Talk of Alaska; Review of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Nine Years Later
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From a PR and the Alaska Public Radio Network Live and across the state you can hear from and talk to the people who make news in Alaska. On top of Alaska this program is made possible with support from APRA and member stations. Here's your host Steve hein. Thank you want to welcome to the show we opened today with a PR and most requested sound bite. It's the Coast Guard tape of Captain Joe Hazelwood reporting to the Coast Guard that he had struck Brian Bligh Reef and was leaking cargo. And of course it happened shortly after midnight on this day nine years ago. So today subject to something every Alaskan has something to say about. So car call early if you want to be heard. We're talking about whether we could have another while still on the tanker route through Prince William Sound. The telephone number for talk of Alaska is 1 800 4 7 8 8 2 5 5 That's 4 7 8. Talk 9 years ago today oil was spreading over the water from a tanker aground on Bly reef in Prince William Sound and efforts to deal with it were proving ineffectual
booms to hold the oil turned out to be under snow banks the barge to deploy it was out for repairs and skimmer sent out to pick up the oil turned out to gunk themselves up into uselessness almost immediately. There was talk about dumping dispersants on the oil but the dispersants weren't there yet. And the world was beginning to realize that America's largest oil spill had occurred in response efforts continued to be ineffectual for days and then a storm hit and blew the oil across the Sound. The question everybody's been asking since is how could we have been caught so flatfooted. And as the thing was analyzed and deconstructed through hearings and court cases on and on and on for most of these nine years. We've learned that there was a there was a contingency plan at the time sort of what. That it hadn't yet been approved. I think it was two years overdue. And.
It hadn't been approved it was still being argued about between the Alyeska pipeline service company and the State Department of Environmental Conservation. This is what would have said yes you can use dispersants and where you could use them in fact that's one of the issues that was that was hanging the whole thing up. The question I think that every Alaskan had to face at the time of that spill was not so much. Isn't this horrible And what does this mean and so forth. Everybody tortured over that. You work for an oil company or work for Alyeska or government or whoever. But how much am I personally responsible for this. Was there anything I could have done to keep this from happening. And somehow those questions of personal accountability are maybe the ones that it's easiest for us to forget. And I'd like to revisit that question now because I discovered that as a member of the news media I didn't have the
slightest clue as to where the contingency plan for oil shipping stood regulatory early. It had disappeared into clouds of bureaucratic fog years ago and nobody was talking about it except those people who were most immediately concerned with it. So I didn't know that this plan was not going to work and that their plan hadn't been approved or any of that. I didn't know any of that and here I am supposed to tell other people so I'm partly responsible for that oil spill. Well we're ready for your calls the telephone number is 1 800 4 7 8 8 2 5 5 4 7 8. Talk. Where were you when the oil spill happened what did it do to you. What could we do better and differently and so forth. Everybody's got an opinion on it. John Devon's sure Does he was mayor of these at the time. He proceeded to run for
public office after the oil spill. Then he went off and became a president of a college in Vermont and lo and behold he's back in Alaska and working for the RCA seat which is a watchdog organization set up under orders of Congress too. Be a watchdog I'd say right John about this very issue as to how prepared we are now. Well we're set up under the Oil Pollution Act of 1900 mandated through that and we're mandated to advise we advise both Alyeska But we also advise the citizens in our region and the communities that were oiled in the 1890s built clear out through to Kodiak as well as some of the organization's fisheries groups some of the environmental groups. But the idea is that it would be you're going to zation that would you know say to somebody in news media hey guess what we still have a contingency plan right.
