War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Kenneth Adelman, 1987

Going back just before the administration comes to power you know they know they're going to get elected no transition teams are formulating policy. Can you tell us about kind of the overall stand the administration wanted to take in terms of its strategic forces. So who's quite clear during the transition period that the administration the new administration the new team wanted to restore America's strength and credibility and determination. There was a feeling widespread among all of us including the president elect Reagan that America had any emanated a vision of weakness around the world partially because the Iran hostage situation. Partially because our defenses had been in decline partially because we had a salty treaty. Not many of us thought it was any good and that we wanted to really get on a path toward strength. I remember quite clearly meeting with the president elect and a group under Bill Casey's sponsorship during the entire interim period from the election to the inauguration and having this quite

clearly the message of the group. And accused would you characterize the restorations attitude with the Soviet Union in that early period in the early period the administration felt don't trust them and they lie cheat and steal on most everything around the world that the pattern of Soviet behavior had been clear for 70 years in the pattern was one of repression at home and aggression overseas. A lot of the administration used them when the Present Danger was significant was that this group of people came together the committee on the present danger came together in 1077 right about the same time as the Carter election though it it was starting to be discussed before the election and it was decided to be established regardless of who won so it wasn't just an outgrowth of the Carter presidency. It was mostly Democrats. It was all hardliners and people who felt that

somehow America was slipping and sliding around in foreign affairs was not on a determined path. It was also in part to rebut the idea that Vietnam from the Vietnam era the strong military leads us into danger. Our belief in the committee on the present danger was that a strong military keeps us out of danger. Do you characterize the people you use ideologically the arch conservative conservatives who are going to be the labels I think are badly misused by the press if I may say so. There are conservatives but there are no liberals anymore. The president even call you Senator Cranston or our Senator Pell a liberal. They're hard liners but they're no soft liners I've never seen anybody in the press use the term soft liner to describe a state Senator Tsongas or Senator Kennedy.

There's ideologues that are always on the right they're no ideologues on the left anymore I think it's a real terrible press distortion. What would you call a man with a president with a sensuous within. They were it was a group of people that came in with the president. We're not mushy centrists if you're talking about centrist being kind of moderate Republicans or more conservative Democrats than there are believe all things on all sides of all the issues. There was a group that decided a few years ago that America was slipping and sliding as lost its footing lost its bearings in foreign affairs because it had bought on to the belief that somehow these problems were all global somehow pollution control was more important to mankind then stemming Soviet aggression and somehow we had so much more in common in common with communists than we had to disagree with them about that.

It's all one big wonderful world and all we needed was a hootenanny and across arms and to sway together and singing ballots and somehow the problems of the world would go away. We didn't believe any of that nonsense. Your confirmation hearing is one of the first confrontations between war has been more than one of the most dramatic confrontation in the ministration of your confirmation what if you could tell us a little bit of the story of the information here. Well the count let me them certainly they can say first when you first get the call to take this position and you know how it works. I got the call to take the position of director of the Arms Control Agency. And January 12th I remember the morning very well. Nothing was happening at the U.N. I was having lunch with James chace of the Council on Foreign Relations or breakfast or exit West. And didn't get back to the office till about 10:30 in the morning. I had signs all around the office called Judge Clark who is the National Security

Advisor immediately emergency. I thought either we had pulled out of the UN or we were at conflict. Nothing could evoke those kind of messages except one of those two things. It was neither of those. He started talking about the position of ACTA. I said thank you very much Judge Clark. But Gene Rostow who was then director of the Arms Control Agency had asked me to consider his being his deputy at the beginning of the administration and I was very happy where I was then there and then there at the UN. Judge Clark says I can. I'm not talking to you about deputy. I'm talking to you about director of the Arms Control Agency. And I said oh my god. He says what's wrong. And I said I just don't think it would be a easy kind of confirmation it would be the age factor I was only 36. I was known to be a conservative hard liner in the administration and before that time in them.

