News in Perspective; 63; Special Report on the Middle East

The following program is from NET, the National Educational Television Network. The National Educational Television Network and the New York Times present news in perspective, special report on the Middle East with Leicester Markelle, Seymour Topping, Seth King, and Hedrick Smith. Today we propose to discuss the crisis in the Middle East. The tension continues there even though there is talk somewhat vague talk of peace negotiations. One

soon senses the general atmosphere in Jerusalem. The old Arab city has been joined by the Israelis to the new Jewish city. The two peoples mangle here. Yet the visitor is quickly aware that under the deep superficial calm emotions are running. Israeli troops stand throughout the city. They conduct careful search to detect potential sabotage. Jews set as visitors in Arab cafes. Yet the prevailing resentment is seen on the face of an Arab passerby. The Israelis come as churres to the hitherto forbidden places, the dome of the rock, and other Muslim holy sites. They proceed in great number to the Western Wall, known to the Jews as the Wailing Wall, and there even Israeli soldiers are found in prayer. Thus there is a mingling of the two peoples, but there are the overtones of ancient enmities that the visitor senses in the so-called city of peace. Jerusalem.

Two weeks ago we discussed the immediate situation. Today we propose to take a larger look. We plan to deal as expertly as we can with the fundamental elements in the situation, the importance of the area, the conflicting ambitions of the great powers, the clashing views of Arab and Israeli, the prospects of peace. I am Leicester Marquil, moderator, editor, and provocateur of the proceedings. Recently in Israel and in Washington, I've tried to discover what are the basic elements in the situation. Thus I am a seven-day expert. My companions today have much more impressive credentials and all-seeing editor and two veterans, except for the ages, foreign correspondents. Seymour topping, foreign editor of the Times, and has traveled almost as Ulysses himself, Seth King lately reporting from Jerusalem before, during, and after the war,

and Hendrick Smith, long station, in Cairo, and an expert analyst of the Arab move. We begin, man, with a discussion of the importance of the area, Mr. Topping. Will you please, as you are so able to do, provide the background? Once again, as often in the past, the Middle East is a focus of international concern and interest because of its geographic importance, its place in the Cold War, and its economic significance. The Middle East is a major crossroad, lying at the confluence of three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa, in kind of a link between the developed and the developing world, and a key to that strategic body of water, the middle sea, the Mediterranean. Russia has a special interest in the area, her access to the Mediterranean is now limited by Turkish control of the Dardanelles,

number one on the map. She seeks spaces in North Africa, number two on the map, to broaden Soviet influence and to ensure presence in the Mediterranean, number three, which would offset U.S. military power in the area, especially the sixth fleet. At the vortex of all this is Israel, a small island of 8,000 square miles in a large Arab sea. During the war, the Israelis occupied the Arab territories shown in black on the map. These comprised 23,000 square miles, almost three times the area of Israel itself. The surrounding Arab countries fall into two main groups. The first includes the United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Syria, the three states that actively took part in the June war. They are the Arab have not states. The second group comprises states which, while expressing

support for NASA, did not engage in the war. These include Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Lebanon. These are, in the main, have states. What they have is oil, and economically, the Middle East is important because of this oil. The region is second only to the United States in oil production. It produces 70% as much as we do. But the Middle East economy is more dependent on oil exports than any other region. Thus, geography and economics combine to make the area one of vital interest to the great powers. Gentlemen, before we talk about the importance of the area, let's speak briefly about what's happened since the end of the war in June. I must dismiss what, as I said, briefly has been happening in Egypt. Well, in Egypt we've had the arrest of a number of officers for participating in a plot against

President NASA, but nonetheless he appears to maintain control of the political situation there. We had recently the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Alat, and the Israeli reprisal by destroying much of the two Egyptian oil refineries at Suez. Economically, the situation in Egypt is poor, has been for years. The war and the aftermath of the war, including the reprisal against the oil refineries, has made the economic situation much worse. You haven't said a word about the Russians, have they been doing nothing? The Russians have been in Egypt for quite a while, but quite clearly they've increased their presence since the war. They began with amazing speed to resupply the Egyptian armed forces to the point where the Egyptians have now got about 65 percent of what they lost in the war in terms of military equipment, particularly aircraft, high-speed jets, and a fair proportion of their tanks back. They have completely replaced the entire Soviet military mission there, apparently being

disappointed in the performance of the Russians who were in Egypt at the time before the war, not realizing that their military estimates of the Egyptians were so bad before the war. But the numbers of Russians in the military advisor group don't seem to have increased much, but we do see much more of the Russian navy in Egyptian ports. In Alexandria and Port Said, this began a couple of years ago, but since the war, it's been pronounced the Russian ships have just been sitting in Egyptian harbors. What about Mr. King, what's been happening in Israel in this period? Well, our first problem, of course, after winning territory was to bring it back as quickly as they possibly could to a normal or to a status as close to normal as they could make it. They have, of course, they have brought the Arab section of Jerusalem into the Israeli section of Jerusalem. They don't like to use the word anex, but that's pretty much what it is. They have

