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Are. You following me Liz without. General Taylor. You served as a military attache in China back in the 1030 days whether any lessons you learned from that experience that were helpful later in Vietnam. Well as for that experience in China I wouldn't I wouldn't say so. First I was there only about six months when the Japanese were moving into North China. My main business was watching the Japanese and seeing what I could learn from them.

I would say however my experience and career with the Chinese. Or we fought the Chinese. I got some impression of their combat capability. What was helpful and I must say it influenced me wisely or unwisely to rather anticipate the same kind of behavior on the part of the North Vietnamese. Could you elaborate on that Korean War experience and what how it served you later in Vietnam. Well the Chinese are very tough fighters. We had great advantages over them in our air. Yet they were able to slip up by moving a few yards one night and then the next night and get up so close in in Russia that it nullified to a large extent the great firepower we had and they took great casualties doing it. So I would like colleagues we were very much impressed with the fighting capability of the

Chinese and also a major military problem in the Far East. The impact in South Vietnam was a little different because I was thinking in terms of Hanoi how they would react if they were taken and was inclined to assume they also have their limit when they realize that they're losing more than they can have any chance of ever gaining in compensation that they like the Chinese and Korea will ask for an armistice. Be reasonable at the table for a long debate and get out of the thing. I was wrong about it in the sense of Hanoi took more losses than the Chinese ever took very heavy losses which you're paying for still but nonetheless they stuck it out and thereby to some extent evaluations made it inside Washington. Well if you had to compare the Chinese the Vietnamese that is the Chinese Communists

and the Communists as from a military point of view what were the similarities and differences between them. I don't know I could be specific about that. The Chinese of course is a bigger man of the North China especially our magnificent military types if you want to wear the deceptive thing about a South Vietnam vet you get Kang in particular where they're small as they look. They were very tough and in a different way. Demand military manpower of China is much more imposing of a chorus on the global stage than any man power and military strength that can be developed in South Vietnam although the latter is not by no it by no means unimportant at the present time given all the weapons they've acquired in the course of the Vietnam War. In 1959 you resigned from the Army.

Presumption was that you objected to the Eisenhower administration's policy of massive retaliation. Did your resignation underline issues that would later emerge in Vietnam. Well I said I wasn't thinking about Vietnam and 1959. Correction I retired because if you resign you don't get paid retired you get your pension. Simply tired of the military service for four years as chief of staff I'm quite happy to retire but I would definitely be drawing final line through my military career and having a chance to develop my interests and force to the Bay of Pigs came along in 1961 and interrupted all that rather But let me pose that question to you develop a thesis in the book that you wrote after your retirement. The uncertain trumpet which was an argument against massive retaliation and a more flexible response did that thesis of yours later

served in Vietnam. Well first I wouldn't say it was a thesis because flexible response is simply not true a reaction of all leaders at all times in all history. They would like to have a lot of a lot of choice between what they want to do and what they what they must do. So that there was nothing novelty about that concept. The novelty of the fact that a great nation should think that they could take massive retaliation and impose a pox Americana. So the real question is why did the government ever take that view. So I was really and furthermore in my book the uncertain trumpet but really avoid criticism which was spreading throughout the country and for many civil forces I was boring for many many critics of that particular policy. Now in terms of Vietnam No except if they had told me it was coming I would say this is the greater argument for not depending on

nuclear destruction in order to control a local situation. So I would encourage In other words in my head and now it's coming but in the 1950s you were chief of staff of the army. We were involved in Vietnam to a certain extent in support of the French were there any other kind of US activities in Vietnam during the 1980s that you knew about that. Tell us about when I became chief of staff in 1955. From 53 to 55 I was in Korea in the same neighborhood in nautical miles of course is a long way down to Saigon but I was looking over my shoulder to some extent and trying to sense situation. And finally in the fall of 55 I took a trip down there from Korea just to talk to the people on the ground. This was after the Geneva Accords or at least the decision had been carried out of

moving populations by request from the north of the Shah. I first saw Saigon surrounded by camps North Vietnam living in the north who had opted to come south and get out of the communist world. That was my first view of it. Realizing at the time I was going to spend a great deal of my life involved directly or indirectly with the events that developed there. I mean if you look back from that perspective really of that period did you ever imagine in your wildest dreams that we would get involved in Vietnam to the degree that it never occurred to me to dream I would or I wouldn't It was just one of those things that never occurred to me to think about. What was the never again club and do you consider yourself a member of it if I could and never again. What was the never again club that's been I never knew of such a thing I hear I read about it but I never knew of it.

