Old South Meeting House; WGBH Forum Network; Legacy of the Cocoanut Grove Nightclub Fire

Good evening everyone. It's really an honor to be here and and spend this time and talk about this very important event. And it's an important event not only here in the city of Boston but certainly for fire protection professionals around the world as well as others and medical community legal community and elsewhere. So we want to talk about this fire. And I want I'm hoping that as we go through this this evening we can really share some of the stories that you have as well as Stephanie mentioned we'll be having time to have some of those those comments and we certainly look for some of that feedback because there are a lot of stories. I've heard a lot but I'd certainly like to hear a lot more now before I dive right into this presentation. I want to point out even when I'm using as my title slides and each of the sections that I'll be talking about I'm showing four books that you see here and the reason for that is back in 2007 we did a session at the NFPA annual meeting when it was held in Boston that year and we brought together these authors

that you see that wrote these books here. Stephanie Sharrow Charlie Kenni Barbara Rivage and John Esposito. And in addition Billy Noonan who's here with us was part of our group and also Jack DD and myself and John Hall from NFPA and we put together this session and what I'm pointing out here is that there's a lot of different people that have a lot of different angles on this fire and no one of us I think are really versed in covering it completely but I'm here to give you this overview tonight and to really share this event with you. My background is fire protection engineering working at the National Heart Association and the fire protection Research Foundation. And so that's my strength. But when it gets into medical and legal and certain other issues I suspect that some of you in the audience here tonight are perhaps more tuned in. And again we would encourage you to share that information with us later. So without further

ado let's let's get right into this and talk about the Coconut Grove fire. And just to do that I want to bring us back into 1942. The city of Boston Massachusetts the United States and what was really happening at that time. Well it was certainly it was the height of World War II in many ways. In fact Pearl Harbor was almost a year earlier just just prior to the one year anniversary. And and the Allies had seen a number of setbacks. But during the year of 1942 with the Battle of Midway and Coral Sea and some other events things were starting to change the tide was turning. And it's certainly with the US entering the war. It was a world war at that point. And so it was a very different time. And so here we are in the film District as a call that section of Boston and in in the streets and I'll go over this in a little bit more detail. They've changed quite a bit in the years but some of these

buildings are still there today. Well so when you look back and you see what was life like in 1942 you know we think some of the movies that were popular at the time like Road To Morocco and I believe that was when Bambi came out from Disney. It was one of their first films Casablanca Yankee Doodle Dandy. You know Bing Crosby was big at that time with white Christmas. So some of you hopefully that some things that you do remember the cost of living of course was very different back then. You know cost of a new house $3700 something like that. So it was a different time. And in in many ways life was simpler. And one of the big recreation points of recreation that people engage in was going out to nightclubs into theater and so forth. And the Coconut Grove nightclub was no different in the shows that were there. It was it was the hot spot at at that time in the city of Boston and it was

was always always had a good crowd in terms of its attendance. And so with that Coconut Grove and as you can see some of these before pictures it had this friendly atmosphere with the palm trees in the in this grove kind of feeling. Now one of the other things as we look at 1942 and especially in November that was a huge sports day in the city of Boston. The Boston College Eagles were favored something and this enormous ratio to to play their last game of the year with Holy Cross and were undefeated whereas Holy Cross had a balance of wins and losses. And interestingly the program that they had the two captains of the Boston College football team on it number 55 and number 12 which ended up being the final score of the game except it was in Holy Cross his favorite it was one of the huge upsets in college football history that's been sort of forgotten because of the events that happened later that day. But

where it ties into this story the Coconut Grove is they were planning to have this celebration party that night at the Coconut Grove. Mayor Tovan himself was going to lead this this celebration. Well that changed completely. And for a lot of people there were some people who still went because they were meeting other people and so forth. But the crowd changed it with different people there some who were going to go didn't go and vice versa. Now other people were there. So it's a good it's a good example of how certain events can really change. You know who ended up being in the grove that night and who wasn't. So. This particular illustration was when we published our article in our journal and a journal for our membership back in 2007 and it shows clearly how the streets have changed. And there's a couple of things I do want to point out here. For those of you see this and I'm not sure it's still a Radisson hotel it might have even changed to something else. It is still Radisson.

Yeah but it's it's a very large structure and this is the this lower portion is the concrete parking garage while the Coconut Grove the footprint for the building was really what you see here and it was quite small. In fact. The one thing that we hear in some of these major disasters like the Coconut Grove we hear this from the firefighters and survivors and others they cannot believe that they were that many people in the building in the first place. It was such a small building comparatively speaking. So it really occupied a very small area of footprint. The other thing I want to point out there are some buildings that are still that were there then that are still here today. So you can actually go down and you can really locate based on this you know the way these buildings are located. You can actually go if you stand at this corner of Shawmut street and Piedmont street where it now intersects really with a revolving door was right in the middle of that intersection on that sidewalk. So. So that's how the streets have changed and really made it a bit difficult to even find that original place. You can go in there and find the plaque that's

there today. Now also stepping back this was as we look at the city of Boston at that time and we realize that the Boston Fire Department was in mourning two weeks earlier on that previous Saturday two weeks before was the maverick square fire that killed six Boston firefighters. One week before was this massive civil defense drill that was done by the civil defense in preparation as part of the wartime preparations involved. It's stated upwards of 30000 people directly and indirectly in this drill with which was a massive drill. But one of the things that played out is some of the items that they worked on during that civil defense drill the week before ended up getting put into put into action. One week later on November 28 1942. So this is where we were in the city of