joined the two nations as the way. Well, municipal unification is what I would call it, city planning, but anyways, as far as in effect, Jordanian Jerusalem is now a part of Israel. On the other hand, they have not extended their legal systems. They have not taken in the other sections that they occupied, what they have been doing in places like on the West Bank of Jordan, part that's beyond west of the Jordan River. Their main problem was to get the Israeli and get the Jordanian crops moving to their normal markets, which have always been traditionally to the east of them. That is, into unoccupied Jordan and Amman and to Damascus and areas like that. This, the Israelis have done simply by turning their backs and letting the Jordanian trucks go across the forward in the river. In In Gaza, they have largely been, which very badly overcrowded area. They have largely been maintaining order, which has been

surprisingly easy for them. The same thing has been true in Sinai Peninsula. Well, now, before we discuss the moods on both sides, I think we'd better include in this picture of events, Rick, something about what's been happening about Jordan. King Hussein has been traveling around to what purpose? Well, I think that King Hussein's visit to the United States has a number of purposes from his point of view. First off, from a very selfish point of view, he wants to improve his posture both in the Arab world and in the world at large. After all, he's lost about half of his country and economically the most beneficial half so that he's trying to regain some stature, but he's after much more than that. He's trying also to regain part of his country, as much of his country as he can get back. So he's moved on to the diplomatic offensive to try to begin to bring some international pressure on Israel to relinquish some of the Arab territories that had conquered during the war. Well, I was about to say, don't you think also?

We should add, he represents still somewhat undefined many of the other Arab leaders to some extent. He's sort of a frontman for this and this time. In the United States, whether he does represent, you say among the does he represent NASA? Well, he said that he did, and I guess Rick, you heard him say it, or were you convinced? Well, I think that's a critical question. Let's set aside a couple of other people that he doesn't represent quite clear. The Syrians and the Algerians are the most extreme militants in the Arab world today. Quite clearly, he doesn't represent them. Because he is, he's far too moderate. Without quotes or with quotes? No, without quotes, particularly relatives. Well, Iraqis, I suppose he doesn't represent well, Iraqis will probably wind up by going along with whatever NASA will pass, but the important thing is does he represent President NASA? We have had some indication that the Egyptians are willing to go along with the American five-point outline for the Middle East, which suggests that they

are backing Hussein in his mood, at least. Well, you imagine that you better say what that five-point outline is. Well, the five-point outline. Try to supply footnotes. The five-point outline comes from a speech that President Johnson made on June 19th, and at that point, he set out five guidelines for peace in the Middle East, the first being the right of all nations to exist, the second being justice for refugees, referring to Arab refugees of Palestine, the third being respect for maritime rights, meaning Israeli access through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Akhaba and the Straits of Tehran, the fourth point being limiting the arms race in the area, and then finally the fifth point, respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all the countries in the area. I think those five points to me sound somewhat like the Bible. I think each of the churches has an opportunity to interpret the Bible as it sees fit, and I think that's what the Israelis and the Arabs will be doing. Well, somebody remarked

me the other day that there are a lot of camel's noses that can fit under that tent. I think that's very nice. But, tap, what would you say the American, we've talked about the Russian position, and you delineated the Russian interest in the area, what did you say the American policy is? Well, should I put this to a Washington fellow? You were foreign at it. Well, I'll take a cry at it, and I'll hand it. No, I dare him to disagree. I would say that, in the first instance, it's something very simple. We're so preoccupied, in Vietnam, I think we would just like to keep the cap on the Middle East, and let us get on with the business in Vietnam. We don't want to be diverted. Then, in general, I think we want peace in the area, we want stability in the area, we want to do the impossible, be friends, good friends of both the Israelis and the Arabs at the same time on the same basis. And make sure the Russians don't engage. And we want to keep the Russian presence there limited. That should be number one on your

list? No, I don't think so. I don't believe myself that at the moment, this is a critical problem, I think, that if the situation there remains fluid, then there would be a possibility that the Russians might be tempted, and we might react, and that might lead to some sort of difficulty. Tempted to deal what? Tempted to expand their position in the Middle East to a point that we would not tolerate, and that we would react in some way. Will you talk about military things, or economic, or influence in general, which seems to be happening? I think that I would also include the military. I think, for example, if in the course of controversy or conflict between Israelis and the Arabs, that the Russians became too overt in their aid to the Arabs, that we might possibly take some kind of action. An action which in the first instance might be not be directed at open hostilities with the Soviet Union, but very easily through a miscalculation

of some kind might lead to hostilities and a general war. I think this is the great danger in the Middle East. Of a possible clash between the United States and Russia? Yes. I think there is a possibility, if the area remains turbulent, that a miscalculation of this kind can take place. I don't think he's a side wanted. The same danger, of course, exists in the forest. Do you agree with the foreign editor? What do you want to talk about? Well, I think one of the interesting aspects of the war in June was that the Russians and we were very careful to let each other know through the hotline and through diplomatic channels that we didn't want this to get out of bounds. But I think what you suggested here, Top, is that you've got a tension between parallel interests between the two great powers and conflicting interests. We have a parallel interest in not having it explode in our faces, either we or the Russians. But they have an interest in keeping a certain level of turbulence that helps them extend their influence and we want to keep a cap on the area.