Various generals have been saying we should never never get involved in a land war on the cotton of Asia. I would say I would be in. Add to that I was in the club and never got involved in any war anywhere. If you don't have to. But curiously enough I think General MacArthur for example reported to have said the president warned him against getting involved in it I don't know of any general that worked harder to get deeply involved but rather perhaps after the fact wisdom I'm not sure. Well let me put the question differently. Generally it supposed that the never again club were generals who served in Korea and said let's not get involved in a ground war. I never heard of any general ever say that in connection with Korea. All of us saw the frustrations of a limited war and I wrote somewhat on this subject

when I left Korea recording some of the impressions I had about Korea. Some of those I reflected upon later in Vietnam wondered what capability the military capability of the population would train for and Durrance their patients all of what I just mentioned previously about it again. And furthermore having worked with the Korean army the importance of American officers to start thinking more and more about the possible role of foreign nations that particular friendly nations so that there was always a give and take in my own mind between based largely on the impression of the problems of fighting the fight in the Far East and the applicability of our

sophisticated equipment. For that reason I considered it again to be focusing our attention on war in western Europe and tremendously expensive equipment bought by the army for that purpose. Disregarding the fact that in a chaotic period I think of history where the use of limited force in limited places is far more probable than any other kind of military. But to go back to this point again about not getting involved on the ground or getting involved on the ground in a limited war such as Korea perhaps you would then be certain kinds of conditions that you would attach to getting involved like I said they would now. You see in Korea we never we were never really felt. React to the home reaction and a great degree. We had the draft throughout the

war. For me that I commanded was a mixture of violence. Let's hear much difference between the performance and the Selective Service. I can't tell any difference at all and furthermore I do little things when I have a decoration for getting various awards for conduct in battle that I teach some of them find their own mixture for them I can see no ethnic difficulty difference in bravery as demonstrated in that. They just the whole the whole the whole issue always came back to me to learn more about the mentality of how to prepare for future situations. But to carry that on you were speaking about the experience in Korea. Could you carry that on to the experience of Vietnam. Did you have a different kind of American soldier in Vietnam.

My direct experience in Vietnam ended when I left as investors 65 when our troops were just started to come. So I didn't I never had that sureness a feel for the combat situation. I would say that the first troops of Vietnam were essentially all regular. There were no problem at all for that. And time ran out the rotation issue which was with Korea and in Vietnam took hold and shifted the composition so drastically that it is very hard to generalize about how the American soldier behaved without putting a time frame on what time frame are we talking. I would say at the outset they look very good on the depth of themselves and the later troops than the later troops when it

was mixed it was mixed. My son with a company of all the time problem but I never saw nor did this next generation ever. If you look back on it. What do you think about our decision to go into Vietnam after the Geneva agreements in 1954. Well now you will have to ask what are you talking about. There were three or four critical turning points of the first to suggest was General Eisenhower quite a very modest response. The new president for assistance and agreement to provide economic and very

limited military advisory with the nose of the camel you might say moving in. And then there were other turning points for the president but still retaining the basic thought which went throughout our entire policy there are we're there for a simple thing. Self determination and ability to live as an independent state. Let me go back one step. You recall when the French asked for help during the Battle of flu and there were various recommendations in favor of the French request but General Eisenhower vetoed the French are very violent. What would've been your attitude toward I would be absolute nonsense. Ever think of going into who at that time credible that anyone would be serious about it. Here was the French surrounded on all sides to the point they couldn't get out only the aircraft could fly and I

