Cambridge Forum; WGBH Forum Network; Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism

Charles Sennott is the executive editor and vice president of Global Post an online international news service which he co-founded. He's an award winning journalist with a distinguished career in international reporting both in print and broadcast journalism. He's been on the frontline of wars and insurgencies in 15 countries over the past quarter century. From the jungles of Colombia to the deserts of Iraq he actually started up reporting on the Taliban. Fifteen years ago a long time foreign correspondent for The Boston Globe Senate served as the Globe's Middle East bureau chief based in Jerusalem from 1970 to 2001 and is Europe bureau chief based in London from 2001 to 2005. Among his many honors he was appointed a Neiman fellow at Harvard in 2005. Most recently he spent some months in Afghanistan. This

past summer where he produced a special report with P.R. I and the world. In titled. Life death in the Taliban. So here now is Charles Sennott. To introduce Andrew bass of hitch in our conversation tonight. Thank you. Thanks. Welcome. Welcome to Cambridge form. I'm Charles Sennott. I'm the executive editor of Global Post which is a new online news organization. Very excited about the conversation tonight and looking forward to hearing from Andrew. I want to introduce him. I've I've known Andrew for. A long time and I can't think of anyone who can provide us with more grounding. And a sense of perspective for the very

important questions we face as a country right now. Probably in the next few weeks the Obama administration will have its most consequential foreign policy decision whether or not to add more troops to Afghanistan. Andrew bass of each understands the kinds of questions that need to be asked right now. And he provides a lot of answers to those questions as well. I just want to briefly introduce you to some of the aspects of his background that helped shape his experience. Professor face of it is a U.S. military academy graduate and served in the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War. After his experience in the war he earned a Ph.D. at Princeton. He was a member of the West Point faculty before joining Boston University. He was a very early critic of the Bush doctrine and he wrote extensively against U.S. military action in Iraq and Afghanistan. His points of view are shaped

by experience but also by a very human sense of loss. Tragically on May 13th 2007 Andrew son also named Andrew 27 assigned to the 3rd Battalion 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment 1st Cavalry Division was killed in action in Iraq. That's a very private loss for Andrew and I'm not going to go into that in my questioning. And it's a it's a private realm but it's one that that really does shape a lot of the way he comes at these issues but not completely as he will share with you. Andrew's knowledge his experience is so vast and so important. It's really my great honor to introduce him. We'll hear from him for about 20 minutes and then I will share a few minutes about my reporting on the ground and then we will have a conversation so with no further ado may introduce and you basic bitch. Thank you. It

was it was a tremendously kind introduction. And I'm very grateful for the opportunity to speak to the Cambridge forum but I know that the real essence of the enterprise is the discussion and you don't want to hear me blather on for a long time. So let me hop right to what I hope will be a fairly concise presentation that may stimulate some of our discussion. History deals rudely. With the pretensions of those who presume. To determine its course in an American context. This describes the fate of those falling prey to what we might call the Wilsonian conceit. If the damage done by that conceit outlives its perpetrators from time to time in some moment of peril ranks ID a

statesman appears on the scene. Promising to eliminate tyranny to ensure the universal triumph of liberty and to achieve permanent peace. For a moment the statesmen AP achieved the status of prophet. One who knew in his own person seemingly embodies the essence of the American purpose. Then reality intrudes exposing the promises as costly fantasies. The prophet's followers abandoned him mocked and reviled. He is eventually banished. Perhaps to some gated community in Dallas. Yet however brief his ascendancy the discredited prophet leaves behind a legacy. Most obvious are the problems created and left unresolved. Commitments made and left unfulfilled debts accrued and left unpaid less obvious.

But for that reason all the more important are the changes in perception. The Prophet recasts our image of reality. Long after his departure. Remnants of that image linger and retain their capacity to beguile. Consider how the Wilsonian vision of the United States as a crusader state called upon to redeem the world. Has periodically resurfaced despite Woodrow Wilson's own manifest failure to make good on that promise. The Prophet declaims and departs traces of his testimony. However at odds with reality remain lodged in our consciousness. So it is today with Afghanistan. The conflict of George W. Bush began then ignored and finally bequeath to his successor. Barack Obama has now described this conflict as the war we must win. Bush's supporters might rightly view the prospect of

Obama pressing on in Afghanistan as a vindication of sorts. Here we have a president who's run for high office derived its energy from an implicit promise to repudiate all that Bush had wrought. Now urged to endorse the proposition that this remote landlocked primitive Central Asian country constitutes a vital U.S. national security interest. The candidate who once derided the notion that the United States is called upon to determine the fate of Iraq now considers the possibility of expending untold billions. Not to mention who knows how many American lives in order to determine the fate of Afghanistan. What is it about Afghanistan possessing next to nothing that the United States requires that justifies such lavish attention. In Washington. This question goes not only an answered but an asked

among Democrats and Republicans alike. Afghanistan's importance is simply assumed much the way 50 years ago. Otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the preservation of South Vietnam. Yet as then so too today that assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny. The fight in Afghanistan is essential to keeping America safe. We are told. The events of September 11th 2001 ostensibly occurred because we ignored. Afghanistan preventing a recurrence of those events therefore requires that we fix the place. This widely accepted line of reasoning overlooks the primary reason why the 9/11 conspiracy succeeded namely the federal state and local agencies responsible for commercial aviation security failed to

install even minimally adequate security measures. We weren't paying attention. Consumed with its ABC agenda. You remember that ABC anything but Clinton consumed with its ABC agenda. The Bush administration in those days did not have its eye on the ball. So we got sucker punched. Averting another 9/11 does not require the semi permanent permanent occupation and pacification of Afghanistan. Rather it requires the United States to erect and maintain robust defenses. Fixing Afghanistan is not only unnecessary It's also likely to prove implausible. Not for nothing as the placer acquired the nickname graveyard of empires. Of course Americans are insistent that the dominion over which they preside. Does not meet the definition of Empire events. Little interest in how others have fared in attempting to impose their will on the Afghans

as General David McKiernan the hapless and recently departed U.S. commander in Afghanistan put it quote. There is always an inclination to relate what we are doing with previous nations adding. I think that's a very unhealthy comparison. Now McKiernan was expressing a view I think it's quite common among the ranks of the political and the military elite. We're Americans. We're different. Therefore the experience of others need not apply. Of course Americans like McKiernan who reject as irrelevant the experience of others might at least be willing to contemplate the experience of the United States itself. Take the case of Iraq now bizarrely portrayed in some quarters as a success and even more bizarrely seen as offering a template for how to turn Afghanistan around 6 plus years after it began Operation Iraqi Freedom has consumed something like a trillion dollars.