And this is where the tension comes. This is where the danger comes. I don't think that's where the danger comes. I must say, and not regretfully, I don't see any difference of opinion here, this is a potential area of cold war. This is really the importance of the area. I think the Israelis fear this in an indirect manner. I think that the Israelis are concerned that the United States may be so eager to hold the level of tension down that they will begin to apply the tremendous pressure that they do have against the Israelis to move toward some sort of a settlement, which the Israelis would believe is nothing more than a papering over the cracks in some sort of a dampening down of a fire that will start up again at a later date. Well, so much for the background of the tension and now for the foreground. And we start with an attempt to present the viewpoint of the two sides, the Israeli side and the Arab side. When I was in Israel recently,

I had a conversation with Prime Minister Eshkol. I began by asking him what he saw as Israel's role in the Middle East. Given peace. Of course, we are doing our working without even when the peace is not so strong or so I should. At a gimp peace, we could be a bridge between Western culture, civilization, and the civilization of the start of the world, Asia and Africa. You may well know that we have today you'll find them almost in all African countries. As some of the Asian countries, you'll find our people

instructing the people of these countries in agriculture, in irrigation, in cooperation, and establishing cooperatives in medicine. But what do you see as the role of a small nation, such as Israel, in a world of big powers? Now, I noticed the other day, I think it was the deputy foreign minister of Denmark who said, and he was criticized for this, he said, a small nation has no role in this world except a mind of wrong affairs. Now, you have already told me that Israel is extending as a small nation, extending its influence. Just as I believe, and I hope you will agree with me, that the British, even though they're a second class power now, have a great role to play in the world, technologically and culturally. Yes, I think about the much smaller nations than Britain, or let's still call it the Great Britain. I think about much smaller nations

like Scandinavian nations, like Switzerland, or like Israel with our dreams and our ambitions, in the good sense, in the fine sense of the world ambition. Great ideas, great inventions were mainly invented in the brains of one man. He doesn't need a big nation for it, because he needs big sums of money. Ideas. Ideas. Ideas. Ideas. Cultural. Ideas. Moral. Ideas. And by the way, this is the place, this is the place where speaking from the point of view of culture, moral religion, and this small, this small place of the world, thousands of years ago, while the monotheism was born here in the heads of one or all of a few, few people,

then Judaism and the Muslim religion and the first Christian, then the Muslim. So you see small places, small nations, individuals, they created grandiose things. Well, we then talked about the future of Israel and the possibility of reaching an accommodation with the Arab countries, and the Prime Minister began with a discussion of the basic problem, the problem of people. No, if you would tell me that Russia is going to open the doors and send you off a million Jews, I would let's say, you need three years. I wouldn't hesitate a minute, even if it was a finalist, I would say, by God, send them here. We'll find ways. So then we have to try to establish new plants, new factories. This is already a pioneering job. You have to create because you have a goal. You have to, you wonder people here. We dream, at least of my dream,

is to double our population in 2025, so double the population, and to become a population of a 5 million. Because that means you need more land. It means mainly we need more industry. Because today, but today, a family, especially here, creates food for a 12 or 15 families. So it's mainly industry and science-based industry. To sum it up, what Mr. Ashkall, do you consider the lessons that Israel has for the world? He proved, because we were told years ago, what is Israel, a small country, dry? What can you do there? We said we love and devotion. The man, people make a country, people can convert a desert in a country, in a living country,

in not vice versa. If you don't conquer the desert, the desert conquer the man. Of course, Mr. Prime Minister, there's a big question in this whole area about which we've talked from the beginning, is the question of peace. How hopeful are you that peace can be achieved here? To my mind, it's a question of time. I am very much hopeful that we'll reach peace, and this is even my or our ambition to prove that peace could be reached among these peoples, because there is much in common interests. If these peoples will work together and on an original basis where land is ample and water is abundant, and some countries

lack people, they need much more people in industry. It's only the beginning of development. I am hopeful that it will prove, in addition to what I told what we have done that till now, during these 20 years, after all, it's not too much. We'll prove that peace is possible to reach, and we'll do everything possible from our side to reach it. Oh, you included a large if and a question, or what seemed to me a large if, if there will be cooperation. How hopeful are you? Of course, for peace, you need at least two parties. Yes, sir. How hopeful I am. Of course, these days are not the best days to go to prophesy, to make prophecies about peace. But living here are already a few decades.

