Realities; 16; The Borders of War: Expansion into Indochina

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . has made it clear that its objective will be to disrupt those forces which have been concentrated in this region for use against the South Vietnamese and United States forces. I think that this represents a wide thing of the war. That kind of thing, not to be undertaken. The policies are clear policy. As fast as we can we're going to get our troops out of combat. I don't think the way out of South Vietnam is through Cambodia and ours. From Bangkok, Thailand and Washington DC, NET presents the borders of war.

Expansion in Indochina. From our anchor studio in Washington here is diplomatic correspondent Henry Truitt. Standing by via satellite from Indochina are two American correspondents who have just flown to our Bangkok studios from Vietnam. With me in Washington are three United States senators and one White House Vietnam specialist. Before we hear from them though, let's get a situation report on the latest military action from NET correspondent David Proud. This is Kasson. Back on the same war footing it was on in 1968 when Marines and Army men held it at all cost against the Viet Cong. The reason for all this activity here is 10 miles behind me. That's where the lay-ocean border is and today that's what Kasson is all about. Out of the helicopters fly in and out of Kasson regularly now, refueling,

rearming and returning to support the 20,000 South Vietnamese troops involved in the lay-ocean invasion. The place of our commitment to provide air artillery and logistics support to the Vietnamese is getting higher. More than 20 U.S. helicopters have already been downed in labs. Reports are coming in from the chopper pilots that knew and heavier North Vietnamese and IARCRAF batteries have been moved in and they're taking their toll. Rumors about a giant communist counteroffensive are still current in Kasson. The troops are filling sandbags and digging in. There's a feeling that they may be there for a long time. There doesn't appear to be much doubt left anywhere that some U.S. ground troops are involved in the lay-ocean invasion. Military sources in Saigon admit there are probably some advisors who stayed with their Vietnamese units across the border. But how many and how they got there without being noticed by superiors is still a mystery. Perhaps the biggest visible problem for the U.S. at the moment is what to do with the artillery fire bases weeks set up near the border. This one is less than a mile from the lay-ocean border. It's a long route nine, close enough to the lay-ocean hills to be a prime target for

North Vietnamese artillery. The United States is setting the North Vietnamese won't mind a major offensive from Laos. A lot of people in Kasson hope we're right. Just blowing hard here today and it's blowing straight towards Laos. This is David Proud and E.T. at Kasson. That's the latest information available on the military situation. With us from Bangkok to add perspective to our analysis tonight are two seasoned American correspondents. On the left, Kai's beach of the Chicago Daily News, the dean of American correspondents in the Far East. He has been reporting from there for 20 years. On the right, Maynard Parker of Newsweek Magazine, he has covered the war in Indochina politics for his magazine for the past six years. Our guests in Washington are Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky and a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He's a sponsor of legislation forbidding the use of American ground troops in

Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, a Democrat and an outspoken critic of the U.S. military involvement in Indochina. Senator Howard Baker, Tennessee Republican, a strong supporter of the administration's Vietnam policy. And discussing that policy is Dr. Roge, Vietnam Specialist at the White House. He is on loan there from his regular job at AID. Herb Klein, President Nixon's Director of Communications, was prevented by illness from being with us tonight. General and I think to begin the discussion. I'd like to go back to Bangkok. Kai's and Maynard, you both heard David Prolet say that in his judgment a number of American advisors had accompanied invading South Vietnamese units across the border into Laos. I'd like the reaction. I think first the Maynard, have you been to case on what is your judgment on that point in particular? Well, there's probably been a few advisors that have gone across the

border into Laos, but I do not think it was a matter of policy on the administration's part to send advisors into Laos, quite the contrary. I do think however that there are a number of Americans in Laos, special forces and civilian clothes, a fact of pilots over Laos, probably forward air controllers on the ground in Laos. But whether or not these really represent a change in policy that started with this incursion into Laos or whether in fact these people have been here for the last four or five years is another question. Kai's, what do you think about that? Well, I know of no American advisors in Laos in connection with this invasion of the panhandle from the Vietnam side. Certainly there are dozens and even scorers of advisors and spooks and various other kinds of Americans in Laos, but I do know that American advisors dropped off before the army troops moved into Laos. Many of them would have liked to have gone with

the troops because some of these advisors are very gunned up. And I know that some of them were required to sign statements required by the commanding officers to sign statements that they would not go into Laos. I believe it might be a good idea at this point to turn to Mr. Drove and let him just outline for us briefly what the administration's policy is in that respect. Well, the policy is a very clear, Mr. Truitt, that this incursion by the South Vietnamese is supported by the American's air power, the logistics support, the helicopters have been discussed, but that no Americans on the ground, no advisors and no participation by Americans in that regard would take place. And that is a very clear and a very definite instruction. Of course, it is a combat zone and this is a question of enforcing that particular prescription, but that is the policy. Mr. Drove's that point relates really to policy. And I wonder if we might

turn just for a second to the legalities of the question and I suppose there's no better authority on that than Senator Cooper who is a co-author of the Cooper Church amendment and the author of two more amendments or at least one that I know of which relate to this subject. Senator, what does the law say in that respect? Well, the so-called Cooper Church amendment which is also sponsored by Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic leader, Senator George Aiken, the Republican senior, only provided is finally enacted that prohibiting the use of combat ground forces. I do not believe the president intend to support to be violated. I can understand in war that there are individuals who would like to get into battle and probably get over at times, but as far as the actual wording of the language, there's no violation at least in the intention of the administration. That relates, I believe, to the amendment as it applies to American forces in

