Prospects of Mankind with Eleanor Roosevelt; 302; Berlin: What Choice Remains

You'll. State Department building in Washington D.C.. National Educational Television presents the WGBH TV production. This is Eleanor Roosevelt. Prospect of mankind. Produced in cooperation with Brandeis University. Here. At the State Department nerve center of U.S. foreign policy. Mrs. Roosevelt has come to examine the explosive issue of her lead divided German. Secretary of State Ross who must advise the president and bear the heaviest responsibility for these matters. Now discusses that with Mrs. Roosevelt. Secretary I can't tell you what a pleasure to have you with us today. No I have great. I and that you would take the time to be here on this program with us today. Thank you Farai. There is a number of questions of course on this subject which we're to discuss the bellying which I think is perhaps one of the most important subjects at the moment in the minds of our own people and

also in the minds of the people of the world. So I would like first of all to ask you when it seems to be a peculiarly American dilemma how are we to persuade Mr. Khrushchev that we really cannot be pushed beyond certain limits and build up. Military power to make him feel that we really are in this. And at the same time trying to persuade people of the world that we are not warmongering in doing this and that this seems to me a dilemma and I would like to have your answer if you're willing to give it. Mr. Roosevelt first let me say what a pleasure it is for me to be here with you on the prospects of mankind. Actually no regard to your question and based on talks that I've had with representatives of peoples all over the world I don't think that this is as much of a dilemma as it might appear to some.

I think there is general understanding throughout the world as to what the purposes of American power are. And I think people have not entirely forgotten the history of the last 15 or 16 years. The United States did demobilize drastically and promptly after World War Two. We had an atomic monopoly. We tried to put that atomic weapon under international control. Our defense budget was about one fourth one fifth of what it is these days. If we have increased our strength. It is because of a series of threats and challenges which developed. After World War 2. First in Europe. And then in other parts of the world. Which forced the free world to bring its strength into good order. I think that it's relevant that. The American people after World War Two committed

themselves I think quite genuinely with great determination. As you yourself will recall. To the chairman of the United Nations and threw ourselves behind that effort. And I think that is generally understood in most countries even the neutrals I think understand broadly speaking what we were after as a people. And especially the neutrals understand that. For the most part. That neutrality is possible. Only if the power of the Sino-Soviet bloc is confronted by countervailing power by those who are committed to the peaceful purposes to which we in the West are committed. So although we regret the necessity. Of increasing our strength. We believe that the purposes are all well and generally understood. I don't believe there's anyone who is under any illusion about who has started the pressures involved in this Berlin crisis. I think a great many people wish it were not necessary to build that

strength because there's so many other things that need to be done. I think it can be fairly sad that the American people bear arms reluctantly they bear arms out of necessity. Well then there is another question that has been on my mind a good deal and that is I have some feeling that there is a justification for the heroes that the Soviets have had of the nuclear rearmament of Germany because I think none of us can forget that two wars stopped in Germany two world wars. But it's something that I think we we have to take into consideration. And I've often wondered how much it is taking in consideration in the formulation of American policy. As a matter of fact this is. Not just a question of Germany. But the ramify is a much broader

problems. Germany does not have a national nuclear capability at the present time it does not have nuclear weapons. Its forces are a part of NATO. And the nuclear capacity of NATO is a United States nuclear capacity. We have been opposed. We in the United States to the further extension of national nuclear weapons capability the problems of trying to keep these. Frightening weapons under control when two or three or four might have them would be greatly multiplied if additional countries got these weapons in their hands. We tried again in 1945 to work out an international control for such weapons because we knew that. Nature would not withhold its secrets from other countries. And we wanted to get this under control before it became became a matter of great.

