Thirty Minutes With…; Colson

[silence, tone] [silence] [silence] [silence] [silence] [silence] [music] [music] [music] [intro music, drums] [intro music] [intro music] People. From Washington across the nation and abroad. People of consequence are questioned on the issues of our time by Elizabeth Drew. On Thirty Minutes With. Tonight, Charles W. Colson, special counsel to the President. Mr. Colson, you've been one of the most important members of the President's White House

staff. You've seldom seen though, sort of one of the mysterious ones there. You've been called a number of things, the General Patton of the President's reelection forces. You've been called Mr. Fix-it and called the Hatchet Man. You're famous for having said, yes, it's true, you would walk over your grandmother, if necessary. I'd like to start with some comments the President made this week when he was talking about the peace settlement and he talked to the press corps, and he said that the least pleasure out of the peace agreement comes from those who were the most outspoken advocates of peace at any price. To whom was he referring? - I don't know that the President was specifically referring to any individuals, but I think it is true that those who have had the least to say, favorable, the least to say in support of the peace agreement are those who, through the past four years, have been the President's sharpest, severest critics. I think it's whether it's in the media or in the Congress. I don't think in 100 years we have had a President who has had to take more scorn and

heat and criticism from those who would have had us leave Vietnam regardless of the consequences while the President continued to stand firm in his determination to achieve peace with honor. And I think you, I can get into a lot of specifics. I don't think the President had any particular individuals in mind. - Well, do get into specifics. - Well, for example, Clark Clifford, who's a prominent Washington lawyer, former Secretary of Defense, was Secretary of Defense during the period that we had our most massive build-up in Vietnam, left office with 550,000 Americans in a ground war to which there was no end, no way to get us out of it. One of the really, one of the most difficult situations that any President could inherit. President Nixon began on a course four years ago of ending America's involvement, winding down the war, of bringing our troops home, of bringing stability and peace in Southeast Asia.

Through it all, the man who left his Secretary of Defense, left us in a terribly difficult situation, was probably one of the President's harshest critics. Just January 13th, 10 days before the peace settlement, Tom Braden wrote a column in which he quoted at length from a Clifford memorandum in which Clifford said there can never be a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The only way out of Vietnam is to withdraw in exchange for our prisoners. Just get out, forget the consequences to 50 million people who live in Southeast Asia. And I think the grossest hypocrisy, really, shocking hypocrisy of the man who contributed so much to our being in Vietnam for him to be so consistently wrong and so harsh in his criticism of the President. - I don't mean to single out Mr. Clifford... - You just did. - But I think he just represented, well, he's representative, really, of a group of people who would have compromised this country's position in Vietnam. - Well, now, what do you mean by that? We could have some discussion of Mr. Clifford's specific role and we'll leave him to

him to answer that. But what do you mean would have compromised this country's position? - Well, I don't think since President Lincoln, that any President has had to face more severe, vituperative criticism of a policy that was designed to bring about an honorable peace, a peace that, or at least an opportunity for the people in Southeast Asia to live in peace and to achieve a measure of stability, all the time that the President was doing this, standing very firm in his belief that we could achieve, ultimately, not only an end to America's involvement, but a ceasefire that would stop the killing in Southeast Asia. All through this time, the very people, really, the Eastern establishment that had been part of the New Frontier, the Kennedy Cabinet that came to Washington, that got us into Vietnam in the first place. They were the harshest critics of the efforts of this President to get us out honorably. - Did they want a dishonorable peace by your terms?