Reagan's Arms Control Policy was controversial enough without infusing these considerations. I explain why I think why I thought then that other choices would be better than this one and I would urge Judge Clark to consider those and talk to the president about that. Clark heard me out and he said I understand your personal position but to tell you the truth that's not the question. The question is will you take the job or will you not. Because the president would like you to do it and he'd like to announce it in two hours time. I say if that's the question the answer is of course yes. But let me tell you why that should be the question. He says thank you very much Ken. It will be announced in two hours time. And there we were. It was you were going to do it. Do you consider yourself would you. Yes. Does that mean. That means you I feel speak for myself that the Soviet Union poses the greatest threat to the United States of America and to our values

of any country in the world that opposes one of the greatest threats we've ever had in our country. And that even though Gorbachev may look good and speak different words at the policies in the direction of the Soviet Union doesn't help us at all in the world. It's diametrically opposed on most everything to what we believe in. Thanks Lee get back to the commission. So you were not surprised. I think one of the hearings that you and position we surprised at the extent are really you know I was surprised by some of the things of the hearings. First of all it was interesting to note that during the first days hearing which is quite extensive none of the news reports from the printed media that sat there all day had the story that he doesn't know the subject very well zero printed media had that there was a television report once it got on to television. The same people who watch the hearings all day begin to write that even though they did not write that before their

broadcast. Interesting lesson in journalism. Secondly I did not know that the confirmation hearing would get involved with my collection of African art with Ed around these suggestions on personnel in the Arms Control Agency with the president's attending Larry pressers birthday party with all kinds of issues that were nothing short of crazy. It became a symbol of the administration. Well as a symbol on both sides. Did you press reports had you read extensively in your first hearing your second is that you know that the briefing was not on substance. Because if anything I made a mistake in the first hearing mistake in the first hearing was being too substantive on these issues. I should have the moated more and had fewer substantive comments because none of the questions had do with U.S. positions in stark terror and I an F in any of the arms control positions they all had to do with emoting about

how I abhor nuclear war. Now I don't know maybe it's my academic training. I don't believe you can make a coherent argument. The Nuclear war is good for you. I think it's crazy to think that any kind of a nuclear war would be anything short of total and utter disaster. So I thought it was a silly kind of thing to emote about but quite obviously all the senators wanted to emote about that issue and not to learn anything much about the arms control proposals. That was a misjudgment on my part. I should've canned all the substance done of few routines of acting and how I abhorred nuclear war in a way that I think is goofy but anyway would have been effective and would have been a tremendous success the senators were to carry me off in their shoulder toward the Senate floor for confirmation. Well in essence you were very different the second hearing at least I think so. I am owed it. I am owed it. Two things happened one on the second hearing

I am moated about how a nuclear war would be bad for me and my children and get into all that schmaltz. And secondly Senator Tsongas realized he had no issue there because he couldn't get that much support. He could not get a grassroots movement going about the confirmation in fact no one gave a hoot and holler out there in the countryside. And so that it was going to flop and so he might as well take retreat gracefully. One of the issues that came up was this article with him or a letter in there where you describe are you ready. Arms control negotiations are shams. But I want to ask them with serious question about that because there was a sense I think in the first two or three years of the administration that there was not an interest in negotiations of any. There was interest in building a military strain. Possibly because if you like when you first of all I don't believe anybody in the early part of this administration or any ministration I've been a

part of and I've been in government for 12 years has advocated getting in a war and winning it. If you get in a war you better well win it that's for sure. But the idea that isn't appealing to build up so that you can get and wars and win him I think is a phony and a bum rap for the sad ministration. Secondly we all believed that till you built up American strength you were not going to get a good deal in arms control and cheese. I just rest my case on 8 years of the Reagan administration. There is no way we would have gotten an IMF agreement intermediate nuclear forces to do way with an entire class of weapon systems unless we had deployed those weapon systems between 19 from 1983 to today. No way to know. There's no way in the world that we would have had a deep reductions in strategic weapons that past administrations have been trying. Time and time again if we hadn't had a strategic modernization program and had SDI. Yes yourself. Why did the Soviets turned Carter

on the production's. Why did they turn down four Dondi Productions. Why did they turn down Nixon and the productions and you come up with only two possible explanations not that they love Ronald Reagan want to help him. Just the opposite they shouldn't want to help him come up with two explanations Number one we had a strategic modernization program going on before and during those negotiations which none of the other three had the number two we had SDI. There was pounding ahead and none of those three other three did. So we've accomplished what the three previous presidents did not accomplish and I can't help but believe that our theory was absolutely right. One of the things is change the administration I think is the rhetoric used with the highpoint when ever it was I guess was the speech in Orlando Florida. The evangelicals if it were free will be very evil and that language is gone. It has even iteration changes as well.

