Briefing Session 1962; 5 Goals of U. S. Foreign Policy

Rwy'n iddaint mweud yn fawr am fawr i'w natron o batter. Bory sefri 7 Ty 4 kwagbwch. Unrbim gしad yn fyddan neu gwya'r traff i ddaiont sydd. Wro'r m Toussaill będzie itzaint syddushau gwoud wrthosh am gwthys. Felly ondem thighaw Several bereg. Mae'r rhau'n n女fiodd, I am Maryman Smith of United Press in a National. I have been covering this Washington scene

for quite a few years. Right now, you are with me on the 8th Florida Terrace of the State Department. In a moment we will step inside and meet the men who plan and carry out our foreign policy. That is no bloodless phrase for men in striped pants getting around the world with pig skin despach cations. Foreign policy, our American foreign policy, is a set of ideas and principles by which we live in the world community. A community which includes some pretty dangerous members as well as many law-abiding citizens and friends. With today's instant communications, we Americans have become more than ever aware of the rest of the world. But these communications can lead to a rather narrow view of events at time. We tend to see only the crisis of the moment, the latest tragedy, for instance, at the Berlin wall,

a guerrilla ambush in Vietnam. At times we lose sight of the deeper currents of the history we're making. To survive, to make new progress in this era of rapid change, we as people need to see beyond the morning headlines. We need to keep our eyes fixed firmly on the lasting interest of our nation. To help you and me understand more clearly our country's aims in the world today, we now are going to sit in on a unique meeting, a special State Department briefing on the five basic goals of United States foreign policy. We'll meet the highest officials of the State Department, the Secretary of Defense, and our representative to the United Nations, men upon whom our personal and national security in great measure depends. How are you, Mr. Secretary? It's a milkberg. Glad to have you with us today.

Mr. Smith, let me introduce you to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. How are you, Mr. Secretary? I'm the Secretary of State, Mr. George Ball. Mr. Fowler-Hamilton, who is the Administrator of our aid program. How are you, Mr. Hamilton? Mr. Walt Rustow, the Council of the Department, who is in charge of our policy planning. How are you, Mr. Rustow? Very well. And then Adley Stevenson, our representative to the United Nations in New York, who will join us a little later on the program. Well, Mr. Secretary, in such distinguished and authoritative company, let's get right down to a discussion of basic United States foreign policy. We shall do our best. We have a simple but transcendent goal. It is, in President Kennedy's words, a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system. So long as it does not threaten the freedom of others, unhappily there are forces in the world which are opposed to that goal. Forces determined to impose their system on all the peoples of the earth. The rulers of

the leading communist states are not only Marxists, who believe their system is destined to prevail over all others, but they are linenists, intent upon expediting that alleged historical inevitability by every practicable means. They speak, for example, of peaceful coexistence. But by their own definition, peaceful coexistence is a program of conflict, a design for extending communist domination by all methods, shorter the Great War, which would be self-defeating. Their design does not exclude the use of force. Indeed, they expressly approve what they call wars of national liberation. A characteristically communist upside down label for the sort of aggression, for example, they are now inflicting on South Vietnam. Our goal, the goal of all free men, is incompatible

with that communist goal. This contest between two incompatible systems and concepts will continue until freedom triumphs. Our objective is a worldwide victory, not of one people or one nation over another, but a worldwide victory for all mankind, for freedom and a decent world order. The struggle between coercion and freedom is taking place in a world of revolutionary change. The times are dangerous. The Department of State must always be prepared for more trouble. But on balance, the free world is gaining strength relative to the communist world. The communists are failing in the competition and production. Compare East Germany with West Germany or Eastern Europe with Western Europe. The Berlin Wall is itself a symbol of communist failure.

Successful systems do not have to build walls against their own peoples. In communist China, the vaunted shortcut to the future has proved to be a shortcut to failure. Compare the conditions in mainland China with those in Taiwan or Malaya or India, not to mention Japan. No new nation has adopted communism. Indeed, no nation has ever adopted it by consent of the governed, tested in free elections. Most of the new nations have rallied to the support of the United Nations in the face of Soviet attacks. Disruptive and erosive forces are at work within the Sino-Soviet block itself. Differences over ideology, practice, leadership, the unquenchable spirit of nationalism, yearnings for more individual freedom evident not only in the Soviet satellites, but in many small ways within the Soviet Union itself.

