NOVA; To the Moon; Interview with Thomas P. Stafford, NASA astronaut, Air Force Officer, and Commander of Apollo 10, part 2 of 3

What do you think is that, that? Well, on Project Gemini, it was such a crucial step in going forward to Apollo, because all the efforts we learned in Gemini, the rendezvous, particularly since everything was based on doing a lunar orbit rendezvous. All the hardware was sized to do that. The performance of the command and service module, the lunar module, the Saturn 5 booster, was all based on assumptions we could successfully do a lunar orbit rendezvous, except nobody had ever done one. And so it was up to Shiran and I to do the first one in space. And we had our problems getting off the pad, if you remember, back in the Gemini program. Finally, after the Atlas of Geno vehicle blew up on us, really, the Geno was the one that blew up. We didn't put a transponder on Gemini 7, launched a Mormon level, the transponder on them as a target vehicle, and then we did the rendezvous. And several critical things, you're phasing, you have to get that down. You

like to have a trajectory that becomes somewhat insensitive, we work those out, but also you're out of plane can really eat your lunch. And if you remember what happened on Gemini and John Young and Mike Collins, they expended about half their fuel coming on us out of plane, complaining they did a whiffer deal right around the Geno target vehicle. So we've learned a lot about rendezvous, how to really make it work, the backup mode, what happens with the computer fails, if the inertia platform fails, if the radar fails. So how do you make it so the lighting is right? So we worked all of this out in Gemini, also the extra vehicular activities. We'll go into that, General. Let me just finish up and ask, I'm going to ask you about the EVAs, but let me ask you to finish up rendezvous. Who bought said rendezvous in spaces as easy as parking a car in your garage? What do you think about that? Well, the statement that the rendezvous in spaces is parking a car in your garage is to me absolutely way out in left field. There's no way. Because when

you park a car in the garage, you really go into a two dimensional area and it's all lined out for you to see it. It's a piece of cake, parking a car in a garage. In rendezvous in space, you have to have the right phasing to make the right approach. Also, you have to be sure that where the planes cross, you know that. If you don't get that right, you can expend all your fuel just like that and not make it. Now, Wally, who's a pretty good friend of mine, we spent a lot of time talking. Wally was very proud of what he did to get make that happen, especially after Mercury when his flight was kind of overshadowed by the whole Cuban Missile Crisis and everything. This Gemini-76 man will lot to him. How did Wally do is the commander of that. Oh, he did great. It was fun to fly with him. Wally's always a ball as a great laughter, a great sense of humor. But as working out the mechanics of that rendezvous, did he pay a lot of attention to that? Was he a good stickman, a veteran stickman there? Oh, he was a good stickman, but there was a lot in the calculations

and the analysis of the maneuvers to be made that you have to do. Good. Let's talk about rendezvous. I just talked to Gene Stern in last week and we talked about Gemini-9 and we talked about the problems he had out there. The EVA. Yeah, right. So, how difficult was it and what made it look easy? Well, that was a problem. So, Leonov, my old friend from Russia, did the first EVA and of course, then everything was a big secret in Russia. We suddenly saw this picture of him floating out for 10 minutes and he says, everything is fine. I have no problem. Later, when I got to know him real well as my counterpart in the Pablo Soyuz and we could speak of Biz Petr Vochika, it means without any interpreter. He nearly got killed out there. His suit ballooned and he didn't have a good device. He could reduce suit pressure, which is kind of dangerous. They could reduce suit pressure and he's built like a bull. He finally got a strength to get back in. Well, Ed White went out and he kind of floated around. He didn't think he had any problems controlling anything.

We didn't do a specific point task like that. Then when he came back in, his suit ballooned on him and he had a very difficult time getting back in. That's when we then made it over the center mechanism of a cable and a bar. We hooked onto the Gemini into the right hand hatch and Gemini so the commander could take and slam it like that, which I had to do with Gene Surnin to get him down in there. As soon as Surnin got out to start this longest space walk we would have, which is around two hours and ten minutes, two hours and five, two hours and ten minutes. Right away, he started huffing and puffing. I remember Gemini had a very lightweight suit, very comfortable and it inflated and inflated it trimmed to a position. Then to move your arms, you had to hold it if not quap. It would go back. Same way with your legs, buddy. We had no liquid cool garments like we developed for Apollo. Then there's all of this effort. We didn't have any major water boiler. We had a little evaporator and a little fan to blow on it. We were so naive. We didn't even think about