With the meter still running. And has taken the lives of over four thousand three hundred American soldiers. Meanwhile in Baghdad another major Iraqi cities car bombs continue to detonate at regular intervals killing and maiming dozens. Given the embarrassing and yet indisputable fact that this was an utterly needless war no weapons of mass destruction found. No ties between Saddam Hussein and that you had established no democratic transformation of the Islamic world set in motion no road to peace in Jerusalem found in downtown Baghdad. To describe Iraq as a success. Much less as anything that should serve as a model for application elsewhere falls nothing short of being obscene. For those who despite all this still hanker to have a go at nation building Why start

with Afghanistan. Why not first fix say Mexico. In terms of its importance to the United States our southern neighbor a major supplier of both oil and drugs among other commodities deemed vital to the American way of life. Mexico outranks Afghanistan in importance to the United States by several orders of magnitude. And for those who purport to believe that moral considerations rather than self interest should inform foreign policy there to Mexico qualifies for priority attention. Consider the theft of California. Or consider more recently how the American appetite for illicit drugs in our liberal gun laws have corroded Mexican institutions and produced an epidemic of violence afflicting ordinary Mexicans. Bluntly we owe these people big time. Yet any politician or pundit suggesting that the United States ought to commit

100000 or so U.S. troops backed by a generously funded multi-year effort aimed at eliminating Mexican drug trafficking and corruption would be laughed out of Washington and rightly so. Any proposal that the United States ought to take on the task of establishing in Mexico City effective mechanisms of governance and dolling Mexico with competent security forces in reforming the Mexican school system while protecting the rights of Mexican women. Well anybody proposing that sort of notion. They'd never make it to the floor of Congress for a vote. Meanwhile those who promote such programs for Afghanistan ignoring questions of cost and ignoring as well the corruption and ineffectiveness depreciate our own institutions where those people get treated

like sages. The contrast between Washington's preoccupation with Afghanistan and its relative indifference to Mexico testifies to the distortion of U.S. national security priorities induced by George W. Bush. In his post-9 11 prophetic mode. Distortions now being perpetuated by Bush's successor. It also testifies to a vast failure of imagination to which our governing classes have succumbed. This failure of imagination makes it literally impossible for those who possess either authority or influence in Washington to consider the possibility any that the solution to America's problems is to be found not out there where they're in this case is Central Asia. But here at home. Be that the people out there rather than requiring our ministrations may well be capable of managing their own

affairs relying on their own methods and see it to disregard a and b is to open the door to great mischief. And in all likelihood to perpetrate no small amount of evil. Now needless to say that. When mischief or evil occur when a stray American bomb kills a few dozen Afghan civilians for instance or when U.S. troops are killed. As Eight work over this past weekend the cost of this failure of imagination are not borne by the people who live in the leafy neighborhoods of Northwest Washington who lunch at the Palm or the Metropolitan Club and who send their kids to Sidwell Friends. So the answer to the question of the hour what should the United States do about Afghanistan. It comes down to this. A sense of realism and a sense of proportion oblige us to take a minimalist

approach. As with or a guy. Or fi G or a St. E.O.. Or other countries where US interests are limited. The United States should undertake to secure those interests at the lowest possible cost. What might this mean in practice. General David Petraeus commander of the United States Central Command recently commented quote that the mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda or other transnational extremists. And of quote. And he went on to say that this requires us to to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks. The mission statement is a sound one. The approach to accomplishing this mission currently on offer an open ended counterinsurgency campaign is not sound. And indeed it qualifies as folly.

Denying al Qaeda safe havens has not required the United States to occupy the frontier regions of Pakistan and it should not require the United States and its allies to occupy and remake the entirety of Afghanistan. The reality is that as long as we maintain adequate defenses al Qaeda poses no more than a modest threat to U.S. national security. As for the Taliban. Unless and until they manage to establish enclaves in places like New Jersey or Miami the threat they pose to the United States will fall several notches below the threat posed by Cuba. Which is no threat at all. And as for the putatively global threat posed by violent Islamic radicalism that project will prove ultimately to be a self-defeating one. What the Islamicist have on offer. A rejection of modernity doesn't

sell. As the recent events in Iran have I think vividly demonstrated time is on our side. Not theirs. The ethos of consumption and individual autonomy will conquer the Muslim world. As surely as it conquered what was once known as Christendom. It's the wreckage that the collapse of Christendom left. In its wake. That demands our attention. If the United States today has a saving mission it is to save itself. Speaking in the midst of another endless unnecessary war back in 1067 Martin Luther King got it exactly right. When he said. Come Home America. The prophet of that era or who urged his countrymen to take on what he called the triple evils of racism economic excess economic exploitation and militarism.