Controversy contest an arms race in this terrible field. This is why we have attached so much importance to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. As a first step. Past a small step but a first very significant step. In getting this entire modern weapons system under control. Had the Soviet Union been able to sit down and and come to a satisfactory conclusion there after the United States and the United Kingdom went to great lengths to meet what we thought were their position and their positions in earlier negotiations then perhaps we might have taken the first step. We hope it isnt too late to take that first step but perhaps we can understand that the Soviets in view of historical factors might be especially sensitive about the situation in Germany. But this is a part of the broader problem we must find some way to bring these weapons under control. Still our original proposal would still have value wouldn't it if we could get an agreement along the lines of the

original proposal that would be great merit in it. But it's more difficult now that several governments have. This capacity. But certainly the first step would be a nuclear test ban nuclear for good and bad and effective inspection and control. And one short question you have been holding conferences with the representative in the Soviet are enough is Mr. Gromyko Could you tell us what your general impressions in these conversations have been while these talks which have been going on for so little time now are not negotiations in the usual sense of the word. Were felt that the proposals of the Soviet Union and the framing of those proposals did not provide an adequate. Basis for negotiation as little as the president put it. What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable. What we have been doing is trying through exploratory talks. To find out whether there is a reasonable basis for serious negotiations with any questions that are

properly negotiable. I think I can say that these exploratory talks have been serious. I think the atmosphere in the mode has been on the whole constructive. But. As to the outcome we just have to wait and see. Thank you so very much Mr. Secretary. I think that it's a wonderful thing that you are willing to come and give on this program of your knowledge for the American people. And we have very great a very great privilege for me. Thank you very much Mr. Rose. Now to continue our discussion of the important questions which Secretary Rice has introduced we have with us a group of distinguished gentlemen have very good points of view. Paul Tillich a religious and political rebel left his native Germany in 1933. Now an American citizen holding the much coveted University professorship at Harvard he is a towering figure in the world of philosophy and theology. On his 70th birthday last

summer the Federal Republic of Germany awarded him one of its highest honors. The star of marriage Henry Kissinger director of Defense Studies at Harvard also spends much of his time as a consultant to various government boards and agencies on defense matters. His books nuclear weapons and foreign policy and the necessity for choice have been spotted on the deaths of some of the highest ranking Washington dignitaries. James Reston chief of The New York Times Washington bureau has the heavy responsibility of directing the flow of news from the capital. Masterful stylist and wit Mr. Reston enjoys the confidence of the men at the top and a reputation for critical exposure of the seeds of government policy before they become policy. Max Friedman Washington correspondent for Britain's Manchester Guardian was born in Canada. He has previously been the Guardian's man in Bonn London Paris and the United Nations. On this occasion he will assist Mrs. Roosevelt in directing the discussion. You have Secretary Rice answer to my

question about the American dilemma in building up more military strength and still not being called war mongers. I wonder if you would like to say something on that subject about this dilemma. I think perhaps I disagree with the secretary of state either diadema I think it's diadema in the situation. And so we should dedicate our attention to it. The one presupposition is that if the situation comes in which an ultimate decision must be made in which all matters of expediency negotiation and compromise don't get any more then the ethical point of view becomes to the frog. And I imagined in

my mind to be in this situation to make such a decision which then had to be made on ethical grounds. Now the decision is if the Russians take over Berlin which they can do in a half an hour of his all serious resistance and move towards the end of the common opinion. And I saw that. Confirmed in most all of Sillitoe which I have read that under such circumstances it immediate resistance with atomic weapons is impossible on the site or no need to Topes. Now that would then bring us to a point where somebody had to make a decision. Shall I

give the order to use atomic weapons or not. And my thesis is my belief is and my deep conviction is that in such a moment we should not use atomic weapons. I believe that the build up of atomic weapons as we do it is absolutely necessary cannot be avoided. But we do it so that the Russians know we produce a total destruction in the West with atomic weapons. Then we can equally use the total destruction in the east but we shouldn't use them except one situation namely the situation that they themselves use them first. But we morally not

permitted to use them force in order to avoid a treat which anyhow. All great nations have done in some situations in every war and especially the British have done almost in every war. And finally easy ones of all. And if the atomic weapons are not use by us then I imagine that the greatest probability certainly not certainty but the greatest probability is that the Russians wouldn't use them either. If they you them then of course this means mankind has had. This moment of Providence in which it destroyed itself and then all human possibilities are gone. But to

