Great Decisions 1968; 6; West Germany

The following program is from NET, the National Educational Television Network. From the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., National Educational Television presents Great Decisions 1968, a confrontation on vital international issues facing the United States. Tonight, Germany, East and West. Your moderator, Peter Lisagore, Washington Bureau Chief for the Chicago Daily News.

Good evening. Germany has been divided for more than 20 years now, and the question can be asked, is there any prospect of a change in this situation in the next 20 years? No, I don't think so, although the government of the Great Coalition at least for the first time is really trying. There are possibilities, but these depend at least in part on the rationality of the nation's concern, for which there is at least a hope, if not a prospect. Germans and scholars of Germany will debate this point no doubt until reunification occurs. Tonight, we'll further discuss this in other aspects of Germany, East and West. Professor Wolfgang Leonhard, visiting professor of history at Yale University, and a one-time Communist Party worker in the Soviet Union and East Germany. And Dr. Gerald Freund, Associate Director for Humanities and the Social Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation, and a noted author on Germany.

Gentlemen, let's start with a question from our audience. Gentlemen, I understand that certain officials in the bond government have intimated that should the East German regime evolve more along the model of a Yugoslavian nationalist communist government, reunification might not be necessary, and official recommendation might be forthcoming, how feasible do you believe this is? I would say that at the present time there is very little chance of recognition of East Germany by the bond government, and that indeed in the longer run the chances of any kind of unification of the two countries would depend upon a gradual program of growing together on the parts of the two countries which has just barely begun. Well, I think you referred to a statement of the Federal Minister for all German affairs, the Social Democrat Habit Vena. He didn't have in mind only national communism. What he was interested in, and I think very rightly so, was internal reforms according to the Yugoslav line, freedom of travel outside, freedom of the press, no centralized planning, and these kind of things.

And this, I think, is the only possibility to hope for, and then get some kind of relations, but I don't see it happening very soon in East Germany, and that I would very much agree with you. Another question, the gentleman here on the aisle. Ronald Betzer, Johns Hopkins University. A few years ago, Dr. Freund wrote that the West German government should initiate a new policy towards Eastern Europe. Well, since then the bond government has done that. I would like both gentlemen to comment on the success of this auspolitik and its future, especially in light of the friendship treaties which East Germany has signed with several other East European countries. Well, I want to show you, I don't take credit for the West German government having adopted a modified policy towards Eastern Europe. But it is, in my judgment, a welcome advance on the part of the bond government because any change, any movement in the division of Europe, after all the division of Germany is essentially the division of Europe,

is impeded in so far as West Germany is mistrusted and is not liked in especially two countries of Eastern Europe that is Poland and the Soviet Union. So this is a step ahead. I would very much agree, maybe put it in a little bit stronger terms. I would say since the Great Coalition, the first of December 1966, the change in auspolitik has been tremendous. First of all, it's an issue and a previous government that didn't care. Secondly, it has been completely different attitudes, no more hate campaigns, no more primitive anti-East European propaganda anymore, real searching for new solutions. And certainly there have been successes. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Romania and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

And all other European countries, there have been no successes. And you get the impression that some did dogmatic forces among communists, among communists in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, want to prevent any successes now. In order to prevent that the Great Coalition has success in the field, which objectively will lead to the downfall of the Great Coalition and a new right wing government in Germany, which I think also the East European countries will later regret very much. The harsh attitude has prevented, except for Romania and Yugoslavia, any significant steps of the new policy. We have another question, gentlemen here. Yes, in view of the Germans' disenchantment with the present coalition government and the lack of any vigorous opposition in the near future, do you foresee an appeal on the part of the Germans for the NDP or the neo-Nazi party, especially within a context of rising nationalism?

