Martin Agronsky: Evening Edition; 50

Ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo From Washington, this is Evening Edition.

Now, here is Martin Ogronski. Good evening. President Ford has called the new Sinai Agreement between Egypt and Israel a great achievement, one of the most historic, certainly of this decade, and perhaps of this century. In Jerusalem, the reaction to the agreement seemed less enthusiastic. Former Israeli Premier Golda Meir said, have to take it in its proper proportions, not with fanfare, but also not with a feeling of mourning. And an Israeli official described the accord like this, Israel gives Egypt gets and the United States pays for it. Well, tonight on Evening Edition, a discussion of the new agreement, its meaning for Israel and for the prospects for peace in the Middle East, with the Ambassador of Israel to the United States, Isimcha Dinnitz, and joining the discussion is Oswald Johnston of the Los Angeles Times, who covered the Kissinger mission to the Middle East. Mr. Ambassador, we start off with a very simple question.

What secrets do you know that we don't know? Well, if this is the simple one, Martin, I'm afraid of what will come next. I don't think that the importance of the agreement is in trying to prove this or that unpublic or unpublished commitment. I think the importance of it, and I will not go as far as describing in the end of all evils or the beginning of a new era, although we hope that it starts a new era. I think the importance of it is in the fact that for the first time, Israel and an Arab country have signed an open agreement, which is not a result of a direct military confrontation. All other agreements that we have signed in the past, Armistice Agreement, ceasefire agreements, were agreements to end a state of actual fighting. This time, it was a voluntary agreement that came out of negotiations indirectly at the first phase as they were, but in order to establish a basis for peace and a basis for cooperation.

And I think in this, in the open phase of it, is the real important thing. Mr. Ambassador, I think one of the things that concerns members of Congress and possibly members of the public as well under the heading of, quote, secret commitments relates not to Israel and Egypt, but rather to Israel and the United States and what has in some quarters been described as a greater degree of formality and a greater degree of American commitment to Israel that has ever existed before. Could you comment on that? I'll be very glad to. I think that this is really not the case. I don't think that in the relations between us anything basically different as occurred as a result of the agreement. I think that what we have done in this agreement, the United States and us, we have tried to set in a more orderly way a set of principles that guided our relations for over a quarter of a century. I think there is nothing in the commitments that wasn't either in practice

done before or in theory believed before. And I think the fact that we have put it in an orderly manner, the fact that we have written it in a more contractual manner, doing nothing more than setting in an orderly fashion what in fact is being practiced, both with regard to aid to Israel with regard to political, strategic coordination with regard to our place under the sun, so to speak. I mean, let me just give you an example if I may. The United States and Israel are standing in the same side of the fence in the global confrontation. This is a fact. We have never sold our ideas in the marketplace of ideas and maybe this is our weakness as well. I believe it's our strength, but maybe for bargaining purposes our weakness. Now the fact that America will resist an attempt, as it did in October 24th, when a world power threatened intervention in the Middle East, a unilateral intervention, has nothing to do with whether... Let's name the world power.

The Soviet Union, when the October 24th alert took place. It has nothing to do with whether there is any written document or no written document about it. It is an action that is motivated by the national interest of the United States. And I expect that in the future any action of the United States vis -à -vis the Middle East situation in general or in our relations with the United States in particular will be motivated by what the United States believes to be its legitimate national interest. But you imply that there now exists a written undertaking to act in a way similar to October 1973. No, I did not imply this. I have just used it as an example of how America acted without any written agreement or understanding whatsoever on this or any other point. But now there is a written... Not specifically on this matter. No, just in terms of consultation and in terms of reassertion of the United States, a vital interest in the traditional friendship for the security and well -being of Israel, which includes, of course, security

