War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Richard Perle, 1987 [2]

The book in 1969 and 70 I want to ask you what was Senator Jackson's feeling about say like whether or not Senator Jackson was a keen supporter of the safeguard anti-ballistic missile defense program and in fact I think had it not been for scoops adroit management of the issue in the Senate it would never have been approved. Was he sort of going out on the limb to defend that program on behalf of President Nixon when a lot of his colleagues were threatened. Well as a Democrat it was not the most comfortable position to be and but it's a Scoop Jackson was the most on partisan nonpartisan Sen. I've ever known where issues of national security were concerned. He believes that it was a historic. To continue without any defense whatsoever that sooner or later there would be defenses that the United States ought not to be behind in their deployment that safeguard was about the best technology we could

manage at the time and a good place to start. And he didn't care much that that was not the predominant view within the Democratic Party and in fact he succeeded in bringing a great many Democrats along with him. Without that coalition at which he was in which he was the center it would not have survived the test in the Senate when in 1069 it was approved by a single vote. Do you know a little bit. I thought one did. He was unhappy with the outcome of the SALT 1 agreement. I wouldn't say that he felt betrayed by. I'm sorry I've left scoop out again so you don't like the Senate Sen. JACKSON. Senator Jackson felt that the SALT 1 agreement was a poor agreement and not in the security interests of the United States.

He voted for it. But he only voted for it after the resolution supporting it was amended to provide that future agreements would provide for equality between the United States and the Soviet Union. But he didn't like the Office of arms agreement the interim agreement reached in 1972 even for the ABM Treaty without serious reservation. He thought that was a reasonable treaty at the time although he never interpreted it to mean that it was desirable to be vulnerable to attack by the Soviet Union. He didn't turn it into an ideology. I don't think he felt betrayed by the decision to abandon defenses. He did think it was unwise. Having negotiated one site which came subsequently to make that one site around the national capital because he thought that that was unwise and wouldn't be approved and in effect it meant we would have no defense at all.

Could you repeat the last part of that starting with The Insider and wash things under Jackson. Senator Jackson thought it unwise. If we were entitled to only one defensive site to place it around the national capital around Washington and he was convinced that the decision to do that meant that there would be no defense at all. And of course he was right. What was wrong with the offensive limited off of GREENMAN I mean the negotiators and Henry Kissinger argued that it was fine because the forces were asymmetric and our bombers forces which are far superior were not restricted and there are other advantages we had. And plus we didn't have a lot of bargaining leverage because they had an ongoing program and we did. We are better off stopping it somewhere that letting it go. What was Senator Jackson's view. Senator Jackson was highly critical of the interim agreement on offensive arms. He was amused by Henry Kissinger on the one hand maintaining

that it was the best we could do given the scant leverage we had and on the other hand arguing that it was a profound victory for the United States. It was not a profound victory for the United States it was an unbalanced lopsided agreement in which the Soviets were entitled to higher levels of weapons than the United States in the areas in which the Soviets had an advantage that advantage was frozen in the agreement. In the areas where the United States had an advantage the competition was permitted to go forward under the terms of the agreement so it was simply a matter of time before the American advantages that were claimed to offset the Soviet advantages would be a road by Soviet developments and that of course is what happened with the result that the Years later one could look back at that agreement and see in it the beginning of a radical shift in the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. I think it's significant that some of

those involved in that it sought one negotiating experience. Eventually with the passage of time in the benefit of hindsight concluded that it had not been a good agreement. I know that's Paul that's his view. Can you understand that when you're talking about areas that were to America's advantage when I was in your particular program. Could you restate that. Yes the the SALT 1 interim agreement permitted competition to continue in some areas where the United States was ahead. We were ahead of the Soviets in the deployment of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles. But the treaty allowed the Soviets to deploy Merv's where the Soviets were ahead in numbers of submarines for example the treaty froze the submarine level and thereby froze the United States in a permanent inferiority. Now how did you make the decision to go and start

negotiations how did Senator Jackson feel about this idea that we were going to enter into negotiations which were basically going to ratify or condone a situation of parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Did he feel that it was unwise to do that maybe we should have pushed ahead with our technological superiority and not given them the credibility of being an equal power. Senator Jackson never quarreled with the the concept that the Soviet Union was a superpower in the same and distinct classes the United States. And he believed that our advantage in anti-ballistic missile defenses the ability rapidly to commence deployment of the safeguard ABM system could be used in the course of negotiations to obtain significant restraint on the momentum of the Soviet strategic offensive build up. I know he thought it was a fatal mistake