Laos. It's a separate amendment, of course prohibits advisors also in Cambodia specifically. Yes, the original amendment was adopted in December 1969. It referred then only to Laos and Thailand. Cambodia at the time is under Sayonouk. Unfortunately, we didn't think about it. Later it became applicable to all three of the protocol states. Laos, Thailand, Cambodia. Senator Hart, there's one further extension of this question which occurs to me you might want to comment on. That relates to the advisability of what the administration is doing. And first I would ask you to address yourself to the question of American advisors in Laos if there are advisors there. First, you believe there are. And second, what is your question? It wouldn't surprise me if we found American ground forces in Laos. I think it's been acknowledged that under

the pressure of the circumstances, this is possible. It's been acknowledged by those who insist that it's not intended. And I buy the proposition that it's not intended, but it's almost inevitable. The more basic question, I think, is the wisdom of the I'm always struck by the way we use these words. It's an incursion. Somebody earlier said it was an invasion. But I just want to question the wisdom of call it what you will, jumping a third country in order to find a way to get peace in the first one. I think it's the wrong way to obtain peace in the first country, Vietnam, by adding two more to the list of those to whom we are doing violence. And what is the national interest of this country that compels and justifies? Senator Baker, I'd like to turn to you on this question of the

American role in the northern regions of South Vietnam at the moment. We are ever we know we agree that American troops are there providing logistics back up, providing air support for South Vietnamese troops in southern Laos. We know that some of our correspondents have suggested that some American advisors have straight across. What is your view on that? Do you think this is an advisable sort of role for the United States to fill? Mr. Trude, I think it's the only sensible role. The United States can pursue if it intends to go about the business of Vietnamizing or disengaging or winding went down the war in Southeast Asia. And after all the primary commitment of the administration as elucidated by the President on many occasions is that we're going to end the war in Southeast Asia. It seems to me that the fact that this is being supported by American troops rather than by the direct intervention of American troops is one most fortunate, especially in view of the Yomon work done by Senator Cooper and others in passing their

resolution, which was a right and proper way. But also it gives some evidence of the success so far of the business of Vietnamizing the conflict. So I view it as not a desirable one. Combat is never desirable, but a logical one. If we're to continue the business of disengaging from that conflict. I'd like in that respect if I made a turn back to the correspondents in Bangkok. And as either of you, I made it, would you like to begin with the question of how the American role has been explained in recent weeks, in particular with regard to this operation in Laos? Have they been candid with you? Do you feel that you've received full information? Well, I think that we received full information within certain limits after the embargo was lifted. As I understand it from the military in Saigon, they are going to provide air and artillery support and logistics support to the border. The problem is that for five days up in Quarang

pre, which is the headquarters of the operation, no American information officer would even comment on any question which had the word Laos appended to it. In other words, they would not comment on American losses in Laos. They went on as far as helicopters. They would not tell us how extensive the support was. And this was compounded by the fact that the Vietnamese briefing officers did not even show for three days that they said nothing. So try out what is going on in Laos all last week was next to impossible. And I think this is one of the reasons why you have had these stories about American advisors in Laos because the one or two that probably did stray across created quite a sensation in the sort of hold down of information that was going on up there by the administration. Yes, Senator Cooper, I don't interrupt this, but you first question me. You simply ask me if it violated. I assume the Cooper Church amendment. And I said it didn't. But Senator Hart then spoke of the wisdom of this operation. Hope you

don't mind it like that about a minute. I think you know that a number of us have been trying for several years to lay some lines down upon the combat area and particularly saying that the president without the authority of the Congress could not go into Cambodia, Thailand, and later, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos. Nevertheless, looking at it just legally and now and constitutionally, even without our amendment, without our amendment, he could use troops if he found it necessary to protect our troops and also from an instant standpoint of international law. I'm not talking about the wisdom now, standpoint of international law. The South Vietnamese troops and the U.S. troops would have, there would be not illegal for them to go into Laos or Cambodia if the neutrality had already been valid as it

had for North Vietnam. That's true under the hate conventions and it's international law. That is upon the legal situation. Now the question of whether it's wise or not is another thing. And I hope to address myself that a little later, but I don't want to take the bulls. I think the Senator raises a very good point and it also applies to the point that Mr. Parker raised that this embargo was really something that was designed to save lives, that it was not intended just to frustrate the American press. In fact, it wasn't intended for that at all. It was intended instead to leave the enemy uncertain as to where you were coming with those Vietnamese forces, which were launching an operation that they call Lumsun 719. And that this was also to save Vietnamese lives so that the forces of North Vietnam would not know that they could move say three divisions down to Japan because we were heading for Japan. Or they could take the Ashao Valley, which is just south of Route 9, and they could be guaranteed we weren't heading for the Ashao Valley. They had to hold a