Remains today the prophet. We ignore at our peril that Barack Obama. Should fail to realise this qualifies is not only ironic but inexplicable. Thank you very much for the audio. I think the. Spirit of tonight is to get right into questions. I want to take a few minutes just to introduce some of the work that I did in Afghanistan this summer to share with you what Global Post is just as a basis for us to begin our conversation together. I was a long time foreign correspondent the Boston Globe and as we all know newspapers are suffering these days. It's a great challenge to all of us who care

about getting what we call ground truth at Global Post and I'll explain what I mean by that but if you care about ground truth you need newspapers you need networks you need reporters who are on the ground with good sets of eyes. And as much background and experience as possible to share those stories with you. The Boston Globe sadly because of a lot of economic reasons has had to make some hard decisions they had to cut their entire foreign staff. They no longer have a foreign editor. They don't have any foreign correspondents the kind of work that I did for a decade for the Boston Globe doesn't happen anymore. And I know that. The editors and publisher of The Boston Globe are as sad about that as I am. But it's a reality and it's a reality at the Philadelphia Inquirer it's a reality at the Chicago Tribune it's a reality at the Miami Herald it's an increasing reality at the L.A. Times and it really hurts our democracy. So Global Post is an effort to turn the tide to try something new.

We are a fully online news organization at Global Post dot com. We have 75 foreign correspondents in 60 countries. We are a very modest start up with a large ambition which is to try to cover the world. One of the most ambitious. Reports that we've done at Global Post was this summer I went to Afghanistan predicting that this would be a fateful decision for this administration. We went with a team of writers photographers videographers and we went out to try to look at Afghanistan in all of its complexity to start over essentially to begin to unpack this story anew and I did that by going with the photographer Seamus Murphy in a team of correspondents who have a lot of experience there. I began covering the Taliban in 1905 and I went back to the same address that I first heard about the Taliban and to see where is that madrassa today. We went and talked to families a family

that Seamus Murphy a beautiful photographer has. Has documented for 15 years to understand their single family story and what it tells us about Afghanistan and its like time life time lapse photography. Watching the devastation that has occurred to this family after just just decades of war. And the loss they have suffered and now the slow beginning of coming back of growth of kids being born of hope. And one of the things I learned in my journey there going back to Afghanistan was that we can't overlook what we have accomplished there. There there have been some considerable accomplishments on the ground that we can get into in the conversation. But I just wanted to share with you that. My sense of what's going on in Afghanistan is that. We are. An empire. That doesn't want to admit it's an empire. We are going into Afghanistan. As Andrew pointed out

blind to the history that so many other empires have faced. But I also think there are institutions within Afghanistan that we need to draw on much more carefully we need to cultivate them. There are local institutions of governance and democracy that we should draw on more. And one of the questions I want to put to Andrew is how do we bring in those tribal. Regional Councils that they have in Afghanistan and make them part of that country's future and help us to open the back door on the way out. I want to invite you to go to Global Post and I want you to really see what we've done in our report life death in the Taliban and become part of that community. You get there by going to Global Post dot com. And I really want to invite you to join. So without any further discussion I want to sit down and we'll begin our conversation with Andrew and then we will open it up to questions after that. And you're good to talk with you.

I feel like I've called you at so many pivotal points in my reporting whether it was just before the war started in Afghanistan or just before the war started in Iraq. Your perspective your sense of proportionality I think and how the U.S. military should be responding to the challenges it faces is always informative and helpful. But on this one right now in Afghanistan I don't understand exactly where you're coming from. You said you believe as the Obama administration begins to weigh this fateful decision whether or not to add troops that it needs to think this through with proportionality. Can you define for us what you mean by proportionality and whether or not you think those troops that are there 68000 troops right now should pull out. OK I'll do my best. Not to push back and yes to push back a little bit at the question.

There is a tendency I think. To pose the issue as either all in or all out. That the choice either in more sort of immediate and practical concerns is either we need to give General McChrystal what he requires to implement this counterinsurgency strategy that he proposes or since that's the only practical alternative in effect what we will be doing will be to accept defeat and to accept catastrophic consequences. And I tend to resist the notion that there is only one choice. There is just McChrystal plan. And I begin my analysis and I try to suggest this and maybe to smart Aliki away in the presentation. I begin my analysis by saying what exactly are our interests there. And I mean it quite seriously when I say that it seems to me that there is this assumption

that Afghanistan is a vital national security interests. And I don't think it makes any sense at all. I know we have interests in Afghanistan but the interest is I think fairly easy to define as ensuring that the conditions that existed on 9/11 don't exist again meaning that we that authorities in Afghanistan don't turn a blind eye to or even get in bed with a violent jihad just like al Qaeda. Further I argue strongly that achieving those limited interest does not require. Remaking the country. And we need to understand very clearly that that's what the McChrystal proposal that's what counterinsurgency is all about read the McChrystal plan that was leaked to the press. Whatever it was a week or 10 days ago.

And it says in essence the key to success to success in a counterinsurgency is securing the population and securing the population is another way of saying winning the hearts and minds. And if you read the details of the plan securing the population does not simply mean protect them from harm which in and of itself would be a challenging proposition. Securing the population means to provide the people of Afghanistan with. Effective governance economic opportunity school systems that work. Police that are effective and not corrupt central government institutions in Kabul that work. In are viewed as legitimate by the people.

That is a monumental task. And again I don't think we have to accomplish that task. To achieve our own interest. Further it's not clear to me that we possess the wisdom to accomplish that task. You know I wrote a piece I think it was in The Washington Post a week ago. And the argument I was trying to make was look I'm not enough I'm not a not a specialist on Islam but my understanding is that one of the defining aspects of Islam is the conviction that politics and religion occupy the same realm. God is not divorced from. Politics. God is at the center of politics. I'm not standing in judgment of that view but I would point out that it is very much at odds

with. The tradition in the West generally and in this country we believe and from our point of view we believe it with good reason that religion and politics operate separate spheres. How then in undertaking this enormous project of of bringing Afghanistan to the point where it is a functioning nation state. Are we going to reconcile that fundamental difference between us and them. Are we willing to argue that. God is central to politics. I don't know how we're going to do that. Moreover. How much is it going to cost. Where is the money going to come from. Who's going to pay me in an hour ago I was

