At Issue; 7; Changes in U.S.-Soviet Relations

. . . . . The American Soviet relationships of the past 12 months have been marked by rapid changes and by contradictions. Just a year ago, these relations approached a serious crisis with the news that Soviet missile installations had been discovered in Cuba. Anxiety and tension ran high as President Kennedy appeared on television to voice the nation's concern over this development.

Yet one year later found not only an easing of this tension, but positive cooperation in the signing of the test van treaty. Amidst qualifications and official cautions, American-Soviet relations seemed substantially improved. The precariousness of the situation was again evident with the delaying of an American convoy in East Germany. The otherwise calm and cooperative atmosphere was in danger of being shattered by an incident with no apparent reason. Yet in keeping with these times of change and contradiction, a Soviet mission was then meeting with American officials to discuss details of an unprecedented sale of wheat to ease the internal problems of the Soviet people. The moods of these changes have been as varied as the events themselves. They have ranged from first competition in the race to space, as reflected here in the

UN honours to Soviet cosmonauts to suggestions for a cooperative effort to land the first man on the moon. Now there is talk of a severe cutback in the space efforts of both nations. Perhaps the closest point of contact is Berlin, where the problems of the Cold War continue to be at issue. And at a time when many Americans are beginning to relax and enjoy the vision of a calmer future with the Soviets, the United States is flexing its muscles with an historic airlift and show strength in Germany. What do these constant changes and contradictions mean? What is America's true direction in its relations with the Soviets? The at-issue commentator this week is Zbignif Brzynski, Professor of Government at Columbia University and Director of its Research Institute on Communist Affairs.

Good evening. Our guests tonight are Mr. Roger Fisher, Professor of Law at Harvard University and Mr. William Griffith of the Center for International Studies at MIT and Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. I think we're all agreed, gentlemen, that there has been a major change in American Soviet relations. And I wonder what your reaction would be to the following formulation of the nature of that change and of the direction which it is now taking. In my judgment, the real change was caused by the confrontation last year in Cuba. Up to that point, the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy which we might define as one combining sustained political and military pressure on the West in the hope of achieving a major breakthrough particularly in the area of the most direct conflict of interest, namely Berlin and Western Europe. Cuba seemed like a desirable shortcut. Yet the confrontation in Cuba and the threat of war

with which the Soviet Union was suddenly, and I think basically unexpectedly faced, forced the Soviet leaders to recognize for the first time that their means were short of their ends. And they undertook a very fundamental reappraisal of the present relationship with the United States and they concluded that we are now in a phase of quiescence, and for the time being there are no major opportunities for change. The other alternative, namely of the national liberation struggle, being more or less foreclosed by the Chinese preempting of it. This being so, I think we have now a new opportunity for an improved American Soviet relationship and on our side and on their side, there have been explorations in order to achieve such a new relationship. Yet it seems to me that we should be very conscious, first of all, of what brought it about, namely the unexpected short strength by the United States, and also very conscious of the dangers which this new relationship could produce for us, particularly in Europe. If the West Europeans are made to feel by the Soviets, the United States is now sponsoring the division of Europe and accepting the prominence of the division of Germany

and is unwilling to insist on our position in Berlin. I think this has to be viewed with considerable seriousness, because if this were to come to pass, it would undermine the present phase of quiescence. I think it is in this context that we ought to examine the deals, such as the weed deal, the new arrangements for aeroplane travel between Washington and New York and Moscow and the other side, and any other tokens of the improved American Soviet relationship. They have to be viewed in this overall political context and seen in the overall perspective which sees this change as being important in the light of the previous confrontation. I wonder if I could have a reaction for you, Mr. Fisher, to this formulation. Well, I agree with a lot of what you have said, but I really would disagree in terms of where we go from here, whether that formulation, whether it is saying we must consider each piece as a part of the overall political confrontation,

is the wisest course for going ahead. Our relations with the Soviet Union have been conducted on this block-to-block cold war bases where every issue was looked at part of an overall contest for victory or for defeat in a war. I think that that perception of our relations, which lay behind perhaps the French ambassador's statement, that we should wait until the Soviet Union abandons its aggressive intentions until we ease tensions. But that formulation is a poor one for working ahead. No one's going to win an unconditional surrender in this political contest. We are going to work ahead, hopefully, pushing the world more the way we would like to see it. And I assume the Soviet Union will continue to hope that the world will go the way they would like to see it, although some means may not be available to them. Rather than asking that each issue be judged as part of an overall issue,