do what I drive from the articular of somebody doing in one of the latest issues that all of her preparation goes top's immediate use use of the atomic weapons because of the superiority of Russians is something which has made me extremely sad. If it is true and we I will say from ethical point of view this could not and should not be done. But now I think there must be some answers to that. How is that to you that's the case in Jaleel distress. Well I certainly disagree with that point of view. In this sense if you take the premise of Professor Tilak. That we were at that position then I think we could argue it back and forth whether this was right and

ethical or whether it was not. But the question I would like to put to Professor today is that at this point in the crisis if this nation took that position which Dr. Kynoch has just defined is it not almost inevitable that the Russians knowing that that was our position could take over the whole of Europe without any action on our part. Does that not follow Dr. Tiller. No I don't think that for us at all. I think that in a moment we can take it although only if you like immediately if we can use the atomic weapons themselves. But the presupposition of my talk was that the doing was it as you see it. No discussion anymore. But surely this is a hypothetical position that is not the actual position. Now is it. Do know.

I mean if I am asked the question then I must make this to go to the position of the hypothetical position must be related to. It seems to me to the cases that are likely to arise and the situation that you describe differs between Berlin and the rest of Europe. Only in the amount of time it would take the Soviet Union to occupy either area. It is the general consensus of people who are concerned with strategic questions that a purely conventional defense of Europe against the forces which the Soviets could now bring against it is not possible for any extended period of time. And if we commit ourselves and that advance never to use nuclear weapons in such circumstances we are in effect not only dooming ourselves to losing Europe in case of an attack. I would even suggest that we are encouraging an attack. We

will give the Soviets no other option except to attack him. I don't think that that really is Mr. Tillich's point. I didn't think that he had to renounce the use of atomic weapons under any circumstances he assaulted or we should not use atomic weapons first. The use of weapons should be in proportion to the injury we have suffered. And that we should not. Devastate the Soviet Union to save half of Germany. Well that is a that is a different problem as I understood Professor Telic it was that we should not use nuclear weapons unless the Soviets used them first in any circumstances in any circumstances. If we use them force yes. That's the substance but in no other circumstance no. So even if they occupy Europe with conventional forces we would rather lose Europe then use nuclear weapon any time we need to gain. As it has happened in Europe move a bit better since the last war where we

had last year. And one that again I have opposed the occupation and also the obsession with using nuclear weapons if it became necessary in the most extreme. But I feel that this statement this is fairly safe. The danger is of this to. The. Time.

Hi hi. Hi hi.

Hi. Hi hi hi hi Chris.

I've never been that easy to be. This is not to say. This is the outcome of the professor like it seems to me that we have jumped beyond the of the original dilemma that was posed to a second dilemma. The first deadline was the Presidents

dilemma. That we were trying to resolve. But it seems to me that you have give given as a god. You are putting is a way beyond question one which is how do you. Try to convince the Soviet Union that we are sincere. That we have we are willing to defend our order without provoking. Only if we fail to answer that question. It seems to me do we come to your question and it is totally in the context of Berlin today and let's come to grips with the immediate problem. I think it's important also to point out to Professor Telic that they hold policy of the government. It's designed to avoid the the extreme dilemmas which he has posed. The. Point of the military buildup is precisely to give the president other alternatives except. Wholesale destruction. Or surrender. And to put us into the position to resist

Soviet pressure is at the most flexible fashion and not to have to make these these extreme choices. On that point Henry what lines of honorable and wise advance are open to negotiation. Are you in favor for example of de facto recognition of these Germany. It's extremely important for us to be in a position in which we are always ready to negotiate. And in fact in which we take initiatives towards towards negotiation I do not consider it a sign of firmness not to negotiate because then when you go to the conference table this in itself looks like a defeat. Now de facto recognition of East Germany. I don't know really what it means. I am not in favor of the. Recognition of the permanent division of