think you go in there and I think you're proposing a nuclear weapon for example. I don't know who they're going to liberate whom they want to kill. You're completely incredible that serious men talked about it as if this advice was followed. What were the reasons for your going back into the government under President Kennedy. Would you describe what happened. Well I think I mentioned I was a Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts Building the place. To my great surprise President Kennedy called me to Washington for the purpose of investigating the term. Find out what had happened. Participants themselves didn't know entirely exactly what the what the cause of the failure was

so I accepted the task with Robert Kennedy the head of the Burke who was the chief of naval operations and we spent about a month going into the Bay of Pigs and submitted our report of our report with the president asked me to come on active duty and there was some discussion I told him I didn't want to come on active duty capacity obligation and any other task but I. Couldn't reject a call in military since the government spent a lot of years and money trying to make a soldier out of his sight came back in July 1st 1961 to become the military representative president in the White House which was really his advice advisor on military and intelligence matters. Do you think from a political or even a psychological

point of view the failure of the bag of Bay of Pigs in some way made the president more cautious about Vietnam. May be more cautious or more aggressive. Well either way hearted warning us of about being involved militarily and more cautious about possibly losing. There's no question but the Bay of Pigs affected President Kennedy very very deeply. When I came back to Washington after the Bay of Pigs affair there were reporters over he was more difficult than Vietnam at the time being recommended or recommended the use of military force preventative as a deterrent or he would turn to me. I mean I just I just lost the battle.

And so in that sense in that sense did make you cautious but at the same time in the Cuban Missile Crisis I never got a back out of that because you couldn't afford to take another defeat. So I had to force pulling on that long way off I dislike to go in but he had the Truman Doctrine before him and it made him very hard not to do something then to that inclination consideration. Shall I look more to my credit. One thing seems to be a little inconsistent even when one looks back on it that he was very much in favor of a neutral solution in Laos. But again I'm sorry I like to repeat that. I mean if you would do that over again because I want to. He was in favor of a

neutral solution so he was in favor of a neutral solution in Laos and yet he was opposed to a neutral solution in South Vietnam and it seems like there was an inconsistency there. No I am not because Laois was so remote so difficult to get through such a mess. From all points of view that their neutral solution which was to look very fragile and anything as durable as it turned out to be and was accepted as against a peace the best you could do. Where's the problem. Much easier not to worry them seriously and for the more the stake was greater or less. How do you recall that the president and his staff including yourself looked at. And in those days in 1961 What was the viewpoint towards Vietnam.

Rather suggest until I came back in 61 from Korea I was going to some extent but really focusing I would say let's not let's not get that definite. I can recall the days when I was deputy chief of staff but the general feeling too far for our military or military zero in that. Role according to our research in the spring of 961 the Joint Chiefs and the Pentagon concluded that forty thousand American troops would be needed to defeat the communists in South Vietnam and one hundred twenty eight thousand more if there was intervention either by North Vietnam or China. Involved in the study.

I've heard that. I don't recall ever being aware of that. It was never cited as the holy writ that everyone accepted. It's incredibly understatement of the problem as we look at it now. Let's go up to the spring of 1960 one you written that you resisted going to Vietnam but then later you accepted to go on a mission with Walt Rostow and Stanley in October. Why did you resist at first and then change your mind. I don't describe the action that way. One morning in the early summer I had to hear a white out said how do I answer this letter and put my hand

walked away with a letter from DMN asking for an increase of an army of 60000 of something of that sort. And I looked it over and realized what I had been told they had to take me some time to answer this question first the question what's the policy United States going to be in South Vietnam. How much of what stake are we willing to put into it. And that question and it started then and internal debate which carried on until late September. What what are we willing to do. How far are we willing to go and willing to give in which will allow the president to give me a directive I could say yes I can take that and give my best. Well let me two questions. Could you describe the debate a little more who was on what side in that debate. Well it wasn't a case of just deliberate uncertain as to where we should go calling it really amounted to a great deal to call in all of the people who have been out