lot of forces in place in those areas. And the same thing is true of the general prescription that the President Nixon is attempting to end the war as Senator Baker said. And in doing so to protect American lives during a reduction of forces, he feels that this kind of action supporting the South Vietnamese in this is going to reduce the kind of hostilities and casualties and costs in South Vietnam for the year ahead because this is the rainy season and the supplies are now on that trail and they really hit the rains in May and the supplies then bogged down in the mud. The South Vietnamese want to cut those supplies to save their lives and in fact to save American lives also. I think that that's supportable and legitimate. On that very point, let me turn back to Kai's being in Bangkok if I may. I'm glad you're turning back to me because I have some observations to make on what Mr. Rose just said. In my view, there has been a conspiracy of silence between the United States and South Vietnam on this

whole Cambodian operation, a whole Laosian operation. And it has not been wholly for the protection of American or South Vietnamese lives. Certainly, insofar as the embargo was concerned, the North Vietnamese, unless they were deaf, dumb and blind, knew that we were in case on on January the 30th. With thousands of rather hundreds of helicopters in the sky around there, with our troops massing along the border, with airplanes constantly stepping up the bombardment of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and all of that, there was hardly any doubt a star in tensions. Yes, that embargo was continued long after the enemy knew beyond any reasonable doubt that we were there. That's so much for the embargo. What I object to even more than the embargo, which

could at least be partially justified by security reasons, was the refusal of the United States Army to let American corresponders fly into Laos on American helicopters. I would like to ask Mr. Rose, who made that decision, who gave that order, and why? It seems I have come to the indiscapable conclusion that the administration and collaboration with the Sagan government has done everything possible to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the foreign press, specifically American correspondents, to cover this operation. The physical, the logistical difficulties placed in our way were virtually insurmountable. Let me put that question directly to Mr. Rose, because I'm sure some consideration must have been given to that problem

in the planning of this operation. What about the extent of coverage and the openness of coverage? I think the intent there was again to focus on the South Vietnamese role in this effort. That is, they were taking the primary role. They were taking the primary risk. They were going in on this ground operation. The thought there was to make sure that all priority, that all copter space, would be a lot for that purpose for support of the South Vietnamese. I don't know who made the particular decision that Mr. Peach is referring to, and I think that the embargo itself had lasted as long as it had, because it took considerably more time to move down Route 9 toward case on than we anticipated it would take. But once that operation was on, I again repeat, it was very important that the enemy, though he knew we were in case on, would not be told exactly where the South Vietnamese were going to target their effort. They had to still wonder where we were going, because a few days earlier, there had been the operation launched in the Cambodian area, the Fischhoop type sanctuaries, and this represented for the North Vietnamese a question of, well, now that comes

from the South, and this comes from the North, are they going to link up? What is this? There was some ambiguity there, and I think it was helpful ambiguity. On that, on that, on that, Hank, if I might just say that if there was some ambiguity there, I don't think it was in the minds of the North Vietnamese, but in the minds of the American public, as far as those forces linking up, there were about 500 miles apart, and the chances of them linking up, in a matter of a few days, was almost nil. I think, you know, I've been in Vietnam uncovering the war for five or six years, and I've had and gone through, say, five embargoes on various operations, and the fact is that this is the first one that anybody complained about, and the reason there's, I think, is Kai's pointed out, is that raises the question of whether, in fact, it was military security that the administration was worried about, or whether it was not, in fact, political convenience in disarming the discontent at home, and lowering the sort of international repercussions of this operation by letting it seep out gradually. Let me put a slight spin on that question,

Maynard, and turn it to Senator Hart. Senator, do you feel the public has been informed adequately on this operation? I think our discussion, thus far, indicates pretty clearly no, including if some of us on the panel. I can't buy the idea that it was to ensure the security of the South Vietnamese troops on the ground who were the principal element, that we didn't want to take space in the in the copters to permit American correspondents to fly. Otherwise, you're taking the position that you're more concerned about safeguarding the South Vietnamese on the ground, and you were the Americans on the ground, because you allowed it when Americans were on the ground. Senator Baker, what is your feeling on this particular point? Well, on the particular point of the news blackout, I really can't say whether there is any conspiracy between the Americans and the South Vietnamese or not. I really don't think that that's the crucial question, however. I think the real question is whether or not it was or was not essential in terms of the operational requirements of that particular episode, and I'll

be perfectly frank in saying that I don't know. Beyond that, it seems to me, unless one of the panelists has additional information that I do not have, we're sort of spinning our wheels. Well, could we agree on this, that it has compounded an already serious credibility here at home? Well, I don't think we can. As a matter of fact, I think one of the most remarkable things. Then we're going to disagree for the rest of the night on that one. Well, that's really not a precedent. I think you and I have disagreed on this and other subjects from time to time, but I might say that to me, one of the most remarkable after effects of the La Ocean operation so far in terms of the reaction of the American public has been its marked and stark contrast to the reaction after Cambodia. I am convinced that speaking of a credibility gap that the people of the United States are convinced that this administration and this president does intend to disengage and to wind down that conflict. I'm convinced that the people of the United States and substantial majority numbers are convinced