I don't think the administration has changed one bit on views of the Soviet Union and I hope to God you know no administration ever does I think it's a right view of the Soviet Union to have that it is a focus of evil in the world. I am entirely comfortable with that. The I think there is a change in the rhetoric from in this administration for the good reason good reason that the times are different. Not the conditions of the Soviets are it any different. Not that they're any less threatening to Afghanistan or to the East Europeans or the Vietnamese or the Cambodians or the Angolans or anything else. But when Ronald Reagan took office there was a prevalent view around the world that somehow the superpowers were tweedle dee and tweedle dum. Somehow there was moral equivalence. It was a wash between who the good guys were and the bad guys. I think Ronald Reagan because of that rhetoric. So I drew the line between what freedom stands for and what to tell Terry and stands for that that was absolutely essential to do at that time. By God there is a difference

between the teachings of Jefferson in the teachings of Trotsky. But there's a difference between the deeds of Descartes and minus Q As opposed to Hegel and Lenin. And so once that decision was made it was made. I think it had an impact and it was the right thing to do at the right time. But now that this is here now it's less necessary. I would say it would become necessary again is the IMF agreement. Woods I hope to God it doesn't. Leads off into a new era of detente and new feeling that everything's fine in the world that somehow the superpowers are Tweel a day into a lead. Somehow we should fall all over our capitalistic selves to give loans to the Soviet Union. All that is rubbish and if it takes another distinction between the good guys and the bad guys to do away with that rubbish that's worth it. At the moment it seems like a lot of the president's original hard liners are leaving the administration and there's talk that moderates are somehow taking control of the situation. Is there

any what would your comment be to that thinking that this is going to be seen now three or four five years down the road. There's a fascination in arms control go look at personalities to do a People's Magazine look at arms control. I'm always more interested in the substance and what comes out if in I in f the intermediate nuclear force we have bellied up on some of the verification provisions are bellied up on the other provisions. Then we'll be held accountable by our contemporaries and by history. I don't believe for a moment we have done that in start I think we have a very good path and a clean path to do that and I think that we won't belly up in the rest of this administration. Let me go back to regular people. Is that a part of the other three summits or or or. Probably like you predict what the what the some of the this program will look at will be regular. Can you tell us the story a little bit. I want to go back with him Dan. love gets arrested is that it looks like it. What's going on within the administration

and the abandoned book for some of their interests. Well I'll just tell you my own feeling before I could make my own feeling was that it's a we have a summit we have a summit if we don't that's fine. I see no reason that some of the great advantage of the United States ever. I'm constitutionally think it's unwise to have the president as chief arms control negotiator at any time. I think that puts him in a very terrible position. And since first with with Woodrow Wilson we've seen that that's a dangerous position. As Dean Rusk said it means that the court of last resort is in session. That's not good to do. I also think that a summit has many other downsides to men's pressure on the American president because of our independent Congress an independent press independent interest groups where no such pressure exists on Soviet leader from its Alterian society and the expectations are built up in such a way that could be very detrimental to us. I did not think it was

a good idea to go into Reich Avik with a short period of time that we had between the invitation in the acceptance some 10 days or so but the president thought it was. And I think Reykjavik was an interesting case of the two elements of arms control. One the very visionary side abolishing all nuclear weapons abolishing all ballistic missiles abolishing this and boxing that. That to me is visionary and in some respects very harmful. On the practical side of arms control what do we do to get a intermediate nuclear force agreement and get a start agreement. Reykjavik was a big help in that respect. We made a tremendous accomplishment on those two. We have an IMF agreement today because the right of it. Start progress we have today because of Reykjavik. So it's an interesting. The same three days in Iceland. We did what I consider harmful and Gorbachev did

