News in Perspective; 115

The following program is from NET, the public television network. From Bonn, Germany, national educational television, and the New York Times presents News in Perspective, a conversation with Billy Brunt, Chancellor of West Germany, with Clifton Daniel, Associate Editor. One week ago today, Chancellor Brunt made a dramatic move in his state of the nation address. He proposed talks with East Germany aimed at more normal relations. The move was part of Brunt's wider approach to the whole communist bloc in the hope of easing East West tensions. On Monday of this week, at an East Berlin news conference attended by Western Newsmen for the first time in nine years, East Germany's Walter Obrick replied, he said, his government was ready to enter negotiations with Bonn.

He attached no preconditions. Thus, the way seemed cleared for the first direct political talks since the two states were established 20 years ago. Today is Brunt's plan. Two days before the Obrick conference, Mr. Brunt discussed it with Clifton Daniel in Bonn in his first extended television interview since becoming Chancellor. And now, Mr. Daniel. Something is happening in Central Europe. That something is a man named Billy Brunt. His excellency, Billy Brunt. Senator of the West German Federal Republic. Chancellor since last October, when his party, the Social Democrats, in alliance with the three Democrats, took command of the West German government here in Bonn. Who would have believed it? Billy Brunt was once upon a time not even a German citizen. In 1933, fleeing from the Nazis, he went into exile in Norway.

He became an Norwegian citizen, and he did not resume his German nationality until 1947. Fifteen years ago, he was all but unknown in Germany, and utterly unknown abroad. It was a communist who turned the spotlight on him. He was mayor of West Berlin, when the East Germans erected the Berlin Wall. And his behavior in that crisis made him a national and international figure. Three months ago, he succeeded to the post once occupied and endowed with dignity by that towering wooden Indian figure, modern German history. Dr. Conrad Adinaw. Dr. Adinaw, whose Christian Democratic party was the rival and competitor of Billy Brunt as Social Democrats. Once in power, Mr. Brunt, the first Socialist Chancellor in Germany, since 1930, began to break away from the policies, habits, and traditions of the Christian Democrats,

who had recently been his allies in a coalition government. He reached out at once to Eastern Europe, to his old antagonist, the Communist, inviting them to enter into negotiations to restore a measure of normality to relations between the powers that have since 1945 confronted each other in Central Europe. A few days ago, he submitted his policy to the scrutiny of the Bundestag, the lower House of the West German Parliament. And after two days of debate, here he is, unblooded and unbought. Mr. Chancellor, what are the immediate aims of that foreign policy that I have so sketchily summarized? Well, perhaps I could say we try in a way to come closer to the policy of our Western allies. What I want to try to say is this, we don't have a Western policy and an Eastern policy

apart from another. They are two aspects of one in the same policy, belonging to the Western communities, but at the same time in confidence with our Western partners and allies, we try to make our contribution in order to, if possible, in order to reduce tensions vis-à-vis the East, to normalize our relations, and if possible, even bring about change relations between the two parts of China. Are you speaking now, you are, as I see, speaking now directly in relation to East Germany? What about relations with the Soviet bloc as a whole? You already, the former government, the coalition government, made it clear that we would be willing, in spite of all the differences of opinion, to normalize our relations with

the states, the Soviet bloc. Most of our Western allies have relations with those countries. We have not, we have relations with the Soviet Union since 1955, but they didn't help us very much diplomatic relations, not always mean normal relations. We succeeded then, early in 1967, to establish diplomatic relations with Romania, that worked out very well. We have very good economic and cultural relations and technical relations with that country. We resumed relations in 1968 with Yugoslavia, which of course does not belong to the Soviet bloc, but still is a communist-ruled country. So what we try is to bring about cooperation in those fields, where cooperation is possible, between communist countries and democratic countries trade and exchange in cultural and other

areas, and also to participate in that exchange of views, which one day may lead from confrontation to cooperation as President Nixon did put it. You've spoken to President Nixon. In your latest book, you have said, I stick by the strategy of peace conceived by John F. Kennedy. What do you mean by that? Kennedy in 1963, President Kennedy in one of his remarkable speeches, made it clear that we must get out of this day-to-day controversy between the West and the East. We must look at the future, give the young generation especially a feeling that we know about a future which leads beyond the categories of the Cold War and the day-to-day controversies.

