The Challenge of Foreign Policy; 8; Is it Likely that All of the Indo-China Will Soon be Communist?

This is National Educational Television. A program produced for the Educational Television and Radio Center. Produced for the Educational Television and Radio Center by the University of Michigan. Challenge of foreign policy. An exploration of vital questions in America's relations with other countries. Today's special guest, United States Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana. And today's subject, Indochina, is it likely that all of Indochina soon will be communist? What would communist control of the whole area mean in terms of American foreign policy? To introduce these questions, here is your moderator for this series, George A. Peak Jr., Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. In a world of unrest and tension, Southeast Asia is in a position of special uncertainty.

We talked about this in our program last week. Today, our focus will be sharper on the single area where the tension is most acute, Indochina. I say single area, but in reality, it is not one nation. There are three different countries. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Vietnam, in addition, is divided into North Vietnam. South Vietnam, and South Vietnam. All these countries were formerly French colonies. At the present time, they have achieved a degree of independence, but North Vietnam is communist. And South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are relatively independent. These countries are threatened from within by a subversion, and from a though, by red China to the North. The United States must be interested in what is happening in this crucial area.

To talk about these important subjects, we have with us today two guests, Senator Mike Mansfield, of Montana, a member of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, a person who has traveled considerably in the area, and who is particularly well qualified to talk about it. And also Professor Russell Feithield, of the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, who has long been a student of far Eastern affairs. Before we begin, gentlemen, let's identify the pictures that we see here above us. One of the pictures is of Joe Dinh Zim, premier at the present time of South Vietnam. The other is a picture of Ho Chi Minh, at the present time the communist ruler of North Vietnam. Now, Senator Mansfield has said, to get right down to the topic, that both of these men cannot survive in the area of Indochana.

How do you react to that? Well, Professor Feith only time will tell us to who will come out on top, and we'll have to, of course, project our thinking a little bit into the future. Ho Chi Minh himself has recognized the fact that there is only one man in all of Indochina whom he has to fear, and that is Joe Dinh Zim. There, of course, will be a struggle for power. What will happen in that area remains to be seen, but we can anticipate that for many months, perhaps years ahead. It will be an area of dissension and struggle, and a struggle on the part of the free world, and its representatives, and the communists, on the other hand, for leadership and control. Wasn't it Ho Chi Minh himself for Mr. Feith who said only one of us has been to survive? I understand he made a statement about effect some time ago. So that you would argue that this struggle is irrepressible between North and South Vietnam? Yes, at the present time.

Well, Senator Mansfield, I wonder if you would fill in a little bit now about some history of this and fallen area of Indochana. Let's say before World War II, and then coming on up to the present time. Well, the history is interesting for that particular area, because most of it came under the control of the French at the time of Louis Napoleon, who had dreams of grandeur, and who tried to add to French prestige and glory in various parts of the world, including incidentally, Mexico at that time, because we were engaged in a civil war between ourselves. But beginning then, and carrying on through cumulative stages, various parts of what we now know collectively as Indochina, was gathered into the French Empire. And eventually, of course, with the downfall of Louis Napoleon became a part of the republic, the various republics of France. Unfortunately, the French exploited that area very badly, and created a certain amount of animosity which exists down even to the present time. During the Second World War, there were certain elements of France connected with the Vichy government, which tried to come to terms and did come to terms with the Japanese occupation forces. During that time, a Ho Chi Minh, who was a long time communist, developed a lot of additional strength, and with the end of hostilities and the restoration of Indochina, first to the Chinese nationalists in the North and the British in the South, and eventually to the French themselves, came, of course, the outbreak of the struggle between Ho Chi Minh and his group on one side.

And the French on the other. Now, it might be well to point out that Ho Chi Minh, who is Moscow trained, and is a communist, Chinese dominated, has not been able to achieve victory on the basis of the spread of the communist ideology, because he has portrayed himself as an anti-colonial, anti-Westmer, pro-Bietnamese. And his picture, of course, has indicated that he is the old benign Oriental scholar. He has kept himself in seclusion, a great deal, although since the taking over of Hanoi last year, he has come to the fore once again. But he has used good psychology to achieve his present position, and he has been put in there largely because he has been so anti-French and anti-colonial, which represents to a great extent. The feeling of the people of all of Indochina, and which is directed specifically against the French and the exploitation which occurred under their tenure.

Isn't it true, Mr. Feifeil, that in some of the conferences during World War II, President Roosevelt suggested that this area be independent and need try to urge the French to move out somewhat? I believe that President Roosevelt was interested in having Indochina become a trusteeship after the Second World War, but the French were of course very strongly opposed to that. What was their policy towards Indochina doing World War II? This was an area occupied by Japan, wasn't it? Well, technically, the Japanese didn't occupy Indochina technically until March of 45, although in reality they had begun to move into Indochina, they are in 1940. Well, what about our policy since World War II towards Indochina, Senator Mansfield? Well, we didn't pay too much attention to Indochina. After control was first turned over to the National Chinese and the British, and then to French until June 1950. With the outbreak of the Korean War, we recognized the significance of that area, and from then on we began to pour in material and supplies in large amounts.