Yes, first of all, I am astonished to hear here, maybe in Washington, about a general disenchantment of the Great Coalition. The opinion polls show that the Great Coalition has the absolute majority of the German population behind itself, besides, of course, some voices against. But a general disenchantment would, I think, not be the right word. Concerning the future, I would very much think that if the Great Coalition falls, the NPD, the National Democratic Party, might get up to 15%. Don't think that this is the main danger for German democracy. I would see that if the Great Coalition falls, the right wing of the CDU, what I call the serious right wing, will become very strong indeed, and will be tolerated by the NPD,

will lead a policy, a salazar of kind, right wing, not Nazi, but right wing, autocratic. This is the real danger for German democracy, something like springer, the springer press of today. Now, I'm not sure I'd agree with much of what Professor Lenhard has just said, principally, because I feel the greatest danger in the democracy is the absence of a responsible opposition. And in a political system where you have a coalition government of the principal political parties, there really is no room for a responsible opposition. Indeed, one can say that the Great Coalition is impart responsible for creating on the extreme right, after all the extreme left is illegal in Germany, so it doesn't appear. But on the extreme right, a dissident element tending towards unification, which has raised a good deal of alarm, even if it has not yet really achieved a great deal of power, in a number of the lender of West Germany.

But my essential point here is this, that the breakup of the Great Coalition in Germany is, I believe, highly desirable, so as to permit the record essence of a system in which there is a responsible and identifiable government party, and a responsible identifiable opposition party, which functions as I believe both must in any democracy that is worthy of its name. This argument, I've heard thousands and thousands of times, I call it the American political science textbook argument. I have the highest admiration for American political science textbooks, I would agree that as a rule for a democratic country, it is correct to think in government party opposition. But American political science textbooks are not manuals for all countries at all times, and there are sometimes certain exceptions in history where you can't look up such textbooks, and one of these exceptions is happening now in Germany.

The Great Coalition has led a complete unimaginative to use the most polite term I have known, 20 years one party government, at least to the German coalition to get rid of that government, at least to get a government which tells something to the people about what is going on, is forward looking, and so on. Now, I know this can't be a solution forever, but you can't judge it purely from the viewpoint of textbooks, you have to have a government in opposition in all countries in all times. Unfortunately, I haven't written a textbook, and therefore I can't claim that what I consider a hallmark of democracy is an invention of mine. Noto, I think it really is a textbook invention, and I want to reiterate here that I see a very real danger, most particularly in Germany, of a political system in which, again, people can in fact participate in government, and yet at critical times plead that they do not have essential responsibility.

After all, we know from the experience of the Weimar Republic that a series of coalition governments in which no single party could be identified and held responsible for the exercise of power gave way to widespread popular dissatisfaction, and was one of the factors that led then to the upheaval from which indeed we had a full blown fascism. I would add to this that the time period since 1945 or 49, and the German governments during that period are no more popular with me than they are with Professor Leonhardt, but I do believe it's a poor argument for a political system to say that if that system were to change, a particular party would come to power, and I don't like that particular party. Gentlemen, we'll come back to the coalition, perhaps in a moment, but I'd like to switch you over to some of the implications of the German developments for American policy.

Chancellor Kissinger has said that I have no satellite complex toward the United States. My question of both of you is, has West Germany matured beyond its old and often neurotic reliance upon the United States? Professor Leonhardt, would you take that one on? I don't think you could speak about West Germany as a whole because there are very different tendencies. I would tend to think that people under 30 or I would now extend it under 35 are to a very high degree free from nationalism and very internationalist minded, to a very high degree indeed. In the older generation you still have quite a lot of nationalism and the problem is I have to find a kind of middle way between a complete satellite system which existed and a kind and very much a nationalistic system which is horrible dangerous for Germany. And I would find a kind of middle way of responsibility without an amenity to any other country would be a possible solution.

I'm not yet sure if this will happen but I would be much more optimistic if we see the newer generation growing up which I think is more imbalanced than the older one. Dr. Freyne, do you have a view on that? Yes, I have found it very desirable to have a leading German spokesman, not only Kiesinger also others. Develop the thesis that Germany has now developed to the point where it should adopt a more independent policy, more independent of the United States. I should note here that American administrations for quite a number of years have encouraged the Germans indeed to take certain initiatives, particularly the recognition of the Odinisaline among them. Chancellor Kiesinger's record is better in restating and stating new policies than it is in implementing them.

So far has taken very few initiatives. One of the few things he can be credited with is establishing the University of Constance. But in foreign policy, a much more thoughtful and in some respects adventurous kinds of initiative is required. One of the things that certainly the Germans are afraid of is the American public and also governmental reaction to a somewhat more independent and free of policy. Myself, I would believe that the Germans will take a more independent line in foreign policy, that they will not be satisfied with the so-called policy of little steps, which is Professor Leonhardt has said earlier, had very limited success in Eastern Europe. And that they will evolve now a policy that in the eyes of some may even endanger the sacred or paper tiger of the common market. And the solidity of these West European arrangements in order for Germany to develop some new freedom of action, not only with respect to Eastern Europe, but particularly there.