- I would call it a dishonorable piece, yes. I think if America had left Vietnam, and there were many, many occasions when that would have been a very tempting thing to do politically, had America left Vietnam to continue... left, withdrawn from Vietnam without regard to the consequences to the people of South Vietnam, who, after all, had relied on us in the first place when we made our commitment to go in and help them, whether that commitment was wise or not, is beside the point. I think if we had done that, it would have been a dishonorable thing. I think that 25 years from now, our children or grandchildren, might be fighting in another war that could well have been brought about by the fact that countries in the future could not rely upon the United States as the great defender of freedom. And I think that it had our commitment ever been compromised, this would have been dishonorable. - Now why would they have wanted a dishonorable settlement? Are they less patriotic than the President? - No. I don't question their patriotism at all. I think that really you have people who, in the case of Mr. Clifford, in the case

of others who were part of the previous administrations, including those on the Hill who in the Congress who voted to support the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to put us in Vietnam in the first place. I think they realized that they had done a pretty miserable job. We had a war that, when President Nixon took office, we had a war that had been constantly escalating. There was no foreseeable end in sight. We really did not have a plan for allowing Vietnam to go it on their own. President Nixon came in. He immediately began a program of Vietnamization. He began to get American forces out. He began diplomatic maneuverings at all levels that resulted in this honorable peace and I think the people who perhaps had a sense of guilt or a sense of failure simply couldn't reconcile themselves to the fact that this man who had been their political opponent was

doing successfully that which they couldn't do. That's just a little bit of sour grapes, perhaps on their part. - The opposition of the doves on the Hill make it more difficult for the President to settle a war. - Oh, enormously so. There were many times, Liz, in the course of the past four years in which the negotiations would be at a state where we had hoped that perhaps they would be concluded successfully. And it was almost---obviously coincidence---but it was a tragic coincidence that time and time again when we would have an opportunity we thought perhaps to achieve a successful negotiation with the North Vietnamese, one of the hundreds and hundreds of anti-war resolutions, of motions in the Senate, amendments to cut off funds, amendments to force the President to withdraw without regard to the consequences. These would come at the most unfortunate times.

I think had the President enjoyed the kind of bipartisan support that President Eisenhower had from former President Lyndon Johnson when he was a majority leader in the Senate, and Sam Rayburn, if we'd that kind of bipartisan support I think the war would have ended much sooner than it did. - Senators Church and Case and perhaps some others are sponsoring legislation now to prevent the President from going, from using any forces to go back into Vietnam whether not just ground but air. Do you think that would dangerously tie the President's hands? - Yes, I think that would be a terrible mistake in this country. It doesn't matter who was President, it doesn't matter which party is in power, it really doesn't matter who was in control of the Congress or the presidency. But the President as Commander in Chief and as chief executive has to have the flexibility, he is after all the sole instrument of foreign policy under our Constitution. And he must have a degree of flexibility, it would be a tragedy if his hands were to be tied in such a way that he could not do that which was necessary for the United

States foreign policy anywhere in the world, not just Vietnam. - The President also said to the press this week, quote, we have achieved a peace with honor. I know it gags some of you to write that phrase but it is true, unquote. Why does he think that? Why does he think that they don't want a peace with honor or that they don't believe him or what made him say something like that to the press? - Well, I think after a period of years, many of the critics in the press began to have almost a vested interest in our failure. It's a tragic thing but it's true that to be wrong for so long as so many were. - They wanted... they wanted us to fail in Vietnam? - Well, I think they were disappointed that we succeeded where they said that success would be impossible. I think they were, I just noticed this week a fascinating column by Vermont Royster, who certainly considered a great dean of the journalism fraternity, in which he's... - Please don't read the whole column, we don't have much time. - Well, just one pertinent quote.

He talked about how when he had seen the President speak and announced the peace agreement that he kept turning his dial, hoping to find some commentator who would say, "Hallelujah." And he said, he said, there just wasn't anybody, he said, "On one network, the newsman was so stunned, they seemed unable to come up with that instant analysis for which they were so famous. Although they had known the whole day long, the substance of what the President would say. On another, the gloom was so thick, you could cut it with a knife. Long, drawn faces suggesting that they did not know what terrible things portended after the peace. - You've had some other harsh things to say yourself about the way the media wrote about the war. You hit CBS News, you hit the columnist James Reston and Joseph Kraft, and you said of Mr. Kraft, his columns quote, "are holy writ to the sellout brigades," not getting into the merits of Mr. Kraft's columns unless you want to, who are the sellout brigades that you were referring to? - I think those who would have had us leave Vietnam without an honorable settlement, leave Vietnam in a state of war, those who argued that the President should leave regardless of the consequences, those who said just take our troops and get out, and forget about