Boston at that time and what was happening. You know people were heading off to war. Boston was a very busy place in terms of LOT of coming and going. A lot of different people there. So now let's let's talk about the fire itself and the event. And I want to switch now and I'm starting this from the perspective of a firefighter my involvement in this whole issue goes back to 1991 when I wrote an article on and went and I interviewed a number of individuals who were directly involved in the fire in one way shape or another that included an employee a firefighter a serviceman a doctor in charge of the emergency room and others. And so we brought all their perspectives together and publish that article. And one of those one of those people that I interviewed the late read Graney was on engine company 35 that responded to the fire.

Now this is an illustration of the Coconut Grove and it really is is a amalgamation of multiple smaller buildings that had been renovated and brought together and which included this and where the melody lounge was down below in the lower area above the coatroom above it was the coatroom area and in the restrooms the main dance floor which had the retractable roof the rolling stage that would roll out and then the new additions this was a these were taller structures by the way up this. But they were only using the first floor and primarily down here was the new cocktail lounge the Broadway Street cocktail lounge that they had that end. And so really the primary ways in were through the revolving door. Over in Piedmont street that was the primary way in. Now there were exits in this facility but all of them had something functionally wrong. I'll talk about that later.

But there was an exit door at the top of the melody lounge stairs on the first floor level. There were exit doors over here on Shawmut street some larger exit doors there were some doors behind these service access ways. And then finally down at the Broadway Street Lounge there was a large store there all of them of which had something functionally wrong based on how we look at codes and standards today. So what happened here. Well in terms of the fire department the fire department they received a call. There was an alarm box. Box 1 5 1 4 came in for a car fire and it was located at Stewart and Carter street. So they responded in my story talking about red Graney. He was on engine 35 at the time and they responded that that car fire and that it was an actual car fire was in the back seat. They thought it was started by a cigarette or whatever and they extinguished that fire that came in at 10:15. Well while they were on the corner somewhere not far removed from

where the perspective is from this photo. They saw commotion people hollering and screaming. And they said hey what's going on over there and they came over. So the fire department was literally on the scene while this this was taking place. And so they came over and people were flooding out. They could see the fire and they realized they had an issue immediately and they could really take in the gravity of this thing was extremely serious and District Chief Daniel Crowley who was in charge he immediately ordered one of the firefighters to go to the nearby fire alarm box one five to one skip a second alarm strike a third alarm one minute later told them to strike a fourth alarm. They wanted as much resource there as quick as possible. They realized they had a very serious event unfolding right before them. The fact that the fire department responded to this fire. And literally was there all calls you know were starting to come in as well to a fire alarm

but they were there. That was a that was of monumental importance. It takes away that question about well what if the fire department had gotten there earlier. Well we see that this fire progressed so rapidly and there were other problems with exits and other issues that we still lost half of the people who were in the building that night. Now when you step back and you realize the occupancy of the Coconut Grove that night was far exceeded estimated between 25 to 50 percent in excess of its capacity. But there are close to 1000 people at the Coconut Grove that night and day that the ratio of survivors to fatalities to injuries was really backwards from what it is and most disasters. Usually there's a small percentage of people who are killed and then a slightly larger percentage but still small percentage of people who are injured and then most people survive. Well this was backwards for every four people who were in the Coconut Grove that night only one

of those four would get out more or less untouched. One of those other people would be injured. And then two of them would die. So that was the ratio of the people that were there in the Coconut Grove that evening. So the fire department upon arriving at the scene there their work was not as much dealing with the fire as far as the fire itself. It wasn't that big of a fire for them. I mean if this was an empty warehouse they would have taken care of this in no time. It was really dealing with the human wreckage and the carnage. This was a really unique event. And even for them to attack and fight the fire and get water in the fire was a problem because the people were trying to get out and the rescue was of course of paramount concern. But nevertheless the fact that the the resources that the fire department were there was extremely important. And I I want to point out that one of

the other authors Charlie Kenni the third his grandfather. And that's what the book is about. When I talked with Charlie Kenney Jr. while his grant their grandfather was on rescue one and they were first at the scene as well. And one of the most poignant Second-Hand actually third hand stories that I've ever heard was Charlie Kenney telling me that when he visited his father and me in the hospital because he was one of the few firefighters that was seriously injured at the event no firefighters were killed at the Coconut Grove fire. But he was one that was hospitalized well when he went and visited him the next day. He was showing him the claw marks on his legs. So I found that is a very striking testimony to what people were really going through. So for the fire department. They were there quickly. There was a lot of work. Of course there were many others who were doing the work assisting the fire department in terms of rescue there was overall there were five

