American Experience; Freedom Riders; Interview with Raymond Arsenault, 3 of 5

[Test tone ends][background noise] [PA] Quiet please. We're rolling. [Interviewer]: Okay, so we're going to get this, um. [Arsenault]: Yeah. [Interviewer]: So Seigenthaler y- know- ?inaudible? -feels good Y- know put Kennedy in there an- then. Ok. [Arsenault]: Ok. John Seigenthaler finally gets to his hotel room in New Orleans, the Freedom Riders are safe, he calls to the Justice Department in Washington. He tells them "it's over, th- the Freedom Ride is over--" let me start- th- over. I'm not getting that right- not th- right pacing here. [Interviewer]: You can start with Pro'lly just start with y- know "Seigenthaler calls to the Justice Department," he- he's going to get us to his room, so when Seigenthaler calls the Justice Department. [Arsenault]: John Seigenthaler calls the Justice Department, he tells them, "it's over, the Freedom Ride is finally over." President Kennedy can go off to the summit meeting in Vienna with a clear conscience, not worrying about the headlines. Um- uh, now what was I- oh I'm sorry I forgot to saw what I was going to say after that. Oh- then an- then the Diane Nash, thats right. Let me do that over again. [Clears throat]

John Seigenthaler c- calls Washington, he calls the Justice Department, he tells them, "the Freedom Ride is over. Finally-" Oh, I'm so sorry, I'm mixing everything up here. [clears throat] John Seigenthaler calls Washington, calls the Justice Department. Oh-God why do I keep messing that up? I keep doubling it up. Using the same words. [Interviewer]: That sounds great, thats great, that's fine. [Arsenault]: Yeah, yeah. [Interviewer]: just keep going. I think you're fine. [Arsenault]:Yeah? ok- ok- ok [Arsenault] John Seigenthaler calls the Justice Department in Washington, he tells tells them, "it's over, the Freedom Ride is over, President Kennedy can go off to Vienna to the summit meeting with a clear conscience not worrying about the headlines." Seigenthaler goes to sleep, he th- he thinks he's done his job. 2 hours later the phone rings, "who in the hell is Diane Nash?" It- it's a call from the Justice Department. Th- that I- I shulda I messed up the end of it. [Interviewer] Okay, one more time.

[Arsenault] Okay. John Seigenthaler calls the Justice Department in Washington. He tells them, "it's over, the Freedom Ride is finally over, President Kennedy can go off to Vienna to the summit meeting with a clear conscience, he doesn't have to worry about the- 'bout the headlines." Seigenthaler goes to sleep. 2 hours later the phone rings, it's the Justice Department calling back, "Who in the hell is Diane Nash?" someone asks. [Interviewer] That's good, we got it. Ok- [Arsenault Laughs][Arsenault]: Ok- ok, never doing in again. [Clears throat][Interviewer]: I want to talk a little bit about the Nashville movement, and this- this can be very short, [Arsenault]: Mm [Interviewer]: Y- know, um, so- so the nash- so- so- we want to talk about them picking up the rides Y- know, an- [Arsenault clears throat][Interviewer]: I think that- that- that- that- that- [Arsenault] about Jim Lawson? workshops or? [Interviewer] No, its jus- just, I just wanna- I think for me the- the thing is that- that y- know the, y- know Nashville-- y- know so, uh, let's cut out when I cut. [offscreen]: Mhm

[Arsenault] Okay, uh. For several years there'd been a powerful student movement in Nashville, um centered around non-violent workshops led by Reverend Jim Lawson, um. The Nashville students were committed, they were well organized, they were well trained, and they were victorious, um. They- they brought down Jim Crow in much of downtown Nashville, uh, and they were thirsting for more- for more challenges, uh. They had a sense of themselves, a sense of- of power of nonviolence, uh, and when the original Freedom Ride, um seemed to fail, they were ready to step in, and to take over. [Interviewer] Beautiful, thank you. [Arsenault] ok, The Nashville students were, they were veterans of the moment, uh. They knew what it meant to get arrested, to spend time in jail, uh, they weren't scared of jail, they embraced it, uh. They- they came armed with a philosophy of non-violence, they were trained by

