Washington Hearings

So, this is an N-E-T. This is an N-E-T. This is an N-E-T. Previously scheduled for this time will not be shown in order to bring you the following special program.

The following program is from N-E-T, the public television network. The committee on foreign relations needs today for a general discussion. We believe the meeting would be more useful and more informative. This meeting is to give the secretary the opportunity to inform the committee and the public about the broad range of our relations with the peoples of foreign lands.

I need not tell you, Mr. Secretary, that many of us on the committee have been quite unhappy about the policies our government had pursued during recent years. I am very hopeful that this new administration will reevaluate our policies, especially re-examine the basic assumptions and attitudes which have prevailed during recent years in the highest echelons of the executive branch of our government. This committee does not wish to appear presumptuous, but we do believe that it is our Constitutional duty to give advice as well as consent to the executive. We believe that with all our limitations by frank and open discussion and of important policies, we may assist in the development of wiser policies and that we may help avoid serious mistakes in the future. Good evening. In his first public appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State William P. Rogers was expected to report comprehensively on the state of the world and on U.S. policy.

That he did in a 42-page statement ranging from Latin America to Africa, but the senators were interested almost exclusively in two policy areas in which a committee majority disagrees with the Nixon administration, the war in Vietnam and the decision to proceed with an anti-ballistic missile system. In either area did the Secretary yield any ground or specific concessions, but in both areas he hinted that administration policy might be more flexible than it had seemed hitherto. Indeed, Mr. Rogers seemed not only more flexible than Secretary of State Dean Rusk had been in the last administration, but more flexible than Secretary of Defense Melvin Lerid had been in testimony last week before a subcommittee. Today's questioning was begun by Chairman Fulbright.

As you know, this committee, a subcommittee, this committee has been having some rather interesting hearings with the Department of Defense over the ABM. And I have detected, I think, an attitude from some of the representatives of the Department of Defense that they and even they alone are primarily concerned with the security of this country. I wonder, as a matter of the proper function of the Department of State, do you consider that you're also concerned with the security of this country? Why certainly do, Senator? The military doesn't have a monopoly upon the security of this country, does it? Well, no doubt about that. Of course, the element of responsibility in the executive branch for security of the nation rests with the president. But I think any cabinet officer who didn't recognize is responsibility, very vital responsibility for the security of the nation shouldn't serve in the cabinet. You would agree, I think, that our security is not solely based upon the military, the amount of military power we possess, is it? No, I think that's correct.

It's only one aspect of our security, isn't it? And that there is a feeling in some quarters that the military in recent years has become perhaps more powerful in the development or the determination of our policies than they should. Did you happen to see an article that was referred to in Washington Post this morning written by General Shoop? Well, I saw a reference to it, but I haven't had a chance to read it, yes. Well, I certainly recommended to you. I hope you'll read it. But here's one of the outstanding generals of recent years decorated for extreme bravery by Congressional Medal of Honor. Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I can't imagine a man coming to this to being better qualified to write an article about the role of the military. Because of his intimate knowledge and also because of his reputation for independence of thought, vigor of expression, we had him as a witness. And twice, I believe, in this committee. And we're familiar with him as a personality. And he is one of those men that expresses what I have in mind here that the State Department and all this committee, at least speaking for myself, what it do is to strengthen the hands of you and the State Department in this matter of trying to secure the real interests of this country to determine what they are and to secure them.

As a matter of fact, this country hasn't been invaded in some time. Has it by any foreign force? But I mean, here we are. We have, as you know, the, I think, the, we are told, the most powerful army and military strength in the world, don't we? You have any doubt about that? No, I have no doubt about that. But I think the, I think the difference between our military strength and that of the Soviet Union has, has changed considerably. So, but I, I agree with you that we probably are the strongest nation, militarily, in the world. And yet at the same time, we appear to be from public discussions the most apprehensive and the most fearful.

Fulbright said that some Japanese, with whom we recently talked, were less fearful of China than we were, even though they were much closer to China. Rogers pointed out quietly that in Japan, a defeated nation, subject to a peace treaty, did not have to concern itself with defense policy. But Fulbright persisted in his criticism of the ABM. Our relationship with Russia is not our only concern. And he said, we have our own bad economic conditions in this country. And here we are wasting money on a frivolous gadget that is not useful. On this question of negotiations, we, you're familiar with the debate that took place on the non-properation treaty, the emphasis we gave to Article 6. And really, my, I suppose one of the reasons I, and I think others reacted, maybe we overreacted, I don't know. I don't think we did. Was the coincidence of having passed it one day by a large majority of the very next day, making the decision on the ABM to proceed with it. Now, we say, I think that you could proceed. I thought you could proceed sooner with negotiations under the influence of Article 6.