the fact that you made a commitment to defend the people of South Vietnam, or to help them defend themselves, or to give them the right of self-determination. - Do you, is the logical conclusion of all of this then, that by opposing the war, you know, by the politicians or the press who opposed the President's policy, they made it more difficult for him to settle the war? - Enormously more difficult was the... I don't think I've ever been prouder, as an American, as I was with the President on May 8th, when five months before the election, I went into him the afternoon before he made his announcement that we would resume bombing of North Vietnam, and mining of the harbors of North Vietnam, and I talked to the President about the domestic political consequences, concerned as I was with an upcoming election, and we forget now in hindsight, but that was a time when the Harris poll had Senator McGovern only seven points behind the President.

Most of the columnists and commentators were talking about a close election, and I talked about the domestic political consequences with the President of what he was doing, and he said, you know, it doesn't, this job wouldn't be worth being reelected to if I did not do the right thing. No President could occupy this office and feel that he was able to lead a great nation because we wouldn't any longer be a great nation, and if the consequences of my action are harmful to me politically, then that's the price I must pay, and I left the office that particular day feeling that thank God that we have a President with the courage and the wisdom, the plain guts to do what is right, and regardless of the consequences to him. - The, by your definition, the quote sellout brigades is a rather large group of people, isn't it? - I think there are, there are those in the Congress whose opposition to the war is well known.

Senator Fulbright, Senator McGovern, Senator Church, Senator Kennedy. - Are they part of the sellout brigade? I think they wanted us, I think they would have had us leave Vietnam without regard to the consequences. They'd be part of what I called in the New York Times article the sellout brigade, yes. - The networks brought the war to our living rooms in a way that no other war had ever been brought. Do you think that that hurt the President's efforts to end the war? - No, I think the reporting of this war made it very different from prior wars. I mean, it's one thing to read about, I mean war is a brutal thing, and I think the President's greatest goal in life and greatest dream and greatest hope is to create a generation of peace, which will mean we won't have more wars, but it's one thing to read about a war that has taken place thousands of miles away. Americans have been spoiled. We've fought in many wars, but they've never been here at home. With modern technology, with communications, bringing war and the horrors of war into the

living room of every American with a television set, there isn't any question that that exacerbated public feelings, made people that much more conscious of the war, but that's just part of modern communications. - I've been very involved in media policy at the White House, and a number of your colleagues have made a number of suggestions, at least out loud in public speeches, as to what they think ought to be done about changing media, regulation of the media, the way the media ought to change. What's the Colson solution? - Well, the Colson solution is not very novel. I think the networks have a public trust, which is something that most people don't realize. A broadcast, a television station, is a license that's granted by the government, granted by the government, it's granted by the people. The public airwaves are used by a limited number of licensees.

It's a little bit like going out and getting a charter to operate a bus company. You're a public utility, you're regulated. Networks are constantly talking about wanting unrestricted First Amendment rights. They want the same right to say or do whatever they want without restriction. But at the same time, they really are using public airwaves as a public trustee, as the Supreme Court has held in a decision in 1969, the famous Red Lion case. You can't have it both ways. You can't have a free license given to you by the public, which you can, by the way, sell for hundreds of millions of dollars, and not have a concomitant responsibility to present to the public a fair and balanced perspective on the news. 60% of the American people say that their prime source of news is television. That means with three networks having 200, approximately 200, affiliates each one, 600 stations, that being the prime source of news to the American people,

you can't have that as a public license without having a responsibility that goes along with it. - So what would you do? - I would do one of two things. I would either enact legislation, which Tom Whitehead has talked about, and which the administration will be proposing, which sets more definitive standards for broadcast licensees to be fair and balanced in their presentation to the public. - To be decided by? - Well, it has to be decided by the... by standards that would be adapted in the law, which basically are in the law today. The Communications Act today requires, and the courts have required, that networks present both sides of an issue, any controversial issue. They must present the conflicting viewpoints. They don't do a very good job of it. I'm simply saying they should be held to that standard, or we could do what Milton Friedman suggested four years ago, and auction off a broadcast license. If anyone wants to have a television station, they can buy it from the government, pay