I would say, let's break it up. Let's fractionate the Cold War. Let's look at each issue on its merits and see if it makes sense. Because in that way, where we have common interests, we can move ahead. And worrying less about precedent, less about political consequences, if the wheat deal makes sense, that's to our mutual advantage. We can convince the Europeans it does nothing about Berlin. If the Civil Aviation Agreement is to our advantage, as well as the Soviet Union, as I believe it to be, it will increase the number of visitors from the Soviet Union to this country, then that's to our interests. And if it's really to our interest, let's tell the world it's to our interest, and that's why we did it. Now, I'd rather look at each case on its independent merits. I wonder if that's going to Griffith to lead off? Well, like Mr. Fisher, I would think I would agree in general with your diagnosis of the present situation. The confrontation in Cuba proved to the Soviet Union that its strength was not sufficient,

and our will was not sufficiently weak to enable them to push us back, particularly in respect to Berlin and Germany. But I would disagree with his ideas for our future conduct. I find them unrealistic as to foreign policy in general, and with hardly any relation to the attitude of the Soviet Union toward foreign policy. The Soviet Union never looks at things individually. It always looks at them from the point of view of the total political picture. The Soviet Union is inexcerably indefinitely and indomitably concerned with revolutionizing the societies of the rest of the world. What has happened in respect to Cuba is simply that its power to revolutionize has been, it realizes, diminished. Its will to revolutionize has, I think, not been, and where there any possibility that it would be, the even more furious will of the Chinese would, I think, prevent this from taking place. I agree that we should negotiate with the Soviet Union when there are common interests,

and there are certainly common interests in avoiding an accidental term in nuclear war, for example. We can be sure that the Soviet Union will see these as well as we will. But the question of wheat or the question of airlines, we may think that it is not a political question. The Soviets will never think so. The question in general of dealing with the Soviet Union on the basis of, as I seem to sense Mr. Fisher was talking about, about going beyond the Cold War, is about like saying to somebody, well, I'm going to get out of the water, and I will assume you will, but he stays in the water. The Soviet Union is not going to abandon the Cold War, Mr. Khrushchev has said and says it again and again, that for him peaceful coexistence, that is to say things like the signature of the test band treaty, mean the intensification of the class war, the intensification of the Cold War, by means other than actual interstate military conflict. And as for the question of relaxing our guard in general and in Europe in particular,

I would again agree, agree with Mr. Prženski's diagnosis. It seems to me that if the Cuban crisis has proven anything, it has proven that the United States cannot afford to accept parity in strategic weapons with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is an aggressive power. The United States is a status quo power. We therefore must, as Secretary McNamara has said, indefinitely maintain strategic superiority. And finally, as Mr. Prženski said about Germany and Berlin, we could not, if we wished, make a deal with the Soviet Union on the status quo, because the status quo cannot and will not indefinitely continue in Europe, and in particular in Central Europe and in Germany. Any attempt on our part to do this would not only be contrary to our interests, but far worse would drive the Germans first into the hands of the French, then into the hands of neutralism, and finally and most probably into the hands of the Soviet Union. You've bitten off an awful lot there, Mr. Grafford.

I wish I had taken full notes and come back with you at each one of these points. But for the first major premise that the Soviet Union will continue to look at the world as a total confrontation, a political confrontation for political purposes. I accept that. I believe that the communists in this country during the Depression saw our problems in terms of a class war, and that they continued to look at them that way. The question for those of us who are not Marxists, for those of us who are not communists, is what is the best way to deal with people who look at the problem that way? I suggest that if Franklin D. Roosevelt had run on the program, let's win the class war. If he had said this is a class struggle in which the communists are trying to take away from the rest of us, and let's fight it as a class struggle, it would have been unfortunate for this country. But let's take these issues one by one, perhaps. Maybe that would be more fruitful then. Let's take the weak deal, for instance. Do you feel that this is a political or a non-political issue? What do you feel are the benefits for the Russians? What do you feel are the benefits for us?