Germany. That's the acceptance of others of the fact that Germany has to be divided permanently if this is meant by de facto recognition. I would think it unwise. From a moral political and psychological point of view to have a chance to develop. What do you think. Yes I do. I still think you got to go back and resolve. Question one or I don't think you can get to these other questions. You can. Skip over this preliminary to say that the president and. Prime Minister. But. Because I've been trying to deal with you know for two months and that is to try to make clear to the Soviet Union. That they are taking what we regard as an unethical position by using their force in East Germany the way they are doing and confronting those with a choice where are vital rights seem to be at stake. And I think we have to answer this question. How do

you make it believable to Khrushchev that if the imposes his will against our vital rights we will fight. If we can answer that if we can achieve that. Then I think we can come to questions 2 3. But until we deal with that it doesn't seem rather secretary seemed to say that actually we hadn't done that. That he actually believed that the world did not think. That we were all. You I wanted to bring on board that they've they've. Had. The. Background before them and that they were convinced if he is right. In that the question is I don't know the question is not answered if the world believes in a. Willingness to fight. The question is whether that's the that's the harder question that it does is that there's a key element in the question.

I would however not accept the notion that first we have to convince and be vilified if necessary and then we'll negotiate. I don't think you can segment policy into first building up strength and then at some later point and having a. Transformation in a way that hasn't ever been defined in the diplomatic route you must always be ready. I think we can go down both tracks simultaneously and in fact. If we do it skillfully we ought to be able to use the negotiations to prove not only what we will concede but what we will under no circumstances concede. Henry I think that there are really three tracks unless I'm mistaken. The ethical dilemma raised by Professor Tilak is not a source of weakness to the west but a source of profound strength or weakness if we answer it. And Professor Tillich's words in advance. I agree. If we give the other side the if we give them a commitment yes. But the fact that we are wrestling with this moral

problem. Surely is is of profound significance to our whole political and military integration. And it is because we may ultimately have to give an affirmative answer that in that context of aggression created by a communist I'm sorry it is under my terms of reference a highly ethical response because otherwise you are committing Western Europe free Europe to the slavery of the communist system. And I think the force used in defense of freedom has an ethical justification that is totally different from force to use to impose domination. And wouldn't you accept that totally and use all force all people to get out. But the question was should we use it means which by its very essence defies it's help. They need to see freedom. They would not see freedom but the toys destroy all the countries in which he didn't say receive. That's my cents on that.

But I think in the grim calculus of military power you have to recognize the practical inescapable fact that unless we do under a conceivable circumstances consent to use our nuclear power we are doing free Europe to to Tehran and slavery. So I think that Scott is questioned about the ethical dilemma is answered if you if you yourself agree that the last resort we use all the power that we have all the power that we have except that power which is not helping to liberate freedom but destroy all the foundations of freedom you will use human beings and nations which live there. And all power. I don't think that's why she's so powerful it is along the lines that the whole east and west is not either to conquer. If you want. It's not as powerful. Presupposed that they are not atomic weapons. If they are then this means something is. But I speak on the

presuppositions that they use. And I think a kind of freedom slavery and so on is only if he accepts it but if he don't accept that and threaten to come back with all our power it is the power of service. Then this is not the giving. Well I think that Henry gave a sense of just how Russia. Has been treating so those are the things that exist. If you wanted to say why didn't we see you doing

so often. Sex slavery is in the future. What's next. If you don't see the great. Food food food food. Food food

food even without food the last thing I would say you would have to say even under Kuli I think this is the consequence that you young man made one more likely against the increased destructiveness that you're seeing the use of nuclear weapons and if it is that it is later to say we have developed the conviction to do that under no circumstances would the nuclear weapons then I am sad

and lonely as big as the combined forces of the free world is the only of the United States would be the only country like America and Australia and every other fan advantage and that might. And then all of Asia and Pakistan. The world outside of the United States is communism. It's the regime that's made flesh. If you resort to nuclear weapons we should do it in the most discriminating fashion possible and that we must accept that decision that we use must automatically lead to the slaughter of populations. We have an obligation to try to limit damage no matter what happens. That is a very grave danger that it is as useless as an offensive gender position that that is really a very guilty pleasure.