I think Kennedy, especially when he visited Germany in the early summer of 1963, West Germany and Berlin, was very, very able in convincing people that the West stood for something beyond the quarrels of the day. Mr. Nixon, would you say is continuing this? Yes, in a way he is. When you became Chancellor, you made very prompt approaches to the Soviet Union, to Poland and to East Germany. But it seems to me that your advances to East Germany have really been repulsed or at least discouraged. Walter Ulbrich, the head of the East German regime, has proposed what appear to be unacceptable conditions for negotiations, is that true? Yes and no.

I'm not thinking in terms of weeks and months. This is a process which will occupy our energy, our thinking, our activities for years. We hadn't really made a formal proposal to the East German regime, but we had said in our Declaration of Policy last October that we were envisaging discussions, negotiations with East Berlin, as we had proposed to discuss problems with the other countries of Eastern Europe. Then, Herr Ulbrich presented a draft for 3D between the two parts of Germany, which I think did not help very much because what he really proposed was to get recognition to discuss certain formalities, and by that creating a wall, and behind that wall, nothing

would change. This is not our idea about the relations. You spoke of the fact that you had not yet made a formal proposal to the East Germans. Are you planning one and we'll look you soon? Yes, it will be rather soon. It will be the essence of the proposal. The essence will be that we would like to, at least we would be willing to discuss, a treaty on renunciation of force with East Germany, as well as we proposed 3Ds of that kind with the other countries of the Warsaw Pact area, what we call the Soviet block. We would be willing, within that framework, to discuss any other question which East Berlin or Bonn might be interested in putting up a discussion.

Have you had more success with your discussions with the Russians than you've had with the East Germans? And do you expect success with the polls? It's rather early to answer that question. Discussions with the Soviet Union have started. We had discussions, here I must go back again, to the former government. We had discussions in 1967, 1968, but then things moved into that Czechoslovak crisis, which meant to set back here, as it did mean in other areas. Discussions have started again, and I think they will go on. Both on practical problems, I think the Russians are interested in more contact with Western Europe, including Western Germany, but also discussions on these unsolved problems, border

line issues, and problems of that kind. But it's impossible at this moment to say when we might reach an agreement. This will not happen within the next few months. The Polish government made it clear that they would be interested in discussions. We have accepted, and I think in a few weeks from now, those discussions will start. Last October, the Warsaw Pact country is referred to your advent as chancellor, as a positive change in the situation in Germany. Do you think that the Russians and the polls and other East Germans would really like for the East Germans to enter into negotiations with you? Will they encourage the East German regime to talk? I think some of the East European leaders are not very happy with the rather negative attitude taken by Adolf Richtin.

Here's people. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the influence which East Germany has within the Soviet look. The other day, when we had a debate here in our Bundestag, our parliament, my predecessor, Dr. Kiesinger, thought it still would be right to look upon East Germany as a satellite of the Soviet Union. This, I think, is a misinterpretation of things as they are now. East Germany is an important partner of the Soviet Union, and even if their political freedom of movement, so to say, is limited, they play quite a role. So it's not the way, as it may have been 10 or 15 years ago, that they just get orders on what to do. They play a role of their own within that framework. This brings to my mind two questions.

First of all, do you think that Herr Ulbrich is himself personal or the stumbling block to negotiations between East and West Germany, if he disappeared would things be easier? Personal factors of that kind play a role, but perhaps one should not concentrate everything upon that personal factor. There's a group, a leading group, which is represented by Herr Ulbrich. And that group believes in separation and not in communication. They think that their interests are better taken care of if they isolate themselves from the communication with the West. They think the danger is too great that communication might bring about unrest and difficulties. But this may change.

