Vietnam: A Television History; Tet, 1968; 107

1968 a new phase is now starting we have reached an important point. When the big the end begins to come into the. Tent. The Vietnamese New Year. A massive Viet Cong and North Vietnamese offensive struck the cities of South Vietnam. The attacks spilled into the living rooms of America. And split the White House staff. Yes I was Optum optimistic after the Tet offensive even more optimistic in a sense than before because it's one thing to have confidence that you're going to cope with this maximum effort. It's another thing to see that everyone was coping. You'll see that

the cables from Saigon from Ambassador Bunker told us that the enemy was defeated on the ground very early to take time to mop up. The rest of us who were not in the National Security Council staff even though we were reading many of those cables and going down there for such reassurances we could get. We were also watching the American television and American television was showing a different side that sense of the awfulness the endlessness of the war and the unethical quality that did not recognize when a man was taken prisoner he was not to be shot at point blank range. The terrible sight of General Lon raising his revolver to the head of a captured Viet Cong and killing him.

They were all full contradictions. The cables on the one side the television on the other it was very disturbing. To violate their own report on Vietnam Countrywide. Here is NBC News correspondent Jack Perkins in Tokyo by satellite 232 G is killed and 900 wounded makes one of the heaviest weeks of the Vietnam War and it is not a week is just over two days. The past two days two of the worst we have known in Vietnam sniper fire still coming from the Joint Chiefs command high ranking.

Vietnam was history's first television war. Now as the fighting ripped into Saigon. Millions of Americans watched the battle. Of the. Two border forces that are trying to push him out of his way but hes got to heavily fortified US for small arms automatic fire grenade launcher and haven't lost any men here. I've got six six people I've had to wonder. How. Many. Employees have gone to the embassy trying to get the snipers out. By themselves.

Nothing dramatized the Viet Cong drive more vividly to Americans than the scene inside the U.S. Embassy compound in Saigon. The South Vietnamese capital. The center of American power in Vietnam. Had come under fire. General. Law how would you assess yesterday's activities in today's What is the enemy doing these major attacks. Say EOD setting up a couple of them 79. How would you assess the enemy's purposes. Yes. Today the enemy secretly has taken

advantage of the TROs in order to create Max maximum consternation with an assault Vietnam particularly in the populated areas. But consternation was in the maximum. For years the North Vietnamese and Vietcong had fought mainly in the race fields and jungles. Now for the first time. They were fighting in the cities. And their biggest offensive of the war. They hit nearly every province and district capital across South Vietnam. They hit Westmoreland's own headquarters near the Saigon airport. They hit key targets throughout Saigon. Including the government radio station. I was the head of a squad assigned to attack the Saigon radio station.

And on January 27 our regional command gave me the final orders. This was I was told a once in a lifetime assignment what we were instructed to occupy the radio station in less than two hours then turn it over to the regular forces. This is the main Vietnamese language radio station in Saigon. And right now are undisclosed number of VC inside occupying the station. They're not broadcasting on the air and they're surrounded by South Vietnamese troops and they're pinned down inside. I think they're going to be throwing. What I think is going to be throwing tear gas any moment out to try to get them out that way. There's been a lot of shooting at the windows from inside on the second floor. Quite a comrade inside the radio station had

captured an enemy machine gun and had fought with it throughout the night. By nine o'clock in the morning he had only 20 rounds left. He was wounded his leg shattered. He asked me to go and find out whether he should try to hold the place or blow it up. At about 10 o'clock in the morning. We had only eight men inside with a very large explosive. They detonated the explosive destroying the entire radio station and sacrificing themselves in the blast. He's. Like. Oh I don't

know when. U.S. combat troops had been in Vietnam for nearly three years before Tet 1968. Yet all their superior power had failed to grind down the enemy. The war was deadlocked. In July 1967 communist planners in Hanoi debated their next move. Some wanted to continue their war of attrition but the men approved a bold offensive designed to break the deadlock and open the way to power. The war in 1967 posed a different problem for Lyndon Johnson.

He had to raise taxes to continue both the war and his social programs to rally domestic support. He had to promise light at the end of the tunnel. He said very very encouraged. I've never been more encouraged or in mind for almost four years. They were making real progress. Everybody is very optimistic. I know it intimately associated with our effort there. We feel it on the military side there has been substantial progress over the past two years that in the last six months the progress has been even more rapid. Than the 18 months before that. All the challenges have been met. The enemy is not beaten but he knows that he has met his master in the field. Johnson had orchestrated this campaign of optimism only weeks before Ted

but he had reason to believe an enemy attack of some kind was coming. During the two previous years the Communists had staged winter offensives along South Vietnam's borders. Now as U.S. intelligence detected large deployments moving south. Westmorland expected similar assaults. The Russians six thousand American Marines and South Vietnamese troops to case on a remote frontier outpost near the hoochie Minh trail. From here he had hoped to control North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam's northern provinces. The North Vietnamese attacked case on in January several days before Tet.