alarm sounded for this fire which brought 25 engines five ladders one water tower one rescue other special utility units and so forth. But they had the resources they need it. It really was an event that unfolded so rapidly that even with them on the scene had that had that characteristic. So now let's I want to switch and talk about not so much just the firefighter but the overall incident command and those who are in charge and provide a little bit of their perspective. And I believe when I was mentioning earlier I'm not sure that I mentioned Paul Christian was part of our group in 2007 as well. And he provided this perspective on the incident command and the commander's perspective as a former commissioner of the Boston Fire Department. But one of the things that's quite noteworthy in this by the way is a very rare photo of the fire because you see smoke. If you look at most of the photographs of the Coconut Grove fire and you don't see smoke or fire

because really that got knocked down quite quickly and that event unfolded so rapidly in terms of the fire itself. But so soon after you know that it was really again the work of trying to to take care of the people and to move them out and to get them out and to perform the rescue that was needed. Now one of the issues in the profession of firefighting we talk about the National Incident Management System they call it nym's and it's a very organized structure of who's in charge and who's doing what. And it's very carefully orchestrated at any fire ground in the United States of America and it works very well. And but one of the things that became apparent here is there are a lot of different people at this 1942 Coconut Grove fire of different rank. In fact this is perhaps a classic of where the incident came in. It never really became an issue but was different than

other events where it's very clear the fire chief is in charge because at this event it turned out that Mayor Toben was there. There was a fire commissioner the police commissioner the superintendent of police the state fire marshal was there and seen the acting commissioner of Public Safety the director of Boston Committee on Public Safety the military had all their units and their representatives the Red Cross Salvation Army. The list goes on and on. There were a lot of Representatives so that fortunately this never really came into play because it was very clear what needed to be done and that was the rescue of the people that were there. But in terms of you know this whole hierarchy of incident command that that is one of the the issues the other is that as they were sending the victims to the hospital and trying to get them transported and there were transporting them in every possible vehicle they really discovered that they didn't have the transport they needed and there weren't enough ambulances they were moving them in private vehicles newspaper

delivery trucks were used taxis bringing people to the hospitals. And one of the things that happened is the diversion of most of the people heading to Boston City Hospital and. Where that where that became an issue is that Boston City Hospital they received over 300 of the victims were brought to Boston City Hospital and even today as I understand it still rates as one of the highest admittance rates ever for a hospital because you don't normally have this kind of influx of of injured people and they received a for one hour and 15 minutes they received a person every 11 seconds. And that amounted to the over 300 individuals when they realize this is an issue. This is a problem people were lining the corridors dying in the corridors. They were they diverted many of these to Mass General which received them. The the the second biggest number of

victims at 114. Thirty nine of which were finally bedded down and survived to be treated. Of which of those 39 out of the 114 seven of them died in the first three days one of which was Bob Jones the the celebrated movie star on the cowboy. So. Really trying to deal with the people was a problem and they ended up using the garage the parking garage across the street as a temporary morgue to place the victims as they were bringing them out. They just didn't have a place to put them in. So that ended up being their primary triage point for transport to the hospitals. Now I want to pause for a minute and then switch into the medical side of this because the Coconut Grove fire is really a milestone event in the in the work then in the medical field and when you look at what has happened remember this is at the height of the wartime era. So there was a lot of work that was going

on and Dr. Oliver Koop at at Mass General Hospital was working on what he had called the soft technique and this was brought forth to try to help during the wartime effort in terms of what could be done to minimize burn injuries and make them heal faster and better. Well it turned out the Coconut Grove fire pushed their research and their work. It really propelled that and made a big difference in terms of how those techniques those burn injury techniques were implemented throughout the rest of the war and elsewhere. So the big issues as I've been told and is on the medical side involves the surface and surgical management of burns involves a fluid management. And that gets back to the plasma and that that's provided for the the victims in a burn incident the respiratory management. And that's another issue that we see a lot of focus in the final of these was the infection. And clearly in terms of the infection

they did use penicillin there is some talk about that. But what I've been led been told is that they use it in dosages that were too small at that time and we've since learned that the proper usage would involve more. But just stepping back for a second the point about the respiratory management of that wasn't an issue that was confounding the doctors initially because there were victims who were coming into the hospital who were coming in. They seemingly didn't have anything wrong with them except that they were agitated. Next thing they were dying and it turns out that there was severe pulmonary issues in some of these cases. And then there were questions about that there was something toxic that they may have been exposed to. And it raised questions on the similarities with the Cleveland Clinic fire that happened about a dozen years earlier which killed the 120 something or so individuals and where the victims had been exposed to phosgene gas from X-ray films that had burned. And the question was