there who for example came two or three others came back the vice president went out and getting all these reports in and then reflecting on what do we have what shall we do about it. And when you did go out you say you went out with a directive. Did you go out with a with an idea of what you were going to find or did you go out to do a study. Well I certainly studied and talked to everyone prepared myself as thoroughly as I could. I was not made up my own mind of what I was going to do I tried deliberately not to do that. So it was I would say that I was well prepared as I could be but I had no predilection. I remember the vice president's trip and in that period I covered it up and what kind of influence did he have what kind of position did he come back with this with Vice President Johnson time and to what degree did that influence the administration.

I never heard him make his report I read his report after that and talked to him occasionally about going to came back from the October trip but he was very much interested I spent quite a period going over what we had found and why we should be conclusion. I would say very much I would say what we call on the whole he had no doubt in his mind that this was an area of importance that it fell clearly within our policy which extended the Truman Doctrine. So I would say that he was. He wanted action but he himself didn't know exactly what for. Why did you or how did you determine the composition of the mission. And one thing it's been noted is they were in any senior State Department people in that group as you and. Well first it was my mission mission I took entire responsibility for it and responsibility for the full report. I was very happy who had been following the Vietnam situation from the start of the Kennedy administration.

No question there. Then the question then what did I want. I simply wanted a strong representative recommended by their principal defense. Yes I am not sure. I requested a representative from the heads of these departments to censor very good men who the State Department for I'd have to get there but they're all good. They were not the senior ones but they were just the kind I want to get out and do hard work and then come back and write a report which they had to write their report when in appended it is not strictly speaking a part of the report. Did the president to President Kennedy give some instructions before you left. Well and since we talked about it

I knew that he didn't he didn't request of American troops. I knew he didn't want to send any American troops in there no doubt about that. He put in the draft of my directive which is a public document reminding me which I didn't need to be reminded that this was their war over there and we were not to do things that they could do for them. So I would say the two principal thing is not to have American troops get involved and be sure that we didn't take over the job if they could do it. Now when you arrived in Saigon it was the 18th of October and you had a long meeting with a couple things. The first thing is this When was the first time you met with you know I had met him when I came down and. I had met him before but could you tell us what your impressions of him were what kind of a man how did he strike you

rarely hear. So you will start again and struck me as this way and you start struck with the impression which I give it to you now it resulted not from one interview but from many from 1955 have happened to leave here for a short little man a nice clean looking man always wore a white linen suit Sharkskin Suit and he would call on him. He put it down and he would start smoking he was a smoker. A couple of questions. How are things doing so to speak. And then he took off on a almost a monologue about to go on as long as four hours in France. He was started back at the beginning of first to South Vietnam and forward through the

wars against the French and so on and then finally about to be getting up into the present time. You had come to talk about and then for about an hour you were more or less current. I found it impossible that I would cry by saying I just been talking to the mag chief and the ambassador. Very good. I just wanted to get your hear from how you feel about those things. You had to go back to the wheel and start inventing it. He would get a sort of half trance look as if he were kind and there was no repetition with a clear statement of history I suspect terribly hard to put up with. If you if you had a tight schedule and you had to get a plane day after tomorrow to get back to Warsaw for I was always very much impressed with a man of

great integrity. I don't think with all these enemies they had lots of them. Anyone ever charged with anything with to be called corruption and corrupt like your kinfolk so to speak and keep yourself surrounded with. He had great courage. He had a feeling that sooner or later the communists would get him some time. Someday they're going to shoot me right there. I found when I got the position trying to persuade him to do it from time to time it was a very stubborn fellow. I think many times I would come and say Mr. President you must broaden the base of your government. You have a group largely of your cronies and you will never have the popular support but on that basis to suggest that I would take off.