on The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer. Because it was pre-taped and I was on with this guy General Jack Keane this retired four star general who's a big proponent of counterinsurgency and the end of the point I kept asking him trying to asking through Larry was. Come clean with the costs of what you are proposing. And I mean you can tell me it's going to take five years not six. I mean you can tell me it's going to take 450 billion dollars not 500. I mean you can tell me it's going to take a thousand American dead versus fifteen hundred. But come clean and acknowledge that the duration of the project is enormous and the bill is going to be huge. We've already spent a trillion dollars in Iraq. Congress I believe is currently considering a defense bill. Which will appropriate or authorize one hundred twenty five billion dollars

for the next year's operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. How many hundreds of billions of dollars are we willing to pay for Afghanistan. And again where is the money going to come from. The fiscal year that just ended if I'm not mistaken the federal deficit was one point eight trillion dollars. The Congressional Budget Office projects trillion dollar deficits for the next decade. Who's going to pay that bill. I mean we the United States government does have I don't I don't personally think for a second that moral obligations weigh very heavily in the way policy gets made. But I would argue strongly that there are moral obligations in the primary moral obligation of those who govern in Washington is to the American people. The oath they take is to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.

The preamble of the Constitution says that the purpose of this union is to secure the Blessings of Liberty for the American people and for our posterity. We don't do that. If we bankrupt the country in pursuit of military expeditions that are other then absolutely necessary. So it seems to me that there are a whole host of contradictions or things that people conveniently overlook in this regard. And final point since I've gone away too long. Final point there are plausible alternatives to achieving our limited interests. Now we don't have to stay there and build a new nation for the next five years. One plausible alternative. It was now being called the counterterrorism option. And the counterterrorism option says establish a system of comprehensive surveillance over the entire country. I'm not

suggesting that's a small task. I'm not suggesting that that won't cost money. A comprehensive system of surveillance over Afghanistan and as intelligence identifies al Qaeda presence al-Qaeda activity al-Qaeda plots. We act either to disrupt or to destroy that activity. That's not going to convert Afghanistan into a liberal democracy. Which again I don't think we have the capability of doing that could plausibility prevent another 9/11 which is what we ought to be doing. Me ask you to. Unpack a much simpler question and I'm going to ask you to do it in numbers that are precise and I'm going to say fair enough if my question was is it 68000 or more or nothing. That's not a refined question. But we do have 68000 troops in there now. We do have a presence in a country from which our

country from which the attack on our country was planned and orchestrated. It's not Fiji it's Afghanistan and there are 40 million Pashtuns in the belt between Pakistan and Afghanistan the do from my reporting on the ground pose a significant peril to our country. If they are allowed to regroup if al Qaeda is allowed to regroup if certain elements of the Taliban are allowed to regroup. I don't think you're arguing a full out immediate withdrawal but I want to know what you are putting forward as proportionate. Would it be the troops we have now would it be less than that. Would it be a gradual drawdown give us as precisely and as quickly as you can your sense of that troop proportionality from your point of view it would be far fewer. I mean again. Yeah probably. But but I would emphasize that.

Political authorities establish the mission and political authorities go to the to their senior commanders and say OK tell me how to get this done. I mean I would go to General McChrystal and say this is your mission your mission has changed. Now please take another six weeks and tell me how to get it done. I would anticipate that he would say that a day a mission that emphasize that prioritize counter-terror. Would require far far fewer U.S. troops on the ground now. Counterterror isn't the only solution. Should we try to build up Afghan security forces. Sure absolutely. And that requires. Ten thousand numbers I'm guessing people on the ground in order to do that. There's no question about it. I'm not advocating anything that looks like. So called cut and run. And I'm not advocating ignoring Afghanistan. I'm advocating changing our posture so it's in consonance with the interests and you and I I think disagree sharply on how great those interests are.

I think we do I think I think where we do agree is on the need for clarity of mission. And one of the things that I saw on the ground in talking both with the Afghan government the U.S. government Afghan soldiers and police American soldiers and just people Afghan people is a sense of complete confusion about what is our mission there. If you were advising the Obama administration right now if you could be brought inside the conversations that are occurring as they begin to shape this policy and the president the United States turn to you and said I'd like for you to tell me what you think. Is a mission that we can achieve and that is important to achieve in Afghanistan what is it. Have in place the capacity to prevent al Qaeda from transforming Afghanistan once again into a sanctuary from which it could mount attacks. The striking that General Jones on whatever TV program he was on

yesterday said that there are in fact today very few members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. I mean in a sense if that's true I have no reason to doubt that that's true. For all practical purposes the basic mission has been accomplished. What we need to do is to set in place the mechanisms to ensure that that achievement is extended over time and again from my point of view. That doesn't require nation building. OK. I want to also just ask you about. Afghanistan as a culture is a very sophisticated culture I've heard you describe it as primitive primitive country in terms of its levels of economic development through a very sophisticated country though in terms of its culture its history its traditions its literary traditions its art traditions and even I would argue its traditions of governance and its tradition of resisting empires.

It would do just out of curiosity how would you describe the tradition of governance as you reported on. I think that it is a participatory democracy that is defined locally on a tribal basis. And I think its not drawn upon enough by the United States government in trying to effect the change it wants to effect within Afghanistan. Instead we end up imposing a system that doesn't really function within Afghanistan. And there are people who do work in NGOs and work very hard without much success to convince the American government to pay more attention to those structures as they exist right now. I want to ask you about the election. And I wanted to ask you about Karzai and the widespread allegations of fraud and really confirmed cases of fraud I think we have to say at this point there seems to be very little dispute that there isn't as many as a million votes that were fraudulent. And I saw by one estimate approximately 900000 of those votes went for Karzai. If you took those votes off the table it's pretty clear there would be a runoff

election with Abdullah Abdullah the former foreign minister. Is it your sense. That the Obama administration first of all is it going to accept the results of this election. And second of all and it it looks like it will if it does. How much will that complicate the situation on the ground to have. A leader of a country who is elected in a very questionable election. Even if we're going to hope to carry out the mission as you define it with the troop levels where you would place it. Well my reading of the just with the reporting is that yes this the administration is going to accept the outcome of the election because not not because they believe the election was legit but because the consequences of. Declaring it invalid are more than the administration is willing to stomach at this point. I think it's an enormously consequential issue here

and frankly it reinforces my view that the counterinsurgency strategy is a dubious proposition. How can we build a nation when at the very. Core. Of the political establishment is this corrupt. And ineffective and illegitimate governing mechanism. I mean we chose Karzai and for a good period of time it appeared to us that he was going to be the George Washington of a new Afghanistan. Not not to not to engage in the typically flip Vietnam analogy but it does appear that he's a bit more like President ZM than he is like President Washington that poses a huge.