We're making progress, but the road ahead will be long and hard. Our policy may be said to have five principal components, first to deter or defeat aggression at any level, whether at nuclear attack or limited war or subversion and guerrilla tactics. That is, security through strength. Second, to bring about a closer association of the more industrialized democracies of Western Europe and North America and Asia, specifically Japan, in promoting the prosperity and security of the entire free world. In other words, progress through partnership. Third, to help the less developed areas of the world carry through their revolution of modernization without sacrificing their independence or their pursuit of democracy. That is, the revolution of freedom. Fourth, to assist in the steady emergence of a genuine world community, based on cooperation

and law, through the establishment and development of such organs as the United Nations and the World Court, the World Bank and Monetary Fund, and other global and regional institutions. That is, a world community under law, and five to strive tirelessly to end the arms race and reduce the risk of war to narrow areas of common interests, and to continue to spend the infinitive threads that bind peace together. That is, to win peace through perseverance. Well, this Secretary, let's take these goals one at a time. First, I think it'd be interesting to discuss security through perseverance. Well, I think the best person to discuss that would be our Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. That Secretary Rice is indicated. Our job in the defense department is to maintain the strength we need to either deter or to defeat aggression

at whatever level it occurs. And to this end, we've added substantially to the forces programmed in the department when we took office. We've taken specific measures to strengthen both our nuclear and also our non-nuclear forces. For these purposes, approximately $6 billion was added to the $44 billion defense budget originally planned for fiscal year 1962, and about $8 billion above the original 62 levels has been appropriated for the current fiscal year, fiscal year 1963. Of these two increments, $6 billion in fiscal 62 and $8 billion in fiscal 63, we have spent about a billion and a half dollars in each year to add to the strength of our strategic nuclear forces. And for these expenditures, we've increased the forces in the following ways. First, there's been a 50% increase in the Polaris Submarine Program. Originally, 19 Polaris Submarines

were planned to be deployed at the end of 1964. That number is now programmed at 29, as I say, an increase of over 50%. In addition, about 12 additional submarines for a total of 41 are planned to be operational in the year shortly thereafter. Secondly, there's been a very significant increase in the number of minute-man missiles, the hardened and dispersed intercontinental ballistic missile, which will be the foundation of our strategic nuclear forces. And in that connection, we have doubled the production capacity for the minute-man missile in the event that our forces need to be further increased in the future. And thirdly, there's been a 50% increase in the number of our strategic bombers on 15-minute ground alert, the number of B-52 and B-58 bombers, which we expect will survive any surprise attack, any potential surprise attack on this nation. As I stated earlier, the budget increases have permitted not only an increase in our strategic nuclear forces, but also very substantial

increases in our conventional or tactical forces as well. These include such actions, for example, as a 50% increase in the number of combat-ready Army divisions. A year ago, July, there were 11 combat-ready Army divisions today. There are 16. Secondly, a 50% increase in the rate of procurement, a munitions and ammunition for our armed forces, ground, sea, and air. Thirdly, a very substantial increase in the size of our airlift and sea lift, this to increase the mobility of our forces and the flexibility of our response. Fourthly, as you know, we are reorganizing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard, this to increase their combat readiness and complement the actions we have taken to strengthen our active forces. And finally, to deal more adequately with the so-called war of liberation, the threat of covert aggression and subversion, the type of action as Secretary Rust mentioned, which the communists are carrying on in Southeast Asia today, we have more than traveled our counterinsurgency forces. These then are

the actions that have been taken to strengthen our present military power. But of course, it's not enough to look only at the present. For particularly with the immensely complicated weapon systems with which we are dealing today, we must look and plan far into the future. And to meet the future, we face three major problems. The first of these deals with the new power relationships within NATO. Europe's increasing integration, as well as the tremendous economic growth, which has taken place in Western Europe, requires to reassess our military relationships. These same forces, of course, provide opportunities to increase substantially the NATO defensive capability to meet a variety of threats in Europe and opportunities to work out a closer relationship, both among the members of NATO and between the U.S. and the Western European nations. The second problem arises from the possibility that the value of our nuclear

superiority may decline over time. We have substantial nuclear superiority and strategic nuclear forces today. We believe we can maintain that nuclear superiority in terms of numbers in the years to come, but we cannot maintain the near monopoly on strategic forces, strategic nuclear forces, which we have possessed over much of the past decade. And therefore, since the utility of our numerical superiority is likely to decline, we have to start planning now against the day when our strategic nuclear forces may be a less effective deterrent than they have been against major aggression, short of nuclear attack on NATO. We're faced with a very real paradox that has nuclear weapons developed and continue to become more effective. It becomes increasingly important for us to supplement our strategic nuclear power with adequate non-nuclear forces. The third major problem we face is the problem of arms control and