I would like to discover my age, if you would like it. So, looking forward and understanding that people must come to senses, and they will understand that instead of spending hundreds of billions, maybe almost billions, either dollars or pounds or the dinars for tanks and planes, and then it can be destroyed in six days or in three days. Instead of this, in people, people, for instance, in Egypt, are starving, really, it's a situation of starvation. So, they'll come to their senses, one day, say, now let's sit down together and discuss how to produce, how to create, in order to destroy. I said in a sire, who's often quoted by PREVIOUS, let us sit down and take counsel together.

Yes, sir. So shall we hand on that biblical note? Very nice. Thank you, sir. I feel that out of your conversation, I get this moral in your own words, if man does not conquer the desert, the desert will conquer me, and I thank you for that thought. Well, such is the picture as the Israelis see it. I talked also with a number of Arabs in Jordan and found their feeling almost unanimous and very bitter. Virtually all Arabs see the continued existence of Israel as a constant threat, the policy of bringing in as many Jews as possible, they believe, in the long run will require that Israel expand its territory once again. The Arabs argue that the Balfour Declaration promised the Jews a, quote, national home in Palestine, but did not contemplate the creation of an independent state.

These Arabs profess sympathy for the Jews who have sought refuge from persecution in other lands, but they ask, why was the Jewish homeland set up in their midst? Why was it not Canada, or Latin America, or even Texas? This bitterness of the Arabs toward Israel is reflected in the cartoons that have appeared recently in the Arab press. Al-Aram of Akirao shows Israel perch precariously on top of a time bomb, the bomb representing the Arab territories captured during the Jew war. Al-Naha of Lebanon continues to suggest close collusion between Israel and the United States. Of course, that is General Diane's eye patch on the Statue of Liberty. Yet now King Hussein of Jordan is talking about the possibility of recognizing Israel's right, quote, to live in peace and security, unquote, provided certain

conditions are met. Whether the Arab leaders can damp down the feeling of hostility toward Israel in the Arab masses is a real issue. Let's begin then with a comment as to what the Arabs might say in reply. I have, as objectively as possible, written, made the case for the Arabs, or made the Arab answer. Do you want to amplify that or correct me? Well, I don't know whether either you or I are fit to commentators on Mr. Eskall on behalf of the Arabs. There are two or three points that he made in his interview, which I think would be answered very quickly by Arabs, and I think I can guess pretty well how they might answer it. One, he talks about Israel possibly serving as a bridge between Europe and the underdeveloped world. Well, the Arab response to that, I'm sure, would be something of a horse laugh, and they would be saying, well, actually, what Israel is is an obstacle, not a bridge. We want to unify our part of the world. Of course, there are plenty

of problems within the Arab world, and among the Arabs themselves, the unification, nonetheless, their line is that Israel is an obstacle to their unity, so how can it serve as a bridge between any part of the world and another part of the world? There are, however, I think probably some Arabs, particularly say Christians living in Lebanon or something like that, who would recognize that Israeli talents brought from the West might well be an advantage to the Arab world, given a complete and overall settlement. But I think far more important than that is his comment about the Russians. If the Russians could send me a million more Jews, send them right away. My dream is to expand the population of Israel to 5 million people. This is precisely what the Arabs are frightened about. More people, they say, means more land. More land, they say, means less land for the Arabs. It means traveling on the Arab rights, and that's what they say to go all the way back to the Balfour Declaration, is what began back in 1917, and that's what this shooting has been about ever since. So this is the kind of thing that hits them right in the guts. I mean, this is the gut

issue, as far as their concern. And when they talk about a settlement, and they say that Israel must meet their terms, their terms revolve about land and people. They want back as much of their territory as they can get, and they don't spell it out in public how much, if they can, they can get the world committed to all of it, they'll take all of it. In private, they somewhat hedge this and say, well, maybe they can only get part of it. When it comes to people, they're talking about the Palestinian refugees now numbering something like a million and a half, and they want these people according to the words of UN resolutions, either repatriated or compensated for their lost land. These are the gut issues, as far as the Arabs are concerned. Well, so thank you, or I think you've done as well as Colonel Nasser himself. I tell you, I mean, is that entirely fair now? All right, King, he's an objective reporter for the New York Times. Oh, he said, well, that's what he's done, because after their case, extremely well, and I failed, I apologize, but I didn't have that. I would like to talk, Rick, you've been a Cairo, you've been

in the United Arab Republic a long time. I think to talk about the Arab mind a bit. This is what fascinated me. One Arab who is objective, who said, consider the word arabesque, which is the definition, I guess, is his design made up of various strands, and he said the Arab mind is like this. They have five strands at one time, and they can think about five different things at once, and each one contradicting the other. Is there, in your experience, any justification for this description? Well, I think what you're suggesting, in terms of the contradiction, is that the Arabs seem to do things, at least from the outsider's point of view, which run directly counter to their own interests, and this is where we see the contradictions. I have five strands, it could be a hundred, it could only be two, but they have a number of concepts, which are very difficult for us to grasp. One of them is the whole notion of the hero, Samson, to us as a