I was thought I knew, and I think it's accurate, that the preceding administration had gone quite far in preparing for negotiations on this subject with the Soviets. I thought that they were prepared and had made all the, they thought basic research and whatever it takes to go to a meeting to meet in December. We certainly aren't going to take a year. And there was some preliminary work done by the other administration. We have to review that work, and we have to take a general overall look at our defense situation. We're not going to delay this long. Mr. Smith, who is going to be our negotiator, is now in Geneva in disarmament talks with the Soviet Union and other subjects. Now, he has to get back here, and as soon as he gets back and is convinced that he's prepared, we'll proceed.

That's what I wanted to hear. You say, I hope you would be in that mood. And it is a fact that previous administration had made preparations for a meeting, hadn't they? Yes, I'd rather not go into the discussion. Well, you know, I don't want to repeat that. There had been some preparation, there also was some slight confusion, not only in the administration, but with our allies. And we want to try to eliminate that before we get started on those talks. I think it's very important for us to keep our allies informed what we're up to because some of these things that we might decide on would directly affect their interests. And then our trip to Europe, we advised them that we would keep in touch with them on general principles and objectives that we had in mind before we entered these bilateral talks. Because they have a fear that the two great powers are going to get together and do something without taking into account their interests. We want to let them know that that is not going to be the case. So all I'm saying is that there is no intention on our part to delay this for the second delay. As soon as we think we are prepared and we know what is going to happen in a general way when we start the talks, we will start.

When I say when we know what will happen in a general way, I think it's very helpful to have preliminary discussions as we have done in the Middle East. So that when we get in the talks, we have some idea what the agenda is going to be, how we're going to proceed, where we're going to proceed. We already agreed with the Soviet Union that we will have these talks fairly soon. In the Middle East talks, we're having them now. And I think that we've played the groundwork. I think it's been done fairly successfully so far. I think all parties feel that we are prepared and we're going to get started either next week or the week after. And I would hope the same procedure could be followed in these arms limitations talks. One, I can say personally, the last time I had a conversation with President Johnson on this subject, he didn't say they were going but he asked if I saw any objection to the going. One of the few times my advice was asking recent times. And he, of course, had not. But I am sure he thought they were about at the point where they could. And you don't have to commit yourself. That was what took place the last meeting I had with him in November.

On the preparation of those agenda, all those things. This is what I had referenced to. This is the groundwork which was well. I'm very pleased that you do feel that you can proceed reasonably soon. I think it's very important. I think at least my information that has been supplied to the committee that there has been some criticism in the Soviet press, especially task reports. And I had one article we put in the record from his vestia raising a question about the attitude of the United States in view of the decision to deploy a B.M. I mean, there seems to be a difference of opinion about this. We've been told that there has been critical observations about it as indicative of the attitude of this country. I think they go along the line that we seem to be determined to carry on the Cold War. That was about all. I don't think it's been very severe and very great. I don't think it's terribly concerned because I don't believe they think that the A.B.M. is especially effective.

It isn't that it's actual effective to object to. It's more our attitude. What are we? They're trying to read our mind. Like the Secretary of Defense has already read the Russian mind by declaring the other day that without any doubt, they are working for a first track capability. Now, I question this very much. Do you have any evidence that that's their intention? Would you agree with the Secretary in that statement, which was made publicly here two days ago? Well, I don't think I'm qualified to analyze that intelligence item. I'm familiar with it. I know what the intelligence is, but I think it's better to leave that to others and to make it myself. Well, I've just been handed a further one. This is March 27. That's today in the Washington Post. There's Russian criticizes gambit or A.B.M. This is in Dateline at Moscow. Reuters despatch. A Soviet commentator described as extremely alarming today. U.S. press reports that the Nixon administration plans to use the safeguard anti-balistic missile system as a Trump card and disarm a talk to Russia. And so on. I won't read it all. I put it all on the record, Mr. reporter. I won't take the time. But there is a difference of opinion.