Well contingency plans are a big part of our focus like job and has on my staff and Joe spends most of his time reviewing contingency plans working with the shippers and with Alyeska and the other groups. And you know we all got very complacent back in 89. I mean we've gone a long time without anything major happening. And I mean you're right Steve I mean there are a lot of us that review in our minds couldn't I have done more couldn't I have pushed a little harder some of us realize that the equipment wasn't there. Valid is you know at one point had tried to increase the taxes now Alyeska didn't fight us on this the state fought us on this but we tried to we tried to put in a response center there that laid an area and then there was the mayor's ad hoc committee that looked at what if and that the night before you know and I'm sure you remember because you've interviewed me a number of times but Riki Ott was on my ad hoc committee to look at what if oil spill happened in Ricky's famous words were It's not a matter of if it's a matter of when and within a few hours it it happened
it was on its way to happening. And even at that moment at that moment you know in fact probably the moment Ricky was speaking Joe Hazelwood was on his way out with with that infamous load. You know it's like I guess read the books a bit. Most of the books that have been written about it and I'm sure many Alaskans have I'm sure and I'm not alone. I read the report from the oil spill commission while Parker headed who basically Stephen Beck and John have locked me and mostly wrote it. I've read the different analyses you find oddly that they don't agree. You know that the different accounts of what happened differ as to you know what Greg cousins the third mate who was up on the bridge and for how long. And things like that that actually the facts are starting to dissolve and get a little squishy in this sometimes and I was always amazed that
the public perception of it in the lower 48 was so erroneous from what was actually going on that somehow these these endless images of soggy wildlife and people scrubbing beaches are like sort of all that remains in the public memory in fact to this day I could bring it up to most anybody in the lower 48 and that's what they talk about is that was so ineffectual watch him dabbing away at those rocks you know what did they think. You know and they all say that oh isn't that awful those dead animals. And they never realized that close to half the oil got out of Prince William Sound went on down all along the outer coast of the Kenai Peninsula and on then across the bottom of Cook Inlet in the Cook Inlet and on to Katmai National Park. And you know all these national parks were just heavily oiled. Kodiak Island and on down the coast and for the most part it wasn't till years later where accounts in the lower 48 would even would even show you maps where that happened they kept saying was Prince
Williams on Prince William Sound. And it wasn't you know it was a huge swath of Alaskan geography. So that's one myth. You know that we've got going over so many more that that piled up in the public mind I think as time went on about what had really happen. But I want to talk about how prepared we are now. Do you think that. From your position and what you worked for RCA see for what just a matter of weeks now right. Well actually about a year. Yeah now I came back April 15th. So it's close to a year now close to a year. Well then you have it. You've had time to look at it. I mean we got a score of vessels I think we need to actually go into what has changed. And would you say that we we do have a contingency plan right. We have contingency plans. We have considerably more equipment. We're much better prepared. One study that we were involved in would
suggest that there's a 75 percent improvement. I'm not saying that exactly right but a 75 percent less chance of an accident. But who in the world would have ever believed that Hazel would take that big boat over that rock I mean. That morning Dave hammock was the one that called me and said John you better get up and put your Mae Auriol hat on you got an oil spill and I said David there's been other oil spills for you waking me at this time in the morning and he said this is a big one and told me what it was I said can't be nobody would take a tanker over Bligh Reef. And so I mean we've got to remember with everything in place there's still the chance that some human error or some other kind of error can happen and we can have another one and that's why we we put out a lot of our emphasis on preventing complacency. Got to keep it alive gotta keep people involved keeping the communities involved because in reality it was the communities that suffered. I mean it's the people that relied on it
that the subsistence users the fisherman the people that relied on tourism those are the people that that really suffered and so we keep them involved and we keep the emphasis on prevention. Well I know that there have been twice now where the people of Jena Bay have simply said look there is still oil out there. We still want to clean it up. There was one point where they finally got the go ahead to go out there with five gallon buckets take the mussels off the muscle beds dig up the oil out of the sediments underneath them put it in the buckets and put the mussels back it's been much better since then. And then lately they've also for it took forever to get any kind of permission to use this new solvent this P.S. 51 which apparently seems to work at getting it out of some of those deeper sediments as well they blew it off and it's very expensive and so forth. But I mean there are those poor people that have had to be endlessly insistent to get any kind of action at all because the consensus among officialdom is it was more it's more trouble than it's worth. I was at and
that's easy to say that's more trouble than it's worth unless you're there. That's right. But you know I don't blame you for wanting to get their beaches cleaned up I mean people are saying well it's OK it's not doing any damage but it's a back yard. In fact it's their front yard. But I was out last summer and Larry I have an office and Gail invited me out to observe the work they were doing they got a small grant to do some cleanup and they were doing some substantial cleanup. There was oil. They were getting oil and they were using the solvent and getting it out of the ground in there. I was very impressed with what they were doing. Talk of Alaska 1 800 4 7 8 8 2 5 5 That's 4 7 8 talk and we turn now to our second lucky guest of the day the vice president for corporate services of Alyeska pipeline service company Rob. Rob I understand when the oil spill happened you were actually Alyeska as a lobbyist in Juneau. I can't even imagine that that was a survivable profession.
That's correct I was in Juneau the company that asked me to go down and December and participate as an information lobbyist on behalf of a company with the legislature obviously with the oil spill my role changed dramatically. And it was painful process to go through but a necessary process to review with the legislature what happened and then you know there were quite a number of bills that were introduced and passed to try to prevent this in the future. There were indeed. And where do you stand now do you still do this same type of work or what how do you what do you do for Alyeska now. Well part of my responsibilities include people who interact both with the legislature and Congress on occasion I personally talk to people in the legislature and the Alaska delegation. It was you know I remember it was the kind of thought at the time that. It could have been handled differently then
maybe if if the Alyeska had given up control over tax on a little earlier Exxon might have been able to act a little more quickly. I would say it's unlikely but nonetheless it's been said one does where does the boundary line now between Alyeska and the owner companies in terms of who's responsible for what. When a vessel leaves the terminal Well part of what we've done in working with the regional citizens that council and other groups in the state government in the federal government is to try to clarify exactly the answer that question and the way the clarification works is that Alyeska is the initial response section contractor to a spill from a vessel. We plan to be involved in that capacity for approximately 72 hours and we plan that within 72 hours after notification the vessel representatives who are designated in the vessel spill plants will come and come in and take over management of the spill response. When that occurs at Alyeska
equipment and people will continue to be involved in the response as long as needed. But there is a planned and drilled process to hand over management within 72 hours so it can occur faster than that it's really dependent on how quickly the vessel Representatives can arrive and satisfy both the state and federal representatives on seeing representatives that they are ready and capable of taking over management direction of the spill response. So it sounds like the there is a rather firm set of guidelines. The way that you're telling it to me anyway and there's got to be a plan. There are and this is something that drilled on a yearly basis and we usually have a fairly large drill that practices this with one of the vessels representatives each fall. Now Alyeska employees escort vessels right. Yes and so is that tanker then Alyeska is as it goes out through the Narrows and on out to Montague.