disarmament. Disarmament and arms policy are ultimately related. They're both part of the effort to provide for our national security. Some of the most important things we do in this field are not part of what's customarily thought of as either disarmament or arms control. We don't, for example, think merely of numbers of weapons. When we're estimating our defense needs, we think particularly of the kinds of weapons of their survivability and in particular of the effectiveness of our command and control over those weapons. For our armaments must protect our national security from inadvertent as well as from deliberate aggression. We can't hope to deter aggression without taking some of the risks that are associated with a failure of deterrence, a risk that we shall have to fight the war that we're trying to avoid. There's a ever-present problem, therefore, a balancing of risks.

But fortunately, the goals of deterrence, of defense, and of arms control are not always in conflict. For example, when we improve our command and control systems, we improve our deterrent to aggression. And at the same time, we decrease the chance of a completely uncontrolled war should deterrence fail. We've installed a number of both administrative and physical safeguards for our nuclear weapons, which reduces as far as possible the chance of unauthorized use. The great emphasis we have placed on forces which can survive a nuclear attack from the Soviet. Not only serves to deter Soviet aggression, but also greatly reduces the pressure on us to act precipitantly in a crisis, thus decreasing the danger of inadvertent or accidental war. In summary, then, we're strengthening our military forces to deal effectively, to deal flexibly with a wide range of threats, both political and military, and we're working

with our allies to develop policies appropriate to the changing needs of the alliance. In our defense policy, as in our foreign policy, generally, our effort is to carry out the President's expressed intentions to find a third choice between Holocaust and humiliation. Good, Secretary. I wonder if you've got time for one question here. All of us from time to time hear complaints about the size and the cost of our armed forces in a way they're strung out all across the world. What would happen if we just threw up our hands and closed down our bases, brought everybody home and relied on the two oceans to preserve our safety? At a time when in our strategic nuclear forces and in the strategic nuclear forces of our opponents, there exist intercontinental ballistic missiles with ranges of 7,500 miles, missiles which can cross the oceans in but a few minutes. I think it's perfectly apparent

that the oceans no longer provide the safeguard that they have in past decades. Now, Secretary Rush, after this look at security through strength, why don't we proceed to the second basic point of our foreign policy, progress through partnership? Well, on that one, Mr. Smith, I'd like to call on my colleague, the Undersecretary of Statement, Mr. George Ball. Thank you, Mr. Rush. As Secretary Rush and Secretary McNamara have pointed out, a prime objective of our policy is the security of the United States and of the American people. In the mid-20th century, this security must be sought in a world of change, a world of faster and more pervasive change than we have ever known before. In this relatively brief time since the war, only about 17 years. Three major alterations have taken place in the shape and face of the world as we knew it. As we are all constantly aware, an iron curtain has been erected to form a prison

for about one-third of the earth's population, about a billion people. For the remaining two-thirds, that portion of the population, which is in what we call the free world outside of the iron curtain, great changes also have taken place. We have seen, first of all, as Secretary Rush mentioned a moment ago, the shattering of the old colonial systems and the creation in their stead of 53 new nations since 1945, and there are more to come. 53 new nations united in their determination to maintain their newfound freedom, sharing in common also a determination to attain a decent standard of living for their peoples. Now, one might have thought that with the erosion, with the shattering of the old colonial systems, the colonial powers, those handful of countries in Western Europe, that had maintained such a great influence over so many people in the world,

that those colonial powers would have been irreparably weakened. But in fact, they have turned their energies with extraordinary vigor toward a great and heroic task at home, toward the building of a new United Europe, the realization of a dream that no conqueror of old was ever able to achieve. This United Europe started with the initiative of six continental powers who created a economic community, the common market as we know it. When this process is completed, we shall have, on the European side of the Atlantic, a new entity containing about a quarter of a billion people, 250 million, an entity which has enjoyed and is now displaying the most extraordinary economic growth, a growth rate since 1953 almost twice our own, which from the period during the period from 1953 during 1960 increased its exports by 113 percent as against 29 percent for