And I gather from your statement, you will learn the impression that the Russians are completely relaxed and don't care about. Well, I didn't say that, Mr. Chairman. They have criticized, as you might expect, the decision itself. They have not suggested that they thought it would adversely affect the initiation of the talks or the outcome of the talks. I must say that, as far as I'm concerned, my discussion is that it's never considered this particularly good negotiating point. And I don't think that we should approach it in that spirit. Mr. President didn't say that, and I've never said it. So I don't know where they got that information. In any event, I don't think that their article comes with very good grace and view of the fact that they have an ABM system of their own. Excuse me, a lot bigger and more important than the one we're talking about. So I don't see how they can criticize us for at least talking about it and starting it. I must say on the ABM, in its relation to the strategic arms talks,

it seems to me that, in view of the fact that it's not going to be operational till 1973, in the fact that Congress isn't even going to act on it for a while, and then each year it has to be considered again. In view of the fact this administration is quite conscious of the opposition to it on the part of many people. So why there is this feeling that it can't be turned off. I have no doubt in my mind that if the arms talks are successful, we can stop this program just like we stopped the Nike zoos. Well, why do we think that we were committed forever irrevocably if we make the decision? That statement was bombed to the senatorial ears. Perhaps it wasn't radically new. Some administration spokesman had said before that his decision to proceed with the ABM was not irrevocable.

But Roger seemed to emphasize the point and to suggest subtly that the administration had been deeply impressed by the views of the anti-ABM senators last week. Nonetheless, there were more sharp questions about the controversial defense system. Some of them came from Democratic senators Stewart-Somington of Missouri, a former secretary of the Air Force. Got to a point on this ABM where it might be well to have the director of central intelligence come before this hearing, before this committee and say what the Soviets are doing around Moscow. My question is this. I have a friend in Chicago who says well to cut through is the way he sums things up often. Now just to cut through with you, Mr. Secretary, if we are successful in putting up a successful resistance to the Soviet attack on a minute man base, then provided that the Soviets want to maintain equality with us in the nuclear arms race. Does that not mean that they in turn have to build more ICBMs to maintain that equality?

Well, I don't think so. I hesitate to get involved in elaborate discussion about the military aspects of it because we have been talking about whether this decision might adversely affect the arms limitations talk. But as I understand it, Senator, the safeguards system has its purpose protecting our retaliatory capability. Now, the fact that we protect our missile bases, our minute man bases successfully or partly successfully, I don't think anybody suggests that the safeguard system is going to be a total protection against our minute man bases. But if we succeed in protecting enough of them so that we have missiles available in the event of a first strike by an enemy, then we think that will be a deterrent to any reasonable opponent not to start the war, not to make a first strike.

But the ABM, one of the reasons that we have not even thought about going to a thick system, is that we don't think that the ABM would probably ever be able to give total protection to either our minute man sites or our cities. And we also think that if we tried, the cost would be so exorbitant that it might destroy the country, so we're not thinking about that. But the idea of putting it up is that it's not going to be an adequate defense, and that I think is an additional reason for not putting it up. Well, I didn't quite say that, and I said, I mean, you brought it up in your statement, you see, and then you had lived more on it. So, in effect, my impression is that you're now attempting to sell the ABM. No, my only question about it is this, and all sincerity. And I repeat it again, and I'd like to give my own answer. If you are going to add something to our defense, which increases our capacity to prevent the Russians from destroying that defense, for example, in case they might have the idea we'd like to attack them,

then you are automatically making it essential, not only necessary, but essential for them to build more ICBMs if they are determined to maintain a position of parity with us. If you do that, then in support of the position of the Sunday from New Jersey, I'm sure that will result in an escalation of the arms race as I am. The sun is coming up tomorrow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Dove-like character of the Foreign Relations Committee is thoroughly bipartisan. The senior Republican on the panel, now that Iowa's Burk Hickenlooper has retired, is George Akin. He is 76 years old, third in seniority in the entire Senate, and so popular in Vermont that last year, the state's Democrats not only didn't run anybody against him, but gave him their own nomination.

Akin was one of the earliest Senate skeptics on the Vietnam issue, and he's a skeptic now on the ABM decision. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I find that I'm sure the people of the United States will find a statement of a Secretary of State far more acceptable than a testimony which the Subcommittee, headed by Senator Gore, has received in recent days. As a matter of fact, I'm afraid that some people will interpret it the testimony of recent days which sets forth the tremendous power of the Russians and the tremendous need for our equal in our exceeding that power, as laying the groundwork for the greatest time of recent history. And I'm sure that people will not prove of that at this time. I'm sure members of this committee are not going to be scared into approving the ABM program or any other program which is based on such a premise.