How does that work. Now the taker is still under the commanding control of the vessel master there is a pilot who is required by state law to be on the vessel as she transfer from the berth to Bligh Reef which is the current in the vicinity of Bligh Reef which is the current location for that pilot to leave the vessel and hand it back over to the master. L. Yes because role is. Really to be there is another set of eyes and ears to detect if anything unusual happens to be in a position to respond quickly to that. The escort vessel is actually a tug is actually tethered to the tanker by a line as she passes through the narrow Scn. The reason for that is to be in a position to provide rapid assistance in the event of any problem with the vessel. And where do we stand with the tugs Now I know there was endless
fussing about how big a talk with a tug was needed and so forth what does that stand now. Well we work through those issues again with a cooperative effort with the state of Alaska. The Coast Guard reasonal says it buys wary Calcio through a risk assessment process the process that say you should have one tug or another it provided some recommendations. We've worked through those and Elli Aska has commissioned the construction of two tractor tugs which are the first of which should be delivered roughly a year from now. The second will be delivered later in 1909. So John Devon's does that mean we have a little bit of vulnerability at the present time. Well we certainly favor the the new tractor tugs that they're bringing on but there is still a good compliment out there Viz and the plan is to bring in what's called the protector class tug which is also as I understand it's a tractor tug but it's a smaller version to fill in the gaps
in the mean time. But there's always I mean I guess if anything comes out of this it's that there's always the chance that something can happen. How about weather restrictions and things like that. I understand that right now if the winds that engine broke are over a certain amount the tankers have to hold up and all that sort of thing. There are actually criteria at three different places for weather that restrict the operations that the birther criteria as you know sits a spill we've been boomin each vessel before she's loaded and the boom stays in place until the vessel is ready to depart. And that's been very handy in one case right. And if the sea state when the such that that boom is not effective we suspend loading of the vessel. The second place the weather restrictions part of LDS narrows. If I recall correctly John correct me if I'm wrong here but if the winds sustained winds are over 40 knots in the narrows.
Takers Laden tankers cannot transit the Narrows. If they're between 30 want to 40 knots an additional escort vessel is required including for Ambon tankers and then it hits a brick entrance so I think if the winds are over 45 not sustained vessels cannot transit through there either. So it's all good though. Those are changes a bit and put in place over the years since the Exxon Valdez in an effort to identify where the risk are that we can take steps to reduce the rist an acceptable level. You know John I've heard tell this would be unfair to ask Rob that although he can respond if he wishes but but. I've heard tell that a lot of the problems with Alyeska and its and its so-called corporate culture have to do with the way that it is constituted that it belongs to the owner companies and alter it and according to how big a share of the oil they have is how big a control they have over this operation
and they kind of they're always fighting amongst themselves or there's a rivalry between the owners of the oil as to who can make the most money and who can keep their secrets best. And it's kind of like. A sort of a stinginess trend you know sort of outdoing one another in the stinginess Department. That kind of led to this situation where they didn't want to spend I mean obviously it's going to cost a lot of money to pay for these escort vessels and you know deploying this equipment and so forth all that costs money. And if you've got these companies that are all fighting over every single drop of oil on what belongs to. It's just hard to see where they're going to be terribly generous when it comes to these things unless unless they're dragged into it. Well Steve I'm not sure what you want to say on that one. You say it doesn't matter whether you are a neighbor of a company you watched it all happen you've seen it you know the president speak it changed like
Hat's over there and you saw I mean the rumor was basically that there were came a certain point after the spill where BP all of sudden cracked the whip and also then they started spending and you know and that was just it and they hadn't done that up till then and they were all the way over there in England. You know they didn't belong to John Rockefeller anymore. Well actually I don't know what the answer would be. I mean it is obvious that yes Alyeska. It is a service company that services quite a number of owner companies and I'm sure there's some conflict there. We don't see it often we've seen it recently in terms of trying to get accurate throughput projections because we're very interested in seeing vapor recovery being put on birth 3 and butt Alyeska is challenged with gee how do we know what the throughput is going to be next year or two years from now because why should we put all this piping on here to contain the vapors of we're
hardly ever going to use it. Yeah I mean that's their you know that's the problem that they're faced with and it's exactly what you're saying and the very sound there is. It's very sensitive information that's coming from the owner companies and the owner companies keep it pretty close to their vest. But as citizens who want the most environmentally safe operation possible we want to see this happen but but that would be one example of what you're saying. Back in 89. I'm sure there were cost cutting measures I mean there was a point at which the Alyeska had a team that very much like serves only not certainly developed serves as I would guess I would guess I could say serves as the best response organization of its kind in the world today I mean it is really top drawer. But back in before 89 Alyeska started to cut back on that and I'm sure it was a cost cutting measure they were taking people and reassigning them to other duties and so
that we didn't by the time the bill came there it just wasn't there. Today there's an awful lot more there. Steve I can't resist jumping in here and say that I was hoping you save me if you can. And Steve we could spend a lot of time talking about the history but if we could perhaps it might be most productive talk about Alyeska is culture today and I'd be happy to talk more about history if you like the odors and Alyeska have recognized the need to change the culture and I've been involved in that for the last four or five years personally as have many people in the company. And the basic thing we're doing probably relates back to what you talked about personal responsibility and we've tried to distinguish the responsibilities of people at Alyeska from those in our own companies who we refer to as our board of directors. That distinction is that we have achieved. Now is that people at Alyeska including me in my capacity as an executive of a company now are accountable and responsible for safe