well were these people exposed to anything. That's part of the mystery that still shrouds this overall event and I'll talk about it in a bit more detail. So one of the issues here even with any disaster of this magnitude is how many people died. We talk about four hundred ninety two individuals died in this event and that's where the the the the press the newspapers and so forth have settled on that number. However if you go look at the official Boston Fire Department report it talks about the list they provide Of all the fatalities and all the injuries which supersedes all other lists and it has 490. And you realize wait a minute. And in the literature if you look at Paul Benza Quinn's book cover the keys borke and so forth you realize. Yeah. They didn't include Eleanor Powell Powell as I recall the name who died at Boston City Hospital. And then there's questions even about including others who get into that gray area. There was Frances got arena from his wife perished in the fire. He

was injured. He was released after a few days or a week or so was very depressed was readmitted to the hospital and six weeks after the fire he threw himself through a closed six floor window in the hospital. And the question becomes is he a victim or not. So there are stories here. And you see that you realize even counting the fatalities is a challenge in an event like this. It's not straightforward. So I want to now shift into a different direction. The legal community in the Coconut Grove fire was indeed a another event that marked a milestone for the the the professionals involved in litigation in legal activities. Now immediately after the fire there was a commission put together by Arthur Riley the fire commissioner to immediately and they got this started within 24 hours. And they their purpose was to really look closely at what the the

fire department activities had involved which included not just their activities on the fire ground but it included looking at their fire prevention activities and that was looked at in significant detail with Lieutenant Frank Lynnie who was the fire inspector who you inspected the Coconut Grove one week before the fire and submitted a one page report that indicated the fire the conditions were quote good and that there were no inflammable quote unquote materials to be found. Well that single page report was published in its entirety on the front page of the newspapers. So immediately that was brought into full light. And the fight apparently was looking very closely at that. But in addition to that there was a grand jury was assembled and the district attorney and the others they handed down indictments for this the Coconut Grove fire and 10 10 different individuals were indicted as a result of this fire. However

after the trial in one of them by the way was Franklin D. The fire inspector nine of them were found not guilty. One was found guilty. And that is Barney Lenski the owner of the Coconut Grove. And so he was he was he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. And this is a precedent setting case that even today if you go you'll find this reference for instance on the BP oil spill as an example where it's asking the question about you know being responsible for involuntary manslaughter. So it really does provide this legal precedent Barty Walensky was convicted sentenced to 12 to 15 years. He served four of them before he was pardoned because he had cancer he was terminally ill. He was released. He told the reporters the day he was released that he wished he had died with the others in the fire. He lived nine weeks after and

then succumb to the cancer. And this picture this is the jury that's doing their site visit to the Coconut Grove. There were 400 civil suits that came out of this. Once all the assets were compiled and divided the survivors and the victims families each got $150 is what it all came down to that was available. Now I want to talk about the cause and origin. And this is where our good friend Jack Didi had helped us in 2007 and causin origin. Now there's a really interesting twist to this to this story if you go and you pulled the newspapers like we did out of the Boston Public Library. Now you can clearly see how the additions were changing and rapidly updating and trying to reflect the numbers of how many dead were there really and so forth. But you do also notice that police say bus boys match cause fire. Boy admits starting fire. Well this young man was crucified in the press. And

and so there's a lot of speculation about how did the fire start. Who caused the fire. Well I can tell you from fire professionals like myself. That's that's almost an academic point. We want to know. Wait a minute. Whether it's electrical short or whatever the issue why did it spread so fast. How did those people not get out if there was a fire here tonight you see these exits here with emergency lighting. We have sprinklers. We have a lot of fire safety features built in here. What went wrong that allowed that to escalate to that point. So aside from the fact of that specific point of origin. There is there's a number of other issues in and I do want to tell you that as we look at other possibilities there were significant other possibilities such as the electrical wiring. And this came out not only during commissioner Riley's investigation but also during the grand jury inquiry that there were some there were certainly some other questionable points of

ignition that that were raised. So with that there was the fire Commissioner's report on this fire and I quote you can they indicate First of all in Riley's report he says quote I find no evidence of incendiarism point number one. And the most important of those two points though is quote this fire will be entered in the records of the department the Boston Fire Department is being of unknown origin. So the official cause of this fire is unknown. Now there's a number of other things that I want to point out. I'm going to just expand on it in a moment but there are other issues here that raised some serious questions and Charlie Kenny Jr. and Jack D.T. and a number of others who have been looking at this there's this question about the methyl chloride used in the refrigerant during wartime you could not get the normal refrigerants like we have today that we're

in the ones they were using at that time were flammable and there were some questions about if there was a possible release. None of this ever was addressed during the official investigation. And but it's noted that the compressor was actually down in the corner behind the wall where the Coconut Grove fire started. The point of origin was down here in the corner of the melody lounge in the basement. So you know what. What contribution did this or could this have possibly read and that's part of the mystery of how this fire spread the way it did. Now I do want to point out that if you look at down in the melody lounge one of the things that becomes apparent is that yes there was plenty of fire damage but there was also a lot of lot of stuff that was left. This is the bar on the on the melody lounge and from Daniel Weiss who is the employee who we investigated for our for our story that we wrote in 1991. He indicated that