I think the testimony which we had yesterday and which I couldn't hear all the way through without making headlines which I didn't want was very harmful to the ABM project. And unless this impression which many people got is counteracted in some way, I don't believe that the Senate could support the ABM system and certainly I couldn't. And in a sense it was given entirely different impression than the President did in his initial statement which I found quite encouraging. Now, I've got just two or three or four questions. I have a couple here that Senator Cooper wanted to have answered. The first ones would be, once I have my own news, you were asked if you thought China would attack Japan and you invite she would not.

I hope you didn't need to imply this. If China won the war, she'd go 10,000 miles from home to get into one the way we did. I just was referring to missiles, that's all. I think she was entirely right with that statement. She does not want war with Japan. And do you think she has territorial designs upon any of her neighbors excluding perhaps the disputed territory which slays to the North? Well, I think that's a difficult question to answer, Senator. Certainly some of the statements that they've made would indicate that. I think the Soviet Union has got some concern along that line, but I would not want to make a prediction about what red China has in mind.

Well, I realized nobody else could answer that question, which I thought perhaps you could. If you were Secretary of State with China, would you be apprehensive about the United States intentions at this time? No, I certainly would not. I would think that they would feel quite relaxed about that. Because I think they realize if they are smartest, I'm sure they are, that we do not have any territorial ambitions. And that our involvement in Vietnam, whether it was right or wrong, would not suggest that we should make any attempts at conquest anywhere. So I wouldn't think if I were Secretary of State of the Soviet Union, I'd have any concern about the belligerent motives of the United States. You wouldn't be fearful of an attack by the United States on the mainland of China.

I sure would not, in spite of the fact that it's been advocated by the record, he said China, you said Soviet Union. I met China, excuse me. I met China. Now, I don't think there's any chance I'd ever be considered a Secretary of State for the Soviet Union. So a few days ago, we had before Mr. Mayer, who I think had been nominated as Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, and I asked him about Cuba. And he met the statement, I think it's a matter of record, that if Cuba wanted to talk to us, we should listen. Which we haven't been doing very well for the last eight years. Do you agree with Mr. Mayer's statement? Yes, I do. I think we should listen to anybody that wants to talk with us. And I think any opportunity to improve friendly relations anywhere in the world we should pay attention to. There again, the Secretary of State gave an impression of flexibility without yielding an inch of specific ground.

He merely said he would listen to Fidel Castro or anybody else. The Committee liked that kind of answer. The next question, Rogers, was Democrat Albert Gore of Tennessee, who last week, as Chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee, had left locked horns with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Gore asked today what precisely was meant by talk of a gradual United States withdrawal from Vietnam. The Department, one day last week for a briefing by one of your assistants. I don't care to identify anyone. And one of the participants has written me, I'll be glad to let you have the letter if you like. And they were discussing, in the briefing, this question of withdrawal was brought up. And it was presented as a gradual phase withdrawal that would last a long time. And so one of the gentlemen asked how long that this might continue.

And the best I recall a letter, I'm not sure whether it's said two years or three years. I believe it was three, but two or three. So this gentleman expressed to your assistant, one of them, that he doubted if the American people would stand for another three years. Or the Vietnam War. And according to this report to me, the officials said, well, the American people will be brought off with phase withdrawal. Fifty or sixty thousand a year, I believe was mentioned. Now, I bring this up because I think a long drawn out phase withdrawal is not a formula for peace, but for prolonged war and indefinite involvement. If our goal is a South Korea type, peace, leaving American troops there to support and prop up a government that is not representative of all of South Vietnam,

then it looks like a long drawn out bloody war. And a long drawn out phase withdrawal seems to me to overlook. And to miss the one and only formula for America that extricated herself from this morass. And that is a political settlement brought about in a large amount in one agreement. Would you comment on this problem? Well, I'll certainly comment on the first, well, I'll comment on both parts of your question. First, I agree with you that it would be unrealistic and unwise to be talking about a phase withdrawal over any such period of time as that. I would think that if the other side is willing that we ought to have a withdrawal as quickly as possible, we're prepared if the other side is prepared to have a withdrawal over a very short period of time. I don't like to get involved in actual time limits because I think when you have self-imposed limits

that cause us trouble later on, but certainly what you've expressed does not represent my view at all. Well, I think it's in the interest of everyone to work out, as I said in my statement, a settlement of both military nature and political nature. And I would hope that these can be discussed at the same time, and either in bilateral talks, parallel bilateral talks, or in any other fashion. Two said the other day that he would be prepared to talk bilaterally, or with three in the room, or with four in the room, that expresses our attitude. And I think that the sooner we could work out a mutual withdrawal of troops, the better. And I think as you suggest at the same time, discussion should be going on about a political settlement. And as soon as that can be worked out, the quicker that can be worked out, the better. So generally, I agree with the comments that you've made.