Additional barrier to the successful implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy. I think we'll go to questions in just a minute so I'm going to ask those of you who do have questions to begin to prepare them and maybe come up to the microphones while I ask one more final question and the question I guess I really wanted to get into was just it seems. As if. What you are proposing is a is a much more reduced mission a much more clear mission. But I also. Want to get into the point of disagreement that we have which is does Pakistan and Afghanistan in the Pashtun belt pose a threat. To our country. Is there enough resentment on the part of the United States for abandoning Afghanistan after the long hard fight that we supported on so many levels for them against the Soviet Union which they won. And

then we almost immediately forgot about them and abandon the country. Now we also abandon Pakistan and that we abandon both Pakistan and Afghanistan and the ceding resentment that you you can feel and touch almost in Afghanistan is right there and it's in Pakistan. The militant Islamic movements that I've heard come out of that region the violence they have already perpetrated the intent to harm the United States it seems very clear to me. I wonder how it is possible that you wouldn't see that threat or or perhaps maybe not in the sense that I see it but give us a sense of what you think that threat is and how best we counter it right. I mean there is a I would want to urge that we distinguish between intentions and capabilities. There's no doubt in my mind that this seething hatred directed towards the United States exists. On a very large scale. Why it exists is a complicated question.

But we cannot deny that. A partial. Answer to the question is the policies pursued by the United States of America and the greater Middle East over the past 50 years. And I think it's important for us to acknowledge that because it kind of again gets back to what is it we think we can accomplish. I mean were you a citizen of Pakistan today. How seriously would you take professions from U.S. government officials that we are devoted to the well-being of the Pakistani people and we're here for the long run you can count on us. If I were a Pakistani I wouldn't believe that for a second. And yet the presumption that we can bring them around informs the notion of this global war on terror in which we are going to persuade the people of the

Muslim world to like us. I think it is several bridges too far. What do you do when the target continues to shrink even as the force expands. OK. I'd like to just remind the radio audience that you're listening to Cambridge forum and we're discussing Afghanistan revisited with Andrew bass of it and I'm Charles Sennott of Global Post. Andrew do you want to take that question. Erect and maintain robust defenses. Again the argument here is not that al-Qaeda poses no threat. My argument would be that it poses. A limited threat. And if we keep the door locked then they're not going to get in. We are the United States of America and they are a few hundred people. Armed with an AK 47 ZX hidden in caves

in Afghanistan and mostly in Pakistan. We need not live in fear. We simply need to defend ourselves and then to try to behave as wisely as we possibly can in order to advance our interests and maybe a little bit on the margins actually advance the interests of the globe in a in an ending war is not the way to get that done. Thank you I think. Thank you. Just to follow up on that a bit I find myself nodding my head with you every time when you talk about proportionality in the threat we face and I agree with that. At the same time we have the case of this this guy Zazi the airport shuttle bus driver from Denver who was arrested gathering up chemicals from beauty supply shops to use in a bombing which sounds like a ridiculous plot and you could on the one

hand say it may embody al-Qaeda on the run fractured broken desperate but on the other hand having covered so many bombings like the Madrid bombing. The London subway bombings the first World Trade Center bombing which was really a ragtag operation. It doesn't take much for them to pull off something horrific that can kill a lot of innocent people and I don't know that we see when I Charlie when I say erect and maintain robust defenses. I really mean robust. I mean to take very seriously in terms of intelligence capabilities praise capabilities I mean rather than spend a trillion dollars on Iraq now spend 500 billion dollars on the FBI and the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration and so on. So the attacks that have recently been been going on across the globe in Indonesia for example there was a

very interesting sort of surgical strike on an al Qaeda influenced leader there or the ones in Yemen Somalia. That's the kind of strike you think we should be doing that's the kind of approach to al Qaeda sure an operation that happened I guess is now two weeks ago in Somalia you know where we I don't remember the. Guys name but basically it was a helo borne raid. They killed them. They snatched him they took him out at least from the newspaper reporting we did not killed any noncombatants in the course of that operation which means therefore at least in an operation we avoided the problem of alienating the population and recruiting more Jihad us. So your question I have a question for a little more clarity about how you see the relation between rail politique and moral arguments. So I understand from reading your book and hearing some talks which I very much appreciate that you have the sense of tragic limitations on the one hand and hubris on the

other. You know society is a dense fabric of desire and limitation so we should not be doing these things because we cant do them. But suppose for the sake of argument and this may not be worth addressing and you could say why not. But suppose we had the power to rebuild these we suppose we could really realize these will sunny and ambitions should weigh and will at what point does the moral argument come in as the moral arc. Because we usually think of moral arguments as at least tugging against self-interest. You seem to have found a position where you have a kind of a happy pre-established harmony between what is morally required and what is in our interest and I'm wondering if they were contingently to tug apart would you think that we should not be pursuing a Wilsonian program even if we could. Or how do you see that relation between realpolitik and and you know you talked about the just war tradition for example. Is that just sort of a happy accident that it goes along with with with real

politic. Or how do you see it. If we had the capability to save the world. Should we try to save the world. Heck yes. Save the world means save the world means potentially invade other countries impose our way of life on them. You know when you talk about a tragic sense of women I wonder I don't think I don't think imposing our way of life would be saving the world. I mean I guess and maybe that is not the way to reprice I mean I. It in my book I tried to make the argument that. To my mind the reigning conception of freedom in American society is false and that makes it that much more absurd I think that we should portray the American mission as freeing others bringing

freedom to societies in which there is no freedom. I would like to see us far more conscious of our own sins and to attend to them. First I try to be clear that that doesn't mean that we can simply turn our backs to all of the evil in the world that there are instances of such horrendous evil where I think we are obliged to act lest we simply. Can see the world to be taken over by darkness and the classic example in our recent history I think is the is the is the Rwanda. Case. You know there we could have acted not to save Rwanda not to give democracy to Rwandans but it seems pretty clear we could have acted in order to put an end to a horrendous slaughter.