tragic figure, he brings down the temple on his own head, and destroys himself as well as other people. I mean, like shooting a destroyer out of the water, and things, I'm the sewer that refineries go up and flamethrower. You've got the parallel. He is a hero to them, because he is stood proudly for what he believed in, regardless of the consequences, and there's a kind of regardless of the consequences element. Something to that point of view, wasn't there? Well, not from our point of view, we're having a pragmatic common sense type people, and we don't see that. If you knock off an Israeli destroyer, you're going to lose a refinery in that cost more. I'm running into Rick Banner, what to say. Somebody once said that logic is a systematic way of going wrong with confidence. Arrows might cite that again. Well, King was saying, King was saying himself as a good example of an Arab hero. Here is a man who stands up publicly and says, the war last June didn't make any sense. I didn't want to get into it, but I'm an

Arab, and I had to. And he is regarded today, generally, as a hero in the Arab world. He did the right thing, even though it cost him half his country. And other Arabs, respectively, I was in the Arab world during and after the war, and the tremendous respect, King who says prestige had never been higher. And here is in a Western country, this would have been disaster. The government probably would have fallen. There would have been elections or a coup or something like that. Well, Rick, don't you think after the shock of the Israeli war, war with the Israelis and defeat the Arab stuff? And don't you think there is? There are some indications that the Arabs are moving toward a more pragmatic position. We're getting that not only from Hussein, but a lot of dispatches, for example, Cairo, talking about acceptance of Israel. You don't get it from NASA, perhaps, but you get it in the columns of Al-Aram with Haiko telling us that we have to be more realistic in a praise of our own strength and in our attitudes toward Israel. And so on, is this just a very small group? No, I don't think it is small in terms of the Arab mass, but then I don't think the

Arab mass necessarily is going to be determining here. It's always got to be taken into account, but it may not be determining. No, I think there is evident, as you look back over the weeks from the war, and then a couple of months ago. And now, I think there is a sobering up process going on, but there is also, this is another one of those strands that Mr. Markelle was talking about earlier. You've got these things working against each other, and when you're dealing with Arabs, you can't be sure which is on top, or whether or not one is going to be a continuing strand. Top, could I complete this, to me, very interesting examination of the Arab mind? What does this characteristic of the Arab's mean in terms of the possibility of a settlement? Well, it means that there's going to be a constant ebb and flow between various elements that seems to me of their mind and of the way they appraise the situation, so that you aren't going to move and a neat progression towards any settlement. It's always constantly going to be in the balance

as to whether or not you can make a settlement, or whether or not you veer off in exactly the opposite direction and you wind up with another blow-up. And one of the things you have to watch very carefully is the kinds of things the Arabs are saying to each other, because words in the Arab world have tremendous power. At times, almost a confusion of the word with reality. When the Arabs, when NASA used to get up and talk about driving Israel into the sea, psychologically, millions of Arabs believed it was going on at that time. It's a susceptibility to the demagogue, which is far beyond what we have. We all have this discussion. Are you suggesting the Israelis should send their poets to negotiate with the Arabs instead of their politicians and soldiers? I wouldn't think it would be a mistake to have poets and philosophers in the delegation. I think you've got a point there. But back to what Tom suggested about the sobering up and the columns. One of the most important things, even when the Arabs are not coming forward necessarily, with specific terms that the Israelis are going to buy, the mere fact that the public tone of Heiko's articles and of what King Hussain is

saying is changing is part of the preparation for the Arab people for a possible settlement. I'm not saying it's going to happen, but this is a necessary prelude to it, and I think it is significant that it's going on. Well, Jerry, you served in Israel a long time. What about the Israeli characteristic? I discovered there was a great spirit of nationalism, and I was told a story, and I'm told that reveals this very clearly about Ben Gurion, about a Frenchman who came to him and said, they were having a dispute, and the Frenchman said, look, I'm first a socialist, I'm second a Frenchman, and I'm third a Jew. And when Gurion said, sir, in this country, we read from right to left. I know what about the spirit of nationalism? Well, I think it is intense, and it is partly is flamed by a survival. The Israelis know from, they can look around themselves, and before the

five-day war, Kerr, six-day war, Kerr, they knew how much land they had, they knew how many people were around them, and they knew what the Arab attitude toward them was. And I think that this is something that you have to keep in mind. Whenever you start to talk about all of the possibilities, the technicalities, the various diplomatic ploys that may be made in this matter, is that Israel's primary concern has got to be survival. And so far, there has been nothing, I think, that the Israelis believe that they have seen nothing from the Arab world, either before or after the Jew war, that indicated the Arabs were prepared to accept the fact that Israel is there to stay. Until you find that, then I think that a lot of what is going on has been going on in recent days is simply maneuvering, and we wait to see whether you have to, you're going to come back to all of these things that sound reasonable enough until they come up against the Arab, I mean, the