Thank you. And would you go so far as to suggest that our interests might not necessarily coincide with a particular political regime and side on our particular personality in that government? Yes, we don't. We're not, as I've said in the statement, we're not trying to suggest or determine the decision that the people of South Vietnam should make. We think that they shouldn't have a free choice, and they should have the opportunity to make that free choice as soon as possible. And we should have some guarantees or inspection or something to be sure that the elected processes fare. And whatever they decide on is certainly what we want as a nation. Well, I'm encouraged by your comments, and I bring it up because several things. One, statements have been coming out of the military regime in Saigon propagandizing such a phase withdrawal.

Only a few days ago, there was a delegation of members of the Parliament of South Vietnam here in Washington, and they dispatched a message to the President Nixon, which was given to the press, urging a South Korea type of political settlement and phase withdrawal. And then, indeed, from our own Pentagon, have come numbers of statements about withdrawal of implements over a period of time. So I'm encouraged that you do not endorse what seemed to be the motivation. Rogers was on delicate ground during that exchange, as Secretary of State, he could not say, as Gord did, that U.S. interest did not necessarily coincide with those of Saigon or of any particular personality in the Saigon regime. But again, Rogers seemed to hint that the lives of American boys were not irrevocably tied to the fortunes of Vietnamese politicians.

I, the whole Democrat Frank Church, asked some questions about Vietnam, then picked Rogers up, picked up Rogers' earliest statement that China need not fear the U.S. Secretary, do you think that it is likely that peace could come to South Vietnam without a peace settlement? Well, I hesitate to make predictions, because you get in such thin ice. Suppose it depends on what you mean by peace and a peace settlement. I think that any satisfactory solution, which would bring about stability in the area, probably has to result from agreement. I think that's a satisfactory answer.

Do you think that any such agreement is possible that would permit a sizable U.S. military presence to remain in South Vietnam? Well, I think it's possible, but certainly not desirable. You don't envision in your thinking the kind of a truce followed by continued American military presence in South Vietnam, as in fact occurred in Korea, where we still retain some 50,000 troops 14 years after. I would like to answer the question this way, Senator. I would certainly not hope that we would have that kind of a solution to this tragic situation. Well, I certainly share that hope, and I'm very pleased to have you answered the question that way.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Secretary, most of what you said this morning has been reassuring to me. There was, however, one comment that you made that I found a little difficult to accept. I think earlier, someone here on the committee asked you the question, if you were the Foreign Minister of China, how would you feel toward the United States and you said relaxed? Well, I'm an American who doesn't question our Modi. If I know that you don't intend any aggressive action toward China, neither does President Nixon, or Mr. Laird, certainly the American people, are not in that mood and would not condone a policy of that kind. But it's quite a different question as to how the Chinese might look at us. We look at them with suspicion, much voiced at great frequency. And if the Chinese were deployed about the United States in the same proximity that we were deployed about China, if the Chinese had a fleet operating between the West Coast and Hawaii,

and if half a million Chinese troops were engaged in Mexico and a civil war, as we are in Vietnam, and 50,000 Chinese troops were in Cuba, as we are in Korea, and the American Secretary of State said that he was relaxed about China. I would be looking for another Secretary of State. I mean, I think that our deployment around China is such that the experts who have come before our committee, who are experts on China, have indicated that they feel that there is a basis for the Chinese fears, the xenophobia, and it may have something to do with the close proximity of this arc of steel that we have drawn around China. Therefore, I find it a little difficult to say that you would be relaxed if you put yourself in the shoes of the Chinese foreign minister.

Senator, I think your comments point up the fact that I probably shouldn't answer questions of that kind at all. I'm not sure that I'd be relaxed of being a Secretary of State of any country. Well, what I meant to say, and I agree with your comments, what I meant to say, and I think this is probably an exercise that is exercise and futility, and I meant to say that if I were Secretary of State of red China, knowing what I know now, I would not be concerned about any belligerent intentions of the United States vis-a-vis red China. When members of the Senate press the Secretary of State for a change in policy toward red China, they reflect a change in the climate of American politics. Only a few years ago, leading senators of both parties were members of a group called the Committee of One Million, perpetually warning the State Department against any change in policy toward China. The next senator to take part in today's hearing, New Jersey Republican Clifford Case, didn't so much question Secretary Rogers, is subject him to a long and impassioned lecture on Vietnam.