operation and maintenance of the pipeline. That includes accountability to be sure that we understand what the laws are for Prince William Sound and understand what the expectations are and work to meet them. The owners on the other hand are now involved more in like a typical board of directors and what's the strategic direction for the company wants a future for the company in the like and have very clearly left the day to day operation accountability with people in the company. It's an improvement from our perspective and one that is both an opportunity and a challenge for people like me to now have that type of accountability for what we do. Obviously with things like birth three there there there needs to be in any business an evaluation of what the requirements are and for a very close question like Do we need additional taker controls on birth 3 is something that we continue to study. We're committed to
following the legal requirements on that and have informed both regional Citizens Advisory Council and the EPA in the EEC of our commitment to abide by the legal requirements. Well gentlemen I really enjoyed this discussion by I think it's time to turn it over to the people of Alaska so if you already you know hang on to your hats because I'm sure it's not going to be a real easy ride. Telephone number is 1 800 470 TALK that's 1 800 4 7 8 8 2 5 5. We're talking to John Devon's and Rob shelf and we're talking about how do we stand in terms of being prepared for the oil spill in terms of preventing an oil spill in Prince William Sound and on the tanker routes. We'll go now to Eric calling from all the way down in Catch you can. Eric welcome to Talk of Alaska and thank you mean on your program. I was at Seward at the time the oil spill happened and we had a little bit of warning we knew it was coming.
We responded to the best of our ability and I like to say one thing is a lot Alyeska corporation I've seen a lot of change happened since then much learning from the mistakes that were made at the time it was quite it seemed like there was nobody knew what to do and everybody was trying to pass the ball to somebody else and in the event of doing it the shellfish and the animals of the coastline were affected and the waist of her lack of disorganization and it's unfortunate that we have to have something like this where this does happen. Eric Eric tell me this when you were in Seward you say was it a surprise when the oil suddenly showed up in resurrection Bay. No. I have friends that I'm a commercial fisherman and also a subsistence user as well to a native of the local region. We have friends of pilots that told us what was going on and we went right out right away and checked on the the bird directories I'd also previously worked for a tour company up there. You know if your
tour so I was quite familiar with all the locations of the individual animals and the sea life. So I was right out there right object in on everything and see how everything was that there wasn't a surprise we knew the currents and we knew it would become in that way. We tried our best to protect it and there was an unavailable of resources at a time so that the city took it upon themselves to. Get on the ball so to speak and ended up flying up oil boom from I think Louisiana or something on a private level and just to put oil boom occur. The salmon streams and there was a lack of ability of materials to do that it was quite quite a feat what they actually did accomplish. OK Archiv we covered your ground you got more to say. Yeah it was one thing I was going to ask is it I add. I received some compensation from Alyeska the subsistence issue an out-of-court settlement and I was unfamiliar I wasn't expecting that from Alyeska corporation
we are into leg ation is that consistency uses with Exxon which were still Exxon is still going through that appeals process. But some of the original corporations and also individual users subsistence users have received fines from Alyeska. And an out of court settlements and those fines can't replace what damage has been done and is still being done from the over the time release of the oil but I have to say it does and does acknowledge some responsibility. The moral aspect of you makes an individual feel a little better in their heart that somebody saying hey look you know this was a mistake and this shouldn't happen. We're still fighting with Exxon which makes you feel like it's going to happen and there's nothing we can do about it. And that's just part of using technologies. All right Eric thank you very much. You're listening to TALK OF ALASKA. We're talking about the oil spill nine years ago today talk of Alaska's phone number 1 800 4 7 8 8 2 5
5 4 7 8 talk and we will continue. To. Talk of Alaska comes to you on the Alaska Public Radio Network with support from listeners like you who support this member station. More information on how your business or organization can help to support public radio programming. Call 1 800 7 5 2 8. 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. You're listening to TALK OF ALASKA we're talking about the Exxon Valdez oil spill something just about every Alaskan has something to say about the telephone number is 1 800 4 7 8 8 2 5 5 4 7 8 talk. Our guests include John Devon's who is now the executive director of the Prince William Sound regional Citizens Advisory Council the watchdog group set out set up under the oil protection act. Well Pollution Act of 19 90. And Rob's show put the vice president Rob so Shoaf excuse me vice vice president of corporate services at Alyeska
pipeline service company who was Alyeska as a lobbyist at the time of the spill so he's he's seen it all. It's been a really fascinating conversation here. The area where I'm trying to steer the conversation is. For each of us to kind of look at how we might personally have acted a little differently and kept it from happening and whether we can keep it from happening now do we even know where things stand. Regulatory wise do we know if there's sufficient boom deployed in the places where it needs to be deployed. Do we know what kind of protection we now have do we know how adequate The crews are on the on the on the tankers they have to work those outrageous hours that they that they had to work on the Exxon Valdez which is certainly a major contributing factor to this to this Marine disaster. Jim is calling now from Eagle River Jim welcome to talk about Alaska. Hi Jim.