Israeli premise that is this going to lead to a permanent peace, and are we going to be accepted? Is this question of acceptability? It's paramount to them. You hear Mr. Ashkel talking about doubling his population and doubling his industrial capacity. Well, now this is going to hinge, and one of the things that has stalled the Israelis in their own internal development has been, the fact that they don't have any ready markets around them for these industrial goods that they're trying so desperately to make, and until this acceptability comes, and it's in a form of permanent peace, then I don't think you're going to find the debatable points that the United Nations can bring up or going to have any effect on Israel. All right, well, we've sketched in the background of the conflict, and let's now plunge directly into the question of the chances of its resolution, and of course the crux of the matter seems to me is the occupation of the Arab territory. Mr. King, let's have some of the background here, please. All right, as a result of the six-day war,

the Israelis have quadrupled the area they occupy, and in the newly occupied lands there are a million and a quarter hostile Arabs. These factors pose severe problems for them. The occupied areas taken from Jordan are Old Jerusalem, which has been a symbol of Israel's frustration over a divided capital, and the West Bank of the Jordan River, which has been a base for border raids. The region seized from Syria is the high ground, the Golan Heights, from which the enemy had bombarded Israel's northern regions and sparked the conflict over the Jordan River waters. From Egypt, Israel captured the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. A Gaza was a staging area for attacks. Control of the Sinai would mean control both of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Akhaba, Israel's outlet to the Red Sea. Now, there is involved in this issue of the occupied areas, the question of security, of guarding the borders from Arab retaliation,

or of ensuring free passage of Israeli ships as at the Suez Canal. There is also involved the large question of the Arab population. If the Arabs in the occupied areas are added to those in Israel, their total is almost a million and a half, for some 37 percent of the population of Israel proper. Now, this imbalance creates great problems for control and assimilation, and so the confrontation stands, unless Israel with its two and a half million population can reach some sort of an accommodation with the hundred million Arabs in the area, there is no likelihood of a peace for a long time to come. Yes, sir. Thank you. And not before we discuss the possibility of an agreement, I think we ought to talk about the pressures on both sides. Now, what are the pressures on the Arabs? You've indicated, Rick, that there is the economy in Egypt. There is the revenue loss from the Canal. We've had, as I understand it, a bad cotton crop, the tourists have trade has collapsed. The destruction of Suez, they lost

mostly their oil refining capacity. Isn't the pressure very great on them to reach some sort of study? Well, I think the economic pressures are significant, but less significant than the psychological pressures of having an enemy on your territory and wanting to regain as much of your territory if not all of it. As you can, the Arab leader can't turn and look to his people and say, I'm an effective leader of your country if an enemy, which he has long claimed is much smaller and would be submerged in the Arab sea, sitting on a fairly large chunk of Arab real estate. I think this is where the real pressure is. It's certainly the primary pressure on King Hussein, and I think it's also pressure on NASA. The Canal, the loss of the Canal revenues are important for President NASA. This is true, but he has gotten an agreement which will tide him over for some months, an agreement from the other Arabs, the oil rich Arab states, to providing with $266 million a year in flat out support. This is about $30-40 million more than the Canal

revenues. It also depends upon how much the Russians are prepared to underwrite of the Egyptian economy. The Russians have provided wheat shipments on a couple of occasions since the war, and they were doing it on a few occasions before the war. How long they'll do it, and to what extent they'll do it? It's a very difficult question, but he can string along for a while economically, and then I think there's one other point to be made on the economy. That is, if you think of Indonesia and other countries in the underdeveloped world, there is a capacity for endurance that a fairly low living standard, which far exceeds the expectations of Westerners. We tend to look at gross national product and foreign exchange and balance of trade and this sort of thing, and say, the economy's busted, the government's bound to collapse, and they've got to come to terms. It just doesn't work that way in the underdeveloped world. They are used to so much less that there's an awful lot of give, and after all, most of the people in Egypt are fellow-hine, or peasants.