he was allowed to go back in the next day to retrieve the money from the cash registers including down here and it's surprise him at how the ceiling area was burned but much of the rest of the melody lounge actually didn't look that bad. So there's it's also it's a point that it's not only what. Byrne But what didn't burn. And we realized that even in some cases upon frauds and so forth. Now there's other questions that we step back as investigators 68 years later and we realize that wait a minute there's some other questions here that are important to address. This is the Broadway lounge the new Broadway lounge and there's two pictures here. But really what is of importance is the ceiling and you can't quite see it in this picture but in the next picture it's a bit clearer. In here we see the telltale globs of glue on the ceiling. And these became a culprit in a series of fires during the late 40s and early 50s where it became very noted that these asbestos

ceiling tiles 1 foot square ceiling tiles which don't burn well they're glued up there with this glue and that glue if you go and you try to take these things down you need a chisel to get those off it. That glue hardens rock hard unless you heat it. And when you hit it guess what it's flammable. It softens the ceiling tiles drop down. You have a flammable ceiling. And so this was a discovery that they realized. And so the late Frank Frank Branigan wrote us after we published this this picture and he said Aha. The telltale globs of glue on the ceiling in the new Broadway lounge. Well one of the things I'm building up to here is there's a number of factors that really relate back into the mystery of why did this fire spread the way it did that evening in Commissioner Raley's report. He talks about the fire traveling from the point of origin two to four minutes it traversed the melody lounge built up its energy and came up like a fire ball

up the stairs and out into the main foyer and then five minutes. He estimates five minutes at most. It had traveled from that point of origin out the Broadway door so the locomotive had really left the station and it was really a significant amount of fire that was coming in an extremely short period of time. And so from the codes and standards standpoint as we step back and we ask so what really happened there. We see a tremendous amount of energy being released in a very short time period. And I can tell you that as hard as we work to make sure this kind of event doesn't happen again it does happen again. It happened again in West Warwick Rhode Island and we struggle with that because how do we make sure that we don't have this kind of event happen again. It happened again in the Happy Land Social Club in New York City. It happened again in the Cromagnon nightclub in Brazil. And the recent fire in Bangkok and the Gotham Bergh disco in Sweden. So we know that these fires happen and we work hard to try to

prevent them but but this is where the challenge is is truly in front of us. Now the Coconut Grove that night there were there were a number of main ways out of the building there were four key spots out of the building. Every one of those spots had something functionally wrong so that if you were in there that night then you were going to have a problem getting out so that even as you look at the main entrance here coming out of the the main for her into the building with if you look closely you can see still see the ride here for the revolving door of that infamous revolving door. All I can tell you at the time. The fire protection community with the life safety code which is really what we use it's a backbone of all our building codes today. It was already in existence. A lot of places weren't following it. And one of the things that was already very clear that you have flanking doors on any revolving door. Now one of the key problems with night

clubs is they were exempt as a place of assembly in the building code at the time. So we realize well wait a minute how could that even be. I mean you know don't a place of assembly. Isn't that like a nightclub people get together. Well yeah except as a carry over from prohibition and sort of all the political and ties and things that happened it was sort of not written in as a place of assembly. So in the city of Boston the coconut grove was not a place of assembly at that time. So there were different requirements that they had to stick stick to. But you also find that as you look at every one of the ways out of here there was something wrong with that. Now here is the top of the stairs to the melody lounge. I mean this is if it's standing at the corner back the person's back and took this picture as has the restrooms right behind them they're looking out the door. This is a door all to the street that the stairway down to the melody lounge is right there and it goes down on the left and the left. Down those stairs. Well here's the door while that door that was

fully equipped with panic hardware as you see here. The problem is it was bolted shut in two spots. And so when the fire department did finally propped this open and get it open it was piled chest high with people who had parents at this point the door at the Broadway Street Lounge. It swung inward. It was you know these are just such basic issues in the Coconut Grove had something functionally wrong with all those ways out of that building that night. And further the main doors the big doors that they had on Shawmut street they were bolted shut. What happened was is one of the bus boys got it open and that ended up saving quite a few people getting those doors open. So we realize that you cannot have an event like this. And and really you know you need to get the people out and in and in the time period necessary. And further you know we step back today from the investigation commute and we ask the question what really happened that the Coconut Grove. It is a bit of a mystery.