against the threat of a world power. Well, Mr. Ambassador, let me follow Mr. Johnson's question up in a very specific way. Israel, in case there were to be a war, one hopes there will not be, but it could come, must have oil. You've given up the Abu -Rudais oil fields which provided you with better than half of your oil. The United States has provided $350 million out of the monies that it's going to give you to provide you with that oil that you're losing at Abu -Rudais. Now, if there is to be a war, you simply must have access to oil, unless you have enormous reserves. Maybe you do, and I'm not aware of it. But one would assume that you must have a constant flow of oil. Now, what concerns everyone is that it seems most unlikely that Israel, knowing that on oil depends her survival in a protracted war, would not be willing to sign any agreement

in which she was not absolutely guaranteed, absolutely certain that that oil would be provided, which, of course, leads to the supposition that Israel and the United States have some kind of an agreement that the United States will see, no matter what power attempts to intercede to stop it, that Israel continues to get its oil. Does such an agreement exist? Well, you have made a very convincing argument for having such a strong and definite commitment. All I can say is I don't think there is any country in the world that has an absolute guarantee that there is never going to be any interruption of oil under any circumstances. What we have tried to achieve in our dialogue with the United States is because we have given up not only 60 % of our oil consumption, but actually we have put our dependence on 100 % on importation of oil. It is to say, because we have exposed ourselves to this degree of danger, we have tried to achieve from the United States an understanding with

regard to the availability of oil. It is to say we will continue to make our own arrangements in order to find oil wherever we can to supply our needs. And if they fail? And if we fail, we have an understanding with the United States that the United States will help us within the terms of whatever constitutional and other arrangements are being made, like in terms of shorted, you cut your own oil reserves and in terms of agreements that you have with other countries, that at least oil is made available for us to purchase in this country in addition to the other sources that we hope will maintain their flow and their supply. But there is no provision and this is really the point that I wanted to make for the United States, as was printed in some of the papers, for the United States to send warships to escort our oil or our tankers and none of this was made. The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sisko, said exactly that to me night before last on this program, sitting where you are now. You reaffirm it that there is no such specific agreement. You know, sometimes when

both of us say the same thing, it still is true, you know. But this would then mean that we're there to be a war situation or an embargo situation that Israel might have to go without an assured supply of oil from the outside and instead rely on its reserve capacity. is correct. We will have to rely on our reserve capacity, even as we make arrangement to get oil to Israel. And part of our oil comes to a pipeline and therefore we are not as vulnerable as all that. But naturally, in times of emergency, in times of war, that would be a problem that we will be doing everything in our power to see to it that we will minimize this problem as much as we can. But I don't think there is an absolute solution to cases such as this. And this was settled without an absolute guarantee of supply at all times. Well, I think it was settled to the best possible extent that

an agreement such as this can be settled between two sovereign countries. I don't think we could go beyond what was promised by the United States, and I think that what was promised by the United States is quite inadequate if not 100 % satisfactory, but quite an adequate assurance that we will not be victims to deprivation of oil in a time where it will be needed most. All right. Mr. Ambassador, let me again follow Mr. Johnson's line of questioning a step further. I'm sure you read the piece written by the former Under Secretary of State, George Ball, about this agreement. He was very critical of it. And he makes the observation that if there were war in the Middle East, it could become, as he put it, a proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union. He puts it on one level would be a conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis, on the other a proxy war. And if Israel threatened, he says, the fall of Damascus, for example, the Soviets would be under pressure to airdrop paratroop

divisions. And he concludes, what then would be our response, the American response? What do you think of this whole process? Well, I have read this article and I have read many of his other writings, and I must say I don't always find myself in agreement with his analysis. First of all, I fail to see our person both warns against the confrontation with the Soviet Union, and at the same time is advocating to incorporate the Soviet Union in the peacemaking process in such a way that I believe will lead to a stalemate, which would lead to a confrontation in a much easier way or in a much more imminent way than the chance that we are taking on a piece by piece or a step by step approach to the situation. Secondly, in case of a threat to Damascus that he is describing this analogy, I mean that whether the Soviets will intervene or not, that question can legitimately be asked regardless of whether there is an interim agreement with Egypt or there isn't an interim agreement with Egypt. So I fail to