that there are not American ground-tooped troops there and that they're convinced to the third essential requisite. And that is that this operation on the ground by South Vietnamese is one, a demonstration of the increasing victimization capability and two, necessary to continue the business of de-Americanizing the country. Let me on that point, Senator, refer back to Bangkok. Guys, do you feel from the military standpoint that this operation was one necessary to advisable in the total context of what the United States is doing in South Vietnam now? The answer to both questions is yes. I am I endorsed the operation 100%. I regret that we weren't able to do it sooner. I think it's military, it makes a great deal of sense and I think it's been viewed despite my earlier criticism of the news blackout and all of that. That this operation is most essential. But I do think that it's been viewed in two narrow contexts.

You are going a rather arvin for the South Vietnamese going into Laos. It was a logical follow-up to the operation in Cambodia last spring. For years and years, for about 10 or 12 years in Laos, the enemy has been using the Ho Chi Minh trail to funnel, to channel supplies to the South. And it's something like, well, suppose you're engaged in a fight with somebody who lives across the street from you and you draw a line on the little district which is the border and you he can shoot a few from over there. He can do anything. He can haul up all the supplies. He wants to hold on the other side of the street, but you can't go over there and bothering. This has never made any sense to me. And now it is it has become possible for us to for the South Vietnamese without support to

rindy the situation. I think that this is an effort, however, really to win the war to seek a military solution. I think that's what President Nixon and President too are trying to do. Let me interrupt you right there because that's a good point, I think, to get some comments from the members of the panel here in the war. I have no objections to that. I have no objections to any war. I'd like to turn that to Senator Hart, just on this particular point of I think Mr. Vitch has broken some confidence. I'm teasing. You won't get the White House to agree that they're undertaking to win a military victory. But it confirms a growing unease here at home among those of us who think that the way to save American lives and to reduce further expansion of death to the whole Indochinese Peninsula is simply to fix a date by which we'll get out and

hopefully get out by then and the meantime killing will stop. But at no time as this administration acknowledged that they are, as Mr. Vitch says, out for a military victory. But if that is the case then all of these intrusions, incursions, invasions, what have you make sense? There's always military justification. We're going to New Delhi if it helps or going across to the North. I think, but we don't want that. On the conscience of the world cries out against that. I think specifically on that point we, it's Mr. Droges, definitely Droges turned because on this question of the goal of a military victory, which we, of course, we all know is not the about goal of the administration, but address yourself, if you will, the advisability of this operation in military terms in just that context. Yes, I think Senator Hart that what you're talking about is a goal the South Vietnamese might hold in defense terms that they intend to shut off the kind of means that would exist to attack their country from North Vietnam down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Now in that sense, our goal is to assist the South Vietnamese to be able to carry and meet the full burden of

their security responsibilities. In other words, we're trying to cut off the supply of war goods that comes down the Ho Chi Minh Trail by supporting South Vietnamese who want to go in and do that job. And for more than a decade, the South Vietnamese have watched that, that also rated condition of supply, of this sort of war supply, logistics coming down that trail, trucks, guns, rockets, the kind of equipment that Hanoi had to use to keep its 10 divisions in the South in the field. Now, I think that it's logical that South Vietnamese would looking ahead, seeing the day when we are going home, seeing the day when they're going to carry their own number. Wait, let me projection on that day that we're going home. That's the meat in the potato question. Let me finish just a moment, sir. That they would want to be able to reduce the risk to themselves during this time while we still have the kind of support capability we have in South Vietnam. Now President Nixon has made a number of promises and kept these promises to the letter on the reduction of troops in Vietnam. And he's going to stay on that timetable as a timetable with respect to bringing them home.

The timetable is at the present time to reduce by the end of May 1971 to have cut the troop level in half from what he encountered when he took office in 1969. He's got a quarter of a million men now. And he is also talking about the end of American combat role in South Vietnam. And that is by some gentleman, excuse me. So I'm afraid I'm losing control. Let me turn the microphone just for a moment over to Senator Cooper and ask him in the context of this very interesting debate. We've just had Senator whether you think the administration is on the way out of Vietnam. Yes, I do. And I think we have to look at the facts now. I know they're men in this country. They're men in the Congress. Senator Hart has expressed that to you. They do not believe that the administration actually intends to take the troops out in the war. There are others who believe that we still want to win the war. We still want to have found some way to actually defeat the North