We're able to look at events like the Station nightclub. We have the video record and it is extremely powerful tool for us because we can use that against the fire models and we can see that between the 80 and 90 second period from when the ignition started from the juror or we can see that the temperature according the computer models went from about 200 degrees at the five foot level to over 1000 degrees. And really what's happening it's I'm back to that point about the train has left the station. Once that fire gets underway and it's increasing at that kind of heat release rate it just it's too quick. And so the station it was 80 to 90 seconds. So we step back and we say something similar happened here at the Coconut Grove. Something really propelled that fire and really got it moving through there. And there was no way for the people to get out in this overcrowded facility. So as we wrap this up I know I stepped back and I look at disasters like this and I realized that almost 500 people

perished in this event and it touched many many people. Here we are 68 years later and we're still talking about this. It's a it's a very important issue to many people. Well I like to think that those people who suffered and those people who died that evening in November 1942 that they did not do so in vain that all the advances that we've made because of this not even just the fire protection community but the medical community and elsewhere that they did not die in vain and that we've made the advances and prevented others from suffering a similar fate. So that's it for me. Thank you. And now I would like to invite those who have a question if you could please proceed to the mike. And we'll stockinette going on and out maybe get things started by by asking just one question to get things going about the knowledge that those revolving doors were. A safety hazard but they were not. Actually that was not being enforced was that in other areas other than just the night at

the Coconut Grove or other places have revolving doors without the flank doors. At that point there were still cameras right. Yeah. In fact there were other places that had the revolving doors including City Hall and the stories told of how though they were removed immediately after. And you know it gets back to having the proper exits and the flanking doors we have revolving doors today. But you'll always notice about the flanking doors with them. And further you know they're supposed to be the collapsible type but the exits any building will have its exit size. So to make sure that the capacity to those people can get through those exits get down the means of exits and the discharge and so forth in the time period needed. I do want to point out that we also have with us my colleague from National Fire Protection Association Bob devolvement back who is also deeply familiar with the codes and standards as well. This.

Year. Thanks again Casey. My name is Ralph Reed and this is fascinating beyond my life and I have a couple of questions that I'd like to follow up with something. Started a couple of the initial questions you answered tonight one of them. But I had seen before the exact location of the compressor room that was one of the things I want to do. The other one I'm not sure about is you know the exact location of the power panel was that caused the lights to fail the look. So the question is the location of the power panel the electric electrical power. And I don't specifically recall where that is. I believe it was in the basement. But there is a lot about the electrical system in the building and especially with the renovations and the multiple buildings that were put together to form the Coconut Grove. But one of the key issues that happened as well aside from the

possibility of a point of ignition possibility was the fact that the lights went out. They went out early in the event and this was another thing that came out of the Coconut Grove fire in terms of changes in the codes and standards. These exit signs that you see around here on a separate system a separate electrical system with battery backup power that they do not go out in an event. But as far as the exact location of the panel itself I have to tell you at NFPA in our files we do have the blueprints of the building and you know so that's interesting to take a look at that if that's something you ever want to see yet to follow but the reason why he asked that. I thought I had read someplace in one of one of the books. That was kept was made to. Get the roof open. You know the automated roof and of course they couldn't do it. But I thought they said they tried to do that from a power panel some way behind the stage. Yes as far as there was that retractable roof. And the question about

attempts to open it. The firefighters who I spoke with they never addressed that. And and I have heard stories about possible attempts to try to do that that were unsuccessful. But I've never been able to confirm that. And indeed as the event was unfolding I guess I stepped back and I think that by the time the fight of I was really getting in there I mean you know they were already knocking down the fire and it was really just pulling the people out. So time line wise I'm not sure how that would have impacted if they could have done it. Well the reason why I say this and I'd like you to comment on my my theory it's my contention that the door at the top of the stairs from the lounge but panic bar. That's huge huge much bigger even than any book I read. I know a little bit from my background about fires and combustion if that door had opened when people were trying to come up from the lounge. Maybe more would have perished and knowing the losses would've been like a blowtorch. But that would have

spread that would have slowed down the spread of that fire tremendously and especially if the power panel was upstaged. The lights would have stayed on much longer. In a panic wouldn't ensue the way it did. Well yes your point is well taken about that. For instance if that door at the top of the melody lounge had opened one of the clear things we see with the fire models that we use today it completely changes the dynamics of the fire in terms of the ventilation characteristics Jack. And you're right it would have been a it would have been a very different scenario that still would have been a large loss of life but it would have been very different in a lot of those people in the rest of the facility would not have been impacted the way it was that fire had nowhere to go. So but all the way to the other end and just really go through the crowd of people. Hi my name is Kevin. I just had a question about the way the people actually perished. Do they know if it was from actual fire or was it from the heat or was it from other causes being trampled for example.

That's a really good question about how the the victims perished. And it was a mix because when you go and you read the literature and not only in terms of the rescuers and how they were finding people in their personal accounts but also in the hospitals where they were finding people that were severely burned but some with no Burns who are actually perishing and then realizing that it was this respiratory damage that they had suffered and as well as other questions about you know possible toxic gas and so forth. But the firefighters when you read the stories for instance they'll talk they'll tell you that some of the people and one of the stories is about John Collins who was one of the people that we interviewed and he talks about when he first he was one of the first firefighters down at the the melody lounge and there was a very pretty girl he said sitting there and he's like What are you doing here. And he realized that she was sitting at the table but she was dead. And you know somehow she had died but seemed seemingly

untouched. And so that was a complete mix of people some who were had serious parents and some who had respiratory issues and so forth. There were very few the reports from the medical side. No reports of broken bones. And so in terms of crowd crush and other issues like that that didn't seem to be a factor. Thank you. Stephanie. Mr. Casey thank you for the presentation this evening. I have a very tough love interest in a coconut grove. So I was there the next morning before the days of TV We heard the news on the radio. My father was a fire captain. He said let's go. I was 10 years old. We went into the coconut grove. You found out before the days of the yellow tape they had the wooden bargas. So two of us were standing there. The burials were set back.