Jim are you still there. OK we're hanging up on you Jim you can try again. Matt calling from Val DS. Matt welcome to the show. Yeah hi john how you doing. Good to see you back in the stadium with RCA like you Matt. Yeah I have a concern and it's kind of a. I'm concerned I base it on my experience in being a vessel traffic controller involve these in the early days with the Coast Guard and you know live directly the effects both environmentally and socially on the Hill here in Valdez. So if you wish to get met we should get a little background here you actually did work for the Coast Guard at one point right. Yes I was a vessel traffic controller in the early 80s and lived first hand experience as a tanker Prince Williams down in 82 in November of 82 when she drifted to Prince William Sound for eight hours and nearly ran aground on glacier island then nothing happened so everybody said well OK big deal nothing happened let's continue operations as normal and and no improvements were made at that
time until the Exxon Valdez occurred when one of the problems I forsee with the vessel traffic system and this is a special concern is the K pension book area and it's a monitoring system that they have out there only pick stop the participants in the oil trade and some other odd traffic. In other words when a vessel traffic controller looks at the the presentation of Cape engine broke which is an electronic presentation. All these days are the vessels that have little black boxes on that that we transmit their position back to the vessel traffic center. But it might not show a full fishing fleet or a barge and a tug in tow out there or a fleet of charter boat. It shows it gives the vessel traffic control or a very limited picture of what the vessel traffic is like in in the Cape engine Brook area. And this is a concern I brought up when I was on a committee with the RCA bee and it just seemed to go over everybody's butt. But talking from
practical experience never see that as a as a major problem. You're talking about the potential for an actual collision because the Coast Guard vessel traffic people I don't know how much they even deal with people once they get outside of a pension Brooke but nonetheless the Coast Guard people wouldn't know about certain vessels in that area right. Yeah oddly the tankers and the escort vessels than any other participant in the vessel traffic system that has this so-called black box on them. But there's a whole fleet a charter boat a whole fleet I mean there could be a hundred boat and an engine block entrance area and the Coast Guard is only in for a vessel. And I I I've been an advocate of the true radar system at Cape venture book system at Cape tension Brooke for a long time similar to the radar we have in the valleys narrows and I keep on hearing is an expensive problem they'd be too expensive to maintain it. And originally the vessel traffic system in Prince William Sound
required entire radar coverage of the whole vessel. Traffic system where the only vessel traffic system in the United States does not have entire radar coverage of its system so we do still have some deficiencies and I would think that the area most at risk for a collision or a grounding is engine Brook endurance based on the fact that we have an 8 flayed and an aging fleet of tankers and it's also a place of incredibly bad weather and if we were to have an accident out there and response was necessary the only thing we would pick up on on the electronic presentation the Coast Guard center is a tanker it's been a few a few spares vessels. OK I got just one of those wouldn't show up. OK. You would have to say however that the potato point situation has gotten better that that radar that where they actually weren't looking but even if they looked they might not have seen the Exxon Valdez as it was deviating out of the lanes.