And that would bring on that at least has to be weighed against the suffering of others a fool with a few passions to do chances of surviving the devastation of rescue. Yes. I'm. Optimistic that this it's Friday. But as hard as we say but I believe that the Saudis choose life and that is to say I believe that we can answer the question before we look and raise the risk to find the section that they are not fooled. Therefore I believe

with those families and I think they should say within a month two I feel it again it seems to me that this is going on. I disagree with at this point but it seems to me not only reason to react to the proposition that the West it has the same rights of dealing with the East that the rest of the great Lady de facto relationships between the cities. So yes. And it seems to me a little for the U.S. to say that you cannot in any way discuss this question for an Amish relationship which would involve

the suggestion some way recognizing them in a different way. That's a lot of reasons I that's And I think the Soviet Union that we are using us as a Rockefeller Center for propaganda against them is a reason that they say you. And that it's forcing. In the end they journeyed and they say she's in 1950. I think the level of forces within these things is discussed and the question is whether you have some kind of United Nations presence I guarantee you the freedom to keep the West Indies people of all things. I think this is a discussion.

So there are many things we have to talk about and it takes one to understand as a military and it's extremely difficult to discuss each one on its own terms. We can agree that discuss the charge that it's thing that is being used as a Sunday to start up again and as long as we understand what we mean by propaganda. He says in his latest In a recent letter to me he said that he didn't like the bloodshed. Germany whether its head out now stands at them. Now these happen to be the leading the leaders of the three parties and that feel that the very existence of freedom is considered an act of hostility to say it in defiance of this or that it is in the sense that we will be. Then

it is worth talking about that building because. The Soviets have really eliminated most of the specifics which one for the tend to get to them the blue attach that label. And I think that any issue that fixes the external relations is something that is good. That is did. I forget that at that point in time to come back for that final version. And probably the real thing went on. Hopefully we will be committed an offence. It seems to me I also committed to a lesser extent so that the German people when we ask them when they had said Wednesday when the two countries will recognize this day as

this federal republic is the spokesman for Germany in world affairs. That's excluding the recognition it is the journey. And second he said to leave the system the scientists hope to find something that I think is best to stay. How you work that out isn't enough to make what is not legal. First of all that the economic and political freedom of the rest is not they wish to stand. I would say See the rights of access to the rest that is the right of the presence of the West. And yes

a fair number of troops may be allowed to do. There was nothing magical with the 70000 last two France and under the present. And in fairness to follow up here. We ought to keep in mind that substantial percentage of the dealings between these two presidents the United States is taking place. It was taking place under that measure in 1955 when the Soviets in those access civilian access to their land to the east to repress the rest to a means to accept it and to work out technical arrangements. And I don't think it comes with exceptionally days to say that since we didn't stand on our commitment than to some protests going down at an algorithm. Now we have to take some more additional steps and makes it very hard to get and

still to take seriously. And it is with many of the proposals that I to take another step for fear that that could be used as a basis for something else and to do that instead of two or three years. Now I'd like to make one other thing in discussing here. All the things we might conceivably have many of those films you don't have to make a proposal about what we consider. Freedom in Central Europe. Coupling it with reasonable security guarantees to the Soviet Union and let the Soviets bear the onus of rejecting it. Why should we cooperate with them in the suppression of freedom even though we may recognize that the situation cannot be changed except by force.