Quite clear, that the public's frustration and rejection of the last administration in regard to Vietnam is based on two facts. One, that it was not winning the war, and second, that it kept on claiming that it was winning the war. In the face of evidence that came back to us irresistibly from outside governmental sources, the things were going from bad to worse. That the essential job of winning this war had to be done by the South Vietnamese themselves, and that the most we could provide was marginal assistance. That if that nation was not willing and able to defend itself, then nobody from the outside could do the job. And it was both futile and destructive for us to attempt to continue what we were doing, that is making this an American war increasingly.

Now that concern about our doing this went on for years. Many of us in the Congress for years pressed the past administration to stop it. As you long ago, as several years, leaders of both parties in the Senate took this position and publicly stated it. The American people were not opposed to our effort to maintain a political balance in an area of the world in which the wars and many other things had utterly destroyed the powers and the power structures that had then kept that area in relatively stable condition. We did not regard the American people generally did not regard America's efforts to restore stability to that area. As immoral or as evidence of imperialism or of an overreaching desire to exercise power for the sake of exercising power, that wasn't the feeling of the American people, though some people did express this and they were in the small minority.

We did not regard this as an immoral act on the part of our government. If we had, it would have been stopped long ago because the American people will not tolerate immorality on the part of their government. But we were becoming increasingly frustrated at failure and at refusal to recognize or admit failure. In fact, at the persistent tendency of the past administration to claim that success was just around the corner in face of evidence that was appallingly to the contrary, and it is not strange that the administration's complete loss of credibility resulted in its rejection. I'm concerned, Mr. Secretary, that this administration should not fall into the same trap. I'm desperately concerned about this matter in regard to Vietnam. Secretary of Defense came back a few days ago from his first trip to Vietnam since he had been secretary.

And certain reports said that he was appalled to find how little the South Vietnamese were doing for themselves, how relatively incapable their military and civilian operation was to take over any part of this war and of the management of their country. I'm surprised that the Secretary was surprised at this, frankly, because it seems to me that this is increasingly a generally understood matter in this country, and I think in all the free world, at least a year ago. We were getting quite specific about this in Congress. I made a speech on the floor, and I don't mean to bore the committee, Mr. Chairman, with the repetition of this, though I would like if I made a put appropriate excerpts in the record at this time. And the thesis of my speech was that the course that the administration was pursuing in Vietnam was sterile and self-defeating, that it could destroy South Vietnam and that without a change in direction, it would destroy South Vietnam. That our success depends primarily on the South Vietnamese doing the job themselves and the odds against their doing what only they can do increase in proportion to the growth of the American presence in that country.

How could anyone, I said, expect the South Vietnamese to change its ways when those who had control of it had never had it so good, and yet it didn't, unless it changed its ways we were faced with an endless involvement of the war on the Asian mainland at an awful cost in American and Vietnamese lives, both North and South, civilian and military like, and in the end, Vietnam reduced to dust and ashes. And I pleaded then with the administration to change its course to fit the facts, we had to de-escalate our position and insist that the South Vietnamese take over the burden. No. A year passed, as years have passed before that, and now our Secretary of Defense finds to his dismay that the South Vietnamese are not doing this, and they're not prepared to do it, and that we have not trained them to do it. I just hope, Mr. Secretary, that this administration will not accept this as our position. I recognized a year ago and said, and I was most interested that the Washington Post and its editorial today, its lead editorial picked up the same theme a year later,

that the South Vietnamese will never undertake to do this job unless we insist that they do it, and that the pleas that the Secretary of Defense have just given for a little more time for the South Vietnamese to do the job are only a repetition of what we have heard for years, that they will never do this unless we make it clear in the only way we can, that they must do it, and that is to fix some date which we begin disengagement. And at the same time, we double our effort to make them able to do the job that they must do, we cannot pull rabbits out of the hat in Paris. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me the only thing that negotiators can do in any situation is to reflect in formal ways and by formal documents, a situation that already exists. Unless situation in South Vietnam is conducive to negotiations and a successful negotiation, we have only one choice there, only the choice between getting out or continuing the war indefinitely.