Jim Lawson, uh, they knew the dangers, um, but they- th- they knew what they had to do, to push the moment forward. [Interviewer] 'We can't do that, that there's a group of Freedom Riders is now stuck in the- in the Birmingham bus station. [Arsenault]: uh, lets see- ok. Th- the Freedom Riders, uh, let me start again. The Nashville riders make their way back to Birmingham. Now you have 2 waves of riders there and once again they're trapped in the Birmingham bus station. Do you want more than that? [Interviewer]: Yeah, yeah, um, uh. [Arsenault]: An- oh, you want about the Kennedy [Interviewer]: Yeah, say- say- [Arsenault]: uh, and so the Kennedy administration an- they have to start negotiation. [Interviewer]: Say- say so- so- so- [Arsenault]: Okay. The first group of Nashville riders make it back to Birmingham from the Tennessee border. There's a second wave of riders from Nashville already

there, so now you've got 2 groups of Nashville riders stuck in the Birmingham, um, bus station, uh. This requires the Kennedy administration, everybody concerned to try to figure out how to get them out of there. You want something more than that? [Interviewer]: Yeah, let's try it one more time, I'm sorry. [Arsenault]: No it's ok. [Interviewer]: Um, just say that, um, y- know, they- they're stuck there, why are they stuck there? They stuck there because no- no- no- bec- because no bus driver will refuse 'cause they can't get a bus driver who will drive them. [Arsenault]: Okay, you want to talk about about a hot me- about a- Hoffa an- that stuff or no? [off screen coughs][Interviewer] He's lost to history in more ways than one. [Arsenault]: Yeah, yeah right. [Interviewer]: OK, ready? [Arsenault]: Ok. The first group of Nashville riders make their way back to- to Birmingham from the Tennessee border. They discover, they already knew- [Interviewer]: Yeah- I'm sorry- [Arsenault]: Yeah? [Interviewer]: You can just say they don't get back by high-noon, but they get back by 3. From the- [Arsenault]: Okay, start there then. [Interviewer]: Yeah. [Arsenault]: Ok. Th- the Nashville riders- uh, sor- I'mma start again. The original group of

Nashville riders, they get back to Birmingham not by high-noon, but by 3 o'clock and there's another wave of riders from Nashville already there. So now you've got 2 groups of Nashville riders stuck in the Birmingham bus station, uh. How are they going to get them out? Well there are all kinds of negotiations, uh, by the Kennedy administration, by the leaders of the movement. Trying to figure out how to get them out of there, but no bus driver will take them, uh. Jimmy Hoffa, the leader of the Teamsters Union has said, "none of my riders is going to get on any of those buses." Uh, Greyhound can't find any drivers who'll do it, um, so it's a- it's a huge problem and they- they're stuck there for- for- for a- for a long time. [Interviewer]: OK, um, If you could say- [Arsenault]: No- no, thats too long a time- well- I'm jus- thinkin' I- I, um. [Interviewer]: -And so they're stuck there. [Arsenault]: Yeah, do you want to just the end of it, um, uh? Wanna do it again? [Interviewer]: Yeah- yeah, you said "none of- none of my riders," not "none of my drivers." [Arsenault]: Oh did I? Oh, ok, god I- uh, s- terrible. [Interviewer]: It's ok.

[Arsenault]: The first group of Nashville riders made it back from the Tennessee border, back to Birmingham not by high-noon, but by 3 o'clock and there's a 2'nd wave of riders already there so now you have 2 groups of Nashville riders stuck in the Birmingham bus station. How are they going to get out, uh? Negotiations by the Kennedy administration, by the leaders of the movement, uh- uh. They've got a terrible problem, uh. Jimmy Hoffa, the leader of the Teamsters' Union says "none of my drivers are going to get on any of those buses." Uh, Greyhound corporation can't find any drivers willing to get on the bus, um. So the Riders are stuck there and it's not clear how they're ever going to get out of Birmingham. [Interviewer]: Um, and- and just add- and- and- and so Bobby Kennedy calls the, uh. Head of the Greyhound Corporation. [Arsenault]: Ok. [Interviewer]: Just add that. [Arsenault]: So Bobby Kennedy calls the, uh regional manager the Greyhound Association trying to figure out how Greyhound can can- uh, sorry, say- [Interviewer]: Is it Greyhound Association? [Arsenault]: It- it's the