to conclude the ABM Treaty before we had any firm outline of a conclusion to the negotiations on offensive arms. It was the sort of mistake that a careful negotiator would not make. He also believed that as he stands you know. OK. Senator Jackson also believed that the SALT 1 interim agreement focused on the wrong things it limited the wrong things it limited the numbers of launchers for ballistic missiles for example. But it was either silent or ineffective and vague on the issue of what kinds of weapons one could place in those silos. And he correctly anticipated that the growth in Soviet strategic forces would come not through the

construction of additional missile silos but through the improvement of the missiles placed in those those launchers buried in the ground. And in fact in October of 1970 he sent Henry Kissinger a secret memorandum. Which said you are headed down the wrong path. You are restraining the number of launchers but within the number of launchers the Soviets would be permitted under the agreement you're negotiating. They could trouble their effective forces by resorting to better missiles and improved fuels lighter alloys new launch techniques and and multiple warheads. That is exactly what happened. The Soviets did all of those things that are fuels new alloys new launch techniques with the result that they more than tripled their effective ballistic missile forces within the

total number of launchers that was agreed. I just want to clarify one thing when I asked about the parity superiority issue. I think what you're saying and maybe you can clarify that this is what you're saying is that you thought it wasn't so important that we weren't going in there to try to give up our lead and to accept parity but rather it was it was useful to go into Zot negotiations in order to stem their ongoing development while we know he was in trouble about parity this was a completely phony argument that we wanted to cling to superiority. That never bothered him. But then there was his chief. I mean what he would want to get out of the SALT negotiations maybe you could put it that way that the chief. You know what his chief motive for wanting he wanted to slow the momentum of the Soviet build up because he could see the curves they were on and where it would eventually lead. Can you restate that saying that Senator Johnson thought that thought leadership. Yes for now Senator Jackson thought that the critical function of the

SALT negotiations in the beginning was to halt the momentum of the Soviet strategic build up because he could see the trends and where the Soviets would eventually arrive if those trends were permitted to continue unincumbered. When the SALT 1 interim agreement was concluded the the argument for it from Mel Laird and Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon and others was that it had in fact halted the momentum of the Soviet strategic build up and scoop Jackson's opposition to the interim agreement was that it hadn't done that at all and we have the advantage of hindsight that scoop was right. It didn't alter momentum and permitted it to continue. OK. Now I want to ask you how he felt about this President Nixon and Henry Kissinger's concept at a time when the strategy of detente with the Soviet Union was it appropriate when you're in a smart way to deal with the Soviet Union.

And Senator Jackson thought that the Kissinger Nixon concept of detente was fundamentally unsound. He believed that Kissinger in attempting to tie the Soviets down in a series of agreements that would somehow lead to a moderation of their behavior. That he was really getting himself that we were going to get tied down that in any effort to in cumber the monolithic or near monolithic institutions of the Soviet state dealing with free and independent and widely disparate institutions in the United States that you would not wind up with an American hand on the lever you'd wind up in the Soviet hand on the lever. I think that was all rather badly so yeah you might want to understand the numbers but it's good I mean here's their idea was that a prolonged period of people might

look nice but it be to the advantage of our dance with it and not the Kissinger Nixon concept what with all of us after he's stuck in the Kissinger Nixon concept of detente was that we would engage the Soviets in a broad number of agreements covering many fields science technology medicine transportation nuclear weapons and the like and that the Soviets would become dependent on the United States in a manner that would cause them to moderate those of their international policies that we found most objectionable. We would end up exercising influence and leverage over Soviet decisions. But Scoop Jackson was acutely aware of the fact that you had a democracy with its free and disparate institutions. Bein put into a series of relationships with the Soviet state and whether one talked about transportation or medicine or energy there were many

agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was our universities and our research institutes and our professors dealing with officials of the Soviet government who had a single purpose and under those circumstances scoup believe the Soviets would end up manipulating us and not the other way around. And I believe that's what happened. We turned the business community into a virtual lobby for the Soviet Union when they saw the prospects of increase trade. We turned the scientific community into a sympathetic voice in our own politics. When they saw the prospects of scientific cooperation. So the theory was not only wrong it was 180 degrees wrong. I mean just make one more concise statement that you're hearing with some reasoning and time. You can start with Jackson thought about it I think you set up what

you said it what it was very well said and I said I felt that their concept. If you want a much shorter. Yes just one take it Senator Jackson President Nixon I mean that the Nixon Kissinger cons of the time was fatally flawed or whatever because Senator Jackson thought that they just enjoy Nixon concept of detente was fundamentally wrong because it would not lead to a moderation of Soviet behavior and greater American influence over Soviet decisions but on the contrary it would lead to greater Soviet influence over American decisions. OK now after this one agreement was ratified. The White House apparently gave Senator Jackson certain concessions in terms of because of his dissatisfaction with the salt one agreement and one of them was that he would have the opportunity to hand him the next top negotiating team and also a lot of the active staff can you talk about how Senator Jackson