putting defog on our visor like you. You do when you go snarkly in your scuba diving. He was huffing and puffing. I was flying the spacecraft. I was pressurized. The hatch was open. About that far open. It was keeping local horizontal the best I could and Surnin was just torquing the heck out of the spacecraft. He says, Tom, I've got a hard time controlling myself. We didn't have a good way of simulating how you'd really do task in walking in space. We had a little polished steel out floor. You had some air branch you'd try to maneuver around. That's only two to mention. I'm asking the frictional forces. Were you getting worried about Surnin out there? Particularly when he got in the back and he said he was standing facing this pack in the back of the spacecraft. He said his back was burning up. Later we turned out what happened the super insulation that split on his suit on the left side. When he got down the day after landing, he looked back there. His back was still pink. He'd been burned. The flux

of the sun was coming right to the suit. The super insulation had torn from the zipper on one side. He was really huffing and puffing. Then as soon as the sun went down within a few minutes, he was trying to work in there. He fogged over. Then when he went to communications on the back back, he only had one way of two way calm. I said, this is not a good situation at all. I told him I said, look, you can read me. I said, if the sun comes up and you don't defog right away, we're going to call it quits. We're going to get out of the back back. We're down to about two or three steps to go before I would throw a switch and blow in loose. The sun came up. He was still fogged over and also the communications when he's hooked into the back back. Versus the hard landing he had on there. It was unacceptable. I called the ground on the contact set. I've called the quits. I'm going to get him back

in before we go in the next night time. Then he slowly worked his way back in. Of course, I had to pull in as snake he was on to get back in. Got him in the Seattle Deal maneuver like this and pulled down the bar with design and all that. Then I went and used this over the center mechanism. I was pressurized like that. Then he rushed it at home and then turned the pressure up. Of course, both our suits started to inflate. Finally, he just couldn't hardly move. When he opened his visor, he was absolutely pink like he'd been in a sauna about an hour too long. Then I had to help him get his gloves off. His hands were pink. What I did was take the water gun and just hose down his face to start cooling off. You know, he shouldn't have water splashing around in his spacecraft. I had to do it to cool him down and drink. Then that night, he nearly froze all the water. I think it was the data showed that the next day we landed and they flew the suit right back to Houston. Those were right off the east coast. They had over a pound or a pound and a half a water

out of each boot. But he lost, I think, ten pounds, ten and a half pounds and two hours and five minutes outside. So he said, wait a minute. Wait a minute. There is a lot. We do not know about walking in space and working and doing task in space. So how do we simulate it better? Well, then the idea came up about using a water tank. Finally, we were able to do that, I think, before our Gemini 12. From that, you can very, you ballast a new suit to buoyancy and then hook up the right connections and you can start to really evaluate things. So Aldrin had a very significant increase in capability on Gemini 12. Now, suppose we had never done any of this. Say, we'll be, we're going to the moon and never done it with Apollo. It would have been a disaster. Perfect. What did Deeks say to you in the transit ban on the way out to the launch for Gemini 9 about if Gene got stuck out there? Well, it was in the trailer we had on Pad 16. We had a double trailer put together

with drive, you know, security vehicle. Take us down to Pad 16. We'd suit up there if the suit techs. I wasn't one room genius in the other one. And then I had on my underwear. It was like a long handles you have on. And I had my urine collection device on and my bio med harness was on. I was suiting up. I had my, my pressure suit about halfway on. Deek came in and told the suit tech to leave. Said, we got to talk to him. And he said, Tommy says, NASA management wanted me to let you know, you know, this is the first time we're having a space walk all the way around the world. So I wanted to get this tether. And something happens to him out there. And if he dies, you've got to bring him back because we can't afford to have a dead astronaut floating around out there. I looked at him. I said, we've never talked about this before. And I said, wait a minute. I said, have they thought what this is about because to bring him back, I've got to have that cord coming through the hatch, which means I am depressurized. I've got to, you

know, finally set the program up, fire the retros and all that, which I could do. But then we never simulated one with a big mass at rocket pack when you're firing retros. Remember, Jimmy did not have an autopilot for retro fire. It had a little round ball, roll around circle and eight ball. And you had to put the spacecraft there and you held it. When the retros fired, you flew the spacecraft and controlled the torques. But what happens during that, if you have this big mass out there, torquing you around. So that's number one. Number two, assuming I get through retro fire and I blow off the adapter sections back there and get squared away for our entry. I started my entry. I said, you know, we don't have too much stability to start with in Jimmy. Let me start right there. But analysis, general. What would have happened if you'd had to? Well, what I went on to tell Dick was, look, I said, assuming I can get through the retro fire maneuver, then I start the reentry. And the spacecraft doesn't have too much stability to start with, you know, small margins and stability. And what's going to, we've