Vietnamese. I'd like to say this in the first place. It's evident that North Vietnam wants to win the war. North Vietnam has been moving troops down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the South Vietnam since 1964, 54, and increasing that flow. We must look at these facts. From the beginning of 1961, when there was 650 American troops in South Vietnam, it rose under 1962 and 1963. It rose up until 1960 to 550,000 men and great casually. Now it is correct. We can't get away from the facts. Since President Nixon came in, the troops have already been reduced 165,000. There'll be almost half out in April the 1st and he says he will make another reduction. The casualty rates gone down 75% and the cost is gone down

and had. I think we have to look at these facts. I believe that he's the intent to finish, bring the troops out, and I believe he'll keep on schedule. There are some other questions involved which I have some views about. I'll talk about later. Senator, that was a beautiful introduction to our next piece of film as a matter of fact. The administration has argued from the beginning that this Laosian operation is a logical extension of its Vietnamization program. Turning over the actual fighting to the South Vietnamese, but any T correspondent David Proud reports that the scale of fighting we are now seeing would not be possible without massive United States military support. This is the public gunship, nearly $800,000 of the most sophisticated helicopter gunship in the world. It's maintained by highly skilled technicians and flown by highly skilled pilots. Here at flying tree, hundreds of millions of dollars, hundreds of the world's

best trained military pilots and maintenance men are working round the clock to provide vital air support for the South Vietnamese troops in Laos. A number of military and civilian observers are asking if this is what we mean by de-etnomizing the war. It appears obvious that the Laos invasion would not have taken place without U.S. air and artillery support. The question being asked now is if South Vietnam would or could have invaded Cambodia and make this Laosian invasion? Well, if the U.S. wasn't around to help. And if that's the case, if this is de-etnomization by our terms, when can we let the South Vietnamese go along with the expanding stuff? Gentlemen, de-etnomization. That really is what it's all about now. You may have noticed in some of the earlier discussion, I was holding you back just a bit on that subject because I wanted to free the decks so we could really go after that. I'd like to turn first as we did

at the beginning to to Maynard and Kai's beach and ask Maynard first if it's working. Maynard is de-etnomization working. Well, it's working in a certain context. In fact, it's working better than I thought it would two years ago. But it's working because of the tremendous effort by the military in bringing the South Vietnamese along. And in some areas, such as the Delta, they have been able to turn a great deal of the fighting over to the regional and popular forces, which are sort of like the National Militia or National Guard. The real reason, of course, I think, and one of the real reasons why it's working is because we have gone or went into Cambodia, and this has decreased the pressure on the southern part of South Vietnam. To those of us who have always looked at Vietnamization, the big flaw in it as a way out was that the South Vietnamese would never be able to handle the handle the North Vietnamese as long as they were in the sanctuaries. Thus, this meant at some point the war either had to be logically expanded

or the US had to be prepared to take a defeat in the field, it would be the South Vietnamese forces. The other thing, of course, about Vietnameseization is that I don't see it as a way out for a long, long time. I think we're going to have to provide massive support to the South Vietnamese for the next four or five years. I also think that although the administration says we will be getting out of a combat role, that we will have at least one and possibly two infantry divisions in a security role or a reaction role there for the next three or four years, if the president can possibly get away with this on the domestic front. Before I bring it back here, I'd like to turn the the subject over to Kai's immediately. Kai, do you agree with Maydard in this prognosis? In part. I suspected that. Yep, well, we're good friends, but I'd like to think we respect each other's views. I think the Vietnameseization has been the far greater success than many people are willing to admit.

The fact is that during the past couple of weeks, the South Vietnamese have been able to mount two 20,000 man operations, one into Cambodia, another one into Laos, simultaneously. Now, this is the much maligned, much revived Arden. Now, true, they would not have been able to do that without American logistical support, but the fact is that they are the people who went across the borders. They are the people who did the planting. They are the people who are executing this operation. And the American role in South in this war is really, in support of his combat is concerned, is relatively minor these days. I think the fact that they could mount these two operations speaks volumes about Vietnameseization. So I think Vietnameseization is only one aspect of it.

The object is to prevent the North Vietnamese from coming down South. Senator Hart, do you find that argument persuasive? I find that Mr. Beach using a narrow definition of American involvement in the current excursion, color what you will, into Laos, I got the impression that that massive air support represented the meat and the potatoes, the whole works, and absent that. That South Vietnamese arven group probably wouldn't be turning war loose in Laos as we and they have now turned at loose in Cambodia. And that apparently is the definition of Vietnameseization. Mr. Truett, may I say a word on that subject? I turn that over to Senator Baker on that point. Really, it seems to me that Senator Hart and I have a basic disagreement on what is meant by the ending of the war to begin with, which I'd like to come back to in just a moment. And the business of what's going on in Laos,

because from the statement you just made, it seems to me that there's the clear implication, although I think it's an unfortunate and an accurate implication, that the South Vietnamese have very curtly and very cold heartedly invaded Laos and are fighting Laotians. And we both know that that isn't the case. The South Vietnamese are fighting North Vietnamese who invaded Laos a long, long time ago. To relate that, if I may, to a comment that was very accurate and most perceptive by Senator Cooper, on the question of whether we're trying to win the war. I think clearly the position of this administration is not to obtain or seek a military victory, but rather to disengage and to turn the war over to the local nationals, the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese. So I don't think that's an issue. But it is true, as Senator Cooper pointed out, that the North Vietnamese want to win. And their policy is to win. And in furtherance of that policy, they have invaded Laos,