And even though we are clear that we are not going to use force to change it certainly from your knowledge of German history and the temper of the German people what do you think the prevailing German view would be to a proposal such as Henry is just about. Yes now. This there are many things involved. Let me only say one thing. I was there some several times in Berlin and four months and three months in western Germany. There is a change of mood. I to say every second since 48. And all this lecturing that means much time. And. In Berlin was by far the best and the most courageous the most. And some the even that and what I notice at this time was that in the West there's no fear in the best people about

the chuffed when the miracle of economy and the materialistic influence on all people's thinking there. And in Berlin. The mood has changed even before a ball was elected. In June 2010. I was mostly there. They've held that cup. And they have now is a feeling I know that from many letters I got for reasons which are to say for what do we exist now. We were again and Heppy as the gateway between east and west. Now there is all this Voll means that we actually had that city and we are willing to tolerate our being imprisoned as we actually are. You cannot imagine what that means. The body my sister and all my relatives and so. And. Now Zuber have

started feeling they have function to come between East and West knows this function is taking away from them. And so she has now really profoundly depressed feeling for what do we exist for what do we stand. All these miseries which are connected with our present existence. I am troubled by this line of argument because it seems to me that there's an implication the Arab. Of that very troubling ethical point of asking is in effect to collaborate with the use of force and with what I've always been taught was wrong. I think that's the first ethical question on the question of the denial to the people of Berlin. A purpose in life. Freedom is the purpose. I do not see that the commerce that went through the Brandenburg

Gate from West Berlin and East Berlin is a greater purpose than that continuing to live on the air as the symbol of freedom in a vast wasteland of turn. No one has. The Berliners to stay in Berlin as a symbol. The whole issue arises because the large majority of them up to now have wanted to stay there and have wanted to stay there and freedom. And before we evacuated millions of people. I think we ought to give very serious start how we can give new meaning to freedom in Berlin and make life meaningful for the people who are living there. I cannot believe that moving a million people around will be anything other than a major moral defeat for for our idea of freedom. I know it will not end what the Russians want and Germany.

Will just move the frontier of danger to a new place have the election instead of just taking place. For. Any. Any change in the. Present situation. I think that. Drew of money now is going through. A emotional. Crises and I don't think it is clear. What the elections mean but there are certain symptoms of what they might mean. That. The major or the basic orientation of western Germany during the last decade has been to tie itself in the Middle East to the west. And we have as Mr. Friedman pointed out. We have insisted that this was not inconsistent with with other women go. If it should develop that within

Germany it comes to be thought that a tie with the West is inconsistent with the future of the German nation. Then we might get some very unfortunate developments and we might. And what might transpire would be the very thing that people are now so concerned about and they be these unfortunate developments. Well I would think that if one looks at history of the past 70 years the disaster for Europe has been a Germany and the center of Europe trying to conduct a policy based entirely on its own strength and sort of playing off East against the West and thereby bringing about a coalition of both against them and a spiraling situation of tension. I would hate to. See a new terminal develop that feels itself betrayed by the West hostile to the east and tries to extort from both what the traffic will bear. I think

this would be disastrous for Europe. Be disastrous for Germany and would be disastrous for the Soviets. It will be disastrous for everybody. Consider Scott if you regard this as a foreseeable danger. Well I think it's I think it certainly has to be taken into account. I can see a situation where we argue that. We can make a deal with the with the Russians over Berlin. That got us out of the jam. It was convenient for us that you could find yourself holding on to Berlin. But so dispiriting the people of West Germany that you would lose Germany. I feel that they really enjoy revolt and at the same time breaking up the perhaps the most hopeful movement toward unity in the whole of Europe smash the whole reconciliation between France and Germany and find yourself in an impossible position

in view of that Scott in this industry. Isn't there. An imperative placed upon us to negotiate to make sure that our rights of access and our rights of freedom in Berlin are more secure than they now are. They go back to a casual and extremely clumsy ad hoc military arrangement entered into many years ago and reaffirmed since then in ways that are lacking in adequate precision. Isn't that. Too dangerous to have this smudged crisis perpetually under the surface in Berlin and ready to erupt at any time and shouldn't. Certainly this would be highly desirable. But we shouldn't place an excessive. Reliance on the on the piece of paper that after all there was a formal document that was not in the slightest sense ambiguous that Berlin should be under a