southeast, I'm trying to think of the exact, um. It's not a- [Interviewer]: Y- you can just say Greyhound. That- that'll be fine. [Arsenault]: O- ok- ok. So Bobby Kennedy calls the Greyhound manager- No- no- no- not manager, um, w- um,I'm trying to think, um. Want me to just call it's Greyhound? [Interviewer]: Sounds great. [Arsenault]: Ok- So Bobby Kennedy calls Greyhound trying to figure out how they can get some driver on that bus to take those Riders out of Birmingham an- to- down to Montgomery. [Interviewer]: Okay, thats good, mhm. Great, talk about how- how- how it comes about that Seigenthaler and Patterson have a meeting. [Arsenault]: Bobby Kennedy was really getting frustrated and he threatened to, um, to issue an- uh, no, wh- whas I trying to say. Lets see- 'm sorr- trying to think how to phrase it, um- um. Bobby Kennedy was getting frustrated, as was the president, and they decided to prepare the way for intervention in Alabama and they got word

to John Patterson that it was about to happen. John Patterson gets on the phone with Bobby Kennedy and they go back and forth a kind of jawboning session an eve- [Interviewer]: L- let me interrupt, uh. Im sorry. [Arsenault]: Th- its the jawboning one isn- [Interviewer]: N- N- no, I love the jawboning- [Arsenault]: Freedom Riders you won't do anything and we're going to have the federal government is going to have to intervene. [Interviewer]: Yeah, we will- [Arsenault]: And they didn't really make it clear what they meant saying troops- [Interviewer]: Yea- yeah but uh, [Interviewer] They say if you don't collect the Freedom Riders, we will, the federal government will. Ok? [Arsenault]: Ok- ok- [Interviewer]: But I think again y- know- [Arsenault]: I understand. [Interviewer]: Y' know- alright- y- know, an- I'm not- it's jus- I'm not- it's just not intervention- [Arsenault]: That's to, alright I understand. [Interviewer]: Ok, Let's go ahead. [Arsenault]: Bobby Kennedy was getting frustrated. He gets word to John Patterson, uh, that, uh, if the state of Alabama won't protect the Freedom Riders, won't end this crisis, then the federal government would have to do it. They have to step in in some way. Patterson realizes that he's got to do something. He gets on the phone with Bobby Kennedy and they go back and forth, a kind of jawboning session for several minutes. At one point Patterson's shouting into the phone but finally he realizes that, uh, he's got to- he's gotta do

something specific so he says "can't you send somebody down to Montgomery to talk to my staff, to figure this out?" and that opens the way for John Seigenthaler going down to Montgomery to talk with John Patterson. [Interviewer]: Okay, great. That makes sence? [Arsenault]: S- wait 'Jim's'; there are only 2 in there, Jim Zwerg an- William Barbee. [Interviewer]: Well- Just- just to condition th- of the people, that Zwerg and Barbee, ar- are massively hurting, an- but the other ones a- ar- are- have been beat up an- ?inaudible? [Arsenault Clears Throat] [Arsenault]: Let me see, ok. A number of the Riders, after the- the riot at the Montgomery station, were- were shaken up or injured, uh, 3 of them pretty badly, John Lewis who didn't go to the hospital but William Barbee and Jim Zwerg did, uh, and they suffered massive injuries and it was uh, oh- sorry. Trying to think. [Interviewer]: Thats good- you can start right there, 'cause we got- [Arsenault]: Just- [Interviewer]: -We'll pick up- [Arsenault]: -stop that? [Interviewer]: Nah- you can keep going, they- they, we've got the-

injuries a- a- and the riders were pretty beat up ?inaudible? [Arsenault]: Oh- ok, well the thing is that most of them weren't. I mean most of them escaped without too much physical harm, uh, m- most of them were- mo- they were more shaken up, uh, than anything, an- they- y- know they really weren't badly hurt, most of them, um. I mean John Lewis obviously had the bandage on his head and uh, so I don't- I don't know how you want me- [Interviewer]: Ok, Let's cut- lets cut- -Rollin- [Arsenault]: The riot at the Montgomery bus terminal required a response from the movement, they could'nt let this pass, uh. The movement had to make a statement that it stood behind the freedom riders, uh, so they call a mass meeting. First Baptist Church in Montgomery. Ralph Albernathy's church, Dr. King flew in, Jim Farmer flew in, uh. Fred Shuttlesworth came down from Birmingham in a show of solidarity. Nearly 1,500 people, many of them parishioners of First Baptist, showed up to show their support for the