Well, I feel that we have no loss except the general well-being of the Soviet people, and I believe that is not a loss. And therefore, we are disposing of surplus wheat, which we do not have a market. We are selling at a market price, and we're being paid for it, and we are also demonstrating that if people want to buy wheat, we're prepared to conduct the transactions on a merit basis, rather than saying, since you're communists, you go hungry. From the viewpoint of you, you view this primarily as a humanitarian, not as an economic venture. I look at all the arguments about the wheat deal, and I say, I think it's still our interest. I think the fact that the Soviet interest does not make it less to our interest. But you say people won't go hungry in the Soviet Union. You feel this is an important argument? I think this is one advantage, that I regard discriminating against people because of the government under which their existing is unfortunate. Do you happen to know, by the chance, how much wheat the Soviet Union exported last year?

No, I do not. The exported close to five million tons, and their grain exports were close to eight million tons last year. And this is more or less on the level of the last few years exports. And furthermore, they exported to countries, to which they're exporting primarily for political reasons. GDR, East Germany, Trepposlavakia, Poland, Brazil and Cuba were the most important recipients. And this is a very political interest, isn't it, for the Soviet Union to be able to maintain these commitments? The question really is not that anyone will go hungry in the Soviet Union, is it? I don't think this is at all relevant. Well, I don't think it is fundamentally either, but I would, strangely, as a very perhaps senior Mr. Fisher, I would agree with him in this instance. I think that it would be more to our disadvantage, to refuse to sell wheat to the Soviet Union, than it would be, if we sold it. I think it would be because we cannot stop wheat getting there via third party. But just second, the question is not whether it would be to our disadvantage or advantage to sell it or not. The real political question is, what do we get in return? And we can only answer that question if we ask ourselves,

what is the essence of the wheat deal to the Soviets? And the importance of the wheat deal to the Soviets is one, to maintain Soviet exports of grain, which the Soviet Union wishes to continue exporting for political reasons, and two essential to avoid brought social dissatisfaction within the Soviet Union with the collective farm system. It's not a question of anyone going hungry. This is a totally relevant consideration. Now, we know that in Yugoslavia and Poland, they abandon the collective farm system, because they couldn't resolve this problem. Now, I don't think we can insist that the Soviets, for instance, acknowledge our position in Berlin in return for the wheat deal. The positions are not equivalent. But I think there are a number of marginal issues of the political sort, on which we could insist as a quid pro quo. I rather doubt it for a very specific reason. I think that if we did not sell the wheat to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would be able, by hook or by crook, to get it, vs. purchases through third parties. By, for example, buying wheat from the French or the Germans or the British, who in turn had bought it on the market in this country.

I'm also sure of that, because the fact that the Soviet Union is coming to buy wheat from us is very embarrassing for the Soviets. I don't think they're doing it in order to alleviate our surplus problems or to help our balance of exchange difficulty. So they are probably coming to us because they don't really have that much choice. They really need it very quickly. Well, I think they need it very quickly. And this is a basic problem. So here is, again, a room for maneuver. I'm not saying we shouldn't do it, but I think there are a number of issues in which we could insist, for instance, by way of an example. I don't think we can resolve the Berlin problem. But I think we could get an understanding from the Soviets that the harassment of the sort, which were subjected a few weeks ago, will not be undertaken, subject to someday a resolution of the Berlin problem. Now, I think these are the marginal types of issues in which we couldn't insist. I doubt that you wouldn't get it. I wonder if the official could get one. Well, the big question, the context underlying your statement, is that every move that's made the Soviet Union should continue to be conducted as an overall relationship, which is political. Which is political.

Which is political. Which is political. Which is political. Which is political. Which is political. Which is political. Which is political. Add Nassionim, if you want the Latin for between nations. But you do everything to highest level interrelating each problem. Now, as a process of dealing with countries, I think we want to get away from that. I think that we're hoping to improve our relations with the Soviet Union. We have two interests. One, avoiding war and two, advancing our general interest in making the world way we would like it to be. And that in the interest of reducing the risk of conflict and improving the lot of those countries we want to affect. I think we'll do better to take each problem, whether it's the post office. And instead of saying we won't deliver you letters in the post office, unless you won't put build your embassy building in the wrong part of Washington, D.C. Or we won't let Soviet ships go to the site Lawrence Seaway, unless you stop supporting Castro here. But I think that conduct everything on that basis makes them very precarious. It means that when there's a 30-minute extra delay on the auto route,