the taxpayers. It's then their property. - In perpetuity? Forever? - Certainly. And if they want to broadcast, the same way you start a newspaper, well, it's not perpetuity as long as you can make it a profitable venture. - Where does the public interest come in there? - Well, you would then have a diversity. You then have genuine competition. Today you have an incredible monopoly. - Well, how do we know we'd have competition, why? - Well, but that's the way things are in our society. That's why you have competition on newspapers. You have people who write as Mr. Loeb does for the Manchester Union Leader. One point of view, you have people who write as Ben Bradlee does. One point of view for the Washington Post. If you were to auction off broadcast licenses, then if you wanted to buy a television station and you could raise the capital, you could bid for it and get it. - No one could challenge my ownership of it. Forever, for as long as I wanted to own it. - You could present any views on that particular station that you wanted to be. - If I were rich enough and there's no chance, I would be.

What would prevent me from buying all the television stations or 400 of them? - I think the antitrust laws would prevent you from doing that. - So that there would be some limits on that kind of ownership. - Certainly. - Other than that, whoever is rich and have devised to buy the community station might be able to do it. - Well, that's the case today, you have enormous concentration of economic power in three networks. And they really control, basically control the views of their... To a large extent of the views of their choice. - Your plan would break up the networks. - What might break up the networks? The networks are going to be broken up one way or another in the next four or five years. - What do you mean? - Well, because you have a very rapidly moving new technology in communications. You have cable, you have video cassettes, and the viewing public is going to have a wide range of choices. They're not going to be confined to three networks, and that'll be a very healthy thing in that instance. - Well, I wondered if you also meant that the government might help that process along of breaking up the networks.

- Well, I think the government has to in a regulatory sense because there have been restrictions on the growth of cable television, which restrictions have been fought very hard to maintain... by the networks that fought very hard to maintain those restrictions. And to stifle the growth of cable TV, but cable TV will come. It will require some regulatory changes in the Federal Communications Commission. Some changes in broadcast policy by the Office of Telecommunications Policy. But this is happening. This is the trend of things, and it will be... it will be healthy for the country when it does come. It will have not only competition for advertisers' dollars, but you will have competition for ideas and competition for different viewpoints, and that's healthy in our society. - The Watergate trial, at least the stage of it ended this week with the conviction of two, the other five defendants having pleaded guilty. One of those who pleaded guilty was Mr. Hunt, who was your friend who was brought into the White House by you.

What did you bring him in the White House to do? - He was brought in as a consultant, Liz, to work on the Pentagon Papers project, the classification of the Pentagon Papers, the security aspects, of the fact that highly classified government documents had been stolen and published, and that was in 1971. - Did you keep track of what he was doing when he was there? - No. The cases now on appeal from the two defendants, the two defendants who were convicted, five pleaded guilty, it was tried by the Justice Department, by your own Justice Department, the U.S. Attorney, the judge professed some frustration in learning what had really happened. Is the case closed? Is the American public to assume that they are never going to know really who ordered this breaking and entrying of the Democratic headquarters? - Well, I don't know whether the case is closed or not. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on the judicial process.

It may well be that on appeal, the case will be reopened. I really know very little about the case. As I've said publicly, I knew nothing about the Watergate, had no involvement in it, and what I know about the case is what I read, and I assume I can believe some of the things I read. Senator Ervin is going to hold hearings on the Watergate incident. If he calls you to testify, will you? - I'd be happy to tell Senator Ervin or anyone else exactly what I've just said to you, which is that I had no knowledge or involvement in the Watergate. The delicate question of executive privilege and separation of powers between the legislative and executive branch is something that has to be settled, but if I... I have spent a few hours in civil litigation that was brought by the Democratic National Committee telling them everything I knew, which I think disappointed them greatly. I told them, under oath, in a deposition with Bennett Williams, all that I knew, and it could