They could see the Exxon-Valdez they just didn't pay any attention to it. But if it would be not the same intent management that we now have in the narrows as far as radar presentation and traffic management as we do it Cape tension Brooke. OK well let's see. John can you can you address that at all is has that come up as a concern Matt says he's been trying to bring it up. OK. Alyeska has put the Gulf service out there so that helps a little bit in terms of keeping track on on some of the traffic that is out there. I'm sure that what Matt saying in terms of a financial consideration I mean it's a federal financial consideration to put a radar out there and it is not something that has come up since I've been back. But we talk an awful lot about pension Brooke entrance and what kind of response we want out there and do we want an additional tug out there in the barge that's out there. I mean and Matt's correct. That is a great hazard out there I mean the weather conditions are severe and
you have got the Seal Rocks and I mean there's a lot of hazards out in that area. You know if I could jump in here Rob to get ready for the program today check with the people it serves to find out what was going on and one of the things they provided to me was. The statement that there is some improvement in WRIGHT Our coverage that there is a longer range that now reaches 20 to 30 miles out into the Gulf of Alaska. You know I don't have any more information than that but it sounds like that issue that you raised which is a real one has been thought about and that there may be some improvements and how the Coast Guard monitors that. I'd be happy to talk to you about that after the program if you want to call me an acreage or you could call Greg Jones over at source and get more information about how that works now. Thanks Rob. You know I kind of wonder. I think anyone in their right mind would wonder about the Coast Guard because they're kind of a political
body. They're not really a military thing. They are under the transportation secretary the transportation secretary is notoriously political position. And it appears to me that they get their change their budget chain yanked quite frequently by Congress for not doing its job but also for doing a job quite frequently. It kind of puts me in mind of the FAA in that they they don't do everything that they might believe that they should do. Lots of times and we certainly saw that in the case of Marine Safety Office and they'll be you know I mean as Matt was saying they weren't looking whether or not that radar could have seen him seen the tanker they weren't looking. So John I'm wondering you know what can you do when you've got a Coast Guard that you can't really isn't really independent. You can't really depend on them to keep the shippers feet to the fire in terms of for instance a double hull tankers that they're supposed to be bringing in under open 90 but now there's dispute as to what that really means.
Well you know now it's my belief that by was it 2015 all of the tankers that ply U.S. waters will be double hulled. But it's been our experience that the Coast Guard's done a very adequate job of monitoring and keeping things going in Prince William Sound and related waters. They are subject to congressional appropriations. And certainly I was one I was spoke out fairly adamantly. I didn't get along particularly with Secretary Skinner back in the 89 spill and I didn't like the way Secretary Skinner church. Yost around but that was that was under the heat of battle and we were all pretty excited and pretty upset then but we've been prayer very pleased with the with the response the coast guard gives now. It's part of our CACs job to keep an eye on all of this and to alert the Coast Guard if we see something that needs to be
done and they've been they've been very responsive I guess that's what I'm saying is that being as how it is a political process. The people need need a few some some some chips on their side you know to weigh all the chips on the other side where all the money is. And so it's another good reason for the RCC to exist I would think. Well you remember in 89 I mean the citizens had an awful time getting involved in the information loop in the decision making loop. And a lot of that has improved I mean our CAC is included in the. Not as much as we like there are still things that we would like to get included in that we have a little trouble breaking into but it's it's considerably better than it was in 89. Let me ask you this. I want to honestly answer how able do you feel to use the media in getting your point across to the public. In other words you really lose power if if the public if you don't have access to the public you can put out publications till you're blue in the face. Have events
but if you don't get promoted nobody's going to show up at your events. Nobody's going to read your publications. How good of cooperation do you get out of the media people like me how much do we really pay attention to concerns that our CAC is trying to bring into the public eye. I think the media does well bias. I have you know in as you know my guest very diplomatic Well I'm a. I am I have to get over running for office the next day. It's not always easy to fall back into my other role but I think some of it right now. Our CAC has agreements and it works better. Back in 89 I was a real firebrand as you remember I mean boy point a microphone at me and I was I was talking. Now we try to cooperate because we find out we can get a lot further in terms of getting our points across. That doesn't always make good news. We have protocols and understandings with the industry that we're not going to surprise them
if if we see something that we think's wrong at Alyeska what the first thing we don't do is call a press conference to say gee there's been this not a thing we would call Alyeska. And in most situations Alyeska is very responsive to us and and it is working better. Now I will say it was probably a lot of fun back in 89 when we were able to stand up you kind of put your back into a corner. And you can say a lot of things but today we try to be a lot more understanding of the situation. But again it doesn't. You know the media doesn't stand on our doorstep to ask those questions because we do have this understanding that if we see something wrong sometimes we're the first to notice it and but in most cases Alice has been very responsive. We go now to Richard in Fairbanks Richard welcome to TALK OF ALASKA. Good to have you join us on the show here. Fine fine show Steve. Good to talk to you. I would like to
raise one issue if time permits make a comment on corporate culture. I think at the start it is necessary to state very clearly to confirm Mann's a longtime critic of Alyeska I've done several reports as you know Steve in the last two years on the condition of the pipeline and over and over time I have monitored the area. There is been a tremendous change and Alyeska but I think in terms of what the public can do and I strongly support it and commend Alyeska for it. So trans for mation efforts I think Rob's show is a part. Of the improvement internally.