our own, increased its imports by almost 100 percent as against 35 percent for the United States. Now, as important as this extraordinary economic vitality in Europe may be to us, of even greater importance is the fact these implications of having political union in Europe. For the first time in our history, we have the possibility of an entity of equal size, commanding almost equal resources that can serve as an partner with us in our common endeavors and in our common tasks. In the days of reconstruction of Europe after the ravages of the war, in the days when the colonial empire was falling apart, Europe of necessity had to withdraw from many parts of the world. Power of vacuums were created, the United States had to pick up the burden,

and it was a very heavy burden indeed as we all know. But now that Europe is going strong and now that Europe is becoming united, we can look to Europe as an equal partner to share our burdens with us. We have, as you all know, erected built to institutional arrangements for working with our European friends, the first NATO to which Secretary MacDomerale alluded the moment ago, has had a special responsibility for the whole security of the free world. It has been the heart of our security system. A year ago, there came into being the organization for economic cooperation and development, the OECD, as we call it, through this organization. We are working on a variety of economic tasks. We are concerning our economic policies in order to eliminate the imbalances and distortions in our economic affairs. We are working together to combine to concert and our national programs of aid to the underdeveloped countries and to effect a more equitable sharing of this common burden.

With the benefit of the New Trade Expansion Act, which the President has asked the Congress to approve, we should have a tool which will enable us in cooperation with our European friends, in negotiation with them, to bring about an opening of markets all over the world, not only for United States produce of our farms and factories, but for the benefit of the whole free world. Finally, outside of this structure of the Atlantic partnership, as we call it, the partnership between the great common market of Europe on the one hand and the great common market of America and the other. There is Japan, which has a special meeting for us, not only because it is the largest industrial power in Asia, but also because it is a vital trading partner of ours and because it is working with us and with Europe toward the sharing of some of these common tasks. So I can assure you today that we have made very great progress indeed, not only through the Atlantic partnership, but in the development of an even firmer Atlantic

partnership and in the extension of that partnership toward the carrying out of the common tasks which we all face. And this is the real meeting of what President Kennedy said so eloquently and so well in his great speech in Philadelphia on the Fourth of July when he spoke of the interdependence of the leading nations of the free world and of the common task which the Atlantic partnership must carry forward. Thank you, Mr. Ball. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could now discuss a point that follows right on the discussion we've just had with Mr. Ball, revolution and freedom. Yes, I think for some of our problems in that, the great changing world, we ought to turn to the man who has one of the largest and most complicated tasks in Washington. Mr. Fowler Hamilton, our Administrator for aid. As you know, Mr. Secretary, in the 17 years since World War II,

our government and our own national self-interest has supported a large and powerful foreign aid program. It supported this program as being in the national self-interest of the United States because the program has been based upon a recognition that in the conditions that have existed in the troubled world, since World War II, the national security of the United States depends upon the national security of the free world. And the purpose of this program is to strengthen the national security of the United States by strengthening the security of the free world. This program throughout its history has been bipartisan and non-political. It has been supported by every President and by every Congress that has held office and exercised power in our country during this period. And that is true of the present program. The present program has two parts. It has a long-range part and it has a short-range part. The purpose of the short-range part

is to meet challenges that the communists present to us on a day-to-day week-to-week month-to-month basis. The purpose of the long-range part is to strengthen our national security by strengthening the security of the free world on a long-range basis. Now, the short-range part which accounts for somewhat more than half of the funds that American citizens put up to support this security program consists primarily in assistance that we make available to our military allies. Primarily to countries that are located around the periphery of the iron and bamboo curtains, countries like Korea and Vietnam. The long-range part is primarily focused upon development. As President Kennedy said in his message to the Congress last year, the security of the United States and the security of the free world requires a decayed of development. Now, how does it come to be? What are the circumstances that require the

citizens of the United States to put up these sums for the development of peoples and of institutions in other countries? Well, the principle factor is the one that Secretary Rust adverted to. While the communists have been talking about a world revolution of violence, the fact is that the free world has achieved a revolution of peace that is unprecedented in history. In the 17 years since World War II ended, over a billion people have obtained their political freedom largely by peaceful means. A number of new countries have become independent. 54 countries, to be exact, have achieved their independence since the end of World War II. Now, in many cases, the peoples of these countries, through no fault of their own, lack the education, the skills, the talents that are required if their societies are to be stable and viable, if they are to have the minimum of economic and political strength that's necessary

for them to withstand the kind of chaos that the communists sow as a prelude to communist domination. Now, our country is not alone in this enterprise. The amount of foreign aid that is made available to these less developed countries by other more advanced countries, such as those in Europe and those in Japan, is approximately equal at the present time to the amount of country, the amount of aid that we make available. Parenthetically, I might add, this is a remarkable tribute to the success of the Marshall Plan, which in a brief period of time since that plan was successfully accomplished, enables the former recipients of aid now to make a contribution to aid equal to that of our own. And obviously, by the same token, an equal contribution to the security of the free world against communist subversion. Now, as to the kinds of aid that we have, the present time we make available aid, I might add, that most of that money is spent in the