you're thinking of nuclear war. Whether it's a misunderstanding or whatever it came from. And that it's far better to work toward a process of international relations in which the Berlin route is dealt with by a corporal. And if you need to, you can talk to the sergeant on that. And that's treated as a small question. The way we treat the question about the seals out in the Pacific, where we catch Soviet seals from the Priviloth Islands. They catch our seals at the end of the year. We sell them in St. Louis and we pay them the price. And there's any difficulty. The Fish and Wildlife Service straightens it out. I think that if we can work toward a way in which problems the political element, the nation-to-nation, here's thermonuclear war standing in the background, is reduced. And you tend to have it divided up, break up the conflict. And then it's not a question of being soft or hard. No one says, are you soft on Mexico or hard on Mexico? You say, what's the problem? No one says, are you soft on Kentucky or hard on Kentucky or Montana? It doesn't occur to anyone. That's the way to deal with Kentucky.

Even when a Kentucky may have national instincts. But don't you think there's a rather big difference between... A Moscow is not Kentucky. Yeah. I think that the... I want to make it so the difference is less. I do too, Mr. Fisher. I do too. But I would go about it. And I think the lessons of history show almost conclusively that we must go about it in exactly the opposite direction. The course which you propose, which has been tried by various people in the past, was tried to some extent by President Roosevelt during the war. It's been tried by many other people, publicly and privately. Perhaps the... At least the illustrious example being Henry Wallace. All the result is that the Soviets view us as naive, as people who obviously can have things put over on them. And they proceed to do so. Because they are fundamentally different in terms of their attitude to do so. In terms of their attitude toward the world and its problems than we are. It is not possible in our lifetimes to convert Soviet communists into Kentucky non-communists. And any attempt to do it is, I think, for doing to failure and will cause us grave damage.

What we can do, however, is what we did in Cuba. And also what we did by citing the test-band treaty. We can show them the limits beyond which they cannot go. And here the fundamental element is force. And we can also be prepared to come to agreements with them, to our mutual advantage, on such issues, is limiting the danger of thermonuclear war. But all you would do, if your proposals were to be followed, with the Soviet Union, would be to increase the risk of war, because they would be less convinced of our determination and our force. And this is, I think, fundamentally why they put the missiles in Cuba. I think that if we had not, as we did, hesitate somewhat on the Berlin question before, there would have been less danger of their putting the missiles in Cuba. If someone declares political war on you, you cannot reply by saying, go away, I don't believe in political war. But the salami can be sliced either way, and that the most effective way of pushing is not to push on a broad front. In fact, in Cuba, which you continue to refer, we were, for some time,

seeking to oust communism from the Western hemisphere without success. When he wanted to accomplish something, we narrowed our objective down to a very small target, 42 weapons get out. And in front of that narrow issue, we were able to be effective. And I would say that if we continue to, I'm not the, I really object to the notion that when someone says, let's not accept the status quo, let's move ahead. You said the United States is status quo power. I regard trying to defend the status quo is what someone who escalates the issue does. The southerners say, oh, this affects the southern way of life. If the Negroes are allowed to ride in the back of the bus or the front of the bus, the whole southern way of life will be threatened. You say if the blockade occurs for five more minutes on the order, freedom is lost. That is the way a status quo power acts. I'm saying we should be aggressive. We should not settle for the status quo. We should try to make the chains we want to make. If we want greater penetration of the Soviet Union, let's sign a commercial aviation agreement and get more people in there and more people out of there.

That's not being soft on communism. It's refusing to accept the soft hard dichotomy and pushing ahead where you want to push. I'm all in favor of pushing ahead. And I'm all in favor of not accepting the status quo. I tried to say before that even if we tried, we wouldn't succeed. We would merely lose in the other direction. And I agree that we should have a civil aviation agreement. But what I do not agree is in your fundamental attitude of viewing how one deals with the Soviet Union by, in effect, the way that, for example, Chancellor Anard dealt with the French after the war. He, in effect, made concessions in advance, thinking on the saw, for example, thinking that he would get credit later on. He was right. But the Russians, I'm not the French. But it seems to me that one of the issues involved is really what topics do you choose for negotiating about? We know from the Soviets categorically refused to negotiate about real or alleged interests that we have. For instance, we had a number of times raised the issue of access to Berlin. The Soviet Union will not negotiate unless negotiations are about neutralization of Berlin.