It may also be a problem of generation. Some of the younger experts, the managers, which take over responsibilities, now I'm not the only thing about East Germany, but East Germany as well. Some of these younger, educated managers are closer to the needs of modern industrial societies than some of the older communist leaders have been. I believe there is in fact a generation gap of about 20 years between you and Herr Ulbrich also, isn't there? Maybe, yes. You spoke of your predecessor, Chancellor Kiesinger. And what major way does your policy on East Germany differ from the policy pursued by his government of which you were apart and which you were indeed the Foreign Minister? I think it is not really a question of different principles. It's a question of clarity.

We already had said that we would make our own contribution, we would try to reduce tensions, bring about better cooperation, but still Chancellor Kiesinger and his friends tried to keep alive as much as possible of the formulas of the fifties. They concentrated very much upon juridical reservations, which I think of course sometimes have their value, but sometimes they also bring you away from the realities with which you have to deal. As I understand it, in your state of the nation address to the Bundestag the other day, you didn't mention reunification of Germany except perhaps in a negative sense. I believe you said that there can be no thought of an early basic change in the relationship

between the two parts of the German nation or the two states, as you call them within the German nation. Has the reunification of Germany been brought in in Nierre? No, no. But what I'd say was that I will not give up, but my government will not give up a policy which aims at self-determination and which aims at unity within the framework of a new set up of European peace. But the reunification, I'm hesitating when I hear the word, because especially this first part of what re-read gives the impression as if the problem were to bring things back

to a former state of affairs. This will not happen. This will, in no case, happen. I believe in the unity of my people, but this will not necessarily take place within the framework of one nation's state, there are other possibilities. If we bring about it, this is the main content of my policy to contribute to a new set up in Europe. The division of Germany is the result of the division of Europe. In order to change conditions in Germany, you have to bring it about in new relations between the parts of Europe. Do you have the feeling that the Germans are philosophically, emotionally united in spite of being physically and politically divided, or has that grown up a great divergence between you? There has developed a difference of cause, but at least for two, three generations ahead of us, perhaps even more, the feeling of belonging together will play a very great role.

There are so many links between the families, and there's one, not only language, but also one culture, so in spite of different experience, there is for a large majority, there is a feeling of belonging together. What could be done in a practical way to reduce the differences at this time between the two parts of Germany, the two states of Germany? Could the Berlin Wall be torn down, for example? I would hope so very much, but I'm afraid that the Wall will only disappear after a certain process of communication had been developed. It will not be a first step.

It will not be a first step. What would you suggest the first step should be? Speaking about Berlin, it should be possible to give people the right to visit their families. This could be done even at a time when the Walls still existed, also between the parts of Germany, West Germany, some more communication in the field, railways, buses, but also in addition to trade where we still have some contact, some more cultural exchange. It's growing, isn't it, rather substantially? One should not put too much into it because until the end of 1968, it was declining. Since then it has gone up, but until then it went down or there was stagnation during

a time when trade with the others increased both for us and for these Germans. But there has been some increase during the last year and a half. You mentioned earlier that in his proposal to your government, Herr Ulberg, proposed a treaty that would have called on you to recognize the East German regime as an independent sovereign government to establish diplomatic relations exchange ambassadors. You decline to do so as your predecessors have always declined to do. For the benefit of our audience in America, why? Is Germany in fact a sovereign state, isn't it, under Soviet protection, if you like? It is a separate state organization, no doubt about that. I think there's not much sense in discussing the problem of what sovereignty means nowadays. It is a separate state organization, no doubt about it.

But there would be not much sense in just making a treaty on diplomatic relations and not changing anything of the substantial conditions in the two parts of this one argument, the other argument I have is that it would be a serious error to give people at home and to broad the impression that by doing so, the real problems were solved. None of the problem would be solved if we accepted such a proposal. It could even mean just to stabilize an intolerable, negative situation. So therefore we say, let the representatives of the two administrations sit together and discuss the problems.