And we just up to us to change this situation, which the administration previous to this one locked itself into, and I just hope very much that this suggestion by the Secretary of Defense, that we are maybe falling into the same trap that the Johnson administration found itself caught into, to its own, to its own dismay and destruction, and to the great disadvantage of the American people will not be found to be a trap in which this administration is caught. Republican Jacob Javits of New York led Rogers back to the difficult question Senator Gore had raised, the questions of our relations with the Saigon government. Who would decide, Javits asked, what constituted a free election for Vietnam, the United States or the present regime in Saigon? Rogers back to Wade, declaring that South Vietnam was our ally, and that he hoped President Q would enter negotiations seeking peace as we would. Javits, implicitly recognizing the difficulty in which the Secretary found himself commented, you have answered the question as you should, I have asked the question as I should.

Further pressure on the Vietnam issue came from Democrat Claibor and Pell of Rhode Island. My voice very strongly to the other voices that have been raised here that we do not want to hamper your negotiations now, but time is running out, and we again may have to take a role as we believe we did with our own or with another administration, and push you harder if within a very few months these things have not been resolved. Now, can I make a comment about that? Because of the difficulty that I have mentioned about private talks, and because in a negotiation, it is unrealistic and unwise to explain everything that you have in mind that you might be willing to do at the end of the negotiations. We do have a problem, as I can't imagine anybody entering any kind of negotiation who would want to explain in public everything that he had in mind.

We have, and secondly, as I say, this tremendous public interest about, are you talking privately, and what is being said privately? Now, it's uncomfortable to sit back and not be able to answer, and yet if you tell people, it gets out. So I would just hope that you and other members of the committee and the Congress will be, I don't like to use the word patient, but I would be thoughtful and be recognized the difficulty of the problem. So, if you could do that, if you could ask yourself what it is that you would do differently than we're doing, keeping in mind that you may not know what we're doing, it would be very helpful. That was perhaps the most significant testimony of the day on Vietnam. Rogers said in effect, you don't give your enemy at the beginning of negotiations what you may have to give him at the end of negotiations.

The posture of the Johnson administration had been quite different. Whenever Secretary Rusk was asked about possible concessions and peace talks, he used to reply impatiently that he would not even talk about rewarding the burglar. Later in today's hearing, Rogers apparently decided that he had yielded too much ground to the committee on the ABM issue. He resisted Fulbright's effort to drive a wedge between Secretary Laird and himself. Now, you said earlier today that you did not want to make a judgment on whether the Soviets had gone to a first strike missile system saying you weren't qualified. I was struck by this. It was one of the things that was quite disturbing in the testimony of Secretary Laird. He had no hesitancy in saying there's no doubt about it. Now, how in the world does Secretary Laird know there's no doubt about what the Russians decided about a first strike capacity? The first strike capacity is our understanding. It's almost a dedication to the complete destruction of this country. In other words, they're not relying any longer on the theory of second strike, a retaliation which is we've used as a deterrent. They're out to destroy us.

Preemptive, if you like. Now, here the Secretary of Defense makes this ball statement in public. Just last Thursday, whatever it was. Now, you come along and you say that you're not qualified to make a judgment. Well, I'm inclined to agree with you, but the fact is they are assertive and the Secretary of Defense did make such a statement in this room. And it was in all the press and it was certainly the Russians would know about it. Do you see what the point is making it? Now, it seized me again that you, in this sense, properly. I mean, you're modest and you know you don't know for sure what the Kremlin is thinking about. But here is the Secretary of Defense just coming right out. He does know. And you see this assertion that he knows and can see what into their minds. It first place it convinces some people because it's positive. And I think it could also be very, it could be very damaging in the eyes of the Russians with whom we are hopefully and I think you are wanting to make some political settlements.

Now, it was layered, for example, also in that meeting, you mentioned this matter about the ABM being useful in disarmament talks. He said, if I recall, I think I'm correct that the ABM system deployment would be useful in disarmament talks with the Soviet. Now, I think you said that you didn't see this morning that it was. So here you have at the highest level what I think in maybe I'll check the record, but I have the time to do it now. You have what I would call a very substantial difference. I happen to agree certainly with you. I mean your views on this specific thing very much, but it creates a situation which I think may have a lot more influence upon our difficulties. And especially what are the foreigners with whom we wish to get along the Russians and what do they think about it? If it's difference, if it's confusing to this committee and us, why I think it could well be a great hindrance.

I'm really, I guess, pleading for a little more care within the administration. You've got a new administration. And I'm hoping that you will assert your prerogatives to the fullest and try to bring this under control. I thought I'd make a couple of comments because I don't want the record to indicate that there's as much difference of opinion between Secretary Laird and myself as she might suggest. In fact, we get along fine. And I don't think that the conclusion that that the government is acting at cross purposes is correct. I would like to comment on two of the things to illustrate what I mean. When I said I was not qualified, I said I was asking if I was sure that the SS-9s were being developed for first right capability. My impression is that they are, but I'm not qualified to say for sure. I don't disagree with Secretary Laird and maybe the amount of emphasis we put on is different because he has had briefings and more depth than I have on the subject.