and they are using their bases in Laos to try to conquer and defeat South Vietnam and to win. So it seems to me that all of the accomplishments of this administration in the last two years, the reduction in troop commitments, the confidence that's been gained in this country, that we are committed to disengagement or for not. If we continue to say, well, the Arvin is no good. South Vietnam is not to be believed, and they couldn't do a thing if it weren't for American helicopters or American air support at all. Well, it's true, maybe. But it won't always be true in my judgment, because just as Mr. Parker and Mr. Beach, I believe both pointed out, Vietnamization probably has been more successful than they thought, or than most people thought, and frankly, more successful than I thought. But that gives me courage to think that they'll be even more self-reliant in the months and years just ahead. I think President Nixon richly undeserves to be disbelieved when he makes the categorical assertion that he's going to end the war, and that ought to be directly

contrary to the assumption or the inference that he's going to extend the war. Excuse me, sir. Or to seek a military victory. Let me turn to Senator Cooper on that point. Senator Cooper, what is your view on this? Well, I've always said that I believe that the president is withdrawing and will continue withdraw. I know the reason that the administration gives for these incursions or invasions or attacks in Cambodia and in Laos. It is on the theory that to protect our troops against further supplies and North Vietnamese attacks on our troops. And for the military standpoint, there's no question about that being a classic military operation. I do think, though, and this is where I get to my views about the future. I think I want to talk about the future a minute, just a minute. Because people do wonder how are we going to get out. I can't believe we're escalating the war when we're bringing people out. It's entirely different from the past where we're increasing the escalation and increasing the truth. But I must say that once the

Tonkin Bay Resolution was repealed, I do not think the president has an eighth-large at all except to withdraw. Now, Vietnamization, as I see it, and I'm talking rather legal terms. I know the man out in Southeast Asia as it was in World War II and we're in Europe. We thought the people back home didn't what it was all about. It's an entire different viewpoint. But we have to maintain our constitutional authority. When the Tonkin Bay Resolution was repealed, I don't think the president has any more authority to do anything except to withdraw our troops and protect them as they come out. I don't even believe... He hasn't the power to protect Cambodia or Laos without the consent of the Congress. He hasn't the power to protect South Vietnam and the Vietnamization program except as a means of getting out without the consent of the Congress. Let me interrupt you. The president would announce those saying that it would be a great relief in this country. He should be supported. I'm

supporting him because we have to support him. But I'm trouble too. And I think the announcement of this with getting out, we're not going to stay there for self-determination of these countries. We've tried that. We've done a lot for him. Let me turn to Mr. Trojan that point. Well, Mr. Troot, I think that the Cambodian operation itself has shown that you have changed radically the security situation and the Vietnamization progress, which is also an economic and a political and social program as well as a military program. In the lower two regions of South Vietnam, where more than 60% of the total population of South Vietnam lived. And that it was that change that came about because the enemy lost the sanctuaries in Cambodia. The arven troops went in. They performed very credibly. They came out with a new elan and a new spirit. They were able as your correspondence here, Mr. Parker and Mr. Beecher reported. They were able to turn a lot of responsibilities over to the regional and popular forces at the village level. Now you talk about the supplies for the North Vietnamese not coming through Sianokville.

All of it depends on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. If you'd taken this reverse situation and said, well, why didn't we do Laos before we did Cambodia in the sense of putting pressure on? Well, it wouldn't have made sense if 70 to 85% of all the goods came in through the back door through Sianokville or Kompong Somas now called. And today you have that closed. The Cambodians still standing there as a national force trying to say that they wish the South Vietnamese out of their country and they wish the assistance of the South Vietnamese in this effort. Now if the South Vietnamese put pressure on Laos, they are pressing on the jugular vein of the entire supply effort of the communist forces. There's no other way for 10 divisions of North Vietnamese in South Vietnam, for 40,000 North Vietnamese in Cambodia, for 60,000 North Vietnamese in Laos to get supplies other than the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I think that the president's support of the South Vietnamese operation into Laos is really another step toward strengthening South Vietnam's ability to meet its responsibilities. When we do cut that next step back,

and today American troops can step in and take the place of Arvin units who have left certain defensive positions to go into Laos. In the future, they'll have to carry that responsibility alone, but I think Senator Cooper has touched the vital issue. We are withdrawing, and we are not saying to win a war or we're seeking to achieve a peace. At that point now, let me go to Kai's meeting in Bangkok. Mayor, do you want to come in on that because I want to come in? Yes, I think we ought to not confuse this operation too much with the Cambodian operation, and you also ought to think of U.S. responsibilities in into China, not just in Vietnam. The Cambodian operation did close down Cien of Ville for good. The Laosian operation will only last a month or two, and the trail will still be usable. Secondly, the Cambodian operation did improve the situation in South Vietnam, but it has worsened the situation in Cambodia. The Cambodian army has not really won a battle in the last year. They have barely kept alive. The South Vietnamese have won battles for the