Freedom Riders. It was in an incredible scene, unprecedented really. The Freedom Rides had been very controversial at that point, there wasn't solid support for it in the movement. Many people thought was a big mistake, uh, that they were squandering the resources of the movement, that there were to get themselves killed, that it was a- that it was a- a- you know foolhardy venture. But once the Freedom Riders were attacked in Montgomery they had to close ranks, they had to come together, uh. To make a general statement that nonviolence could not be pushed out of Alabama via violence. That the moment was committed, uh, to fighting Jim Crow, um, through nonviolent means in Alabama, and everywhere else in the south. [Interviewer]: Great, um- I dont- Can you just do it again- I'm not sure you might have done this already-- I'm sorry, it sliped me you know, um, If- if you- you can say that the next day, you know or the day after the Montgomery riots." [Arsenault]: Ok. The next day after the Montgomery riot, it was clear

that- the riot required a response from the movement. That the movement couldn't let this pass, that they had to make a statement, uh, that civil rights advocates everywhere stood behind the freedom riders, uh. That they could not go into Montgomery and just get beaten and pushed out by violence. So they called a mass meeting, in support for the Freedom Riders at the First Baptist Church Ralph Abernathy's church. Dr. King flew in, Jim Farmer flew in. Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth came down from Birmingham. They fill that church, 1,500 people, there were newsmedia media- people there, cameras whirring, um. You know print- print- um, sorry- [Interviewer]: ?inaudible? [Arsenault]: There were print journalists, uh, there to- to- to cover the scene, um, and they were making a statement, um, that the movement was behind the Freedom Rides, there had been disagreements before, many people thought it had been a mistake. That they were squandering the resources of the movement, that they were going to get themselves killed, that it was a bad idea, but now they had to close ranks. Now they had to come together.

Dr. King had to come in and say so, Jim Farmer had 'ta- lock arms with the Nashville kids, they had to say that "we're in this together," that "the Freedom Rides are here to stay." That "we're not going to get pushed out Alabama by violence," that "the Freedom rides, uh, um, means something to the entire movement, and we're not- we're not leaving until- until th- the day of democracy. The beloved community comes a little closer in Alabama." [Interviewer]: Great, love that passion, great. ya' alright? [Arsenault]: Oh yeah! [Interviewer]: -ght, so 'you thought this was foolhardy an- a mistake. [Arsenault]: There were a number of people in the movement who thought the freedom rides where a mistake. Roy Wilkins the head of the NAACP y- know callled Jim Farmer and said 'I hear your goin' on that joyride', uh. Farmer you know, laughed it off, but, uh, he knew that Wilkins was serious- that Wilkins thought that was a bad idea, uh. The movement had y- know limited resources, uh, they were stretched to the limit, uh. They had many- many court cases coming up

and it looked like the freedom rides were going to- not only use resources, but might get people killed. It was going to cr- create a sense that the movement was radical. That it wasn't committed to the rule of law, all these kinds of things. Images of outside agitators, uh- uh, civil disorder and so- many people thought that this was not- not a great idea. That these- these- these kids didn't know what they're getting themselves into, um. An- that it was an uncertain future for- for the freedom rides, and so it took a lo- a lot of uh, a lot of uh- um, I- I don't know what I was going to say there at the end. [Interviewer]: Um- did it seem that- that in some ways, that this was kind of CORE's folly? that it was y- know Jim Farmer and CORE, wanting to kinda step out there, was that part of what pro- [Arsenault]: There were institutional rivalries, and personal rivalries, and disagreements about philosophy- and strategy, is- that sound a problem? [Interviewer]: It is now- [Arsenault]: Oh- ok- [Interviewer Laughing][Arsenault]: Oh I'm sorry,