And then later on, we will find out how this should be put on paper. What kind of a relation this could lead to? But even then, even if it moved in that direction, I would be opposed to a settlement which gave our friends and others abroad the impression that the German problem already was settled. As things are, we have to be aware of the truth that in addition to what the Germans may be able to do, it needs also participation from those powers who reserved their rights for a settlement on Germany. By other words, I would not like to run away from that responsibility which still, to a certain degree, lies with the Western powers and the Soviet Union as far as Germany is

concerned in its proper place within Europe. You mentioned the Western powers in Germany. Do you think that the Eastern European powers in particular, perhaps the Western powers as well, are afraid of German reunification, afraid of a German effort to reclaim the territories lost in the war? The Russians talk about it a great deal, as you know. I think it would be astonishing if one would find too much enthusiasm abroad in connection with German reunification. As far as our main partners in concern, anyhow, there is no doubt that they follow with their great sympathy, our own activities. And I think we would find not only understanding, but also support further on in our activities aiming at a new relation between those areas where the Germans live today.

I think we would find much less support for claims in connection with those parts of Germany, for example, which now are under Polish administration. You spoke of the absence of a peace treaty. There has never been a peace concluded between Germany, the two parts of Germany and the allied powers with London, the Second World War. You foresee, in your lifetime, the possibility of such a treaty? I would not exclude it. You think the current events have brought it nearer? No. It is not very probable that it will just be a peace treaty in the old sense of the word, but I could imagine a European settlement which would include a settlement of the German problems along the formulas of a peace treaty.

You spoke a moment ago about the sympathy, support, and understanding you've hoped to have, or I believe said that you did have from your Western allies. You're going to see President Nixon soon. How are you going to discuss with the President? This, of course, will depend upon a certain degree, what will happen within the next two or three months to come, but I think there is a great area of not so much bilateral problems. We have no bilateral quarrels, but we have some problems of close cooperation. But in exchange of views on European and international affairs, I think, is rather important, and it will at least for us it will be most important to follow up that exchange of views and not

only arms and questions, but also to pick up all the information we can pick up. I think it's so important that our two governments keep very close together. This would be more informative, perhaps, than a negotiating session. Yes. You've spoken of your allies. Your predecessor is particularly Dr. Adinaar. Indeed, Dr. Adinaar was the creator of this policy. Dr. Adinaar had a very special attitude towards a very special relationship with France. Are you maintaining that, or would you wish to maintain it? Good relations with France are a vital importance for this country and for Europe. There will be no European unity if not France and Germany stick together.

So, in so far, my ideas correspond with those of Dr. Adinaar. On the other hand, of course, nothing remains quite unchanged when Dr. Adinaar would develop his policy. And the goal wasn't still in power than those two work together. By now, President Pompey do has taken General De Gaulle's place. And I've replaced Dr. Kissinger here still, both of us, Pompey do and I agree that we need very close Franco-German cooperation, but not at the expense of others. I was going to come to that question.

How does that bear on your relations with England, which have indeed, through all the recent German and West German administrations, been very close? And you have been a great supporter of the British, particularly in their desire to enter the common market. This is interesting, because some people abroad seem to believe that I'm not thinking about anything else than political activities, vis-à-vis the east. The fact is that the first thing I concentrated upon Dotsi and the last year was to bring new life into the process of West European cooperation and integration. So, I went to the little summit we had, West European summit in the Hague. And the success of that summit was that there we agreed with a French that we should come to a conclusion of the first period of the common market and start negotiations with

