Washington Straight Talk; Admiral Moorer

In Alexandria, Virginia, Washington Strait Talk brings you an interview with former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas A. Moore, a veteran of 41 years in the Navy. Admiral Moore, who retired in 1974 after four years as the nation's highest-ranking military officer, is interviewed at his Alexandria, Virginia, home by Henry Truett, Washington correspondent for the Baltimore Sun. Admiral, you just retired recently as the nation's foremost military commander and you're now free to speak as you wish without the discretion that's required of a sailor on active duty. I'd like to look back at Vietnam. We just lost our unambiguously lost our first war.

And I wonder what you would say to the parents of the 47,000 American boys who died in that war. Did they die in vain? No, not in my opinion, because we did, I think, do quite a bit in Southeast Asia to stabilize the area at the time. We indicated that we were willing to make such sacrifices and of blood and treasure to support what we consider to be right. I also think as a side issue, for instance, that other areas in South Vietnam, such as Indonesia, for instance, that wouldn't be in a stable condition they are today if the United States had not have been willing to go into Vietnam. On the other hand, of course, I think that the ending is sad and unfortunate. To me, in particular, who spent about 10 years of what I consider to be my most mature and productive years struggling

with this thing. To see the little communist driving tanks and supplied by the Soviets, and at the same time using rifles supplied by the Chinese in the area, which at one time was occupied by US forces, doesn't leave me very happy. I can tell you. That really leads us directly almost to the domino theory, which was first articulated, I guess, the late President Eisenhower in 1954 and what he said in effect was that the countries of Southeast Asia would follow in sequence and there would be strategic consequences throughout the area, and I think probably by implication the globe, if the United States allowed Vietnam to fall to communism. Do you see the domino theory at work now? Has it proved out? Yes, I think that in one sense it's certainly here, and of course, we don't know yet just what will happen, but I think it's clear in indication, both in the Pacific and for that matter,

in Europe, that nations do not have the confidence in our country that they have had in the past. Furthermore, looking to the future, I think that the acquisition of all of Endo China will permit the comments to use such things as the great rice resources to bring pressure to bow on other nations in that area, and of course you've already seen indications from the Philippines. Today there was quite a bit of talk about withdrawing from Thailand, and worldwide I think you will see that the so-called uncommitted nations might have second thoughts or at least more thoughts about supporting the US position than they have had in the past. Let's let's review just briefly what's happened to the so-called dominoes. Now we have South Vietnam under communist rule. Cambodia also under communist rule. Laos is in a formally neutralist position, but certainly dominated by communist forces, and the ties are in the process

of asking the United States to leave. You mentioned Indonesia. I suppose there have been no direct consequences there as far as I know, and the Philippines are talking about our leaving. Now, do you see this as a hegemonic sort of movement forward of communism, sorry? Or is it really a matter of individual communist parties at work here, and do we expect to see a unified communist front in this area? Well, I think that of course each individual group has its own local objectives, but on balance, it is true that the Soviets and Chinese assisted the North Vietnamese. In other words, they are interests. They consider to be incontinence with those of North Vietnam. I don't look at the dominoe theory as if we're going to have a situation that just goes click, click, click like that, but it's a gradual erosion of the things that have made out of a country prosperous and strong that concerns me. I don't think this is going to happen

overnight, but I think it weakens us, and of course many Americans understandably say, well, what in the world interests us in Southeast Asia? What does that have to do with my daily life? Well, it has quite a bit. For instance, if one visits in Milwaukee straight, so you will see what's taking place down in terms of commerce and things of this kind. So I was standard of living, I was trade, I was economic and political influence, all are certainly affected by the situation is just developed. You know, Admiral, everything we've said leaves a fairly bleak outlook for Southeast Asia, taking an isolation. And yet you said you didn't believe really that those American forces had died in vain there. What do you think the United States accomplished in that 15-year enterprise? Well, of course, as I said, we certainly didn't accomplish what I thought at the outset that we were going to accomplish. But at the same time,