have been done in five minutes or less, I've never been reluctant to say what I knew about the Watergate or didn't know about it. - You raise a point of the possibility of executive privilege, and you are leaving the White House on March 1st, is that right? So you couldn't call, use executive privilege after that, could you? - I think the question of the confidentiality of the relationship of a personal advisor to the President, or a personal advisor to a member of Congress, is something that survives whether you're still on the White House staff or not, or still on a congressional staff or not. There is a well-established doctrine of separation of powers in which we have recognized the right of members of Congress, members of the judiciary, members of the executive branch to receive confidential advice and counsel from close advisors. That has nothing to do with

when you give it, or when your relationship begins or ends. - That's something that you'll be fighting out with Senator Ervin, I'm sure. - I know that I will be. - Well, if you try to use executive privilege... - It's not a question of the individual using executive privilege. You're talking about a doctrine that's pretty well established in constitutional law in this country, and I'm not going to prejudge what will happen, that really is... that's a hypothetical question at this point. I'll simply say that I'm glad to say to you when I've said to everyone else who's asked me about the Watergate. - You are going to leave the White House March 1st, and it's been announced that you're going to remain a consultant to the White House, so you're going to be a paid consultant to the White House. - No, I think what Ron Ziegler said when my resignation was announced was that the president was glad that I would be in Washington and available to consult with him from time to time. I would think that's kind of an informal arrangement. - Now you're going to be doing that and practicing law. Is there any potential conflict of interest that you see in that?

- I don't think so. - It has also been announced... well, we at least know that one of you... - I'd certainly avoid it if I thought there was. - One of your future clients is going to be the Teamsters Union. Do you see any ethical problem in lining up your clients before you leave the White House? - Well, I don't think I... I've been very careful not to line up clients before I left the White House. The Teamsters announced that they were switching law firms, and that received a great deal of national publicity. I've had a very close working relationship with many labor unions during the period that I've been in the White House. I would hope I'd continue to have an association with them. This is a little bit – you know, the double standard. I gave up a very lucrative law practice to come into the government. I'm delighted I did. I've loved every minute of it. I did it because I have a great... a deep belief in the President and his administration and in serving the country. When you come into government, you leave behind all of your private affiliations.

And when you go out of government, you hope that you'll be successful in the – - Most of you do all right, though, don't you, really, after you leave. - I did all right before I came in. - Were there any ground rules, though, about the kinds of arrangements that people leaving the White House could make while they were still there, or the contacts they could have with people that they might be working for or with after they left, any ground rules over there about that? Sure. The conflict of interest statutes apply very rigorously, that no one who leaves the government can handle a matter that was pending before him while he was a government official. And I would certainly scrupulously adhere to the statutes and to the spirit of the statutes and the regulations that have been promulgated. - You chaired what was called the "attack group" during the campaign, which was a... - Other people called it the attack group. - All right. I said it was called. I didn't say you called it. Do you have any concern about the boundaries of the ability of one party to participate in the activities of the other one?

Do you think maybe we have any problem with that in this country? - I don't think I understand your question. - Well, there were widespread reports of sabotage, of involving in other... people in other campaigns. We don't know enough about it yet, Senator Muskie said that there was systematic sabotage of his campaign. Are you worried that we may be running into a problem of the limits of involvement in other parties' campaigns? - Well, that's wholly divorced from what you call the attack group in the campaign. - It is? During the campaign, we were concerned strictly with defending the administration against the daily barrage of attacks that, some of them pretty outrageous, that Senator McGovern was making upon the President. - We just... That's part of a campaign. - Excuse me, Mr. Colson. We're out of time. Thank you very much for coming. - Glad to be here, Liz. 30 minutes with special counsel to the President, Charles W. Colson, an unedited unrehearsed interview with Elizabeth Drew, recorded February 1, 1973.

This has been a production of N-PACT, a division of the Greater Washington Educational Telecommunications Association. [synthesized PBS tones] [silence]