had that power at that time and what he was trying to what his purpose was and trying to restructure the people making these. It is been claimed that following the SALT 1 agreement that Senator Jackson was given extraordinary authority to restructure personnel were involved in arms control. This is simply false. The story's been around a long time. Gerard Smith who had been our chief negotiator had decided to resign and a new negotiator had to be selected. The scope was under no illusions about who had. Who was responsible for the unbalanced as he sought sought one agreement. It wasn't the negotiators and it wasn't officials in the Arms Control Agency it was Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. And he was never under any illusion that you could improve the performance of the administration by by changing relatively

minor subordinates. It's a pretty good door creak right now so it's ok. Yes. OK so you're saying that he didn't have a role in picking the next assaulting an actor you know and the other story is that he was feeling pretty strongly that general Allison should be relieved of his duties and that I was in that sort of you know this or that interest in the military of this country. What mistakes scoop was unhappy with General Alison's performance when he represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the negotiations and I think what led him to that conclusion was the frequency with which Allison seemed unable to answer questions about the treaty when the negotiating team came before the Senate in hearings on the treaty. And that shook Senator Jackson I remember him saying to me I deal with these issues from time to time when they're before the Senate and

I know the answers to questions he's been doing this full time for the last two and a half years and he can't answer the questions I can answer. There is something wrong here. Do you feel that you have to turn Jackson you know that you know and have represented well the national security or military interests that you mentioned. I think Senator Jackson thought that the so-called one agreement was hopelessly ambiguous and that critical details had not been nailed down in the negotiations and that unlike the broad policy was the responsibility of the negotiators and in particular on the technical military questions the responsibility of the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because he says he actually said to us in an interview he said I think it was a big mistake of mine that I let Jackson pick people because that put the White House instead of me and he said I'll just take your said that when she threw that resume being in the position mediating in the middle that that the White House was far to the left of everybody else.

Do you want to comment on. I think it says flatly wrong. Can you. Yes. The any changes that were made in personnel following the salt want to be imminent were made by the White House and by Henry Kissinger and not by Scoop Jackson. And if Henry Kissinger says otherwise it's because that that was an easier way to explain firing his own people than accepting the responsibility and so now what was Kissinger Kim increasingly under fire for negotiation. What was the fear that his family. We feared that there would be a repetition of the salt one agreement another agreement that was unbalanced in that conferred unacceptable advantages on the Soviet Union. We were very doubtful about a negotiating process that led to agreements that permitted significant increases above the levels in effect on the date the agreements we signed

because it seemed to us that the purpose of arms control should have been to constrain the military forces on both sides and not simply to provide for their increases legitimized through a bilateral agreement. Was there sense of distrust that because of Watergate President Nixon's decreasing. What's the word for it credibility that they would be willing to give more concessions that you know that you know there was there there was a point when Nixon was in meshed in Watergate when we feared that there would be a desperate effort to conclude an agreement in order to substitute one set of headlines for another recurring set of headlines and that our national security was being put at risk you know to help the president solve a personal problem of his own making. And

Scoop Jackson had no sympathy at all for that and worked rather hard to assure that that would not be permitted to happen. Can you talk a little bit about the purpose behind the Jackson than I can. The amendment to the trade bill that was to grant us. The purpose behind the Jackson amendment which ultimately became known as the Jackson-Vanik amendment was to condition concessions to the Soviet Union and trade concessions credits and most favored nation status on an improvement in the immigration policies of the Soviet Union which when the amendment was introduced threaten to bring immigration to a grinding halt. The Soviets had introduced an education tax and anyone with any formal education was subject to prohibitive and punitive taxes that people were simply unable to pay. And it looked as though this might be the device by which immigration would be brought to an end. By

offering an amendment that made trade concessions to the Soviets contingent upon an end to the education tax and an improvement in the plight of would be emigres we hope to create the conditions in which the administration could negotiate some kind of compromise with the Soviets. And our biggest disappointment was the reluctance with which the administration regarded the leverage that we placed in their hands. Now Kissinger said to us that immigration during his tenure that immigration soared from three hundred a year in 1968 to 35000 a year in 1973 and that after the event the Jackson-Vanik amendment passed it dropped by 20000 again and that that was a sign that his strategy of reaching liberalization from the Soviet Union was more effective than trying to legislate changes internal changes in their system.