I- I saw you- I saw you listening- i'm so sorry- I'm so- [Interviewer]: I jus- I try to let it go, just praying that it'll stop, an- [Arsenault]: Ok- [Interviewer]: -then It'll be fine. [Arsenault]: Ok- want me to start up again? [Interviewer]: Yeah, I mean- I think- I think the problem is that we don't wanna talk about a lot of names- [Arsenault]: Some leaders in a moment, saw CORE, as an interloper that- they really had li- almost no experience in the south. That they didn't know what they were doing, and that this was a challenge to the supremacy the NAACP, and the southern christian leadership conference, and so not everybody looked on as favorably. Part of it was a legitimate disagreement about tactics, um that this was a kind of, uh, confrontational non violent direct action, um that- m- that, uh, that might backfire, uh, it might put a lot of people in jail expend a lot of resources. That might get some people killed, uh, most people realize that at some point, you would have to take the struggle out of the courtroom, and into the streets. But the NAACP and SCLC, I think wanted to, uh, keep control of when

those decisions would be made, and- and the balance between, y- know legal action and nonviolent direct action, um. So there was a bit of resentment of CORE an- a notion that J- Jim C- Farmer an- the others are trying to, sort of horn in on other people's action. [Interviewer]: Mhm, jus- o- one- one more quest-, really short one, so- so- peopl- so- so there was a feeling that the Freedom Rides were a mistake? [Arsenault]: Definitely. Many people thought the Freedom Rides was a mistake. Within the movement, outside the movement, p- public opinion ran against the Freedom Riders. Nearly everybody supported their goals, but very few people actually, uh, supported, uh, the- the- the details of their strategy. They thought it was too confrontational, uh, it- that it was going to backfire, it was gonna set the movement back, uh. It was too risky, they just didn't have the resources or the skill, uh, or th- really the know-how about, uh, the inner workings of- of- of- of Jim Crow, and racism, an- how to fight in the deep south. [Interviewer]: Great- thank you. [Arsenault]: The Kennedy administration was very

reluctant to call out the national guard for a number of reasons. Most obviously political, they didn't want to make a mistake that they thought Dwight Eisenhower had made, uh, back in 1957 in Little Rock. They did not want to evoke images of reconstruction, uh. John Kennedy himself I think had a rather traditional, uh, notion of what had happened during reconstruction, an- that it had been a mistake. That was it a kind of tragic error, uh, that the federal government should try to stay out of it, in terms of direct intervention in southern affairs, um. So they- that was the last thing they wanted to do, they didn't want to provoke the white southerners, uh. They probably had more political capital to spend then they realized, but of course the, uh, election of 1960 had been very close, uh. John Kennedy did not have a large mandate, he did not have a large m- democratic majority in congress, uh, he was looking forward to the 1962 election. He didn't want to do anything to disturb, um, his political advantages and he- and his advisors were telling him that this

was a potential disaster, an- that you got to do almost anything to prevent the appearance of military intervention in the south on behalf of a- black southerners and civil rights activists. [Interviewer]: uh, ok. [Arsenault]: Uh, Dr, King's on the phone with bobby kennedy during the riot, during the siege- uh, of the church [Interviewer]: Lets start over. [Arsenault]: Ok, um, not call it a? [Interviewer]: No you said kinda ?call it a? an- they we callin- it a seige an- so- that- that'd be better for us 'cause- [Arsenault]: The seige. Right- right. [Interviewer]: -we got the riot. [Arsenault]: Dr. King and Bobby Kennedy were in direct communication during the seige. They're on the phone trying to work things out, try to figure out what to do, uh. Dr. King saying 'The situation here is desperate, you have got to do something, you've got to figure out some way, um, to uphold the rule of law' uh. Bobby Kennedy of course until the very last minute wanted to avoid, at least the appearance of direct intervention, uh.

He wanted John Patterson to do it, he wanted it to appear to come from the state level, not the federal level, and the back and forth between king and- and- and Bobby Kennedy was a- one of the remarkable dramas of the civil rights- civil rights movement. [Interviewer]: Go on. [Arsenault]: Well here you have, uh, y- know kind of the designated leader, the iconic leader of the movement, talking directly to the attorney general, uh. Y- know this became more common later in the 1960's but in 1961 this was uh- unprecedented, uh, it- it gave Dr. King a stature that civil rights leaders had- had- not had before, uh, it was, uh, a- kind of- y- know, personal contact, that becomes one of the hallmarks of the movement later but in 1961 it was a- real affirmation of the- of the movement's power i- it was a sense that we've got th- the attorney generals attention. We've got the administration's attention, uh, we're not getting everything from them that we want perhaps, uh, but they know we're here, and- and- and they