And a police officer came by. My father was talking to him and he found out he was a fire captain. And he says all come on in. So we went right over the front revolving doors both doors around the side locked in all the bodies have been removed. But it made a lasting impression. And I've never forgotten that. And I appreciate your presentation sir. Thank you. Thank you. Frank Fitzgerald and fire department chief retired. Thank you Chief. My name is Rick Winterson. Born and brought up in the suburbs living in Belmont at the time of the fire. I'm 74 I was six at that time. And a missed call. Xplornet lost his life in the fire. It was my father's boss. The old US Trust which was here 30 CT street where the

ocean Rashtra is now. I remember the Sunday night that we came in from the officials of the bank. Mr. Thorne was a vice president. And at 3:00 in the morning Monday morning work day my father got the word. The phone was right outside my bedroom and I remember him yelling in grief. My mother came out to comfort him and it was oh my god not call not call. And Monday morning of course there was the post headline Nov. 28 397 dead and counting hadn't yet finished. And. I interviewed some Suffolk students tonight who were doing a history paper on the fire. And I looked up Google it up. I remember that post headline like it was yesterday and I googled up the post headline and just felt the vibration in the 28. You know. And.

My father didn't want to take his job because it was right out of the recession at that time. And the protocol is you didn't take any man's job no matter what because of the unemployment that pertain to time. And I recognize. My memories are somewhat on the childish side. Six years old. And still very vivid in my mind. And affected my family very directly. And Mr. Ford was a good friend so. I can't. I'm. Tired. I'm from New Jersey and I. Found out about this fire as a child when I was reading I think it was life magazine or look magazine that had a spread that really highlighted the heroic nature of the medical community as they tried to deal with the burns. And the story featured a

sailor who was severely burned. And of course all kinds of new techniques to try to solve the problems of the massive burns that occurred in the irony of the story as I remember it and the memories still stick with me today as the sailor eventually recovered and went back to Iowa. And started a farming. Ironically one day he was plowing his field in his tractor tipped over and the gasoline spilled out and it burned to death and I just was struck by the irony of that. The efforts of the medical community and how critical they can be sometimes for us but I really appreciate your presentation tonight was very eye opening. Thank you. And just to follow up quickly I don't recall his name but it was a Coast Guard and then but your story is correct. And that was another medical milestone as he was burned over the

percentage of his body more than anyone else had ever been and survived and he was at Boston City Hospital and was really a remarkable case out of the whole Coconut Grove incident and again part of the whole medical milestone that was set. I believe his name is Clifford Johnson as I recall. And yet this is a really amazing story of survival. It was a really amazing story of survival and yet with a very tragic ending. My name is John Rattigan. It is very interesting presentation. I think everybody every Boston family has a story. And in my family there are a couple. And obviously it's second hand information but in 1942 my father was a resident at Boston City Hospital. And on that night he and my mother had intended to go to the Coconut Grove to attend

the Boston College victory celebration which was canceled. As you said because of the loss. So they decided to have a quiet dinner at a hotel dining room which some 30 years later was the site of another tragic fire the hotel Vendome. And after dinner they came out and they could hear the sirens screaming and the doorman told them that there was a bad fire at the grove. So my father said perhaps I'd better check in at the hospital. And the doorman said if you're a doctor you're calling all the doctors in. So he and my mother went down just to check in and she was in the waiting area and watching. One body after another being brought in and she was about two months pregnant and in the middle of all this she fainted. And with all the chaos the nurses had to revive her and put her in a cab sent her home. My father didn't come home for three days

after that. Two of his patients were a college classmate at Boston College. And his wife. Who were badly burned but did survive who did go to the grove that evening. And my father's brother was a parish priest in South Boston. And one of the fire houses down there stopped at the St. Monica's. And took him aboard to administer last rites and which he did. And his one memory was that the number of very young women who all had engagement rings not wedding bands but this was the first year of the war and many engagements took place. And that was his one memory. So as I said every family has and has these memories but thank you. Thank you so much for that memory.