Well Senator Jackson was quite convinced that the improvement in immigration figures was directly related to the Soviet effort to prevent the Jackson amendment from being legislated and that the threat of legislation was a very effective tool that could be used by a willing administration if when it had wanted to try to increase the flow of immigrants and diminish the suffering inflicted on people who applied to leave. The figures subsequent to the passage of the Jackson amendment of gone up and down reaching higher levels than ever in 1079 the when 50000 people were permitted to leave. What I think the Kissinger view of history in here right now I think is distorted distorted the facts both in his memoirs and evidently in what he had to say to you. What that overlooks is that from the beginning

scoop Jackson's view was that Kissinger should use the imminence of legislation to work out a compromise with the Soviets. Kissinger refused even to attempt such a negotiation for a very long time and when he finally did begin negotiations under pressure of the amendment an agreement was reached and an agreement that provided for a substantial increase in immigration. We have just interest testimony for that. He now says that that agreement unraveled when it was made public. But he was very much involved in the drafting of the public statement that was to be issued on the day that the agreement was concluded. So it's a it's a wildly distorted account the scope's effort from the beginning was to bring pressure to bear in the hope that a compromise would ultimately be reached and it was really. The part where you make reference to us that you said to us that you know that you know and it makes it hard for

as the years you said he wildly distorted in his memoirs and you make it brief. How Kissinger's account of the battle over the Jackson Amendment and its implications has been greatly distorted in his memoirs and in things he has said elsewhere. The fact is that from the beginning we attempted to work with him making it plain that the imminence of legislation gave him the kind of leverage that had he been willing he might have used to produce a compromise for a long time he resisted the negotiation of that sort and when eventually he undertook it under pressure from the amendment. It did lead on October 18th nine hundred seventy four to an exchange of correspondence between Senator Jackson and Henry Kissinger that constituted an agreement with the Soviet Union the Soviet subsequently reneged on that agreement for reasons that we cannot possibly know at

least which happened for sure. You just gave us as I think we can state have sort of a summary instead of what was wrong with the next and Kissinger concept their time on how to deal with the soviet union negotiated with them what in place how should we regard the Soviet Union and deal with them in arms control negotiations and trying to gain more influence over there. Maybe put it in terms of what Senator Jack and Senator Jackson who read history a great deal and in particular the history of the Soviet Union believed that in dealing with a totalitarian state it was necessary for the United States to have a clear negotiating objectives. To mobilize our own military strength in order to create favorable conditions that the Soviets refer to as the correlation of forces. And then to negotiate fairly

but firmly. What he objected to most of all was the tendency to seek agreement for agreement sake to lower Tintin you Asli one's sights to abandon one objective after another and wind up in the end with a piece of paper that didn't serve our interests. And he objected to that strenuously because he believed it was unnecessary to wind up with an agreement for agreement sake if one kept one's objectives clear. It was possible to negotiate is there a negotiation with the Soviet Union in which I mean is everything that they would agree to sort of not in our hand. I believe it's possible to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union that are in the interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States. But we'll never know whether that's true unless we put propositions to them that have that quality and have the courage the political courage and the

patience to stand firm for the an outcome of that nature. If we abandon agreements of that type early in the negotiating process as we've had a tendency to do then we wind up with agreements and don't serve our interests and may not serve the interests of the Soviet side either. So do you ever conclude that you just have included a brief analysis of what thought one you know. The great failure of the SALT 1 interim agreement was that it did not do the thing that was claimed it was intended to do and that was halt the momentum of the Soviet strategic build up. On the contrary it legitimized that build up by limiting the wrong things it permitted the Soviets to add enormously to their military forces under the terms of an agreement which therefore had the effect of creating

a very misleading impression that the Soviets were not in fact rapidly building up their strategic forces. The fact that everything they were doing was taking place under the terms of an agreement created the misleading impression that it was OK and that it was not inimical to the interests of the United States. Far from halting the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup they sought one agreement permitted the Soviets to continue a massive buildup of their strategic forces without creating the normal apprehensions that would have been associated with an unrestrained because it largely was an restrained military buildup. Because what they were doing was being done pursuant to an agreement. It did not touch off the apprehensions that it should have touched on is that you know we should try for Van. Exactly. Well we did early in the negotiations propose a Merv ban

but we didn't know how to verify a ban on the development of Merv's. So we proposed a ban on the deployment of Merv's with onsite inspection. The Soviets would not accept that proposal they wouldn't accept the onsite inspection. And I'm convinced that they were determined to develop their own multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles with them. Actually we thought when you heard Senator Jackson and supported the Merv ban when it was proposed early in the first rounds of the salt one negotiations. It was a bad and the the American position early in the SALT 1 negotiations was to ban the deployment of Merv's. We knew that we couldn't ban the development of Merv's because it would be unverifiable and we