Cambodians in Cambodia. I think in fact that a good reason why the President finally decided to go into Laos was in fact not to improve the situation so much in South Vietnam, but because the Cambodian situation was getting very shaky indeed. Mayor, let me interrupt you. Right on that very point, and ask you a specific question in that respect. Would you hazard a guess having watched the war in Southeast Asia for some time? Would you hazard a guess as to how much time this kind of operation in the Laosian Panhandle might buy in terms of Vietnamization? If we stay in for until the middle of May, which is the beginning of the reigns in that part of the of Indochina, I think it'll buy one year. Is that going to be adequate to make a measurable difference in the process of Vietnamization and an improvement of the Cambodian army, for example? With the Cambodian army, I think that's a big question mark. They have tremendous fighting spirit, but getting them organized and equipped and trained is another matter. It might be

enough to let them have a holding action. So you have, in fact, a divided sort of country with with the Northeast and North Vietnamese hands and the area around Nampan and some of the other provinces close to Thailand in the sort of easy control of the Nampan government. But this, of course, also depends on whether there are any sort of political repercussions from Loneau's illness, which I think we really can't predict yet. Let me, Senator Baker. I may ask Mr. Parker, Mr. Beecher, a question generally in that connection. And that's whether or not, in your view, the operation in Loneau's may or may not have some bearing on the ability to have peaceful and orderly elections this fall. And Vietnam, as I understand it, or as I remember, the president, the premier, and the lore house, all of the lore house, will be elected in the second elections this fall. It seems to me that that might have been a motivating factor. I have no information to that effect, but I wonder if you have any views on that subject. Guys, I don't know that it was a motivating factor, but I do think that it strengthens, it certainly strengthens the

government's position in general. And it also, more specifically, strengthens president's two position in his bid for re-election, because the South Vietnamese, most of them, at least in my opinion, are very much for this Laos operation, just as they were for the Cambodian operation. It gives them a sense of satisfaction after being on the receiving end for so many years to be able to go in and try, at least, to cover the enemy. This is done a great deal for their morale, and a lot of people who don't like president, too, have developed sort of a grudging respect, or at least acceptance for him. This is an impression that I have, I have not conducted a poll on this. I also think, Hank, yes, go ahead,

man. Hank, that it's important in this respect to look at the internal political scene, because I think the other part of the President Nixon's scenario, for, in fact, if not winning the war, at least not losing it, is the election of president, too. And you have in South Vietnam, today, the fact that the President is beginning to join up his election campaign, that President Nixon personally asked Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams to stay on. So I think you're going to see a, to some degree, although will never be admitted, of course, an effort by the United States to make sure that President True is re-elected in South Vietnam, because this is one thing that would upset the administration's timetable, if there were political upheavals inside of them. I have absolutely no problem at all choosing to whom the next remark is attributed, Mr. Rose. Mr. True, I think that the idea of strengthening South Vietnam is definitely there. The idea that the communists are unable to smash an election, prevent an election, and have refused to join in the election

in a constitutional system, cast quite a verdict on a movement like the Viet Kong, which declared themselves to be revolutionary, and yet risk becoming an anachronism in their own country. And I think that the other side of this coin is that President Nixon is always stressed that there is a two-track policy, a Vietnamization is one, negotiation is the other. And I believe that much of what is being done and much of what is being accomplished really says to the North Vietnamese, time is not on your side. The longer you wait, the more you encounter these difficulties, the loss of the Cambodian sanctuaries, the strangling of the Ho Chi Minh Trail during this very vital two months or three months before the rains come. The loss of a year as Mr. Parker estimated on any capability they would have to launch new attacks of any significant size. Now this would really say to Hanoi with the hawks and the doves and the owls there on the Polet Bureau, those nine men who make the decision for the policy on their side. Well, what is the best course then? Is negotiation a real path? Shouldn't we meaningfully take up the offer of the President as he made the five point offer

for a new Indochina peace conference, for instance? If each year proves the North Vietnamese less able to carry out their announced goal of taking South Vietnam by force, then even a good revolutionary would have to say that perhaps the path lies in more political competition in the South, less reliance on northern troops, which incidentally are quite alien to South Vietnam. And as they run around Cambodia today, do not have the advanced bases and prepared sanctuaries anymore. So you have a very different view, I think, from Hanoi in light of these policies which show South Vietnam coming of age in its own security responsibilities. I address two questions ready to send her to heart on that point. Do you see South Vietnam coming of age politically, uh, Senator, or and do you feel the operation is worthwhile? No nation will come of age politically if it depends on the United States, the guide who's its president. If we have to stay in there in order to protect them or swing the election and that's very immature political country, maybe both of them are. Secondly, these rosy prediction, and I'm sure that the men out there on the

ground see it better than it was five years ago. But let's not be swept beyond reason on this because you can go back for decades and find the same kind of rosy things just around the corner. I fully expect victory after six more months of fighting. I was said by the French General in 1954 and we've got it through our own hierarchy. But I want to get to Senator Cooper's point which I think is the one that we should carefully distinguish. With him I believe that the only military action that is permissible to the United States out there now is that essential to protect the United States troops and not coming to the Congress. Without coming to the Congress which they give every sign of not coming to. There are two ways to do that.