the British before the summer of this year. And I'm convinced this will happen. It was only possible on the basis of an agreement we reached with a French. Going back just one moment, as you've mentioned it, to the fairs in the east, do the United States Britain and France and the West and the Soviet Union on the other side still have, I believe you said that they do, in fact, have a role to play in German affairs, do they still have a responsibility, so to speak, and a legal standing in German affairs? Yes. Yes, this is quite obvious, of course, as far as Berlin is concerned, West Berlin, especially there still is a legal responsibility for the whole of Berlin. There's a three-power responsibility for West Berlin, and I still cannot envisage the

time when this could be replaced by something which is better. And then there is the irresponsibility of the four powers together with Germans to find a settlement one day, which would be good for the future of Europe. This, of course, has very much to do with the overall relations, east-west relations, and especially with those which are developing between the United States and the Soviet Union. You spoke of the sympathy, support, and understanding you had in the West. Is that perhaps hidden or in the background there some alarm over your overtures to the east? Specifically, I raised the question that people often raise. Is there any fear in the West, you think, of another repalal? Another agreement between defeated Germany and a communist Russia? No.

Of course, I know that the word is used sometimes, but it just does not make sense. But let me say in all frankness that Rapallo wasn't quite as bad as people believe. How did you read it as a German? You know very well how it was read abroad in the West. Two countries in a very miserable position after the end of World War I, the Vimer Republic in Germany, with inflation and reparations and isolation, especially communist Russia, also isolated. And those two weak countries try to, without sympathy for each other, try to get some more freedom of movement in, well, the diplomatic sense of it, and they agreed upon some trade.

No. This was not as dangerous as it later became when a new kind of approach between Moscow and Berlin played a certain role just before World War II started, but quite a part from my interpretation of what Rapallo meant in 1922, things are completely different today from what they were then. The Soviet Union now is not a weak partner in a miserable shape, it's a superpower, one of the two superpowers. Germany still plays, or again plays a certain role, especially as far as trade is concerned, but it cannot be compared in any way with the big powers.

So the relations between the two is quite different, and what is more important, there is a strong majority in this country today that we would commit suicide if we tried to move back in between the political front lines with which we have to deal today. We belong to the West as a result of our interpretation of interest, and based upon convictions, and those convictions are a result of the experience we have made during the last decades. You say you belong to the West, there stands between you here in Bonne and between the eastern block, a thin screen of American military forces, and other allied forces. Do you want those forces to stay, and should they be maintained at that special level?

What will you say to President Nixon about that? I would rather discuss that with the President. Now I think we should envisage a period where balanced troop reductions could be discussed between the West and the East, but there would only be a realistic chance for discussions of that kind, if one did not give the Russians the impression that there would be no need for discussions of that kind, because they would know that the West would move in the direction of unilateral reduction, for instance. One more word about East Germany. You said in Parliament the other day that there must be, that can be, and finally there will be negotiations between Bonne and East Berlin.

Do you care to predict when that will come true? I would like to, but I can't. When I said one day there would be the wording in a way already makes it clear that I don't know when that day will come. You are, I believe, in favor of a European security conference, the one proposed by the Soviet Union, but you said that there will be very little sense in taking part in it, unless there had been some positive steps beforehand in the inner German sphere that is in the relations between you and East Germany. What did you mean by that? Let me first say that I'm strongly in favor of the West not leaving ideas of that kind to the communists.

So when this discussion developed about a European conference on security or better a conference for European security, which means that it has to include all factor, the European countries themselves, and both the Soviet Union and the United States, which both are so strongly engaged European affairs and have to be. Incidentally, if I may interrupt you, consider it progress that the Soviet Union has agreed, finally, that the United States might attend such a conference. That was not very much of a concession because the West Europeans, at least we would not have participated in the conference. That was the only condition there on which the conference might have been held, or from your point of view. Well, this is one very important condition. There's another one. Confidence of that kind needs a careful preparation. And coming back to your point, what I meant to say is this.