could only ban the deployment of Merv's with on site inspections so we insisted on an on site inspection and the Soviets flatly rejected it. The Soviet position was that we should cease development of Merv's So would he. The question is was there Jackson in favor of both sides. Not more of that or was he in favor of freezing the US advantage in Irving at that point. Well Senator Jackson supported the administration when it proposed a Merv ban to the Soviets. When that proved unachievable he was very much in favor of the United States proceeding to deploy Merv's on U.S. forces. The agreement that was the proposal that was made would have frozen the U.S. advantage because it would have stopped the Soviets from testing and we had already achieved a test. So was he in favor of one that would have frozen. And the US three men ahead of the Soviet Union in testing.

Now the American proposal was for a ban on the deployment of Merv's. And it was a bad that can only be verified by on site inspection. That was the American proposal. The Soviets proposed a ban on Merv testing. But no ban on deployment and no onsite inspection and that was unacceptable to us because it was too risky. But the Merve agreement really foundered on the issue of onsite inspection. Right and many people said that was the leverage. The ministrations that they didn't really want to move there and it was better for us to push ahead where we had superior technology. Have you read do you think that was true. I think I believe that this business of the always attributing dark motives to people who agree with very soft negotiators is not helpful to understanding the debate and the issues

on side inspection was necessary if you were to have any confidence at all that the Soviet Union was not cheating and the suggestion that the demand for on site inspection was intended to prevent an agreement. This is the kind of. Unfair argumentation that really confuses issues. So you thought it was in that situation it was better for us to go ahead and murder knowing that when the Soviets were there as knights that it would put our land based force in the more vulnerable position. Well we did not know how to prevent the Soviets from Mervin in a verifiable manner without the ability to inspect and they wouldn't agree to the inspection. So that made it impossible to agree to a ban on Merv's despite the obvious consequences of that. OK and then Kissinger said that working on salt on those negotiations that the equivalency and then placed unneeded restrictions on the process that he would have rather

have had some un equivalency in the numbers of launchers in return for. More restrictions on their murdering because we were more vulnerable to their murdering at that point did you. I mean was there any sense that I mean that the equivalency rule was sort of stilted in dealing with the asymmetric forces and could get in our way in terms of stopping this moving which wasn't in our interests. When Henry Kissinger was in charge of negotiations and had no equivalency rules and no other incumbrances of any kind he succeeded in negotiating an agreement that was lopsided in favor of the Soviet Union. My sympathy is limited for the negotiator who says he can do a better job if those who insist on equality would would not in cumber his freedom to negotiate. So what do you think was the main problem is thought so too is one with the beginning of salt I mean Henry Kissinger at one point

1974 said if I realized what a merged world meant I would have been more serious about getting rid of them because by that time we had a real problem on our hands with them or what was Senator Jackson about. Will Senator Jackson realized what a merged world would mean. He didn't come lately to discoveries of this kind is somewhat extraordinary remark that Henry Kissinger after two years in office was beginning to understand one of the fundamentals of the negotiation that he was superintending. I think the record will show that. Scoop Jackson saw further into the future including the problems then shaly discovered by others. And I would offer some evidence of that his memorandum to Henry Kissinger in October of 1070 in which he correctly anticipated Soviet developments if. The administration was so unwise as to conclude an agreement

in which the only significant constraint was on launches. And there were no further constraints on numbers of warheads or the size of the missiles in those launchers or improvements in the missiles in those launchers all of which had the potential for adding significantly to the military capability of the Soviet missile forces. And that is exactly what happened. He said that insult to we went for levels of launchers that were far beyond what we ever built because they were our forces are structured differently than that and therefore we gave away crucial bargaining leverage on things that we would utilize you Ed Henry has a million rationalizations for why he produced an agreement that was unbalanced in favor of the Soviet Union. That is one of many such rationalizations. If if his view is that we didn't want additional launchers and therefore there was no reason why we should

insist on additional launches. One can turn that around and say as we did not desire additional launchers we should have insisted that the Soviets reduce their launchers down to our lower and satisfactory level. That at least would have produced an agreement balanced in terms of the numbers of launches. I think in general about what the purpose of arms control and about this I mean how do you make of this your bargaining chip argument that's usually applied to weapons systems and that we we can't have a moratorium on earth because you know it's based on you know never that we need to build them and then the other side says well we can't freeze the situation we were in what year. Well in my view the purpose of arms control negotiations is to achieve agreements that diminish the military threat that we face and that enhance the stability of the strategic relationship between the signatories. That is not a description of most of the arms control agreements in history many.