United States. We don't give a king or a prime minister or a minister of a foreign government to check and say, here is the money. What happens is that as to at least 90 percent of the aid, the goods are purchased in the United States and shipped abroad under carefully controlled requirements. Indeed, it's been estimated by the great labor organizations that this economic activity generated by this aid supplies job for 700,000 Americans. That's not the purpose of it, of course. The purpose is to help work with our friends in Europe and in Japan to strengthen these countries to help them help themselves. Secondly, based on the sound principle that the Lord helps those that help themselves, we don't extend aid unless the people who are interested in receiving it are willing to work out a partnership arrangement with us, are willing to contribute to the extent that they can, because ultimately, the only forces that can save a society from communism are the forces within that society, the strength, the integrity, and the willingness of the people to make sacrifices for freedom as we have made sacrifices for freedom.

I think it's also interesting to note that under the present program, the preponderant part of the funds that are made available in the form of economic assistance are made available as loans, not as grants. Those loans are to be repayable over a long period of years. It's true, but to be repayable in dollars. Now, what does the money go for? Well, as this chart shows, underscoring the last point I have made, most of it goes for loans, but primarily it goes as to the development side of the program to enable these new countries and new societies to develop their most plentiful and priceless asset, their people. So it goes for primarily for education, education with a small e to educate farmers, to be better farmers, to educate government officials, to be more efficient, to educate technicians, to educate middle-level people, so that these various societies can have the kind of competence and train the kind of competence that it takes to maintain a society in the modern world.

Here you see a picture of an aid project in which an American is helping train one of the citizens, three of the citizens of one of the less developed countries, so that their agriculture can be more productive because of course no society can survive that doesn't have plentiful supplies of food and fiber. Now I should like to come finally to the Alliance of Progress, which is one of the most important aspects of our development program. That is the program, as you know, which was announced by President Kennedy a year ago last March, in which we, working with our friends and neighbors in Latin America, are endeavoring to cooperate with them to help their societies face the very difficult political and economic stresses and strains that have been opposed upon them by economic conditions that have developed within the last few years, by technological changes, and most of all by the fact that the communists are now coming into this hemisphere, in an endeavor to exploit the problems that our friends in Latin America have in the hope that they can produce chaos as preliminary to communist takeovers.

Now finally I should like to conclude by noting that we help ourselves to protect ourselves by enforcing the free world against communism. We do so because it's in our own interest. We also do so because it's in the interest of the 1,250,000,000 people in the underdeveloped areas. As President Kennedy has said, if a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich. Mr. Hamilton, you've pointed out the stake Americans have in helping people of other lands, and yet it seems to me that it's frequently hard for some of us to appreciate this. How, for example, do you explain the urgent necessity for foreign aid to a family in one of our perennially depressed areas in our own country? Well, the first observation I would make on that is that of course, the primary responsibility of our government is to protect its own citizens,

and we should see to it that our own citizens who are suffering unemployment and things of that kind have government assistance as adequate, assuming that they also will practice self-help. Secondly, we won't have a society in which we can help our less fortunate fellow citizens unless we have a free and independent United States and a strong and secure free world so that the citizen of the United States has a real stake in seeing to it that the citizens of these less developed countries maintain freedom. And finally, the standard of living in these countries is so much worse than that that prevails in any area of the United States that there's no comparison. You spoke of the need for recipient nations helping themselves, and yet this at times involves there taking a greater responsibility for internal improvements. If we had much success in this field encouraging some of our friendly nations to update their laws and improve their economic structures, broadener tax basis.