see how, in his mind or in the mind of some other people, this agreement between Israel and Egypt advances or makes the danger of confrontation more acute than it would have been if there would be no agreement and the stalemate would have gone further. But before I end the question, I wanted to comment on something that you said at the very beginning of your remarks. Quoting someone by saying Egypt took Israel, gave and America, paid. And Israeli officials. Right. Whoever is unnamed official. I think there's nothing more wrong. I would almost say more vicious and more incorrect than to describe the role of the United States in bringing about this agreement as if it bought it from Israel or if Israel sold itself for the money. I think it ignores the historical fact, the economic fact and the defense facts of the area. The United States Assistant to Israel is a long -term policy, a traditional policy that started in the times of President Truman.

Where the main purpose of this policy was to see to it that Israel has the defensive posture and the economic viability to remain as a strong and viable democracy in the Middle East. It was not solely done because of our blue eyes. It was not solely done because we have a democracy in the Middle East. There are other democratic countries in the world. It was done because president after president and administration after administration believe that it is the national interest of the United States to maintain a strong and viable Israel in the Middle East. Because they believe that the defense and the frontiers of freedom do not begin in New York and end in Los Angeles. But wherever there are free people willing to defend themselves for themselves and for the sake of freedom. And I think it is the cheapest contribution that any great democracy can make to world peace and stability by allowing people who cherish freedom to fight for themselves and defend themselves and keep their democracy. And I think any attempt to tie it in with the agreement has total

irrelevance. In fact, last year we didn't have agreement and we received more military aid than we expect to receive this year. What we are receiving from the United States for which we are very grateful is the capacity to defend ourselves in face of the influx of billions of dollars of Russian military hardware and Western hardware that are flowing to the Arab countries to maintain the equilibrium and to allow the diplomatic process to continue. And believe me, Martin, if you make an account of what it costs you to keep a diplomacy of peace or to finance a policy of crisis and war, you are still much better off in trying to maintain equilibrium and stability than in trying to finance wars. If I could take off from one suggestion you made, this was that at all times the American policy has been that it is in the interest of the United States to back Israel fully. Now we have a situation where, to a greater degree than at any time

perhaps 20 years, the United States is drawing closer to Egypt as well. I remember several times before the 1973 war, Israeli officials would tell me that it was an unequal situation because the Soviets backed the Arabs 100 percent and with you it's maybe 70 -30. Now it's perhaps drawing closer to 50 -50. Do you think that the American position is changing? I want to make it amply clear. We have very much valued and cherished the friendship of the United States. We did it in the past and we do it today. But we have never claimed exclusivity in this love. We knew that the United States has interest in the Arab world, has other interest in the Middle East. We don't believe that these are necessarily incompatible interests. They can live side by side. We have never, never demanded that the United States should develop a policy of antagonism or hostility to countries which are hostile to us. In fact, we always hope that

you and as a result of the increased influence of the United States, let us say in the Middle East, that greater element of stability will be bestowed on the area and greater influence for peace will be conveyed to our neighbors. After all, we don't want to remain enemies with the Arabs forever. Our goal is exactly as the United States goal to see peace and stability in the area. And if the United States, through the increase of its influence with the Arab world, can help bring this about, more power to it. This does not make us either jealous or begrudging. Of course, we always have to see to it that it is not done on the expense of our vital interest. And I do not believe that this administration or future administration or past administrations will do this on the expense of the vital interest of Israel. Do you believe that this process is underway with respect to Egypt in particular? I definitely believe that this process is underway with regard to Egypt. It is to say the strengthening of American influence in Egypt. I do not exclude that it could spill over to other areas of the Middle East. And as I said, we are not considering a disaster or