I think that up to the present time, we've sent a good deal in excess of $2 billion worth of supplies with the ports of high form in the North and Saigon in the South. Now, it's true, of course, that we have been accused of fostering French colonialism because we did assist the French in maintaining order. But it is also true, and I think this is little knowing, that during all that period under American administrations, both a Democratic and Republican, we put on every bit of legitimate pressure we could on the French to bring about full independence for the three Indochinese states. We recognized the fact that the only answer there was free and complete independence for each of them because of that was not forthcoming. It would mean, in effect, that the way would be made easier for the communists to step in and to take over as they did in North Vietnam, and which they might well do in future areas if we do not pay the proper amount of attention to them. When you said this area was significant or crucial, part of you used that expression.

Well, for one thing, it is underpopulated. There is room for expansion there. For another thing, it is the rice bowl of Asia. Then, of course, you have great amounts of rubber, tin, tungsten, and other materials, which can be derived from that particular part of Southeast Asia. It might be well to point out, too, that if anything drastic happens to this particular area, and is taken over completely by the communists, that the next step would be the oil of the Indies to the South, perhaps added penetration into the Philippines on the East, and to the West, of course, Thailand and eventually Burma, and perhaps India would lay open to communist conquest from within and aggression from without. This would significantly break the ring of containment that we have around Red China. If this area were to fall, it is important because strategically it would break the ring, and secondly, because the tremendous potential of the area economically, is that what you mean? There is no question about that professor, because, as we all know, the chief storehouse of natural resources, as far as China's proper is concerned, is in Manchuria.

Of course, there are indications that oil deposits are being found in Gansu and Sinkiong, that other resources are being developed, but that's all hearsay. We do know what is in Southeast Asia, and we do know what that would mean to the economy of the communist Chinese. You must keep in mind that the Chinese need this stuff, at the present time, they are importing 75% of their needs from the Soviet Union, and only 25% from the outside world. The control, the conquest of Southeast Asia for them, would add a measure of lead to their economic strength. What about the particularly Indo-China itself, Mr. Feifeil? Does it have any particular sources of importance? Just Indo-China. I mean, I'm talking about Vietnam, North and South. I would say that the rice resources are very valuable, especially in South Vietnam. You also have important core resources, especially in North Vietnam. So together, you do have a rather complementary economy.

And Cambodian Laos, I gather, are also underpopulated areas, and potentially very important agricultural wise. Yes, very definitely, as far as Cambodian, it allows to a lesser extent. Well, now gentlemen, to summarize some of the points that we've been making so far, and to give a pictorial background of points yet to come, let's look at some recent scenes of turmoil in Indo-China. Scenes of turmoil and changes, and the people whose future is so uncertain. It was a long war in Indo-China, and many villages burned. But remember this, it was not a case of entire people fighting to be free. Much of the native resistance to the French was a communist resistance. The United States supported France, and this looked like support for colonialism, it's all of Asia hates. And then the Geneva Pact, which ended the war, split Vietnam in two. In the late summer of 1954, in Saigon, French high commissioner Ely turned the government palace over to Joe Dinh Jim.

The flag of France was Lord, and South Vietnam was officially an independent nation. At the same time, in North Vietnam, a different kind of man and a different kind of regime were taking over. This is the capital city of Hanoi, just at the time of communist occupation. Although many groups within the Indo-China opposed them, the communist had forced France to come to terms. The Red Star was in the ascendant over 12 million of the people of Indo-China, and a repressive government was in control. A government led by a man who had convinced much of Asia that he was a simple Vietnam Patriot, a confirmed communist named Ho Chi Minh. By the terms of the Geneva Pact, the people of Vietnam are to vote in 1956 for the purpose of reuniting that divided country.

What kind of government were the people choose? The Red dictatorship of the North, or the non-communist, but precarious government of the South. Will the people of Laos and Cambodia tend to move in the same direction as their neighbors? These pictures of Indo-China take them from a train may be blurred, but so is the future of the troubled area of Southeast Asia. I understand you and Hanoi pretty close to the time that this separation took place. Yes, I was in Hanoi 10 days before Ho Chi Minh and the communist took over last year. A funny thing happened on that occasion and going through the city to see what the effects of the contemplated occupation would be.