Yes, I'm gratified to be able to report to you, Mr. Smith, that we have. The Alliance of Progress was announced in March of last year, but it didn't even get on a piece of paper until last August, so that it's only been in being for about 12 months. It contemplates very substantial changes, and important matters in the Latin American countries. A number of those countries have already shown their good faith by taking those. And after all, you know, when you talk about taxes and land reform, it takes us a good long time to get a tax law passed in the United States. And we've had taxes for a long, long time, unfortunately. Secretary Rush, you spoke at the outset of our hope for the gradual emergence of a genuine world community and this, under the heading of the next point, community under law. Yes, to talk about community under law, I should like very much to go to Atlas Stevenson, our United States representative of the United Nations and New York. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

World community under law. Now, let's try to see what we are doing to turn this idea into reality. If you stood at my office window in New York, you would look down across the street at the buildings of the United Nations. In a long row, you would see the flags of 106 member nations, the United States among them. The United Nations is an instrument for advancing the interests of our country. But it is also an instrument for advancing the interests of all 105 of these other members. Even where there is friction, experience shows that between their interests and ours, it is usually possible through diplomacy and not force to find common ground. Of course, the United Nations can't do it all. This world community needs the support of its faithful members. In the Congo, for instance, it was United States Air Force planes that carried United Nations troops from 34 nations. The community needs to.

The creative work of great regional institutions. The European common market. The growing Atlantic partnership. The United Nations needs the stability and security afforded by our regional alliances, like NATO and the organization of American states. These are not contradictory forces. They are elements and a single grand design. Now, what does this idea of a world community, of which the United Nations is a central institution mean to the United States? Remember the historical circumstances of our time. Soviet communism came out of World War II as a world power, challenging the old order and pressing hard against it. Meanwhile, one billion people in Asia and Africa began emerging from colonial status to independence, often resentful of their old rulers. In Asia's past, the ending of one great imperial system has usually been the signal for the rise of another.

In our time, it is all too easy to imagine a new communist empire in Africa and Asia moving in on the heels of the withdrawing Europeans. Yet the new nations themselves don't want to be anybody satellite. But they want his independence and the security and sense of belonging which comes from being full members of a community. This is what the United Nations means to them. It means a world in which a nation doesn't have to be strong in order to be secure. From this point of view, the whole history of the UN can be understood as a series of efforts to help small, weak nations in their hour of trouble. The list is already long. Iran in 1946, Greece in 1947, India in Pakistan, Indonesia, Israel, the Arab states, the successful defense of Korea, Suez, Lebanon, and the greatest United Nations effort of all, the Congo.

We can learn a great deal from the story of the Congo. Here was a newborn nation, not well equipped for independence, erupting in violence and in civil chaos. It appealed to the United Nations to restore order, to uphold its independence. And the United Nations swiftly answered with an international armed force of 18,000 men. Moscow had other plans. The Soviets placed their bets on chaos. They demanded that the United Nations evict all the Belgians and subdued Katonga by armed force in an orgy of anti-European hatred. They illegally sent in military trucks and planes. The UN and the Congo successfully resisted these Soviet maneuvers, and then came a violent Soviet attack on the United Nations itself and on its secretary general. But Dag Hammershell refused to resign under this Soviet brow beating and said to the delegates of 100 nations, this is your organization, gentlemen.

They understood him and they refused to see their organization crippled. I hope we Americans will remember this Congo story. It was not we but our Soviet adversaries who beat their desks in anger because of the United Nations action in the Congo. It is not we but the Soviet Union who have used the veto 100 times to block majority votes in the United Nations Security Council. Let me emphasize that the United Nations is not paralyzed by such opposition. Nor is it weakened by the crises it had to face. In fact, every great crisis in the history of the United Nations has ended with the UN more effective than before. The UN is more than a fire brigade. It is also a nation-builder. United Nations projects are underway all over the world to develop the resources and the skills of the new nations, shoemaking in Morocco, mining in the heart of Africa, rice growing in Thailand, hundreds of such projects.

80% of the United Nations international staff is engaged in such constructive work. They enter and draw on the wealth of resources in the whole UN family of specialized and technical agencies, each in its own field, like the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization. Now what does all this add up to? The United Nations is now 17 years old. It is battered in Scott, but it is full of vitality. Today it is building bridges of community between the advanced industrial democracies of the Northern Hemisphere and the poor, aspiring new nations of Africa and Asia. One day it may help to bridge that other gulf. The gulf between the free and the open societies of democratic nations and the fanatical, closed societies of communism. For the UN is itself an open society, a school of tolerance, a free debate

where ordinary citizens sit in its gallery and its members do not take kindly to fanaticism or dictation from any quarter. What of the future? We shall try to make the United Nations still more effective. We shall seek to strengthen its potential for handling emergencies and to develop it as a center of quiet diplomacy. We hope too for more effectiveness in the world court. By such efforts, we intend to assure that the United Nations will continue to do its share in the long job of building a world community under law in which free peoples can live together in peace. There seems at times a certain amount of futility in our efforts to achieve real arms reduction, and yet this must remain a very vital part of our foreign policy.