never simulated what would happen coming in like this and oscillates. And here you have this thing hooping around. It's pretty well insulated him and his suit and the big mass of that rocket pack and telling all that hooping around, what would that do to it? And would it get, would it bounce back and forth over probably the, you know, I was just thinking as I was talking to him, you know, that because of ballistic number, the, the, the Gemini would be in front. But this thing is going to be hooping this all around. I said, some furthermore, I've got an open hatch and all I have is this thin suit goes in up just one layer of nylon over the bladder. And I've got 3200 degree plasma coming a couple of inches right above my shoulders through that open hatch. I said, he's got seven layers of insulation. That's not going to help him too much. He's dead anyway. But I've got one layer here and this, this plasma is going to come through the hatch. And I've got to be rolling a spacecraft back and forth to try to get the lift vector in to come down here. And then suppose we even get through all that and the parachute comes out to, there's

going to be something left there. I'll clear with all that big heavy insulation. Then a pilot shoot comes out. Is that going to get snared with what's left of certain? And then here comes the main parachute out. Is that going to get snared? And with what's left up there? And then I remember Gus's spacecraft sank in Mercury. And so here I'm going to plop down in the ocean with the space with a hatch open. What happens then? And he says, well, what should I tell a NASA management? And I said, you tell them that when the bolts blow, I'm the commander. And we'll take care of this in real time. So anyway, let's tuck a little while to go into all this. So anyway, I got all suited up. I was lost later in Gene. So we come out. And of course, we didn't have any sophisticated gear where we could talk back and forth to each other. And so the first time I could talk, we got over to Pad 19. We got into Pad and we plugged in. And he said, hey, Tommy said, what did Dick talk to you so long about over there? He said he said that he hoped we'd have

a good flight today. So I never told Gene a thing about that. And we scrubbed out. We didn't go. Because at this time, the, the Atlas blew up. We did some loops out there and raised this. I never mentioned a thing to discern it. I told Dick, you know, it's going to be a real time decision. He said, fine. And I said, probably I'll cut him loose. If he really is dead, I'll do all I can. But if he's dead, I mean, there's a good chance you're going to jeopardize the spacecraft and me too, coming in. So anyway, we then had another launch attempt. And we scrubbed out at T minus three minutes when we couldn't get the asthma update. Then we finally launched and we did Jimny and I and certain had all the problems out there, which we learned so much about. You know, that's what a development program is about. You'll test program. You learn things about it. So anyway, after we got back and we landed right off these coasts back, we set the record as far as close as spliced out of any of the, the Gemini Apollos or the first shuttle landing because John

glided along on the first shuttle landing. And we came right back through the cape and we're back in the astronaut corners having a drink. And so finally, we're having a drink and get relaxed. I said, okay, Jean, now let me tell you what Dick really said and what went on there. That's great. Now, where were you when, when Neil and, um, uh, uh, who was it? Jimny Scott, Neil and Scott spotted a control. Where were you? What did you think was going on there? Do you think they were in serious trouble? Well, we were training, you know, certain I took over after the tragic aircraft crash. I broke off on the airplane and from seeing bass and we took over as prime. So we had to train a lot. And those days like Apollo, the crew that was getting the next one up to launch would use the simulators to keep the crew behind them and use the simulators at Houston. And we had a simulator in Houston. So certain, uh, we all were mission control, solemn launch. And then we were training in

the simulator doing simulations. When somebody came and said, Hey, uh, Paul, uh, Jimny eight has had major problems and they've gone through one ring of reentry fuel and half the other and they're bringing them down right away. So we just out of the simulation, we got over there. I said, what happened? And they didn't really know they said the thing spun up. It looks like it was a stuck thruster. So we just got over there as they were target them for retrofire. Well, after the fire, as we dug into it, there were all kinds of things, you know, that were major issues of shortcomings in that spacecraft like the inward ceiling hatch versus an outward opening hatch like we had in Germany. And some of us that complain we need to have an outward opening hatch in Apollo, just like Jimny. Some program managers said, no, I can't afford it. Time, money and the schedules too tight. That was just one thing. And it was just all types of things. The software was horrible.