cloud administration and that East Berlin should not be part of East Germany. The fact that a wall was built in central in the center of Berlin was not due to any ambiguity of the written arrangement but was a flagrant breach of etiquette and arrangement. Certainly we should get. Better Access guarantees if we can get them. But the issue still remains at what price. Not at the price that Mr. Reston described. Of course that's beyond but if you can get it without that prize. Certainly. I'm troubled by something else. Haven't we in a sense got a conjectural crisis. Our Western rates haven't yet been invaded. The rights of the people of West Berlin have been invaded by the wall in the Nile a free movement. We always say that we can trust hoovering. But every other occasion we say that he's the mere puppet of Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev has said there will be no interference with our rights. Isn't this a genuine problem to which

we should address ourselves. As I understood the president at the United Nations he said. That. We are not concerned about a peace treaty which Khrushchev might sign with Oprah. I also don't believe that we are particularly concerned. About who stands for papers. We do feel however. That. The Soviet Union cannot transfer its rides. To Oprah. And then force us to negotiate new new access guarantees with a third with a third party but one has a contract with somebody. The obligations of that contract can't be transferred without the consent of the original partner. This is this is the issue. SCOTT Well I don't I would certainly wouldn't call it a conjectural crisis. And. The. Trouble with it is that

Khrushchev's says one thing one day and another another. It makes a public speech. Interprets what will happen when he signs a peace treaty with East Germany in one way. The next day. He rants and raves and tells Jack McCloy something totally different. So if you're going to where are you if Khrushchev signed a treaty with Obrecht tomorrow. Guaranteeing our rights of access to Berlin and removing all ambiguities there would be no crisis from outside. He could spell out any day he chose. Access rights for others and then sign any document he wished with all this discussion it seems to me we've been primarily concerned with where our rights will not be given up where our rights were going to be preserved and that is natural. We should do that.

But. Isn't there something that we can offer that really and. The generals would like to have. Because I mean the Russians would like to have in the generals would accept because it seems to me so far we've been thinking on a one sided basis. Well I don't I don't promise to rest. I remember in early 1945 when Arthur Vandenberg made his speech in the Senate of the United States in which he offered the Russians a 40 year treaty of alliance to keep the Germans down. This was rejected out of hand. We understood their fear. Of German aggression in the past and tried to deal with them. I think we have consistently tried to deal with. We have offered them a system of disarmament. Under which the Germans would not get additional. I would not get arms nuclear arms of any kind. So that I think

I think our record on that is fairly good. We have tried to take their position into yes but I was meeting in New negotiations. Is there anything you think that they are anxious to have that we could offer them. I mean the Russians. Well we hear all kinds of arguments about their desire to. Stabilize it in a legal way. The president Polish German border. Some people say that Khrushchev lays great store by others that he lays no store by the door near the post store. I guess they do want the question if you do that and Henry Kissinger would know much better than I about this. If you agreed to that would you then have a in effect a recognition of formal recognition of the Easterlin regime. No I think it will be extremely painful to the truth. And I don't think we should ever have agreed to evacuating 11 million

people. This doesn't seem to me that odd because to have taken. But I do believe now. We should recognize the Polish German front too. And I think the Germans will have to realize that they can have no prospect of unification while keeping open claims that territorial claims. On their neighbors would make a big distinction between fixing the external state is up to them and recognizing a regime that isn't supported by 5 percent of the vote. Again drawing to a close we've come to know. Decisions here today. We just know more about the problem than we did before. And I thank you all for being with us and that and very grateful for your participation. Thank you Mr.. Friedman. WASHINGTON.

Henry Kissinger is director of the French studies. James Reston is the chief of the Washington bureau of The New York Times. Paul Tillich is a world famous German born theologian philosopher. We were proud to present Dean Rusk the U.S. secretary of state special introduction to this program. Next month's prospects of time will originate from the United Nations in New York. This is Roosevelt. Guests will include Alan Cleveland assistant secretary of state for international organization. This program was recorded for the facilities at WTVG TV metropolitan broadcasting Washington D.C.. This is an E.T. National Educational

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