I think in this sentence, of course there's always a danger involved and I'm one of always a little bit skeptical when I speak about Germany. There's one positive element. Up to the Great Coalition 1st December 66, the previous governments always, whenever something went wrong, it was the Allied were responsible. Whenever they didn't do anything, they said we can't, the Americans. It was a kind of strange situation. The governments praised the United States and at the same time they used the United States escape codes for all difficulties and for not doing anything at all. And I find it one of the positive elements of the new coalition that this kind of thing is not done. They take the responsibility for themselves and they have more independent policy. But of course there's always involved. I'd like to ask you in specific terms, would withdrawal of some American troops, what kind of an impact would it have on the relations between West Germany and the United States?

Well, it's one of the four or five subjects discussed among primary, discussed among the German population. German population, I don't mean diplomatic cocktail parties in Bonn, where you have the foreign correspondence sitting around. But in the German population, I live in a village, which is 12 miles or 15 miles from the greatest military base in the American military base in Europe. And of course, the village boys say, our Unsra Ami scheme, which means our armies are going. Well, you can't hide it when you have divisions if they are going. But strange enough, we are told that they are not going. It might look like that, but in reality it's an elastic regroupment. And then they say, well, we didn't even attend to go. And then there comes a new story within our left. Although the statesmen going, we are leaving Germany. It doesn't matter because we have a new airlift. We can bring them back very soon. Now, if I hear the word credibility gap here, I can only tell you that this would be in Europe at least as big because the statements are slightly contradictory. And they are going.

Now, there are very many people who are very worried about it because what they would like, and I think it's not quite stupid to have a mutual reduction of forces, both from America and from the Soviet Union, and then have disengagement in Europe. When this was proposed four or five years ago by liberal-minded people in Central Europe, it was rejected very often. Now, sometimes I get the impression that it's unilateral withdrawal, which is also maybe not the right way because I would prefer a mutual withdrawal. And I would very much like to know, are they going away or aren't they going away with airlift and with elastic regroupment without? Could I ask you, both of you seem to agree that the German policy toward the east is now an established one and is in most respects a wholesome one. Does this mean that the Germans are now following the policy that President Johnson stated in a speech? He made October 7, 1966 that they taunt in Central Europe as an absolutely prerequisite for reunification. It had been for a number of years the German position that we talk reunification or we'll talk nothing.

Now, is the new reality one that you're going to have to settle the problems of Central Europe before you come to reunification of the two Germany? Well, I don't know if it's a new reality or an obvious old one, but it's perfectly clear that the policies first perpetrated under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and really carried forth from there on the John Foster dollars in which it was believed or rather dreamed that somehow German and European unification would come about through the creation of a strong west in Europe that would somehow magnetically attract into a democratic and western camp. They then, and of course now, predominantly eastern and communist Europe, that this was a policy more of slogans than of realities. The Germans therefore, and not only the Germans, recognize that there is some greater fluidity now. There is a possibility of exchanges of discussions of possibly trade, particularly if the German's office of sufficient credits with eastern Europe.

And they are prepared to do this and are doing this, but I think at one point out that this so-called new west German policy towards eastern Europe has to speak to thrusts to it. Well, on the one hand, it attempts to bridge the gulf between west Germany and the East European nations, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, et cetera. It has, as its second thrust, so to speak, the further isolation of East Germany, that is indeed try and to isolate East Germany within its East European orbit. And while one of these policies might be a prerequisite to a reunification of Europe, the other thrust of this policy carries with it very real dangers. And, of course, significant and difficult choices for the other East European governments.

I just wanted to direct it to your question. As up to four years ago, there was a dogma, which you had to believe in. I was fighting very much against it. The only people who have brought it with students. The dogma was first German unification, then you can settle European questions. Only very few people were criticizing that. Now, this has become the official line of the government. But the government says, first European problems, East-West detente, and then you can have German reunification, if at all. This is, of course, a big step forward. But I'd like to say that the German government is a coalition government, and some may mean it more serious than some others inside the government. So that is a big difference. And then I would agree that the idea of an isolation of East Germany still exists in certain quarters of the German government, not in all. You have a great struggle about that going on. So it is a step forward, very significant. There's been tremendous change also in the whole atmosphere. But the step is not enough yet.