So maybe I just, I'm a little more cautious possibly in how I state it. Secondly, let me say that I did not say that the ABMs would not be useful in disarmament talks. They may very well be useful. I don't know what part they'll have to play and I'm not sure how the Soviet Union will react to the problem. I can imagine that they might, we might be able to say if you have no interest in defensive missiles and you want to take your ABMs out around from Moscow, why we will stop our safeguard development. So it may well be that they'll be useful. I said that that was not a factor in the President's decision. He didn't say I want to proceed with a safeguard program because I think that will be helpful disarmament. Nor did I urge that. Well, but Laird gave it as one of the justification for it. I think that's the only reason he had for mentioning it.

And he might, in his mind, think it would be useful in negotiations. Maybe he's right. I'm not sure. All I'm saying is that was not a factor in my, when we discussed it, I did not press that as a factor. It may well turn out to be that it'll be helpful in negotiations. I can't tell you yet. Well, maybe I shouldn't have brought up the subject. You sort of destroyed what little confidence I had in you. The area. Senator Fulbright gave a more considered verdict on the day's hearing later. We'll return to it in a moment. First, however, an independent assessment of Secretary Raj's performance by the syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft. His testimony by Secretary of State Rogers with genuine curiosity. Everybody knew that President Nixon was himself playing the lead role in foreign policy. Nobody doubted the special competence of Dr Henry Kissinger, the chief White House aide for national security. The issue of the anti-ballistics missile had chaired the kind of punch packed by defense Secretary Melvin Laird. But Mr. Rogers had been virtually invisible. Not surprisingly, there was something of a mystery as to what role he would be playing in the formulation of American foreign policy.

Today's appearance cleared up the mystery a little. Mr. Rogers is obviously not going to be a Secretary of State in the tradition of Dean Atterson and John Foster Dolez, a central figure dominating all foreign policy issues by force of overwhelmingly strong views. Nobody could have been less doctrinaire, less impelled by a mission to indoctrinate the committee. Neither is Mr. Rogers going to be the kind of Secretary of State that Dean Rusk was. It's important to the President, but central because of a sure mastery of all details. But this is not to say that Mr. Rogers is going to play no role at all. The evidence today suggested that Mr. Rogers would be a pacifier, an accommodator, or lubricant in two areas recently famous for difficult, if not harsh relations. First of all, Mr. Rogers is almost sure to get on well with the Senate, and particularly the Foreign Relations Committee. It is typical that he began his presentation on the one subject where the committee and the administration are in perfect accord, the Near East. Throughout the hearing, he made it plain that he would be available to the committee for further hearings on almost any subject and almost any time.

As he said to Senator Simington, we don't have to jockey for position. Secondly, Mr. Rogers is plainly going to be in favor of working out agreements with the communists wherever possible. Everything he said about Vietnam emphasized his own interest in withdrawing troops speedily and fostering a political settlement between the Viet Cong and the Saigon government. Repeatedly, he expressed hope for successful talks with the Soviet Union on arms control. The only point he really scored arose in connection with the anti-ballistics missile and the outlook for strategic arms limitation talks. Mr. Rogers argued strongly, and for my money convincingly, that the announced ABM deployment would not adversely affect the prospect for talks with Russia. Whatever his shortcomings in other words, nobody can fault Mr. Rogers on the issue of peace. As one White House aide said of the testimony, the secretary wears a dove on one shoulder, a dove on the other shoulder, and a dove on his forehead. Secretary Rogers of veteran attorney carried a difficult brief today. On the Vietnam and ABM issues, the administration differs sharply with the committee.

Yet Rogers knew that he would need the committee's goodwill in the years ahead, and he knew that Secretary Rusk and President Johnson had paid a heavy price for forfeiting that goodwill. So Rogers seemed today to be operating on a simple principle. When you can't say what they want to hear, at least say what you have to say in a way that won't offend them. Judging from the compliments he received, he was highly successful. Scarcely two months in office, he hasn't had a chance to display his metal and negotiations with the Russians or the North Vietnamese. But in his first public confrontation with the Senate, Mr. Rogers was a very diplomatic diplomat. Good evening. This is an ET, the public television network.

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