The last point, let's sector, I wonder if we could turn to peace through perseverance. Well, there are some tasks that can never be abandoned. We just have to stay with them. To talk about peace through perseverance, I'd like to go to the Council of the Department of State, Mr. Walt Rostow. The achievement of peace is, of course, Mr. Smith, the problem in the end of our relations with the Communist bloc. The policies you've heard described this afternoon are not necessarily the simple result of the fact that we face the communist conspiracy in the world and the communist thrust for world power. Given the kind of world in which we live with its high degree of interdependence, we would be pursuing, in any case, I believe, a policy of partnership towards a revived Europe, a policy of partnership towards a remarkably revived Japan. We would be turning in the American interest to assist the underdeveloped nations which are feeling this surge of ambition

to modernize their societies. We would be seeking to build in this expanding and highly interconnected free world community, the institutions of community. And given the nature of nuclear weapons, we would have to have a military policy, not unlike that outlined earlier by Secretary McNamara. But all of these policies take on a special meaning in the light of the policy pursued from Moscow and from Pei Ping. Since 1945, it's been communist policy to fragment, not to unite Western Europe. It has been communist policy to try to draw the individual states away from association with each other and away from the United States. You'll all recall that in the days just after the war before the Marshall Plan took hold, there was a systematic effort by the communists to exploit the communist parties in Western Europe,

to try to bring down the governments there. As Western Europe took hold in recovery and as we built the Marshall Plan in NATO, they have turned in the past decade to the underdeveloped areas. There they believe that they see vulnerabilities in the very process of the emergence of these new nations. And in their changes that they must make, the confusion must come as they seek to transform old agricultural societies so that they can receive and use the tools of modern science and technology. Specifically, we have seen the communists from the guerrilla war in Greece, to the guerrilla war in Vietnam, and to the ambitions of Castro with respect to Latin America. You remember he last December, in a speech he made, referred to guerrilla wars the match you throw into the haystack and then said that Latin America looked to him like a pretty good haystack.

This is one technique they've tried to apply in these transitional underdeveloped areas. But it's not the only technique. They've used aid and trade and above all the notion that communism was a technique for rapidly developing an underdeveloped area more efficient, if more ruthless, than the methods that we would propose. After the war, the Soviet Union did not disarm as we did. It build up massive ground force strength, and it probed at every point of weakness. In Northern Azerbaijan, that is in Iran, just after the war, in Turkey, in Greece, and then at Berlin in 48-49. And they probed all through Asia as well, in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Korea. With respect to Europe, they have tried to persuade the Europeans that they are in a position of hostage with respect to nuclear weapons, and that they should be prepared to back away from Soviet demands.

This is a form of nuclear blackmail we have seen in recent years. We must base our policy towards the communist block on the assumption that they would seriously consider the risk of initiating a nuclear war if they judged that we were vulnerable. Therefore, the foundations for our policy towards the communist block lie also in the positive policies you have heard outlined. Our first task is to frustrate all forms of communist aggression at any level by pursuing the constructive policies you have heard outlined, designed to build towards a free world community and to defend that free world community at every level of aggression. Nevertheless, it is not our interest nor is it our belief that the Cold War need go on forever. History is not standing still within the communist block. We have seen in recent years an extraordinary tendency of the communist block to fragment. It is a strange irony that while Western Europe

is pulling together in an unprecedented movement towards unity, the communists who counted on that kind of fragmentation in Western Europe are experiencing it within the block. And at the basis of this is the assertion, the deep assertion of national interests within the block. Secondly, due to the very nature of communism, due to the very nature of the police state control which they would impose over people, from one end of the block to the other, they can't grow food efficiently. As I say, this is no accident. There are simply not enough policemen in the world to follow a farmer around to make sure he does the things he has to do to make food grow. And from Eastern Germany through Russia itself to the great crisis in China, we see this deep weakness, which is not merely an economic weakness, but as I say, strikes at the very heart of the viability of a police state system. At third, in addition to nationalism,

which we see asserting itself, not least in Russia, but also in China, elsewhere in Eastern Europe, there is a deep and quiet persistence of what we might call human liberalism. Be clear these trends towards liberalism will not resolve the Cold War for us. Poets do not make foreign policy or military policy, but it is a fact, and a wholesome fact, that the young Soviet poets are returning to the oldest themes in the Western and Russian culture, namely the integrity of the individual, and there are many other signs. These will not win the Cold War for us, but they are signs and hopeful signs, as I say, that history has not stopped in the communist bloc, and that the great human currents in Russian and Western and world history are not to be counted out forever. Fourth, there is the cost of the arms race. The arms race is expensive for us. It is even more expensive for the Soviet Union. It costs them in housing.