They aren't living any differently today from the way they lived before the war, or really from the way they lived hundreds of years ago. Well, somewhat, but you have indicated, if I have not misunderstood you, that the economic pressure is not so great as the psychological. Yes, I'd say so. Well, does this mean that in order to regain their psychological balance, they're going to try another round if the Israelis don't give in? Well, there's certainly pressures to that effect in the Arab world today. This is what the Syrians and the Algerians are advocating, and this is the cleavage between them and the rest, and particularly when I say the rest, I mean, particularly King Hussein and President Nasser. There is this conflict within the Arab world now, and this is precisely what King Hussein said, is when he comes here. He says, if you don't encourage me, if you don't help me, we'll all slip the other way, and we'll start this long Vietnam-style guerrilla war that the Syrians already advocate. Well, before we discuss the pressures on the Israelis, let's complete the question of pressures

on the Arabs. Now, let's talk about Jordan. You've been seeing quite a bit of the King, I gather, in person, in other ways. What exactly is he saying? Well, the King has spelled out publicly and privately three points that he says are Arab concessions, or Arab moves towards the peace settlement, and they are these. First, that the Arabs are prepared to recognize Israel's right to live in peace and security. Second of all, that the Arabs are prepared to end the state of war with Israel. And third, that the Arabs are prepared to grant free maritime passage to the Israelis. On certain conditions? Oh, yes. It's quite clearly on certain conditions. The conditions I mentioned before land and people, that is, that something be done about the refugees, and he's very vague about that. It's not clear. And that Israel withdraw from the territory she captured last June. Privately, he hints and indicates that he really doesn't expect a full withdrawal by the Israelis.

But publicly, the Arab position is the Israelis have got to pull back entirely. And of course, the most difficult problem there is what's to be done about Jerusalem. He says it's intolerable for Jerusalem to remain in Israeli hands, and as Jerry suggested earlier, the Israelis give every evidence of having annexed it, regardless of what they call it. So here you have a real tough point. There is still a considerable gap between what Hussein is offering as the most moderate Arab position and what the Israelis want. The Israelis want direct peace talks. He says, no, not as long as they're on our territory. Is he speaking as he led recently for Egypt also? Well, I think in mood, yes. But when you get down to the specifics and the most difficult specific for the Egyptians as the Suez Canal, then I question whether or not King Hussein can do the bargaining for President Nasser. I wouldn't have thought anybody else but Nasser could do. You mean they agree about the conditions described, but not about the three points of the

discussion? No, I would say that in general, from my impression, from what diplomats say, the Egyptians have been saying privately. And so forth that there is general agreement on the three points. But it's when you get down to defining those and putting them into language and saying, well, all right, now on what day can an Israeli ship bearing an Israeli flag go through the Suez Canal that Nasser began, or the Egyptians began to talk about wanting an international court decision as an umbrella to explain it away to the other Arabs, why they reverse themselves, or else they say that they want a resolution of the refugee question. Well, now what do they mean by a resolution of the refugee question? They haven't spelled it out. Maybe Hussein's definition is different from Nasser's. That's what I mean. Well, Jerry, I'm going to come to you about the Israeli position. But before that, to sum up the Arab thing top, I'd like to ask you whether you don't think there's a great question as to whether the propaganda which has gone on for years and years by the Arab leaders with the Arab peoples can be diffused. In other words, I'm asking whether

a moderate like Hussein and Nasser, if he becomes a moderate, is not in actual physical danger in view of what Rick has described as the psychological mood of the Arab peoples. I would guess so. We've seen again and again what happens in Arab countries when the leader becomes unpopular in what the mob in the marketplace can do. I suppose that at the moment, one of the reasons why Hussein is speaking as he is in this country to some extent for Nasser is simply that Nasser doesn't feel that he can safely say some of these things in the present situation in Cairo, which I understand is extremely delicate. He's under a certain amount of threat and pressure from various groups and he has to maintain some sort of a delicate balance there. And it might very well be that if he were to come out directly and boldly and say some of the things that he feels or apparently feels that must be said and done in order to achieve

peace with the with the Israelis that he might be possibly dragged down. I would say that certainly anyone who would attempt to take a moderate line today in Syria and possibly in Iraq would be in it might be very well-being trouble. I think Algeria although Algeria is a very militant country at the moment, I think that a person there taking a lead at taking a moderate line possibly would not be so much in trouble because I think that the leadership is more separated from the population and possibly in these other Arab countries. What King Hussein's own grandfather is an example of what can happen, right? He was assassinated for having collaborated as there, I was put it with the Israeli, so that Hussein is walking a very very delicate line and this in part I think accounts for what seemed to be conflicting elements in some of his speeches and public utterances. He's trying to move as I see it, he's trying to move towards moderation and

towards accommodation but he's also trying to protect himself so that he's there to do whatever is going to be done three or four months from now. Well, Jerry, now let's talk about the pressures on Israel for some sort of settlement. They may have secure frontiers but they certainly have an insecure population and how much give you think in the long run they're likely to provide in this situation. I assume at the moment we're really engaged in a kind of poker game and you can't believe everything you read about the demands on both sides. Well, what are the pressures and what is the mood about some kind of reconciliation? Well, you start off with this by you remind yourself that this is the Middle East where people enjoy haggling. You never start, you wouldn't think of coming out and telling giving somebody the price you really intend to pay for something. So you're starting, this is like a labor negotiation. You're starting from two very widely separated