If things remained unchanged as they are with a wall and with this artificial line where people cannot move from one part of the country to another, more difficulties, more rigid division than in any other part of Europe, well, if this remained unchanged, then a conference of that kind would be dominated from the very beginning by what the French call Likere L'Allemagne, the German quarrels. This would not be good, so therefore I've given the indication that a conference would not be successful if one, not in the period before it could be held, made some progress in reducing some of the most abnormal consequences of German division.

How eager do you think the Russians are for such a conference? I remember hearing them talk about it privately more than a year ago, beginning to ask for it to urge the Western powers to agree to it. Are they eager enough for this conference? Are they so eager for this conference that they would take steps to meet your conditions, which is some improvement in the inner German situation? I'm not sure about it. We will have to find out the Russians, of course, are mostly interested in getting, well, getting stabilized things as they are and by that getting a certain recognition for their empire. But there may be other elements involved in it.

May be that responsibilities they have in other parts of the world also make it advisable for them to look for some normalization of their relations with Western Europe. I turn now to a question that does involve the Soviet Union and Poland, and has always been a very sensitive one in this country. Do I understand that you are ready to recognize the older, nicer line, including the lambs taken away from Germany as the Western frontier of Poland? See I can only speak, this would also be true, if we enter into serious discussions with Poland. I can only speak for the Federal Republic of Germany. The East Germany has made a borderline agreement with Poland. What we can say is that we want a treaty on renunciation of France, and this would also include the problem of the borderlines, all borderlines in Europe. I think I should not

go beyond that by the expected model to be said about it when we get to all borderlines in Europe. Are you thinking perhaps also of the eastern border of Poland that that might or the eastern borders of other European countries that they might be subject to rectification? No, of course, when I say all borderlines in Europe, it would mean that I do not believe in any rectification by force, but I would not get myself involved into those problems. We have enough problems about our own. No, the problem of unification for my people of course mainly is a problem for the Germans where they live today. The West Germany is East Germany. But of course we would like to be able to think about the future where

the borderlines would not play the same role than they play today, where it would be easier for people to move from one country to another. Then perhaps the whole problem of even a rectification of borderlines would not interest people as much as they have interested them during. One more question on your initiatives in foreign affairs. Why do you feel free to undertake all these initiatives that your predecessors didn't undertake? Negotiations with Moscow, negotiations with Warsaw, a formal approach to the East German government for negotiations. What is your political and personal philosophy in relation to all these things? The main thing is that this country has to make its own contribution to make peace safer in Europe. This is the main thing. 25 years have gone

since the end of World War II. A new generation has entered or is about entering responsibilities and we cannot just concentrate upon economic affairs. We have to make our own contribution as I said it. And this then makes it necessary that we try, if we can, without illusions but with certain energy to try. If we cannot contribute in a process which brings about reduction of tensions and more communication, even between states with different philosophies, controversial ideas about how to organize a society.

In those 25 years has Germany itself greatly changed? Yes. You said I think that you will not be the chancellor of a defeated Germany but the chancellor of a liberated Germany. Do you think Germany is now liberated and liberated from what? From very bad errors and even crimes of the past, I think most of my fellow countrymen have learned their lesson. This does not mean that we do not live in a certain continuity with basic elements of our history. Everyone has to do that. But I think it's much more easier now than it was 20 years ago to in a self-confident way to discuss what happened after World War I and during the Hitler period. It's a young generation and middle-aged

generation now which is closer to the human values and political ideas in Western Europe than it has ever been in our history. What's happened to German nationalism? German militarism, we used to hear so much about and read so much about. Political nationalism has been to a high degree replaced by the idea of playing a road within the growing European community. It doesn't grow as fast as it should but there still is a process which will show results. But of course within that framework and within a changing landscape in Europe we want to keep together. We want to live together as