Basically the time of the next corrupt being corrupt. The third was involved in the plot against my life and I had some pretty doggone good reasons I would say for all. Yet day after day week after week Americans will be coming in to tell them how to run his country. When he got to you got tired of that and much of the applicable problem the result was that he would hardly listen and listen to the things which he should listen to and became more and more difficult to get any reasonable thing I would say some of the things I was told asking were not reasonable. But when you got down to the real question of his preservation the success of his forces again here was a foreigner coming even though he knew the foreigner. Let's go

slow. It was that that resistance to American advice which developed the great animosity here in Washington our bureaucrats who never set foot decided in advance that we could never succeed with him and that build up to a climax in the 63 when directly or indirectly we pull the rug from under and created the chaos which I inherited as ambassador but doesn't that raise a question really. The question of whether one can work through a client government. I mean we as Westerners in one culture of working for a government that's of another culture it does indeed. Why did we get somebody better than I don't think there was no lack of effort to find someone a civilian. Watch how anything George Washington and every man every every

every man the whole country. But they were just simply hard to hard to find and never never were found as a matter of fact. So the absence of leadership in South Vietnam was a tremendous problem which we never appreciated till we got into the into this thing as deeply as we did say by 1963. You recall that Lyndon Johnson when he was vice president referred to as the Winston Churchill of Asia. The rhetorical I would say I would never get higher marks but looking back on it I would say one of the one of the truly men of integrity and character I met in Vietnam. Did you meet his brother knew. I just met him. Met have met her but I never had any real official dealing with him. Now could you go back. Could you tell us what that conversation was about. What was the substance of that first meeting in October when you were on this very crucial

mission. Well I can assure you I've had a lot of conversations and I can give you it one other than the general just knowing what I was doing that it was then to see him and announced convey a message from President Kennedy which was simply to repeat why I was sent out there. We wanted to be helpful in order to be helpful we had to have access to certain facts we had to get a clear picture. Many parts of the situation which were certainly very much viewed from viewed from Washington. Those generalities rather than anything very specific. Then we went about our business doing all fanning out all our personnel to each own individual task for several days then came back together. We rushed out on the about

rather reached our agreement among ourselves as what looked like the way we ought to go. Then we were going back to D M and tried out the various ideas we had on him before we returned. Could you recall some of those ideas. Yes those are the principal points which appeared in my report which again is a public document. The first was the most startling revelation was one which I knew existed but I had never estimated the magnitude of the lack of quality you might say the complete absence of information on Vietnam. That over the years we have been receiving volumes of reports out of Saigon we've been keeping charts and maps and graphs very wisely and solidly in the offices of the various departments. Yet the data upon which they were based were nonexistent or thoroughly unreliable.

So the very first thing was let's get some system set up that will is out facts from the fiction and improve the quality of what is being happening of course was that the government are very primitive. They didn't keep any records. Modern government would when an economist here would say what the estimate of the crop next. Next month they hadn't the foggiest what it was. So yet nonetheless our rather limited representation in Saigon all they could do was go to the government pose the question take the answer put it on the cable. I always felt they had not done their complete warning Washington here's your answer but no take it too seriously. You know one of the underlining the things that I was seeing for the first time. Go back to what you are is a question the first thing that struck me. Let's get going on improving the intelligence organization getting our own people out here know how to organize intelligence that at least seven intelligence agencies reporting seven different stories to that government

to give us one bag like that one. So that was number one. Number one number two is related. We can see also the ineffectiveness of all admin all the departments of government ministration just housekeeping kind of thing. Well if they would take one or two good Americans who are really good administrators and sit in there and help them get themselves that good health I would feel we accomplished this pretty well. We had lots of intelligence people to go out and welcome them. He knew he was very weak and he didn't like this in the Treasury or in the foreign foreign affairs things of that sort. So that aspect never really really developed but in intelligence yet its always improvement administration especially intelligence that was number one number that the army was following the French practice static posts they were going out and

sitting in various villages all over the country and almost letting the Vietcong run. Move about almost at will except in the hours of daylight on the main road. Well the answer there was that first let's get our own our own mission through their training and their advice to stop that and get mobile get a mobile type force of people moving about and story things up and then let it let us help by providing helicopters and light aircraft so that was another thing. The same was true of a border with some kind of a Border Patrol had a capability never been used. Let's see if we can get some kind of a border guard that cannot plug up the infiltration but least reported infiltration. The obvious things are decided almost by could watch you without.