poles and then have to start coming together. The Israelis have been deliberately vague about just exactly what they would settle for. Are you in talking to Israeli leaders and to their spokesman in their various departments? You always come back to one premise that they put out to you. Now say if we can see permanent peace you would be surprised about what we could do. Now this may be only their propaganda. I'm not sure but they are at least this is what they keep clean to. I think that just on a on plain hard geo politics there are several parts in which they have a good deal of give for they have no interest in the Sinai Peninsula. I think they what about the canal? Well a canal I'm saying this I'm just about to say that they're only interested in the use of the canal. If they are entitled to use the canal they don't want to have Israeli soldiers out there in the desert. I'm sure that I believe in any way that they would probably give up this modest oil field that they've captured from the Egyptians in southern Sinai in turn for some recognized

acceptance of peace treaty. Let's say peace treaty. This is what they're after really. As far as the Syrian areas concerned what they their primary element that this land is that they have captured is largely worthless. If it was a military zone their real interest up there is in getting the area demilitarized so that the Syrians could not again come back with warm material and fire into their area. The Gaza Strip in the West Bank including the city of Jerusalem. There you get into a much greater problem because this is where the refugees are. You not only have peace of territory to settle for but you have a large population that has to be managed. The people on the West Bank excluding the city of Jerusalem are in I think the Israelis themselves say that they were surprised to find that things were better there than they had expected. Over half of the 700,000 people that live there outside the city of Jerusalem are farmers. They take care of themselves. They always have. The Israelis did see that certain amount of normal commerce took

place between the East and the West Bank during this occupation period which was vital. The Gaza Strip is another great problem as long as the United Nations continues to send food supplies in there those people will make it some way. These are our tiny contributions by our standards but they are enough to keep these people alive. So that these pressures the economic pressures on Israel and holding this ground are relatively small and easy. What about the population? Well the population is a big matter now. If you look at it in the short run, let's forget about the long run as to whether I mean this is a Jewish state, it's a Zionist state, it was conceived as a homeland for the Jews. I think that in moments of great honesty that this is all that is wanted in Israel. They have the problem of the Arabs. If a large scale guerrilla activity is to begin, as the Syrians and the Algerians suggest, you have a situation of potential difficulty

and unrest for Israel but on the other hand the Israelis this time, this trouble that's coming is if there's going to be a retaliation raid this time, it's not very far to Damascus, it's certainly not very far to Amman. In retaliation this time that this guerrilla warfare is kept up, the price that the Arabs are going to pay to continue will be a lot higher than it ever has been before. I think the Israelis believe and this has been said of the Arabs too and I'm sure Rick has heard this plenty of times that time is on their side and they are convinced that they are at the moment able to hold what they have while they wait for a bargain and a settlement. Well now before we come to the conclusion, the UN has seized the problem again. Is there a top? Do you think any possibilities the UN can take any effective action in this area? I'm not very hopeful about any kind of a settlement through the UN. I think as always the UN provides a forum to take the heat off

the situation and perhaps the UN can contribute to maintaining for a time the status quo such as it exists at de facto ceasefire but I don't see that there is much chance within the framework of the UN considering how far apart in reality the two sides are of the UN bringing about any kind of a real lasting settlement certainly not in the next months. Well they can issue after there is firing they can issue a denunciation. It's very difficult. The only value the UN would have I think is that this matter is really in the hands of the two big powers isn't it and if the two big powers can get together the UN it may provide some way some road to a solution but that doesn't seem to be any immediate possibility of that. I would like to end the discussion by putting each of you this tough question which give me one answer or such. Jerry what's your best on

the settlement in the near future? Not in the near future and what does the near future include? Well I think you'd be very optimistic if you had good talks going inside of a year right? I go along with that I think because the problem is so emotional that the hopes of any permanent lasting settlement are very slim indeed but they're better now than they were three months ago. But not too good and you? I agree I don't think there's much of a chance of a settlement I think the immediate problem is doing everything possible to avoid a further broadening of a conflict within the next months. And that depends I would say in considerable degree on what part the Russians play in all of this because I have the feeling that our foreign policy is really being made in large part by the Russians. In any case there are now the first even though faint signs that they may be a move towards some kind of accommodation even though we're not very hopeful

in the Arabs and the Israelis disagree and most things but in their proverbs there seems to be some agreement because examples are these Arab sayings quote there is regret in haste and safety in deliberation patience destroys mountains do not regret what has passed and do not rejoice over what has yet come and there are these Israeli sayings patience gives peace haste regret who Russia's in is often late to regret nothing is the beginning of all wisdom patience and portitude in three weeks we shall as usual review the events of the month the usual unusual trio wica frankle and mark hell we trust as always that you will be with us news in perspective special report on the Middle East has been presented by the national

educational television network and of the New York time with lester mark hell see more topping saff king and hedrick smith tune in next time when news in perspective will present its regular review of the news of the month with lester mark hell tom wicker and max frankle this is n-e-t the national educational television network