Germans because I think a European setup still will show the national identities and why shouldn't it. This is the great difference between the growing of the United States and the growing of the United Europe and the United Europe will consist of the independent national identities. The goal was right there in a way. Even if they put too much into it sometimes but this is the basic idea was right. Militarism apart from changing about these problems the material factors have changed so much even if there should be a temptation here and there and going back to ideas in the past. It just wouldn't lead to any result. Germany can only play her role as part of an alliance

and we have accepted that role. Our forces are completely integrated into the NATO defense setup and here again I say we are a medium-sized power of some importance but we are not will not be a leading power again. I say this without resignation but in this context I had to make this clear because it is important to make it clear. Now our military forces are integrated not only into NATO they are also integrated into our democratic setup our new kind of society. World attention has been focused in these recent days and we have focused here today on

your foreign policy but you've also described yourself as a chancellor of domestic reforms. What do you most hope to achieve for your country in this term of office domestically, economically, socially? Well if I make a few remarks and that will I think be about things which are discussed everywhere in the Western world nowadays. One main element is modernization in the feats of education and science. Now the main element has to do with regional reforms. Urbanization I think is one of the words for it in your country. Urban problems. Are there other regional problems? In social legislation it is not just a problem of raising

the standard for certain groups. It is also the question of giving you work is a better possibility of cooperation, some co-responsibility within the factories. Apart from the examples I gave this perhaps is the main thing to make democracy more of a reality for many people. So that the citizen does not have the feeling that he is confronted with anonymous forces and that the only thing which he has to do is every second year or not to participate in an election but to develop methods by which many citizens get a better chance to participate

in formulating the objectives and in controlling the democratic process. Since boyhood you have been a socialist but that program you have outlined doesn't sound very socialist to me. What is the socialist content if it is socialist? When my party doesn't call itself socialist party, its name is Social Democratic Party. Socialism is a word which includes which is used, well it was used even by the Nazis and it is used in the communist world. I think we didn't forget what Nazi means, it did mean that it is social. Social democratic means that the ideas of democracy should not be limited to the state, to the legislative process but that the idea of democracy should

practice where it is possible even within large areas of economic life in the field of control, cooperation, co-responsibility, the social life, educational life. So that many people do not only get an equal chance which is a good liberal principle. But that apart from the chance, the real conditions for many people are well correspond with that element of equality which goes back to liberalism as well but which has to be looked upon in a new way nowadays. What I mean to say is this, that we do not believe as socialist

did in all days in just changing the structure of economy and say let it stay to take it over. There are areas where the state or where the city may have control of certain economy. You are talking about a mixed economy. I am speaking about a mixed economy but an economy which where private initiative will play a decisive role but we are still a common responsibility will be incorporated. Your majority in the Bundestag, your majority with the free Democrats is only 12 votes. Isn't that a rather precarious margin for a radical program either in foreign affairs or domestic affairs? Yes, it is a narrow margin. When Karan Arnauer was elected he had only one vote when he was elected and everyone believed it was his own. He had that first Bundestag, he somewhat

had large majority. He did, however, gain a clear majority in his second election in 1953 I believe. Yes. Do you have hopes of that for yourself? One final question. You have a bus to Abraham Lincoln in your office. Why? What does Lincoln and Americans say to you or German? Oh, this would lead quite some time for it to develop it. As an effect, I spoke about this in February 59 in Springfield in Illinois then on the House divided itself which cannot stand. That, of course, had very much to do with my own country. That's the theme that caused you to be interested in him and what he'd done for his country

or I'd hope to do for it? Yes, and the parallels which I developed from that but of course also has to do with the way which this man had to go from a very modest beginning and towards that great and fascinating role he played including the tragic end of that life. Thank you, Chancellor Brandt. This is Clinton Daniel saying goodbye from Bond, the capital of West Germany. Social educational television and the New York Times has presented news in perspective. A conversation with Billy Brown, Chancellor of West Germany with Clifton Daniel, Associate Editor. Two weeks from tonight, News in Perspective reports from London on British attitudes towards the United States. Appearing with Clifton Daniel will be David Markquand, Member

of Parliament, Leslie Stone of the BBC and Bernard Levin of the London Daily Mail. This is NET, the public television network.