So you know, the astronauts got deeply involved in all these design decisions. In fact, George Lose sent me and charge of the software up to MIT and Pete Conrad is my deputy and would fly a T-38 into Boston, Logan and stay there hotel, I think, called the charter house right near down to MIT lab and we'd go there a week after week after week, you know, to get the software rewritten whereas at least, you know, suitable, operationally suitable because it was just, it was all right for a nerd. That's all you want to do is set there and punch your computer, but you had to do a few other things like that when you fly a spacecraft. And so, yes, John Young was deeply involved in environmental control system. Frank Bournemont was involved with the boosters. Everybody was deeply, oh, legitimate and guidance in control. So we were all very busy in working all types of issues in the design, the redesign of that Apollo spacecraft and the lunar module. Now as Deek was making the assignments and the rotation and you were coming up and you

knew you were going to do Apollo 10. I know there was some discussion at the administrative levels about, you know, 10 is going to get up there, it's going to get close, should it land? Was that ever a consideration of yours? Did you think, hey, we're going to be within 50,000 feet of this thing? Well, it's a very wishful thinking, you know, we're going to be that close. We're taking a lunar module all the way to lunar and our landing, but the problem was lunar module 4 that I had was the heavyweight lunar module. Neil had lunar module 5. Now originally I had lunar module 5, not that that was designated to land, but the lunar module program got into development problems and they finally gave drumming, I think $10,000 a pound for every pound that could carve out. And the first one that finally got the superweight improvement program was lunar module 5. So my lunar module was too heavy to land. Furthermore, the software for all the power decent, that final power decent, all that hadn't been worked out when I flew. So we didn't have all the equations in there, so I couldn't have landed. I would have loved to, but I couldn't. Described to

me getting down that close. I mean, it had to be a thrill. You talk about when you go farther faster and higher. You were down to 50,000 feet. Describe what was going through your mind. What we are seeing now. Well, it was really unique. First of all, lunar orbit velocity is so much slower than Earth orbit velocity. You're doing 5,500 feet per second versus 25,700 feet per second. So even though you're lower, you would have more appearance, you know, moving faster, but you're still the relative velocity. You're so much slower. But the one thing was trying to judge distance down there. Here around the Earth, you get used to an orbit of, you look at rivers and you see, you know, interstate highways when the weather is right and cities and there's some judging of distance. Up there, there was no roads, no section lines. There was nothing, no cities to look at and trying to judge distance. So I put, we had the map that we're going down. We put that out in front of us and put them down and look at these awesome craters and boulders. Those boulders are what really amazed me. But what were you thinking as you were looking at this?

It was just something I'd never seen before, even though I'd looked at photos of them. But it was just so unique to see these big boulders. I thought we were as big as a three or four-story building. Well, they were bigger than they asked for them down in Houston, just topped up. They're various ones, you know. Of course, they're preserved. They hadn't been wind or rained to erode them over the years. What did you learn? I mean, you were scouting for the landing. Well, the radar had to work. The lunar landing radar had to work. So, and it worked better than spec. We locked on that lunar surface higher than spec was. It had to work because that's what up rates of vector, you know, it's for the guidance to bring you down there. So we were able to lock on the lunar surface and use the lunar landing radar. We then photomapped and picked out, you know, the landing site, proposed landing site to really wire that down to the best of our ability. We then did the first rendezvous around the moon, used the radar and the lunar module for the lunar environment, all the

techniques to rendezvous around the moon, rendezvous, and then we stayed there for another day and really did a lot of tracking on the moon using optics to really wire down the lunar data base. Didn't you make some discoveries there about the mass cons, the mass concentrations again? Oh, yes. Talk to me about that and that would further future missions. Well, we didn't, as I only came across SMYC as one of the dark sides of the moon, part of the man in the moon face, before we got to see it, we got shot down about 20 feet per second and shot back up. Now, we were in orbit, so we couldn't feel it, but it accelerated us down and right back up, so that was a big heavy mass there, so it does affect your orbit. Well, you know, we couldn't feel when it was happening to us, but it was really unique. And so there were all these things they were tracking us from the earth through different sites, putting together the vectors and all that, so we'd have lots more wired down, so when Apollo 11 will go a few months later. Now, there was a moment on

the open loop there where Gino said something like, you know, son of a bitch or something, he got, well, what happened? Well, we were going upside down and facing backwards, upside down and backwards to come into blow off the linear module decent stage. I'll get that story to say, we're going to switch mags one more time.