And this immediately renders the issue non-negotiable. Then the Soviet Union wishes certain things from us. And you suggest that we negotiate about them in isolation from the other issues. This, in effect, means that the Soviet Union then gains initiative in the choice of issues to deal with us and can either meet its needs, if there's a crisis, such as agricultural crisis, or it can take the initiative on a variety of other issues, such as the reconstruction of the UN. It seems to me that if we are going to operate in a piecemeal basis, then we have to determine in advance what it is that we want to achieve, what sort of concessions that we want to gain from the Soviets, and then pursue them. And in pursuing them, we inevitably will have to link them to the issues that the Soviets raise with us, in order to get a quick pro quo, or at least establish a reciprocal bargaining relationship. If we don't satisfy the Soviet demands in a variety of X issues, then we'll at least drive home to the Soviet Union. We take our demands seriously. If we do not do so, we, in effect, leave the relationship a very unbalanced one with all the initiative in the Soviet hands. I don't see why breaking up the issues gives the initiative of the Soviet Union.

In fact, I would suggest the contrary that if we insist that our whole relations must be conducted as one unit, all issues in one pot, we either firm or we're friendly, everything being in one context, then we're frozen unless they're prepared to do something. Let's leave the firm. If we're friendly words out of it, but what I'm trying to suggest is that if forms of the Soviet Union has a variety of needs, such as, let's say, the weak deal agriculture, plane arrangements, and so forth, we presume we'll have a variety of needs also. Sure. And I think we ought to make the Soviets very conscious of them as well. I agree with you, and I would say that we can proceed without negotiation. I would think, for example, on the access to Berlin, that rather than waiting for an ambiguous problem to come up as to whether 25 passengers plus drivers, whether the deputy drivers count as passengers and not should be often counted. We just prepare the draft statement of the rules under which we're operating, and we circulate these around and let it call to their attention, give them the UN, as known as the standard operating procedure for access to Berlin,

where they negotiate or not. We will have improved our position. And in fact, enforce them. We will have followed the status quo and indicate what it is. I notice that our time is running short, and perhaps I could ask each one of you to summarize your positions. Mr. Griffith, would you say very briefly your position, Mr. Fischer and myself? Well, I should say that my position would be that we should negotiate with the Soviet Union on issues in which we genuinely have common interests. We should refuse to negotiate only on issues with which they are concerned and we not. We should expect that most of the major issues, and in particular Berlin and Cuba, will not soon be negotiable, and we should above all realize that the maintenance of superiority of force is the fundamental guarantee of our security against the Soviet Union. Thank you, Mr. Fischer. Well, I would think that our greatest force is in the position which we take, and that our contest with communism is not primarily supported by our nuclear weapons. I think that we ought to be both firm and friendly at the same time, that the two are not alternative policies, but consistent policies.

There's no necessity for a choice between the two. That we should break up the issues, work toward a process of dealing in which we deal with independent issues on their merits, and don't just don't give on any issue what's not to our interest, but push on those, but each one independently and worry less about prestige and precedent and more about getting ahead. It seems to me that perhaps one of the dangers which we are now facing is that in the course of the transformation of the international scene, we may end up by being isolated from our allies, and this is what concerns me very much as I look into the future. In a way, one could almost say that today we have a direct Soviet-West European conflict, a conflict which involves a variety of very incompatible interests, particularly the problem of the division of Europe over the Elbe. We find that the Chinese and the Indians engage in a regional conflict for supremacy in Asia, and to some West Europeans at least, it looks as the United States, was very anxious to inherit the mantle of either Nero, or Tito, or Nasser, as a leader of the neutralist camp.

And if this were to pass, we could find ourselves in a situation in which the Soviet Union would gain a room from a new war in Europe, of the sort which it has not had for a number of decades. The danger of a Neuropello, or the danger of an assertive French policy, I think would be very disruptive to international balance in general. And therefore, while welcoming the change which has taken place since Cuba, I personally feel a little apprehensive about the pattern of our relationships with our allies. I would like to see a more concerted policy developing towards the Soviet Union, a policy which would be based, both in firmness and a search recommendation, but one which would exclude the possibility of divisive Soviet initiatives. This is NET, National Educational Television.

This is NET, National Educational Television.