And I believe we should have done so. I don't think we could have made Rwanda into a garden spot however. Your question sir Professor bits of it first I have a comment and a question which I hope is allowed you you mention in connection with Iraq that we suffered the tragic loss of forty eight hundred of our military people and I agree that is a tragedy and that we spent a trillion dollars. But you didn't mention the cost to Iraq which I believe was immensely greater than the cost of the United States. It seems to me that's a moral issue that that if you had stated it would strengthen your position. I concur with what everything you just said. OK thank you. Now my question really has more to do with what the government of asked Afghanistan or asked us to do or permitted us to do when we first went in I don't remember whether they said it was OK to come in it was different from Iraq because in Iraq we overthrew the government a maid that was our major one of our major goals but what what was true in Afghanistan and what

did that. Along the same lines what do the people want if if we if we can tell. Well Charlie I'll talk for the people. But in terms of the start point it was in a sense analogous to Iraq we invaded in order to overthrow a government the government was the Taliban. We foraged partnerships most famously with the so-called Northern Alliance to enlist Afghans to assist us in overthrowing the Taliban. So and at that point then we presided over a process to begin to create what the kernel of a new government and virtually the first step was to install Mr. Karzai as the as the as the leader of this new entity. I think that the idea of me trying to answer for the people is pretty pretty outrageous but I will share with you what I heard very often in villages in very

rural areas in Afghanistan in my years of reporting there. And that is I think people want security. I mean I think the greatest desire of the Afghan people is to live a secure life. It's a country brutalized by decades of war. And what they want more than anything is to move forward as a society in a safe environment where their children can grow up and prosper. It's pretty basic simple simple need. The thing that I think the American troops don't get is they will get that security from whoever they believe can deliver it for them. That is how the Taliban rose to power. The Taliban came out of the madrassas in the mid 1990s to counter veil the the warlords many of whom are now our allies who were so brutal so violent who were bombing Kabul night and day who were sure doing shakedown rackets on the roads who were creating an environment in which people couldn't do trade they couldn't live

with any security any sense of life. And the Taliban emerged and I remember vividly speaking with then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright about how much the Clinton administration supported the Taliban because it was an honest alternative to the corrupt and brutal warlords. Now people see U.S. troops on the ground. They see them driving at 120 miles an hour right through little villages because they're afraid. But they also see them not interacting with that community. They feel they are creating a sense of insecurity not the security they claim to want to provide. And I think it shouldn't surprise the military those who understand the place that those same villages will turn to the Taliban if they think they're the ones who will give them the security. That's just a reality on the ground that I've I've seen and been puzzled to see that. You can find a brilliant military strategist like General Petraeus who can understand that intellectually.

But I haven't seen that understood very well in the very complex small ways you need to understand it on the ground. Thank you. OK this is another question I just want to say the questions have been great and they have been precise and to the point I just want to keep that flowing so no way I'm going to ask really Ramli. Thank you both for coming. Professor basements Could you describe the extent of our relationship the U.S. government's relationship with bin Laden during the time when he was there fighting the Russian occupation. This is not something that I know a lot about. I would simply say that the policy of the United States was to support the people we were calling Dean as we called freedom fighters I guess. Anybody who was willing to take up arms against the Soviet army in Afghanistan without I think asking very many questions about what these people stood for

or what they aspired to achieve beyond ject in the Soviet army from Afghanistan. So I don't know of any particular relationship with with Osama bin Laden. I might try it just to help a little bit on that question. I have covered this story really since the first World Trade Center bombing in 1903. And I just want to share with us a little bit of a reporting journey in 1903. I was a police reporter. I was in lower Manhattan and heard a loud bang. A crime happened. It was an attempt to bomb the World Trade Center. That crime reporting led me to follow the suspects. This is what we did at the New York Daily News. It was a police beat and I love the fact that my reporting on what became what was really nascent al Qaeda and none of us saw it at that point not the FBI not the CIA not definitely not me as a reporter. So I don't say this in any sense of precedence.

But I had a great city editor who sent me to Egypt and then he sent me to the West Bank and then he said once you go to the Sudan since two of the taxi drivers are from there and when I went there in 1903 there was an Islamic conference. And there was a man in white robes there who everyone referred to as the Amir. A few days later I am looking at a small This is pre-Google if you can imagine that. And we used to print out clips and I had a tiny little newspaper clip written by Walter Pincus of The Washington Post that ran like on page 50 a tiny little thing about the World Trade Center bombing and it said There's a man known as Osama bin Laden a Saudi a scion of the Saudi construction magnate family the bin Laden family who may be responsible as a financier for the World Trade Center bombing. But the CIA that sources I have say that's impossible because he was fighting with the United States in Afghanistan against the Soviets

and was known as the leader of a battalion and was referred to as the emir. So I'm thinkin that guy the Amir was that him you know and so that all I knew was like a six foot two guy and with a long route you have to remember this is before all of that. Very interesting small intersection of history that yes that was bin Laden who I saw at the Islamic Conference. Those were Egyptians who surrounded him. His bodyguards at that point presumably Zawahiri was there they had they had. Just you know sort of gathered at this point and this was my timings a tiny bit off because I went in 93 to the Sudan where he was then. So he's in the Sudan at that point he comes over to Afghanistan then as we know in 1906 with Zawahiri when he gets kicked out of the Sudan. That long tangled connection of bin Laden to the forces that were fighting with the Mujahideen against the Soviet Union it's it's very