One is the one that some of us have urged for a long time and that is to propose a date by which the United States shall complete its withdrawal of troops. No one can guarantee that the Vietnamese North Vietnamese will then help us carry our baggage to the boats. But it's likely that they'll stop taking passes that are troops. It's worth a try. And secondly, the point that Mr. Parker made that we are tearing up Indo-China and 15 years ago few Americans could locate it on a map. And what is the national interest that justifies us going beyond the minimum required to protect our withdrawing troops? Why this business of giving another year of blood out there so that the 5th Vietnamese division will then be as good as the 3rd device? Senator, let me interrupt you and ask Senator Baker how he feels about the question of a fixed date for a total of the United States withdrawal. Of course there are many

suggestions along these lines that have been presented in Congress and many others that have been discussed outside the Congress to fix a particular time and then to announce to the North Vietnamese and all the world that we'll leave. The rationale for that argument as I understand it from those resolutions and from the statement just made by Senator Hart is that the North Vietnamese then would know we are in fact disengaging on a day certain and they'd stop making passes in our troops. Well think about that just for a second because it seems to me that it might not work. I think it's right to think about it just for a moment in terms of the experience we've had thus far begin with the proposition that the President of the United States once again has categorically stated that he's going to end the war and de-americanize the conflict. They didn't stop making passes at our troops. Yeah but even Americans can't find out what that means. Well I think I understand what it means. That's a good point at the gentleman on which to raise again this question of credibility. It's one I believe you Senator Baker touched upon earlier and certainly we've had a

credibility gap in the short term. There's another credibility gap too though and I think it's worthy of making just this brief point that the North Vietnamese clearly have some purpose other than to see Americans leave South Vietnam because now that we've stated that we're going to leave South Vietnam they continue to bring this war to South Vietnam. So the only logical inference is that the North Vietnamese are serving some other purpose except to bring about American disengagement. I'll leave it to the rest of us to decide what that other purpose is. Let's assume that it's in order to unite the nation of Vietnam and under a government that will be communist. Well why not assume that it's not going to get out that they would leave us alone until we get out. You said yourself that they're going to stop making passes or some damage there. But Senator Hart what if they controlled Indochina? Senator Hart what that justify the wealth and the blood and the turmoil we're doing ourselves internally

wouldn't really. I think unless you can say yes I think you can't justify doing other than getting out and saying you're going to do it by a date. But now it's like you'd like to respond to that. Senator Hart you've touched on the central issue South North Vietnam is attempting to control all of Indochina the the action in Laos over a decade violating two Geneva courts. I'm making the assumption that South Vietnam well they have no right to that Senator Hart I think that if you see the neighborhood of Southeast Asia and you look at those people in their diversity and they are indeed diverse and we're not talking about democracy we're talking about diversity. Those people have a right to be diverse the Lao the Cambodian the Thai the South Vietnamese are just as much the countries and the boundaries and the peoples and the societies as if we see the polls and the checks and the Yugoslavs can make the same case we're not over there. Senator Cooper would like to be president. I have said already I support the president is ever to get out and I support the idea of self-determination but the United States cannot decide for every country what its

government shall be and actually I say now that my view of the president's power is to withdraw unless it comes to Congress that he has a right to use all methods to protect our troops and coming up but we really under our Constitution and I and no president I'm just not correct this presentation can save Cambodia Laos or even Vietnam without coming to Congress and I want him to pull out he is getting out and he ought to be believed I cannot stand why people don't believe him when he say he's not getting out we want to believe he wants to I believe Lyndon Johnson would have so no I believe his more fill is more not it would lend a number new marically he's bringing the troops down but he is doing it in a fashion that unless we fix a date certain it becomes perfectly evident as you look at those films going to be there with logistics for a long time doing awful damage to other people we've cut our troops in half we've cut our casualties to a fraction we've cut our expenditures down and yet you say

Senator Baker I'm sorry to interrupt you but we've run out of time Senator Hart please think he cannot cut it in this fashion and one of the reasons we run out of time is that date would you please give me the floor gentlemen we've run out of time to complete it that was a fascinating discussion we're grateful to Senators Baker Cooper and Hart and to Mr. Drove for talking with us here the guys Beach and Maynard Parker in Bangkok and to David Proudwick for his reports from the Laosian border we've covered a great deal of distance in the past hour all with whom we have talked to agree with the basic concept of yet normalization all agree I believe that the current operations are going well from the military standpoint but disagreement comes on the means to yet normalization those who see the Laosian operation as an extension of yet normalization are challenged by those who believe the United States may be only sinking deeper in the mire the answers are in dispute as they have been for six years we hope the discussion is contributed to a better understanding on your part this is Henry Trullet good night from NET and Washington for technical reasons this broadcast was recorded just prior to airtime this

evening by NET Washington the program was unrehearsed and unedited and was a presentation of NET special events