It costs them in food. It costs them in many other dimensions, and if Secretary McNamara carries through his plans, he will make the arms race for the Soviets in the next years, a very costly dead end. Fifth, there is the danger as more nations acquire nuclear weapons of their diffusion, and the chances of coming about of a nuclear war which neither the Soviet Union nor ourselves would like. Therefore, our task, while building and defending the free world, is to convince the communists that their notion of world domination is an impossible notion. Our job is to encourage by every means at our disposal the emergence of these forces of nationalism and liberalism. It is also our job to be prepared to negotiate arms agreements, increasing the security of all, so long as effective systems of inspection are included in those agreements.

It is also our interest to alter the terms of the world conflict by limiting issues of disagreement, narrowing them so that where we can defend our interest and to make agreements which, while protecting our interests, diminish the danger that confrontations in such places as Laos and Berlin will lead on to war. Therefore, our policy towards the communist bloc must be rooted in the fundamental policies of building and defending the free world, but aware of the forces of change within the bloc, we must never cease to attempt to minimize the possibility that war comes about, to diminish the likelihood that points of confrontation will lead on to war,

and never lose faith that the forces of nationalism and liberalism are at work within the bloc, and if we maintain our strengths and unity, if we persist doggedly and we persevere with the lines of policy that you've heard laid out, we can look forward with confidence to a victory and a peaceful victory for the forces of freedom. Mr. Rostow, it's quite obviously not in our interest to accept the Cold War is something that will go on forever, but is there a dominant development we can watch for? In other words, what are we looking for to produce a break or a durable fall on the Cold War? I think that the issue that you and Secretary Russ began with is the touchstone, Mr. Smith. The issue of serious disarmament covered by effective systems of inspection. If these forces that I've described

work out, if our policies succeed and these historical forces push as we would like to see them push within the bloc, the signs of victory would be the Soviet willingness to make a serious arms agreement effectively inspected. That is not yet in sight, but as you began by saying, this is the central test of whether we're making progress. Thank you, sir. Gentlemen, Mr. Secretary, Secretary of Defense, this has been an interesting and I think very fast hour, and I wonder if you, Mr. Secretary Russ, could top off this unusual briefing for the glance at the future? Where do we go from here? Well, Mr. Smith, we've been talking about our business of building a decent world day after day and month after month. There is nothing easy and nothing cheap

about the great tasks before us. For freedom asks a great deal from free men and peace is not yet achieved. But those who are committed to freedom have less to worry about than those who would reverse the entire history of men. It is not for us to fear the great winds of change that are blowing today. They are the winds we have long sailed with, the winds which have carried man on his unending journey, the winds of freedom, or the revolution of freedom, which we have so proudly nurtured and fought for in the past, is the true endearing revolution, because it springs from the deepest and most persistent aspirations of men, and history says that this revolution will not fail. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Ladies and gentlemen, what you have just seen and heard was unusual,

if not unprecedented, and yet typically American. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, are ambassador to the United Nations and their chief advisors, gathered before the microphones and cameras to explain to the public the basic goals of American foreign policy. Now, this is no hard sell by these men, but an unusual exercise in contemporary history. Their hope for this hour is that their explanations, their attempts at better understanding, spread far beyond the facilities of this network, into the homes, the shops, the work rooms, and the classrooms of America. Perhaps if there had been facilities for this sort of dead-level approach to foreign policy in other countries and in other years, there might not be quite the need today for armies, and bombs, and missiles. As you discuss this program later with your friends, it might be wise to remember an important point.

Not rumor, distortion, or something passed on to your third hand. This was history straight from the source. From the men who execute American foreign policy, the men upon whom rest the awesome responsibility for tomorrow. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.

This has been Perspectives, a series of reports in-depth on matters of importance to the thoughtful citizen. This is NET, National Educational Television.