Some Americans believe, as I think both of you gentlemen, know that the opening to the East leaves the bond government open to dangerous blandishments from the Soviet Union, in which it will somehow be drawn away from its Western ties, or either of you concerned about these dangers. Well, this is a so-called danger of a renewed treaty over Apollo. A few people, I think, who try to raise that danger, know much about the treaty over Apollo. It was, of course, a treaty between two nations that found themselves in a comparable outcast situation in Europe. And, of course, the relationship is between the Soviet Union and Germany today totally different. Therefore, to expect anything like the same thing to occur is, I think, foolish. On the other hand, those who don't study history don't know it are perhaps condemned to repeat it. And so one ought to recognize at least the possibilities of the Soviet Union seducing West Germany in response to her own interests out of the Western orbit in which she exists. Though, here again one would have to say there are limits to the extent to which this policy could be a success. For surely, and I'd be interested in Professor Leonhard's comment on this, the West Germans would be most reluctant to take steps in arrangements with the Soviet Union that would seriously endanger their own security in central Europe.

I think the possible danger of a one-sided leaning of West Germany to the Soviet Union would be 0.001%. So I don't think it is. What is, of course, very noticeable, and this has to be said in all frankness, that West Germany, like all other West European countries, by no means not only a French general, is getting more and more critical about the policy of the government of this country, and also the kind of general European notion right or wrong about an neglectance of Europe. This has led to a great change of opinion in all European countries, including in Western Germany, but it does not mean any significant one-sided leaning to the other world power is an immediate prospect. Professor Leonhard, I'd like to ask you, and perhaps Dr. Freund would want to answer this too, as to how deep is the agitation within the West German government about the non-proliferation treaty for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons?

Is there a feeling that this consigns the bond government in West Germany to a second-class citizenship in perpetuity? Well, it's against bond government, and it is not a question which is deeply discussed in the German public. It is discussed in the famous cocktail parties, and in a few articles of some of the newspapers, it's not an issue which really people are interested in, and the opinions are divided. I don't know privately among private friends, nobody who has any, they're all in favor of the treaty. They couldn't care less if Germany has the slightest influence on the country that would be happy if Germany is not at all involved in it. But there is a facial government policy. And concerning the official government, I would tend to think in government circles you have three opinions.

One, completely in favor. This would be primarily among social democrats. One, putting up reservations, but not really to wanting to have influence in the problems of atomic weapons, but to use it as a diplomatic argument for the Russians. And the third group, what you would call the right conservative group, inside the government, they want to have German participation and are against the treaty. And I would tend to think this would be one third, one third, one third. Even inside government circles. Dr. Freund, do you have a view on the non-proliferation treaty? My question really is, can they power with the dynamism that West Germany has? And with its expectation that it will be a first class power, be without nuclear weapons. We've taught them that you need nuclear weapons to have first class status. What do you think in, say, 30 seconds? I want to raise the problem in connection with an earlier question. That is, what if there is a major withdrawal of American troops from West Germany? The question immediately arises is, what happens to the nuclear weapons that are in fact in place there?

Do they stay? Who gets control? This is a question to be raised, and I think that many of the West Germans who today take the easy attitude towards the non-proliferation treaty, which is we're favorable to it, see this one coming in the distance and are quite prepared to wait until some of these weapons drop into their laps. Gentlemen, I see the time has come for me to sum up very quickly here. Both gentlemen seem to agree that the opening to the east now practice by the West German government is an encouraging development. Dr. Freund believes that the great coalition should be broken up to allow for a responsible opposition. Professor Leonhard disagrees believing that the coalition is a good development, if not an essential one. Both agree that bonds should continue to develop independent policies, free of two great reliance upon the United States, and if there are any reduction of forces in Germany, they should be mutual reductions on both sides. I want to thank you, Professor Wolfgang Leonhard of Yale and Dr. Gerald Freund of the Rockefeller Foundation, and I'd like to thank our audience for their questions.

Next week on great decisions, our topic will be the dollar in danger. I'm Peter Lissagar. Good evening. This has been great decisions 1968, produced in conjunction with the Foreign Policy Association's great decisions discussion programs for national educational television. This is NET, the National Educational Television Network. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. Thank you very much.