That said I think one of the most important things for the public to recognize is that this is a culture war with itself over what is the appropriate standard how much should it give to the environment how much should achieve off of its potential or real profits to protect the environment. That broad comment is I just throw that out that the public needs to view the issues it talks about regarding oil and the press with their eyes in the back of its mind. So in other words in other words you're saying they've shown flexibility they might not have had at one time and I mean ability and ability to listen to the public to let the public influence them but that does
no good if the public doesn't realize it can influence them. Well two things. One it does no good if the public good doesn't seize the opportunity. And number two if those who are. Are you concerned John Devons and Rob show far in you. Obviously your callers are. The question is to recognize that many people who come from the oil industry believe they have done enough and we do quite enough for environmental protection that contributes to the complacency side and that's what I'm referring to when I refer to the culture at Warwick with itself. It is necessary to recognize that not. Decision makers and operational people are forward looking. Rob shelf
maybe with a general observation I'd like to give a specific example of what is going on right now that the public might be interested in. With regard to. The pipeline mainline contingency plan. There are three contingency plans one is for the terminal of the tanker plans for Prince William Sound by the end of age individual tanker operators and the temps main line plan. Now eight years after the Exxon Valdez with the added concern and commendable attempts to change on the mainline plane in 1997 a 20 year Alyeska veteran field field worker completed a Master's thesis in which he basically concluded that Alyeska is still unable to respond to a mainline plan which would place the Sag River in the north
at risk. All of the rivers the pipeline crosses on the way to the south where you've got the scene of the teco feeding into the copper. This is a rather remarkable statement for a 20 year loyal Alyeska veteran to make after years of research a concern at that point. Alyeska was in the process of beginning to modify the contingency plan for the pipeline and its new three year. Approval was due to be made September 1st because the plan had a three year three year permit. Guess what. The old plan has been extended three times because Alyeska was completely unable to meet the deadline. That plan is now coming up for public review. I'm in the process of beginning to review it. I just got the
box of the documents again this is what March of 98. That plan was supposed to be fully reviewed and done and in place by September 1st 97. We're operating on a make shift into Room plan. Basically I am going to I'm doing research for the. I was asked a forum for Environmental Responsibility on it on a very small grant. John John Devon is being very diplomatic when he says not all things are completely the way they want to be. I heard a dialogue at the ICAC meeting in Anchorage a week ago Friday in which Alyeska said to ICAC we do not want you looking at the mainline pipeline see plan. We don't want you poking your nose in there and the RCC was saying wait a minute we feel we're going to need
to and they're quite quite crosswise on it. OK Richard the opportunity for a wonderful press story. Nobody covered. Yeah there we go again. There we go again and also I guess there we go again with contingency plans that that sort of hang around. Well without being without there being one or just sort of hanging around with the old one I guess there is an area of dispute here as to whether ICAC is really the proper organization to be dealing with at least as a dispute I'm hearing out here who wants to take this for Rob. John let's start with John to always start with John but actually there is a bit of controversy over it. RCC doesn't want to review the entire tap's plan. That goes out of the scope of what what we think is our responsibility. You know year ago we had the GPO and here we have all parked in the JPL to celebrate the
anniversary. And you know it seemed to be sort of a JPL concern here. Well and it is a JPL concern but what we have asked to review and it's not dead yet I mean I know that Stan Stevens the president of our CAC met with Bill noble in valdés this week and they talked about it again but we're talking about that part of the plan where a spill might result in going into one of the drainage is that would come into the sound of Copper River. And so that's the part that we're interested in and we would like to have one of our people get up there and. Take a look at the plan. So you're not going to you're not going to claim the sag. You're not going to go way up in the slope and now we're all one and all that but you are worried about it once it potentially could reach those waters in your jurisdiction is over. Yeah we and that's the disagreement right now Alyeska feels that we have. We're not a contractor for Alyeska but we have a contract with
Alyeska that's where the majority of our funding comes from. And in that contract we have the money established to review things that affect Prince William Sound in the terminal and Alyeska saying this is outside of this jurisdiction we're saying no it isn't because if you spill it it's going to run into it and you know there's all kinds of interesting arguments on that but that's what that's what Richard's talking about and he's right I mean it was it was a bit of a controversy at our last meeting. Well Rob. You're in the hot seat again. This isn't quite as bad as 1989 but you know picnic I wouldn't think or what's going on here how come we don't have a C plan for the for the pipeline. Well we have an old one. Yeah to be clear and to use a little bit different language from what Richard did in Fairbanks but there's more than a makeshift inner plane which was his phrase or is a plan that was approved three and a half four years ago that had been developed.