real it's very rich. You can find 100 fighters who remember him you know who are now part of the quote Northern Alliance who are part of the different aspects of the Mujahideen that are now in power. And they're dismissive of him that he wasn't a real fighter they understand fighting but he was a financier and one of the most revealing explanations I've ever heard of the Taliban's connection to bin Laden. Was a description by a Taliban former Taliban leader of the now deposed Taliban government said you don't understand. We were desperate. The United States had abandoned us. We had come to power over the warlords. And along came this man who offered a leveraged buyout. Of the government of the time that I think is so interesting I think it puts in perspective how bin Laden made his connection with the Taliban. It was purely financial. It was of course philosophical and theological. But what it really came down to was he had some money and

they needed it. So I hope that it answers a lot. OK next question. This this question gets that money too. I'm making and ridiculously so oversimplified but I think somewhat hopeful analogy between Scotland 250 years ago and I'd rather talk about western Pakistan. So if we can call it that in our minds but we all know the region we're talking about anyway Scotland used to have tribes that fought each other a lot and they also had fun specially specially in the eastern part of Scotland they'd run over the border on mass and. Terrorized the English and steal things and then they stop doing that and they stop doing that at a particular point in time which is when Scotland began to industrialize and they industrialized with investment money from England and literally there are letters where a Laird says no I'm not coming I've got you know they give me money I have this factory. Things are great. So we

I think the audience knows about social enterprise and micro finance. And my question about that region is if if either of you have an opinion about and invest in an investment fund that the U.S. would create and people that it would send Who who would begin to grow a stake in individual ism and libertarianism and then making money among people in those regions perhaps working with tribes. So I'm just thinking of Mel Gibson reimagining Braveheart and it's sort of posh Yeah. Yeah. Yes that's exactly Vertu it right. Thanks but no I think it's I think I think there is. There's a question there about the history of insurgencies how they arise whether it's Scotland or it's or it's the Afghanistan Pakistan border. There are always economic underlying factors that create insurgencies. I think you would you would agree Andrew and I wonder if you have anything new to add to what in

this case how did that play out. Well I mean I think it's a question of when. When and how does modernization happen. And are there cases where an outside force. Culturally different can intrude into an underdeveloped society and assuming lots of resources and the best will in the world make things bloom. It's a good example right now Vietnam in the last decade to decade as well. That's foreign investment that's you know made industrialized to a large extent. Well on that point I guess I would argue that foreign investment works in Vietnam

because the Vietnamese have themselves undergone a journey in which they are increasingly recognizing the benefits of the market as an engine of economic growth. And I suspect even though I have been to Vietnam since 1971 that that is reflected to some degree in changes in the aspirations of individual Vietnamese who maybe want to get rich and I don't think that in Vietnam or in China or in India or in South Korea or Taiwan. That those. Creation of those conditions those prerequisites for economic development. Were imposed by the outside. In other words Heck yes. Once modernity gains hold in the Islamic world over time the

jihadist threat is likely to subside. And anything we can do to sort of nudge things in that direction we ought to do. But I would be very skeptical that somehow a great big program created in Washington D.C. supervised by a bunch of bureaucrats could somehow descend on Egypt and make Egypt different. OK next question. Thank you. And by the way since you were in Vietnam I think it's that the number is that since 1975 when the last helicopter left over half the population alive now have been born since that day. So it's an incredibly young and vibrant country. I come from a career in NGO work and that's the where my question comes from right now I appreciate both of your

extreme experience and insights that you bring to this issue but I want to talk for a moment not about nation building but more more on building what you were just saying and that is how and what do you what do you two think is going on in the Obama administration now besides the military strategy question. For example what kind of programs some of which actually happened under the Bush administration surprise of surprises. I have a 47 year old son who went to Afghanistan six years ago to work with an NGO called shelter for life. And he's now has his own NGO that's doing small scale humanitarian work. And it's a very small scale he's building a bridge he's building a TB hospital he's building he's training nurse midwives and building an operating room for the nurse midwives Association up in Masoud

area in the northern to Caer province Taloqan. Do either of you have any thoughts or information about the Obama's administration's plans for offering that kind of humanitarian aid as well as what ever again is specifically through NGOs. Yes it's a huge river of tax dollars that is flowing into Afghanistan and funding an NGO industry that is quite considerable as a as a as a sort of business sector in Afghanistan and we're talking about billions of dollars going into the NGOs. One of the stories that we recently wrote in the special report we did life death in the Taliban was by our correspondent in Kabul. Jean MacKenzie who is an amazing correspondent what she found out was the big NGOs are dealing with these hundred million dollar contracts. And there are no accountants to really watch the dollars or where they

go. And there's an effort to partner with local subcontractors of a well-intentioned effort to try to give Afghan businessmen and business women a sense mostly businessmen a sense of partnership. But the problem is those contracts as Jean found out are paying protection money to the Taliban. So. You know I was recently at the funeral for Genaro Angelo in the north and my office Global Post Offices are very near there. And I just happened to be walking by on the day of the funeral for you know in July and I thought the former head of organized crime in Massachusetts would be rolling over in his grave because the Taliban gets 20 percent and he was only getting 10 percent. All these years. And the Taliban is organized crime and it's a good healthy way to look at it I think. Remember I started on this story as a

cop reporter. I still think a lot of understanding the Taliban is to understand it. Like many count many many insurgency movements there's a criminal element that funds it. And sadly the NGOs prey on it but I want to thank you for your son's service. We say this to military families a lot but this is a huge service on the part of your son. Particularly for working with a small NGO because those are the NGOs from from what I hear on the ground and from what I hear even from USA idea officials is it's the smaller contracts the smaller NGOs that can really. Account for what they're doing and actually do quite good work so it's a it's a huge scale in which the NGOs are being funded. But it's often these these smaller approaches like the one your son has been involved in that can have great successes so I hope that sheds some light. Did you have anything you want to add there and your next question. Yeah Mr. Sunit you yes referred earlier to