I think that looking back on the conditions that prevailed at the time that the commitment was made, it would have determined the commitment. I think that at that time, of course, we were dedicated to blocking aggression in any part of the world that happened to be taking place. I see two anachronisms in the points you've made, Admiral, and I wonder if you would agree with them. One, with regard to public support for the war. Didn't the United States undergo that experience earlier in Korea when public support definitely are the absence of public support, really? Definitely became a factor in the terms under which we ended the Korean war. And it certainly was a factor in which the French into the first Indochina war and doesn't the experience of the French indicate that the United States political leaders and strategic planners should

have taken into account the French experience more than they did. Yes, I think so, but I think, perhaps, the thing that deterred them from really accepting that entire line of thought was that, of course, we felt that, you know, quite properly, I think we could do anything. And we could have done anything if we, in my view, had brought that war to the close. I think that quite a bit of the restraint that was placed on our military people was caused by the concern about what the Soviets and the Chinese were going to do. But I don't think that they ever had an intention of involving themselves in Vietnam. Let it come specific to that point of what the United States should have done militarily in South Vietnam, not politically, but militarily to bring that war to a successful conclusion from Washington. Well, I think, in the first case, the troops should have been landed in North Vietnam. They should have been landed in the Venn area, perhaps in an area where

we could have had forces north of those passes that feed down into the Ho Chi Minh trail. That's one thing. I certainly think that the Haifong Harbour should have been mined at the very I'd set. Everyone was wringing their hands as to what the Russians would do if we mined Haifong Harbour. Seven years later, we mined it. They didn't do a thing. And they never would have done anything, my view. And then we should have put the pressure on the area of Hanoi, Haifong, and so on, and brought the thing to a close. I think that we had the power. We had almost unlimited power. And then we did all these things. We went into Cambodia in 1970. We went into Laos in 1971. We mined Haifong in May of 72. And we bombed Hanoi in December of 72. All I'm saying is you're done all those the same day. Admiral, what about tactics on the ground? We had an air mobile concept.

The use of ground forces transported by helicopters with high mobility, high flexibility. Did that work in the short term sense? I think it worked, but I also think that you've got to remember that, again, that the North Vietnamese were highly disciplined army that had been fighting for years. They were not too concerned about cases. They did not have an identification problem. They didn't care about, certainly about killing the South Vietnamese. And they were in a jungle warfare context. And consequently, it always takes far more forces to defend civilized areas than it does to attack from the outside. And that's, again, comes back to my point about invading North Vietnam. We should have reversed it. So they had the problem of defending the cities instead of having to defend the cities and South. Admiral, let's come back to that December 1972 period in the bombing,

the Christmas so-called Christmas bombing of Hanoi. Do you regard the Paris Peace Accords as that were reached as a result of that bombing as just simply a matter of capitulation on the part of the United States? No, I don't think so at all. I wouldn't call it capitulation. I think that it was quite clear that the bombing and Christmas of 1972 had a significant effect on the North Vietnamese. And it appeared at that time as long as they were faced with that possibility in the future, that they would in fact comply with whatever agreement they happened to make. As you recall, they were very much ready to get back to Paris and talk about these terms, because I think they were visibly shaken. They ran out of missiles. And if we had really wanted to at that time or had taken the action against them, they would have been in a very,

very serious position. So they, in nine days, they were ready to go back. As you recall, we had stopped the bombing back in the early fall and had been a law there for a while. And they had been very difficult with respect to agreeing to any kind of final ceasefire. And I think this made Christians out of such a thing and be done in Hanoi. And consequently, it was thought, I believe, by people in this country as well as in South Vietnam, that as so long as they had the threat of a repetition of this kind of action, which in my view should have been taken years ago, they would in fact comply. I think your remarks imply that you do not agree with the argument of some in this country that the Christmas bombing of Hanoi was undertaken as much to convince the South Vietnamese to sign those accords as the North Vietnamese then. No, no, that was absolutely

ridiculous in my view. I think that one of the things that's missing in all these discussions is that grave concern so many of us had about the POWs. And I will go to my dying grave and I'll never understand why the American people were willing to tolerate this medieval torture, year after year, and not get aroused over it. And President Nixon was very much concerned about the welfare of these POWs. And I think one of the greatest satisfactions he got out of his term of office was having an opportunity to welcome these boys home. And I don't think that we had I think that we had not bond as we did in December 72 that the POWs still be in Hanoi. I brought you mentioned earlier the North Vietnamese concern for repetition of the Christmas