harm on the visionary elements of arms control the nuts and bolts of arms control how you get from here to there. I think it was a very good success. It was a seizure. Looking at it from your recent reading president it was a real emotional roller coaster. It begins with very many expectations as a result and then suddenly it was expectations and I think you're done. Could you do that just once and you know and then at the end with disappointment and then come out and they're really just devastated and then as the weeks go by that is a good basis for you is for sure that the Soviets once we got directed back want to do a lot more business in arms control than we had expected them to do. We had indications including at very high levels in Moscow that they wanted to do a howdy and hello to set up a summit and then not much would happen in Iraq that that assessment was wrong. I think partially was wrong because the Soviets decided

to do more at Reykjavik than they had decided before I think. Secondly it was wrong because there was a certain momentum to the meeting that probably surprised the Soviet side as well as as our side. Secondly there was a certain amount of roller coaster to it although a lot less than the public perception. I did not believe myself that this idea of zeroing out this and abolishing that in a limited in the other was going to get the time of day in any serious consideration. And so if you're saying well you were so close to abolition of something or other whatever it was I don't believe it for a minute. In fact I remember quite well it right Kavik that when President Reagan went downstairs at 4 o'clock in the afternoon for the final session with Gorbachev Max camp and then asked me what I think the chances are that two could come to some kind of agreement. You know I went like this and they said goose egg zero. There's no way at all. And the disappointment at the end. That was

unfortunate. And there was a difference between the way Reagan and even Secretary Schultz came out and said oh it's the end of the. A good roll and that it's just terrible what happened. It's a difference between that and what a lot of us felt which was on the nuts and bolts of arms control we had done a very good job and move the process for start nigh enough along very nicely. And I'm happy to say that that afternoon I did an interview that evening from Markovic there was and ABC that painted a picture of how much we had accomplished in the real estate realm of arms control and that if we were going to have arms control in the future is going to be on the basis the Reykjavik formulas and that ran which is very different from the vibes coming out of Shelton and Reagan at the time. And that was I think right. And I think it was right at the time I think it was right. Ever since. So if you go overseas if it had not been for the president's insistence on maintaining it

you would differently. Well I think that it might have ended differently but that was all this visionary papers. I don't think that they were much good to anything. I think what was very good was Ronald Reagan getting involved in IMF and saying you know we're not going to accept. No limits on Asia we need to have limits on deployments in Asia I think is very good to have Ronald Reagan get in and say Now let me tell you that the definition of strategic the Soviet Union has been using for years a wrong definition. There is very good for Ronald Reagan to say on start we must have deep reductions or we're just not going to go do it. And that kind of stuff. He was terrific and the visionary stuff it was it wasn't what one 20 years from now historians writing about the Reagan years of which one chapter is on military defense policy and part of that is on what the president's

major contribution to Ujiji thinking about reducing your weapons. What will they say. What would you say. But this year I think there will be two accomplishments for a look back on security issues in the Reagan administration. Number one is an arms control package that really does reduce nuclear weapons. That really does reduce the risk of war. It really does have the effect of verification. In my mind none of the three of them have ever been done. U.S. Soviet nuclear arms control before. Whether they come to fruition or not he certainly set the path for making arms control all that it can be instead of the public affairs nonsense that it was before. And secondly I think that the innovation of SDI will be with us a long time may not be SDI as Ronald Reagan thinks of it it may not be asked as I think of it or as anybody thinks of it now but I think some kind of defense in the strategic

Graham is here to stay. I think that'll be very important. QUESTION A lot of concern in part American people which you can see in different ways from the beginning of this administration. I put it this way. Nations in favor of a military build up and very concerned about a lot of talk these days seems to want arms control nuclear freeze probably reflection of that more than anything else. Congressional concern over limiting defense budgets are timed them to talks. So what you are common in that kind of popular pressure on administration like this how does it work. Yes I think that arms control has been vastly oversold in the past. The main problems we have with the Soviets had nothing to do with arms control. They have to do with the aggressive Soviet behavior on the outside and repressive Soviet behavior on the inside. Arms control I believe can help us if handled right and can hurt us enormously if handled wrong. But of anybody goes in they say

I'm to control is going to solve our main problems with the Soviets. I just think they're smoking something. And I think that looking back on this administration we could have done a better job explaining the limitations of what can really be accomplished in arms control and how security really has to be advanced by our defense programs and by are tough international stance. And that's where it's at.