After the Exxon Valdez oil spill and had gone through all the type of scrutiny and review that you would expect in that environment a couple years after the wall spill and it had led to an increase in capability in equipment training consistent with public input and what the DC and other agencies required the play in that review process were in now as we had submitted the plan as required by statute the JPFO agencies came back and said it's not complete for review purposes and required us to respond to a number of questions for detail and we have been basically committed to provide that information that JPL has recently informed us that the plan is sufficient for public review meaning that all the time so I was in the US or not and that's why Richard got to see it rightly and it has the box full of plants here. One comment about our employee was that you know we've taken his
comments and tried to address some in the review process and actually have asked him to. If I understand correctly you ask him to help us be sure that our plan. Addresses the issues that he had previously raised in terms of the public review process. I think it's good for Richard to point out that there is a review process and that any interested citizen in the state of Alaska is entitled to participate in that. We have gone to the communities along the pipeline and help public meetings to inform them of what's going on in the Joint Pipeline Office intends to do that in a more formal structured way. OK we've got time for a really brief one from Heather in sic Heather thanks for joining us on TALK OF ALASKA I can keep it to 30 seconds. I'll try. I was curious. I'd like to point out a fact that we need to have a inner kind of marketing going on and we should have had one going on this whole time so well OK let me answer that.
Heather we actually do in Prince William Sound because of the trusty council process there is a lot of active monitoring of the intertidal intertidal areas and they are showing that there's still oil out there or species are still depressed. And these nine years after the oil spill and that's a fact. Well next week on Talk of Alaska we're going to stay with oil. There is plans for some 80 miles of pipeline up there between Alpine and but Dami and pipe and pump one. And the question is What's that going to mean is that going to be done responsibly. The oil industry wants to expand on the slope that's coming up next week on Talk of Alaska. Thanks to our guests today Robert Shoaf John Devon's talk of Alaska's produced by Tim Tatton engineered by Tom Casey. Thank you all. I'm Steve Hyman. Talk of Alaska is made possible by the 30 member stations of the Alaska Public
Radio Network. This program is a production of a PR rand which is solely responsible for its content the views expressed on this program are those of the participants and are not necessarily those of a PR on this station or its underwriters. Your business organization can also help you communicate to Alaskans in more than three hundred thirty cities and villages throughout the state to find out how. Call 1 800 7 5 to 8 PR ads. Imagine living in a log cabin somewhere down the river from chicken bore up the coast from public radio can become a very good friend. Imagine tragically an entire village killed around a single radio listening to hear how their basketball team is doing at the big tournaments. No it happens all sorts of things happen because of Alaska's public radio stations. People stay connected in public broadcasting in the last minute billed in the black.
Hi this is Geo beach. You've heard me read my commentaries and stories at the end of the radio news but the most important stories I read are to children reading aloud to your children is the absolute best predictor of future academic success. Now that's good news. But most of all reading is really fun and it's just the beginning of a great story. Opening the world of books together with your children this message is sponsored by the Alaska children's trust 1 800 4 7 8 22 21. This is a PR read the Alaska Public Radio Network.
- Series
- Talk of Alaska
- Producing Organization
- KAKM
- Contributing Organization
- KAKM Alaska Public Media (Anchorage, Alaska)
- AAPB ID
- cpb-aacip/235-40ksnzrw
If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/235-40ksnzrw).
- Description
- Episode Description
- In this episode the 1989 oil spill in Cape William Sound, caused when the Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground on Bligh Reef is reviewed. The focus is on personal responsibility, the miscalculations that may have led to the spill and how future events of this nature can be prevented. Host Steve Himel discusses how, perhaps, his and other media personalities failure to grasp and report on the state of the oil industry may have led to public complacency on the issue. Rob Schoff, Vice President of Corporate Services for Alyeska Pipeline Services, discusses his role as a lobbyist in 1989 and the corporate culture at the time. John Devons, Mayor of Valdez and head of an oil industry and environmental watchdog organization, discusses regulations and contingency plans. The bickering between Alyeska Pipeline Services and environmentalists, which caused the contingency plan to be two years overdue, is also discussed.
- Series Description
- Talk of Alaska is a talk show featuring in-depth conversations with in-studio guests about local issues and questions and comments from community members who call in.
- Broadcast Date
- 1998-03-24
- Asset type
- Episode
- Topics
- Economics
- Social Issues
- History
- Business
- Local Communities
- Environment
- Public Affairs
- Energy
- Animals
- Consumer Affairs and Advocacy
- Politics and Government
- Rights
- Alaska Public Radio Network 1998
- Media type
- Sound
- Duration
- 00:59:15
- Credits
-
-
Guest: Devons, John
Guest: Schoff, Rob
Host: Himel, Steve
Producer: Taton, Tim
Producing Organization: KAKM
- AAPB Contributor Holdings
-
KAKM (Alaska Public Media)
Identifier: C-03923 (APTI)
Format: DAT
Generation: Master
Duration: 01:00:00?
If you have a copy of this asset and would like us to add it to our catalog, please contact us.
- Citations
- Chicago: “Talk of Alaska; Review of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Nine Years Later,” 1998-03-24, KAKM Alaska Public Media, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed September 9, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-235-40ksnzrw.
- MLA: “Talk of Alaska; Review of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Nine Years Later.” 1998-03-24. KAKM Alaska Public Media, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. September 9, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-235-40ksnzrw>.
- APA: Talk of Alaska; Review of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Nine Years Later. Boston, MA: KAKM Alaska Public Media, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-235-40ksnzrw