My name is Sean Colby on the member of the Boston Fire Department. I had a quick question. You said you touched briefly on the bus boy. Stanley Thomas who obviously lit the match Well General to talk about the background story with that it seems like a match to light ball back in and somebody in a mood to you know have some privacy. Was he ever studied during the inquiry whether or not that was the faulty wiring inside the club that simply scoring that light ball back in could have caused the short circuit that had ultimately caused the fire. And whether or not that if that had never happened that perhaps the fire never happened. I never really think about that. I was just curious. Well yes. And you sort of explained it as you asked it and it did come out during the inquiry that there were there were all kinds of questions like the electrical wiring. And wait a minute you know if the match did touch something yeah maybe that got things started. But what if it was the electrical wiring and that was unclear in terms of what role the electrical wiring might have had. But there was also

the question about. OK. Even aside from the fact that it was a match or a spark or whatever it was why did it just take off the way it did. I mean that was the bigger mystery and really the concern on the professional side is like you know that just shouldn't happen just like at the station fire. You know it was like we knew it was the acoustical interior of foam and so forth. But what was it at the Coconut Grove and that is that is a mystery today. So it is a mystery as well in terms of the exact point of ignition still. And you know unfortunately that young man was sort of again found guilty in the press but it was you know it was never it was never clear what that actual single point of ignition was that evening. I just have one more question I remembering correctly that they supposedly found nothing wrong with the wiring after the fire. Nothing that could have possibly cause a fire. You know we obviously know that it was. Well you know it legally.

Yeah. There were things found improper and not correct with the wiring. So yeah there were there were problems with the wiring. Yes. I think one of the one of the issues was was there as thorough an investigation is there might be today in that I think is another one of the unanswered questions about the fire and how it started and how it spread so quickly. Just one hope we have one over here. Thank you. I'm just curious. The point of origin. Bacon is pretty much with the match. Right hand at the mouth OK. If the busboy had matches so the point of origin. Is presumably where he is near the compressor room. How did he get out. How. Because most of the people I understand didn't make it out of the melody room right.

That's not entirely true. The people in terms of the people who escape from the melody lounge there were a number of people who were killed who went up the stairs because that was the obvious way out. So going out the way you came in and they perished because they ran into the roadblock of all the other people up there. And the only ways out once you got to the top of the stairs were locked exit or the revolving door. However there were people who didn't go that way. They went into the kitchen. They went in through the basement. In fact Daniel Weiss who we interviewed for our 1991 article who became a well-known psychiatric doctor in the Boston area for years. He was he was tending the cash register at the bar when the fire occurred. His primary job is to protect the cash register. He's not supposed to leave it during a fight or whatever because you know sometimes is what is called they cause a commotion just to get the cash register. So he stayed. Well it turned out when the fire

was really under way there was no way he was going to get out. He got a wet rag. He got down on the floor and he stayed until it just got quiet and he could hear noise in the distance. But he got very quiet and melody lounge. And then he waited and he waited and then he he jumped over the bar stayed low on the floor crawled into the kitchen and escaped with other people who had gone into the kitchen. So there were people who did survive in the melody lounge at night and went out through that way and then eventually did get out of the basement. I assume. I don't know exactly his his way out. But he I'm assuming that it was something similar. I think it was something like I think he escaped with some of the other employees because they knew of the other ways out the other ways out through the kitchen area. The employee the patrons of the bar the only exit they knew was where they came in which is the revolving door and they headed back in that direction. Where

whereas many of the staff. Went into the kitchen and went in that direction and many many did not survive. Many did survive going in that direction. It points out that the fire was a little bit arbitrary in terms of who lived and who died. And I do want to just add one additional point here is that the way that codes are set up even then. But today as well that every point that is a place of assembly or where public people can gather like we are here. There was always at least two completely independent ways that you can get out. And they have to be made known and so forth. But once again the Coconut Grove didn't have that for those patrons it was that just going up the stairs. That's all they knew. About. The door at the top of the stairs. I've heard that there were doors that were locked. Yes the door was locked that was the picture I showed at the end of the presentation correct it had it

had the panic hardware on it but it was bolted shut in two spots. And then this gets back to part of the guilt of the owner and others while the owner primarily was the only one convicted in involuntary manslaughter. But you know they had locked it to keep people from leaving without paying their bill. I just have a very short story to tell. What I was a little girl with that fire happened I was four years old. And we were living nearby at that time so my mother took me by the hand because she wanted to go see the ruins. By then the fire was out. So I was with her and we walked there. And even though I was just a little girl. I knew something bad had happened you know just by looking. At the ruins you just do. Even though we were a little kid I even asked him a question. You mentioned the glue in the ceiling but you didn't mention other causes. For

example they had that artificial leather. Covering the walls and the furniture. I don't forgot what it's called. They called. They were calling it Leatherette. You know whatever they call it I was under the impression they discovered that that was part of what might cause cause that situation the fumes from that. Yes. Yes. Is it true that the stuff that was in that was also used in hand-grenades. Well OK. I cannot confirm that last point but I can tell you that the leatherette was something that was looked at after the fire and the materials in the grove were of concern. And it gets back to even I mentioned about how a fire inspector. Lieutenant Frank Lynnae had done his inspection. Well part of that inspection including taking a piece of that material going out and trying to light it with a match and it wouldn't light. But today we realize that that's not the kind of procedure that is used all the materials that are in a building like we're in now go through these rigorous tests to determine not simply how easily they ignite

but what happens there's materials that are very hard to ignite but once they get going they will be I'm very hopeful that you know fumes that were caused. By that leatherette the actual fumes. Well that's what I'm. Yeah that's what I'm finding out right now is that there were materials like the leatherette