We noticed, of course, that business houses were closed and people, the Europeans especially, were leaving. However, in walking through the street of the paper makers, we did come across some indications that the people of Hanoi were getting ready to become accustomed to their new rulers. Because there we found, on sale, peace dubs, pigeons, really, the Picasso type, with red stars embossed on the side of each. Now, our impression at that time was that the people making the best of something they could do nothing about and they were going to prove to these communists coming in that they had been communists all the time. I wonder if you would talk a bit about the basic provisions of this agreement, which I believe was held at Geneva, to split Vietnam and to North and South. Well, in the first place, a lot of us were surprised that Ho Chi Minh did not demand a line, say, down to the 14th parallel, because he had the power and the mobile spiking strength at that time to achieve it. Nevertheless, the agreement at the 17th parallel seemed to be the best it could be expected at that time.

As you know, the city of Hanoi had to be evacuated by the first part of October in 1954. The city of Haipong had to be evacuated around the latter part of April or the first part of May of 1955. And in July of 1956, there are to be elections under the Geneva Convention, which will decide the future of Vietnam as a whole, both communist-dominated North and free and independent South. That means, of course, that in the meantime, there are international truth commissions there in all countries, in all four of them, made up of Poles, Canadians, and Indians. They are to see that the terms of the Geneva pact are observed. Now, personally, I do not think that there will be any elections in July 1956, because I think that South Vietnam, for example, will take the position. That it was not a signatory to the Geneva pact, and therefore is not held obliged to conduct such elections.

How would you react to this? This seems to be a pretty starting statement, almost, that there's an agreement to have elections in 1956, and yet the suggestion may be that the elections will not be held. What do you think, Mr. Byfield? I would say, for one thing, the communists under Ho Chi Minh have been violating the Geneva provisions by arming Ho Chi Minh's forces. Furthermore, the communists have been dilatory in allowing refugees from communist Vietnam to go south of the parallel to South Vietnam. I think, under the conditions of violation, it's quite likely that the South Vietnamese would feel further justified in not holding an election. Yes, and don't you think it might be well to point out that over 800,000 refugees from the North have voluntarily left that area to find refuge in the South, indicating, in my opinion, that there is not a great deal of sympathy for the communists who are having their troubles in North Vietnam at the present time. It might be well to point out also that certain areas were to be evacuated by both the Vietnamese and the Vietnam troops, and this has been brought about.

Now, what has happened to the occupation by the Vietnamese of the two provinces in Northeastern Laos? I do not know, but there is a question as to what will happen there, and it's interesting to note that as a result of the Bandung conference, that an agreement has been entered into. So, really, a mutual security pact, a treaty of friendship and commerce, between Laos on the one hand and Northeastern Vietnam on the other. Now, that may or may not mean anything, because, as you know, as well as I do, scraps of paper which communist government sign usually do not amount to a great deal, but it may be a straw in the wind. Laos and Cambodia weren't actually involved, of course, in the Geneva PAC, where they sent them? Oh, yes, indeed, they were, and thanks to the activities of the Cambodians, especially, more or lenient terms were gotten for that country. And this show of determination added greatly to the prestige of their king, Nora Dom Cianouk.

Has the Peace Commission been effective? The Commission was set up in implementing this thing. You talk about violations of the truth. I gather it has not been implemented very well. I don't think they've been too effective, and it's my understanding that the Canadian elements of the various peace teams are pretty discussed with the way the activities of the Commission has been carried out. Of course, as you know, the Indians are superior, as far as numbers are concerned, in actual membership, and also in furnishing the Secretariat for the various countries. That's understandable because of the closeness of India to the areas under consideration. The Canadians have been operating on a fair, reasonable, and legalistic basis. The polls who are the least numerous of the group have, of course, been throwing roadblocks in wherever possible with the result being that the functions and the duties of the Commission as set out by the Geneva PAC have not been carried out as they should have been penned these numerous violations, which Professor Feifield has mentioned. How did the French react to this, Professor Feifield? I think the French made the best of a bad situation under Pierre Mondes France while he was premium.

But in more recent months, the French seemed to give indication that they haven't really given up their long range hopes of at least maintaining a strong or economic position, especially in South Vietnam. Can you supplement that a little bit? I would say there are policies as regards one of the leaders of South Vietnam, Premier Z. There is an indication of this. The allegation was made at the time that the French had really written off the whole area. Now you're suggesting that maybe the French are not ready to write off the whole area and want to hold on to South Vietnam? Well, of course one can never be sure of that. But certainly since Pierre Mondes France ceased to be premium, there is some indication that the French are having a stronger position towards South Vietnam. What about the relation to France and not Vietnam, Senator Mansfield? Well, Professor Feifield, the French have always thought they could get along with Ho Chi Minh and his group. And what they did immediately after Geneva was to send out a man by the name of Jean Santanae, an old friend of Ho's who had spent many years previously in China.