The most difficult one. Shall we recommend military American units as a part of American military individuals who would buy a recommendation increase considerably in their advisory role. I knew very well the president didn't want a recommendation on troops and I had no where in the slightest. But starting it in Honolulu and my talks with every American official in every Vietnamese official will never get off the ground here unless we have some American military presence. To cut the story short. Their final recommendation and I didn't mention the fact that when I got there was in full flood the greatest flood of the century. You get an airplane and start heading south with Saigon

water all the way out of here and there. So it is of major importance. My final recommendation straddle deliberately astraddle my littlest battle that they need very bad troops and bulldozers in the kind of equipment we have to help help them dig out. We have the chance to put in a logistic task force of communication men that can do an excellent public works kind of job and at the same time fly the flag and have only the combat infantry just to protect them if they need any protection in the going about and thereby kill three or four birds with one stone we can try out a reaction to foreign troops. We can see does our presence have any obvious effect. Is the information that group will get from their work. Is that helpful in the intelligence picture. And that was the

height of my recommendation a logistic force for that purpose. I never I never put their number 8000 is always attached to it. I never put any any number on it. I went back and gave it to the Pentagon. The president approved of force for this purpose. To an estimate about 8000. That was the only recommendation which was not approved by the president. It was political controversy shared in the controversy. The pros and cons I could make a list pretty well balanced but I said this recommends the best judgment of people out there. It was never really disapproved. Just put on the table and never deferred until later when is overcome by events overtaken by events. Do you recall what President Kennedy said in response to that recommendation. He never said a word that we talked about around the conference table people to several times Pentagon State

Department. Collegial kind of discussion place you never you never show it and took the side you didn't like it. But there are some merit in it. But he hoped he wouldn't get from the Pentagon. It's not enough you need more. Was never keen about it all seem to support it of course. Introduction of troops would have been a violation of the Geneva agreements but did the administration consider that the Geneva violating the Geneva gave in the set the number and increasing the numbers of our advisors the numbers of advisors personnel was around a hundred I think. When we went and a year and a half later about 17000 there was a lot of when I made the distinction between individuals and units. There are

many many individuals reinforcement of individual implicit in the recommendation. Apart from that this is just logistics for us but what question really is did by that stage did we consider that the Geneva agreements were dead anyway. It was in point of fact yes you're quite right. By these actions of approving it it was disregarded. Could you just give us the noun so I mean could you repeat that you consider the Geneva agreements were already dead by then. Well for practical purposes the Geneva Accord insofar as that restrain the numbers of people we could have in South Vietnam with a dead letter. And it really was not. I never heard that particular point being used as an argument against what we were doing. In other words by this stage we had already discarded the Geneva agreements we had already just consider that they were dead.

Yes because of course our answer would have been they were dead long before that because North North Vietnamese had violated the agreement by never allowing the inspection by that upon which the whole agreement was conditional. During your discussions of Yamit that stage you recall his attitude towards the solution and very much afraid of it. Could you describe what's very very low in Saigon when I got there for three reasons one was the increase of the activity has grown up very deeply since the 1959 when without it we did so without our being aware of it. Hanoi had really declared a war of national liberation but it didn't. But we saw a great deal of them by the increased activity infiltration of more and more assistance from north

from North Vietnam. So one cause for global success of the enemy the Vietcong. The second one was the great flood and the third was Laos because we finally reached which they were which was just in the course of completion when I worried very much they felt that that was really giving to the Communists and for a while it looked as if it would be turned out better than the new but nonetheless both official didn't express concern about the course of our negotiations. Could I ask you to repeat one call.