a negative phenomenon or a negative development in our region. Mr. Ambassador, what about the Israeli relationship with Egypt? In the beginning, there was a great reluctance on the part of the responsible members of your government to accept on good faith propositions or declarations made by the Egyptian president, Mr. Sadat. Now there is apparently such a disposition. I will tell you, Martin, we always were well disposed, but we were sometimes skeptical. And the reason we were skeptical is because, after all, the record of other quarter of a century indicated that there were broken promises, that there were belligerent statements, that there were bellicose attitudes starting from the demand to throw Israel into the sea through the Khartoum conference of no negotiation, no peace, no recognition. So obviously it's only natural that our people would be skeptical and would be saying that they are taking risks for peace. And I think this is exactly what we do. I cannot

say that there are no doubts in our mind, but we feel that in order to test these doubts or rather to test these intentions, we must take risks. And we have taken this risk with the hope that really maybe not a new book but a new leaf is going to be turned in the Middle East. Well, one extremely significant new leaf that could be turned now in addition to your agreement with Egypt would be negotiations with Syria. Now, your Premier Rabinus indicated that he finds it very unlikely that the Syrians would be willing to go ahead with a negotiation, knowing, as he put it, that they couldn't exchange more than 10 or 100 yards in the Golan Heights. But now there are indications that Israel and Egypt asked the United States to try to initiate Syrian -Israeli negotiations that may indeed be underway. Did the United States do so? Are they underway? I am not aware of any Israeli or Egyptian request to the United States to initiate negotiation with Syria. What I am aware is of our declared

policy, which was before and subsequent to the Egyptian -Israeli agreement, and this is that we are prepared to negotiate an overall peace both with Syria and with Jordan, in fact with any Arab country who is willing to negotiate peace with us. Let me explain to you now in relation to the agreement, the Syrian situation. There is nothing in the agreement, directly or indirectly, which we have bound ourselves in any way to start negotiations with Syria or to go into any certain arrangement with Syria. Our policy, as I said, stands that we are prepared to negotiate with Syria. We are prepared to negotiate with Jordan if these countries do indicate that they have intention to negotiate peace agreements with us. But I want to go beyond this. The very purpose, the very essence of the interim agreement that we have signed with Egypt, as I was trying to explain in the question before last, was that we were trying to build a new foundation for peace. This foundation cannot be built solely by documents. They cannot be sanctified solely

by signatures. It has to be implemented by goodwill on the ground. We have to see how the Egyptians interpret those commitments they gave, how they treat the agreement, how we live together in those areas in which we have to have cooperation, such as on the joint roads, such as in the joint commission. And then, I hope, a feeling of trust will be developed between us and the Egyptians, which I believe will have a great influence on the future relations in the Middle East, not only with regard to Israel and Egypt, but with regard to Israel and any other Arab country. It is not going to serve anybody's purpose to say to Israel, first, you did not sign an agreement with Egypt because you wanted to sanctify the status quo. And now, you have signed an agreement with Egypt because you want to preserve the status quo. I think this is an erroneous and incorrect assessment of the situation. We are indulging not in an act, Martin, but in a process.

And a process of peacemaking, as opposed to an act of peacemaking, is something that takes time and builds trust. And I think we first must concentrate to see that these buds of peace and of cooperation of the agreement produce the right fruits. But as part of this process, to rephrase Martin's question again, is it possible for an interim agreement to be achieved with Syria? That is something that you obviously know, or anyone who has visited the area know. The terrain in Syria, in the Golan, such that there cannot be any room of maneuvering, such as we have, for instance, in the Sinai Desert, for another interim agreement. In fact, when we have signed the Disengagement Agreement with Syria, it was our understanding that the subsequent agreement would be a final peace agreement, because there is simply no room to have additional maneuvers. You can move from disengagement to peace. And that is why our prime minister said that in a course of an interim agreement, all what can

