to come together and appear to go apart, and I think that it will be with us for some time, the dispute will. I think that as a consequence of this, you will probably see some experimentation in policies, a period of agonizing re-appraisals, if you will, especially on the part of the Chinese communists. Do you mean by experimentation?

Well, I think they'll try different things, mainly in the political realm, but I wouldn't exclude experiments in the military field that they regard as low risk. I think they're impressed with free world power and should be, but I think you will see all things like Mr. Whitey knows for the first time Mao signed a letter to all the heads of state throughout the world. Well, there are reports from time to time that there are still Russian troops on Chinese soil and Xinjiang province there. I believe you're an authority on that part of the world. Could you tell us about it? Well, I think a lot of these reports come from neighboring capitals where rumors are pretty right. I can hardly believe the Russians would be putting troops on their soil and the Chinese not complain about it, they've been complaining about everything else over the last two or three years. We certainly would expect a lot of border tension and maybe the Chinese will come out with some maps that show areas of disputed territory, who knows. But in terms of an actual military confrontation, the probability is very, very low. Have the Russians ever given back any territories that they took from the old Chinese imperial regime?

Not that I know of. Under Secretary of State, Avril Haramon has made an intriguing remark last June. He said he would welcome a great debate on American China policy. But if the faults all in China, what is the point and what do we have to talk about in this country? I think anyone who knows Avril Haramon and what a great American he is knows his profound commitment to the American tradition of debate about all aspects of our policy. And his point being that this is the way America deals with problems, and he hopes it always will be the way that America deals with problems. I think this is what he meant. I think anyone who knows him would come to that conclusion. I might subscribe to that view, most heartily, and also to say that just as we've been discussing here, we're entering a period of flux. I think Asia is an important part of the world, and I would hope that this debate on all of our policy problems would focus on these problems of Asia.

Thank you, gentlemen. This is NET, National Educational Television.

This is NET, National Educational Television. Thank you.