probably know what they should be doing. That they should find some way to protect us, to uphold our constitutional rights. [Interviewer]: Mkay- lets cut- ?inaudible? how- how are we doin- there? [Arsenault]: -per- [Interviewer]: I wanna say they- that they ?inaudible? [Arsenault]: In the 2 days following th- the rescue, at the end of the siege. The Freedom Riders, and others leaders of the movement gather at Dr. Harris's house an- it's an amazing scene, uh, nothing like it had ever quite happened in history the movement before. Where you have young and old leaders- sort of sequestered in this house. Talking about the philosophy of the movement, the strategy, what to do next, uh, should the freedom rides continue? Y- know, how are they going to get the freedom riders to Mississippi? How are they goin- to protect them? Um- Y- know what they should do, what they should not do. And part of this, uh, involves the relationship between the riders, between the freedom rides, and Dr. King. Everybody knows y- know he's the

iconic leader or of the movement it would be an amazing thing if he became a freedom rider himself. Everybody knows it would be dangerous, uh, that would be risky but it would make a strong statement. About his commitment to the freedom rides, about the importance of freedom rides. So, there is a series of discussions about Dr. King's relationship to the freedom rides, there is a lot of evidence that he personally was inclined to become a freedom rider. That if it had been just his decision, he would've gotten on those- on those buses, uh. His advisors feel very differently and many of the freedom riders felt differently, that he was most valuable as a spokesperson, as a fund raiser. That, h- he probably wouldn't do them as much good, um, if he was just one of the riders. It would make them feel better, it would make up- kind of a moral statement perhaps, uh- uh. But it would be self indulgent, maybe not be the best

strategy for the movement but, people disagreed about this within the movement and there was uh- uh- uh quite a debate in the Harris house and uh. I think Dr. King went back and forth on it, uh, finally decided that he simply could not, uh, take the risk, that- he was not gonna get on the bus, that he was going to serve the freedom rides in another way, um. But there was no consensus and, uh, there were some hard feelings about it, um, th- the fact that uh, that- that he did not actually become a freedom rider himself. [Interviewer]: G- cut. -lright an- um- [Arsenault]: Ok. [Interviewer]: how bout the uh, the effort to persuade, uh, Martin Luther King to become part of the movement. [Arsenault]: Part of the ongoing discussion of the Harris house revolved around recruiting Dr. King as a freedom rider. Actually put him on one of the buses goin into Mississippi, it turned out that Dr. King was conflicted about this. S- some of the freedom riders were certainly conflicted there were differences of opinion about whether was it a g- a good idea, uh. Some people

felt that it would raise the profile of the freedom rides, it would make a moral statement. In the same way that Gandhi marched at the front of the line, it would be great to have Dr. King on the bus. Others felt that he was more valuable as a spokesperson- as a fund raiser that they didn't need him in jail at this particular time, and there w- of course was the possibility that they would get arrested, an- that he would get arrested. But it- but it was uh, quite a debate about whether he, uh, should become a freedom rider or not, uh. He decided in the end that he couldn't do it. He didn't want to do it, that it was not time, uh, for him to become a free rider an- he made that clear, uh. Some of the freedom riders were disappointed, uh, some of them never fully trusted him again. I think there was a real disappointment, uh, particularly among some of the younger- kind of- ?snick? kids, uh, who, uh, who- who- who- thought, uh. Despite the risks that, it was time for him to step up and to become a free rider at this point. [Interviewer]: Mhm- I just want you to give me th- the beginning of this again, an- an- an jus- say th- that they they- that uh- y-know- [Arsenault]: Ok, yeah. [Interviewer]: -st don't wanna give you the wrong image in you're head. [Arsenault]: Yeah.

after the siege, freedom riders gathered at, uh, Doctor Harris's house, s- was where the largest houses in the black community in- in- in- Montgomery, uh. Doctor Harris is one the great supporters of the Montgomery Improvement Association. He gave them the House, gave them the run of the house, uh, it turned into a- a- a- an extended seminar room. Where there f- for 2- 3 days they had this discussion about, uh, various philosophies strategies tactics what should they do, uh, how can they get s- to Mississippi safely? Should the freedom rides continue, um, should Dr. King even be a freedom freedom rider? Um, you know all of that a- and it was a- it was an amazing scene at the Harris's house for those days, people were there never forgot it.