the existence in Afghanistan of longstanding and sophisticated political structures. Based on tribal and ethnic lines. And I think that's an important point to make but I think it begs a larger question and that's what the what's the tradition within Afghanistan of having a coherent and effective central government. And I think the answer to that question is a resounding No but there is no your addition of that and doesn't that in itself argue against them McChrystal plan. That's a great question and I think Andrew will have a lot to answer that but I'll start and then maybe you could jump in because this is such an important point. One of the one of the organizing bodies that I'm speaking of actually is the loya jirga which we remember was the body that brought Karzai to power essentially I mean we may have picked him but it

was it was it was the loya jirga that confirmed the appointment. I'm wondering in this period of crisis in the aftermath of a clearly fraudulent election what are the local institutions and forums in which decisions could be made on how to proceed. The Loya Jirga is one that I'd like to hear more Afghanis talk about. I'd like to know from the Afghan perspective is that something that the Afghan people think could be a way for them to resolve what will be a wildly disputed election which won't allow Karzai to govern at all. He's had a very difficult time as you point out because central governments have always had a hard time in Afghanistan or not always for most of its history the vast majority its history there are notable exceptions that are that are often overlooked. But I do think you raise a very important point I think this election will weaken him even further. Well I think and I'm no absolutely not an

expert in the history the political traditions of Afghanistan but it does seem to me that that tradition is one of decentralization in which real clout is exercised by these chieftains or warlords whatever we wish to call them. And that again in searching for ways to achieve our limited interests. Most efficiently and effectively. I think it's worth exploring whether we can contract out governance to the warlords. To some degree the analogy here I think is to the so-called surge in Iraq. I think we know now that a key component of the surge was paying Sunni insurgent leaders to put down their arms and make common cause with the United States. So I wonder if it would not be possible for us selectively to provide similar incentives to some

of these warlords and get them to carry our water to some degree. The next question I should say we have a few minutes left. There are about four or five minutes so maybe if if I could propose that we sort of ask real quick questions and we'll try to get to all three of these remaining questions and we'll try to do rapid fire answer so sir. OK I'll try to be brief. To get us out of Afghanistan. Isn't it really important to understand why we're there. I mean I'm concerned with the with Professor base which is analysis that we're there because of Wilsonian idealism. Isn't it isn't it really true that there are some Americans that have an interest in in controlling the greater Middle East isn't it. Isn't it about oil. Isn't it about empire isn't. Don't we have 700 military bases throughout the world don't we need to blow up these weapons from time to time in order to get contracts to build new ones and finally don't we need a radiological opponent to mobilize our population

behind all this policy. Communism out terrorism n.. OK and the Bush administration advertised its purposes as Wilsonian but their true purpose is in my judgment were more accurately classified as Imperial. OK very short question. Yes thank you. I had hoped to ask this question in person but I want to take any more time on the theme of the questions going to all different and I think that the answer won't take very long. I did a couple tours in Iraq in 0 5 0 6 and 0 7 0 8 and I came away from a very disillusioned feeling that we did more harm than good. I was an honored first and we both times were slated to go to Afghanistan and happening. And lately I've been out for about six months and I really can't get it off my mind. I was kind of a bit of an idealist before and during my enlistment and it was very tough to become disillusioned Iraq and I know you've kind of

covered it and summarized it already and it might kind of be rhetorical Ference But basically you're second to none in your expertise of understanding. American history and for me you know if I knew if I could understand or see some truth that way we would not be making the world a better place or be help or. Be helping people by continuing the current strategy over there because I wouldn't be going S.F. I'd still be in Light Infantry. And B would we truly be making America a safer place or a less safe place. And yours and others answers those questions are going to greatly affect my decision. I'm very interested in kind of overall if you could kind of give me your opinions I know you already have already but well I don't and I don't know what I can say I mean my I believe that service to country is an honorable calling and that the honor that accrues to you in serving your country is quite independent

of the policies that the country is pursuing. You have no say in those policies. It's not your job as a soldier. It's partly your job as a citizen. It's not your job to decide what the policies are. So. I in my own life. I try to cling to the conviction that if I did my best that that's good enough and that I should not get hung up on. Any thing that any lies that Lyndon's Lyndon Johnson told or that Robert McNamara told. I did my best. I assume you did your best and I think that's enough. If I could just follow up very briefly I guess I would just ask your opinion honestly if you believe that if we continue with the current strategy in the the troop expansion if we will if you believe we will succeed

or if you believe that we will make it the way I believe that is I believe that if we execute the McChrystal strategy that we will fail and we will fail at enormous cost to this country in terms of of lives and of treasures. That's why I oppose that. That project. Thank you. Thanks that's an excellent question. Last question. Yeah this is a comment and then a question. Professor Bass of it you at the beginning when you referred to the events of 9/11 I noticed that you used a politically incorrect term you used conspiracy. So I was wondering exactly what you meant by that because it's a term which is not supposed to be used even if you're applying it to the official government conspiracy theory as promulgated by the 9/11 Commission. I got I also got the impression that you thought it might have been the events

of that day were the result of the the U.S. military sort of being caught with his pants down. They weren't ready not only the military but the whole billion dollar defense and security apparatus of the United States on that one day simply had a major failure. Well you know the national security apparatus failed on September 11th but had the attack happened on September 10th that would have failed then too. Because the national security apparatus was not focused on the task of defending Manhattan and Washington D.C. as it should have. I didn't know that the term conspiracy was politically incorrect. I do believe that there were conspirators within this organization called al Qaeda that put together that operation and alas executed it quite successfully. Thank you. I want to thank you.

The press surrender base which thinks this evening is fine thank you very much. Thank you all for coming. I.