bombing. In other words, a respect for strategic bombing. That was a first time they'd really gotten the treatment they should have had several years before. Now, in the spring of the following year, after the Accords were signed, there was great deal of discussion about actually counterpart discussion about alleged violations on both sides, but I don't think there's any doubt that the North Vietnamese in fact invalid the terms of the Accord. Why didn't the United States then do something additional? I will recall for you that the Secretary of State said the other day that there was consideration. I believe he said in April 1973 of what sort of action might be taken to punish the North Vietnamese for violations of the Paris Accords and that the President never came to a final decision on various options that were discussed. Now, can you tell us since you were involved in those discussions, what kind of options were discussed and why in your judgment no action was taken? Well, we had several options. One of which of course was a repetition of what happened previously and certainly they were discussed. As a matter of fact, we make a career

on studying options, so far as everything around the world is concerned. But the North Vietnamese at the very outset said about to violate those agreements by pushing supplies across the DMZ, building airfields, bringing up missiles in the case on area and things of that kind. And of course, I can't answer your question as to why no action was taken. I do think that the Watergate was a factor. Many people in the administration were preoccupied with that, but I'm not in a position to tell you why it was not. The decision never did reach a kind of a knife edge situation such as occurred on the 18th of December 1972. But I always considered that this capability should be maintained ready and it was. Any event that this decision was made to force the North Vietnamese to in fact comply. Admiral, there's a great deal of discussion in this

country now about the need to avoid recriminations and so forth. And I suppose one doesn't need to recriminate in order to assign responsibility if one is going to learn one's lessons. Where does the responsibility lie ultimately for the American loss of this war in any sort of practical sense, at least? Now, we now have talked about public reaction, we've talked about congressional reaction, we've talked about executive actions, that sort of thing. Where does the sequence lie in your judgment? My judgment, of course, the difficulty arose from the things that we've already discussed. First, deliberate effort to insulate the public from this action. And secondly, that's in the country itself. And secondly, in Southeast Asia, an effort to fight the war with just as little effort as we could put forward on a military sense and fight it in an in a gradual sense. I remember that when I

was commanding Pacific Fleet, I was always getting messages, which is said in the fact that the purpose of this operation is to get the message to Ho Chi Minh. But Ho Chi Minh never got the message, because he was a dedicated revolutionary that didn't understand anything but brute force. And he never was really subjected to that brute force. And as I said before, he was guaranteed aid that he was not going to be overthrown and be that his country was not going to be invaded. And so he'd just stay there forever. Admiral, we've discussed the war in Vietnam in some detail. Let's turn to the strategic consequences of this war. If you were dealing with the strategy of Japan today, how would you regard what has happened in Southeast Asia in terms of your own long-term security with this particular eye to the United States, the Soviet Union, and China? The Japanese in the first place have two problems. One is that they, of course, import 95% of their oil and a very large percentage of their raw materials.

Secondly, they, as I've expected, quite often have a yen for the yen. In other words, they are primarily concerned about the scope of their trade. And I think that the happenings in South Vietnam are going to have the same effect on the Japanese. They've perhaps been having worldwide. The Japanese will look at the situation and see whether it might not be to the advantage to let us say alter the fine-tuned balance of their relations with all countries, including the United States. Perhaps they may not be as confident as they have been in the past that the United States would, in fact, continue with the mutual defense treaty. But I don't think that this is a real problem for them. I think that they can be confident that we

will continue to do our part with respect to the mutual defense treaty. Now, with regard to fine-tuning their policy, you're suggesting that they might make political adjustments in their relations with China and the Soviet Union rather than rearm themselves and build a Navy, for example, with offensive capability. I think that they would try that first. However, I think that the Japanese eventually will build a large Navy. For the reasons I just outlined to you, namely that they depend almost entirely on the sea lines of supply for their economic viability of their standard of living and for that matter for their political strength. The Japanese, of course, have their technological capability. And once they make a decision, one way or another, they can move very quickly. Does that mean that the seventh fleet or what is

now the U.S. seventh fleet would be in competition regarding the sea lanes in harmony with the Japanese fleet or in competition with the Japanese fleet? Well, I think the initial task of the Japanese fleet would be to protect the approaches to Japan. And that being the case, this would permit the seventh fleet to cover a wider area and be relieved with that particular task. Because the naval strategy as such, of course, is in specific involved with tremendous areas. And any area that will be covered by the Japanese will simply make the task of the seventh fleet simpler. I'd like to just make an abrupt geographic transition from their admiraling and navy terms to the Mediterranean. Everyone knows, I think, who has an interest in the subject that the Soviets now have a fleet in the Mediterranean. It's very busy. It apparently is rather impressive.