be done is insignificant changes. And we are not trying to sell here any bill of goods. Our position is known very well to the Americans. We have made it publicly clear. We are not trying to hide anything. We are prepared to sign an agreement with Syria, but we don't see any feasibility in trying to play this interim business in a terrain such as this, in a territory such as this, and under circumstances such as this. So then it becomes necessary to get to the really basic issues of the Middle East dispute. That is correct. Either with Syria alone or with the whole situation with Syria and Jordan. Yeah. Let's carry to Jordan. Carry to Jordan. Well, the situation with Jordan, of course, is of a complex nature. First of all, we are, and I can reiterate it, prepared to enter into peace negotiations with Jordan. With regard to Jordan, there are two problems. First of all, the Rabat Conference has deprived, maybe temporarily, but have deprived from Jordan the mandate to speak in the name

of the Palestinians. I don't know if the Arab countries or some Arab countries live to regret this, and maybe it will change, but the fact of the matter is that so far it doesn't have a mandate. As far as we are concerned, we are prepared to negotiate with Jordan a peace agreement. We are prepared to take such a plan to the decision of our electorate because the government has pledged itself to parliament that before we implement or sign rather any peace agreement with Jordan which involves territorial compromise, we will take it to the voters. But the government is not afraid to take a peace plan that entails compromise to the voters. What about the Palestine Arabs? we have said on a number of occasions, the Palestinian question must be solved. It is not a question that can be ignored. But it can only solve within a framework of peace with Jordan because Jordan itself is part of Palestine. The majority of the Palestinians live in Jordan. The majority of Jordanians are Palestinians. It is only artificial to talk in terms of creating

yet a third state between Jordan and Israel. Artificial or not, Arafat exists. The PLO exists. They want a state. The other Arab countries seem to be backing their demand for the creation of a Well, I don't know whether the fact that Arafat exists means that what Arafat says is legitimate or right. After all, if you choose, if you look at the position of Arafat today, even within the Arab world, even as a spokesman of the Palestinians, today, as opposed to several months ago, in the high glory of his appearance in the United Nations, you realize, at least we realize, that more and more Palestinians are having their doubts whether he is really the spokesman that will bring them the coveted solution. He is a slogan -producing organization and not a territory -producing organization. there any alternative authority that could speak for the Palestinians other than the PLO or King Hussein? Well, it could be King Hussein and it could be any other authority of Palestinians that will be based on accommodation with

Israel, will be based on establishing the Palestinian right and whatever claims that they have within peace agreement with Jordan. Because after all, there is room there, there is a ethnological connection there, there is religious connection, there is definitely territory there, and Amman is as Palestinian as Nablus. It is not less Palestinian than Nablus. To say that Palestine is only where the Jews live, because you want to solve it by dissolving the Jews, this is maybe a very tempting slogan, but it is hardly a commitment of, as our prime ministers once said, national suicide is not an international obligation. And I have just seen Arafat recently in one of the stations in America, and I noticed some reporters were very diligent in trying to extract from him a promise that at least he would leave side by side with Israel even if he would be allowed to establish a state in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. And with all the good intention

at least that one of them had, he never succeeded to solicit from him this condescension that Israel can also leave as an independent state until he said maybe for a while. I think that was the closest that he got to a compromise. Now for us, it is not a very appealing proposition. Mr. Ambassador, we only have a few seconds left. Looking at the thing in the round, has it improved the prospects for peace? I believe so. I believe that at least it laid the foundation to a large extent up to us, the Egyptians, the Israelis, the whole world, to let these things be nurtured and developed properly. And then I think it could be a blessing to the area. Thank you Mr. Ambassador. Thank you. all. Thank you. Good night for Evening Edition. On Evening Edition Monday, a talk with two members of the Wednesday Club, a group of liberal Republican Senators with Senator Charles Percy of Illinois and Senator Ted Stevens of

Alaska. Funding provided by Public Television Stations, the Ford Foundation, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. This program was produced by N -Pact, a division of GWETA, which is solely responsible for its content. Thank