And through him it was thought that perhaps some arrangements could be made by means of which economic relations would be bettered and French commerce industry protected. Well, it didn't work out that way because Santanae received absolutely no assurances or promises from Ho Chi Minh as to what would be done. And shortly before the evacuation of the port of Haipang, the last French held area in North Vietnam, the French went in and dismantled. All the surface properties of the Hungai coal mines, which indicated, of course, that they'd given up hope of maintaining any commercial or economic contact with Ho. In the South, though, I'm afraid that the colon's the French businessman may be causing a great deal of trouble there as they did in North Africa. And I would want to agree with what Professor Feifield has said because one of the reasons, perhaps the main reason for the overthrow of Mendez France, was the political interest and pressure exerted by the French colon's businessmen in North Africa. And you had the same elements in Indochina who are trying to undercut and undermine Allied policy there. And compared to us, I mean, let me put it this way.

The French and ourselves, we can cut our losses and make the best of it, but once the French seem to get their hands on anything, they hate like to do to let go. Now that all like our policy towards the Philippines breaks it. Oh, not at all. And the result may well be that if France doesn't wake up, she may lose the economic position of superiority, which she holds in the present time, in which I think she should maintain. But if she loses her economic hold as a middleman in Indochina, it's going to be her own fault because she has given up a position which no one else can occupy as being the contact between the outside world and that particular part of Asia. Now, Mr. Feifeel, I wondered if you would comment on how the neighbors of Indochina react listening. I'm thinking about red China and India, for example. I think the evidence indicates quite clearly that the Japanese a few years ago are considered Indochina to be the key to Southeast Asia. Today, it looks as though Mao Zitong and the Chinese commoners have a similar viewpoint as regards Indochina.

Certainly, Mao Zitong has a valuable ally in a very important part of Southeast Asia, namely Northeastern Indochina at the present time. No doubt the greatest threat to the security of Indochina and of Southeast Asia comes today from red China to the North. Now, let's move on into United States policy towards the area. Senator Mansfield, what has our policy been towards Vietnam, both North and South? We, of course, have no contact with North Vietnam, the communist and dominated area. We do have a consulate in Hanoi. How long that consulate will remain as a question of time because no recognition has been achieved as far as our relations with the whole are concerned. We, of course, are very rightly interested in the independence, the continued independence of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. I want to repeat again that it has been the consistent policy of this government to bring about freedom and independence for the entire area.

And it will continue to be our policy so far as I am able to gauge the situation to insist upon that because we know that only in these people being free and having the control of their own future and their own destiny in their hands. Is there any hope in that area? How have we implemented our policy in the area, Senator Mansfield? Well, we have, for example, since the Geneva vaccine to it that all aid, except for the maintenance of the French Expeditionary Force in South Vietnam, has gone directly to the governments of Cambodia Laos and South Vietnam. We have tried to do what we could to help these people to better their own outlook in life by introducing good hygienic and sanitation measures by helping them to train administrative officials and by doing what we could to lift the level of illiteracy. You and those areas, as I recall, Mr. Fifeil, how effective has our point for a program, as it's called, economic aid been in Indochina? Well, I'm not as familiar with Indochina as I am, perhaps, with the Philippines. My understanding is that the economic program in Indochina has died rather late, as compared to the Philippines, and therefore it has suffered from disadvantages.

Furthermore, there has been a war going on in Indochina, which has also impeded the effectiveness of the program. It might well bring out that what we've had in effect there are crash programs, and it's due, as Professor Fifeil has indicated, to the fact that there's been a constant struggle going on, especially in Vietnam and to a lesser extent in both Laos and Cambodia. But you think the most effective long range program I gather from the talk last week also is this economic assistance to the people. It's no question that the point for a program is the most important and the best facet in American foreign policy and all the underdeveloped areas of the globe because it's cooperative. It's down to the people, and it has this ultimate objective that as time goes on, our contributions and our personnel will be reduced and the administration and the greater contributions made by the receiving countries. But the end effects, insofar as the individuals of people who comprise the most important elements in any area of the globe, they are the ones who will be benefited and they are the ones who will be our friends in the future.

Thank you very much, Senator Mansfield. As you can see, this area of Indochina is one of peculiar tension and significance for the United States. We have done all we can to build up this area economically to make it strong so that it will not fall into the hands of the communist in this struggle between the Western allies and communism. Now, Senator Mansfield, if I can return to the point for a program, has Congress implemented this program effectively? In listening to a discussion of Indochina and its importance to American foreign policy, our special guest today was United States Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana. Also participating were professors George A. Peak, Jr. and Russell H. Phi Field of the political science department of the University of Michigan. Our subject next week, India, can the United States and India work together toward mutual goals? Be with us then for a consideration of this vital issue, another program in the series, Challenge of Foreign Policy.

This program was produced for the Educational Television and Radio Center in the television studios of the University of Michigan, Don Hall speaking. The preceding program was produced for the Educational Television and Radio Center. This is National Educational Television.