What is the relationship and strategic terms between the U.S. sixth fleet and the Mediterranean and the Soviet Mediterranean fleet? Are you at a disadvantage? Do you meet them on terms of parity? Well, I've asked this question many times. And of course, I think that the sixth fleet can definitely take care of itself. At the same time, you're not going to have a contest, like the Battle of Jutland or Saurab and Rustam type of thing. Because if any kind of exchange of the weapon fire was to take place between the Soviets and the sixth fleet, of course, that would automatically mean that you were practically in World War III. In other words, there would be action taking place in Italy and Greece and all through the Middle East and both air and ground action and perhaps even in central Europe. So many people have discussed this problem in the context of simply choosing up sides and getting out into a little free space

in the Mediterranean start. It's not going to happen that way. There's going to be tremendous amount of strategic warning which would cause the sixth fleet to take certain defensive actions. The Soviets at the same time have problems too. Namely, the Dardanelles causes them a problem and so forth as access to the Black Sea is concerned. And you must remember that the Mediterranean is really closed up in the sense that you have the Straits of Gibraltar and you have the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. And the Suez Canal is extremely vulnerable in wartime. I mean, it could be mind and stopped immediately, in my view. Admiral, in strategic terms, how do you balance out in your mind the relationship between Israel on the one hand, the Arabs on the other and Arab oil in terms of strategic needs for the United States and the industrialized world? Do you think the United States should maintain an ultimate political commitment to and military commitment to Israel?

Well, first I have never thought that there was a military solution to the Middle East problem. The emotions and the confrontation, of course, date back centuries. And consequently, there's got to be some kind of accommodation that would make all sides a fee or secure and I think other nations besides the United States got to participate in this. So far as the Arab oil is concerned, we've got to accept the fact that no matter what action we might take in the United States in terms of operation independence or whatever you want to call it, we will be importing the Middle East oil for several years in the future. And basically, I think the Arab nations are very favorably disposed towards the United States. And I personally believe that this overall problem can be worked out if we make a steady and reasonable approach to it and consider everyone's interest. I think that you've got to try to keep a motion out of it and realize that

both sides have a point. The Israelis being a very small country, a small population, they cannot accept heavy casualties for very long and they are concerned about the military side. I would think that all nations would realize what this is and guarantee the safety of Israel. And at the same time, I think that Israel perhaps is going to have to make some kinds of certainly adjustment with respect to these lands. On that very point, do you think that Israel can afford strategically to withdraw out of the 1967 borders in military terms? If in military terms, if Israelis, of course, left out their loans, so to speak, in political terms, then they'll be very reluctant to do that. Because what they fear, because their country is so small, is a sudden surprise attack and a penetration of their country. So they want this for

what amounts to a buffer zone. Let me interrupt you because we're about to run out of time. And I'd like to get your judgment before we do on the relative military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union today in terms of the strategic balance and particularly in terms of the Navy, which you're primarily interested in. Overall, of course, you have to divide this into the nuclear capability on one hand and convention on the other. And quickly, so far as the nuclear capability is concerned, I think that we have a deterrent that's adequate as of today. So far as the conventional forces are concerned, I think that if you look at the record, you will see that we have been gradually reducing our conventional forces while the Soviets, on the other hand, have been increasing theirs. And I am concerned about that particular specificity with respect to the Navy. I think now that we have shifted from a world of

a surplus to a world of shortage, we're going to be, of course, transporting oil and critical materials all over the world that our vital interests demand. And we have a enabled force sufficient size to ensure that the United States can, in fact, have access to those materials which, uh, mandatory, we are going to maintain our prep and standard of living. Admiral, I thank you very much. It's been most enjoyable meeting out here in your back yard with you this afternoon. Thank you very much. Well, I enjoyed it very much. Thank you. Washington straight on. At his home in Alexandria, Virginia, Admiral Thomas A. Moran retired, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been interviewed by Henry Truitt, Washington, your respondent for the Baltimore Sun. Production funding provided by Public Television Stations, the Ford Foundation and the

Corporation for Public Broadcasting. This has been a production of Anpacked, a division of GWETA.