Westmorland thought this would be a decisive engagement. I think his plan is. To show how. A. Major effort. To. Win a spectacular battlefield success on the eve of cats which is a Chinese New Year. Which takes place at the end of this month. Johnson was so concerned that he kept a model of Khe Sanh in the White House. But neither he nor his generals then fully knew the communists real purpose in fighting there. I did feel that it was. A target that the enemy was very much interested then that he would want to seize it. And I wanted to fight him in the general land rather than allow him to get down among the people in that very costly. And carriage place.

Yes I can. Our objective was to inflict casualties on the enemy the song thus compelling him to shift more of his forces there from the southern part of the country. In that way it would be possible for our people to organize in order to liberate the south. But because we drew the larger enemy forces into chaos and allowed them to supply and reinforce themselves we could not turn the encounter into a final big battle. Days after they began to showcase some communist commanders issued final orders for their nationwide offensive against South Vietnam cities. The longest battle was wage for HWE. The old Imperial Capital. Survivors of the battle tell different stories. One is a refugee with families still in Vietnam. The night of the lunar new year was different from other New Year's Eves. Firecrackers went on longer. They came faster and faster.

There were more many more than another New Year's years. The sounds of firecrackers and gunfire interspersed. Nobody realized that it was the gunfire of Communists who were overrunning the city of gray. At that time I was at the nursing school. Now the secondary school for nurses I was among the students there and weapons were smuggled into us at the nursing school. We also managed to print a number of leaflets and tracks for the National Liberation Front calling on the population to remain calm and not carry out reprisals when its forces enter the city. For example when people arrested an enemy agent they were to turn him over to the quadrilles.

The Communist soldiers came in and asked my father's occupation and his residence. They told my father to describe his background. My father replied that he was deputy district chief of trial Phong and that he was already old and would retire in one year. They wrote down everything then went on to other houses. A North Vietnamese and Vietcong dominated way for three days. They rounded up South Vietnamese officials and government sympathizers. Some eluded arrest and fled with other civilians. Many did not. My father was ordered to attend a study session for 10 days and he was told that he would be released afterward.

My mother and I accompanied him to the school. There were about 100 persons there. We stayed there until we saw my father leave my mother and I was very worried because in 1946 my father's father had been arrested in the same way by the Communists. He never returned. He did. Not to the people so hated those who had tortured them in the past. But when the revolution came to way they routed out those despots to get rid of them just as they would poisonous snakes who if allowed to live would commit further crimes. And so even though our policy was to re-educate and never kill anyone who surrendered to us the people of the city took justice into their own hands. And there was

little Our revolutionary commanders could do to control them while the fighting raged. The. Troops of South Vietnam's 1st Infantry Division joined us Marines in the counter attack against way. Many were fighting for their homes. And for an historic city. The Norwegian emperors had built the Citadel ways walled fortress early in the 19th century. They modeled it on the impregnable forbidden city and taking a Chinese capital. A North Vietnamese army set up a command post next to the throne in the palace of perfect peace. Delta Company 1st Battalion 5th Regiment U.S. Marines headed for the Citadel.

I think my most vivid memory is as I went in was in talking with one of the other company commanders who had already been participating there in the action for a couple of days and in a very matter of fact way without a great deal of embellishment on his part. He just frightened the hell out of me and telling me how bad it was. And I thought in my mind right then and there that you know hey here I am with a fresh company and I knew without having to be told that what my mission was going to be the next day was going to be to try to take this fortified tower position along the wall. And sure enough that that evening when I went in to be briefed. Major Thompson. He just said Delta Company tomorrow you're going to take that east wall. And I said I sir and went at it.

No. I. Know. Where they are at. Right around the Russian soldiers were. Told to stay alive day to day just like. You. Lost any friends on the other day.

And. Two days later on February 14th the company took the fortified tower and moved on. We tried our best to avoid malicious damage if you would. We just didn't shoot it was just a bomb down. But when we had a house we shot at our house we had to destroy a house. We destroyed it. But we didn't go in there with the express purpose. That this is a wonderful opportunity to show how. Great Our weapons are and how much destructive power they possess. As a result they're being so entrenched it required for us

to bring maximum firepower at our disposal. The one. But we were fortunate in that we did have the weapons that were capable of routing the NBA and the Viet Cong out of their position in LA LA LA LA LA LA. LA LA. They directed artillery fire into the area where I lived. They knew all the houses and trees were destroyed. They also directed rocket fire against the homes of the people in my neighborhood. The people here use kerosene and gasoline and so their homes burst into flames when they were hit by the rockets.

Yeah. Yeah. Old folks children and pregnant women who could not flee were burned alive in their homes. And throughout all of this you constantly had this fear not so much that you are going to die because I think to a certain degree that was a given. This was combined with the semi-darkness type of environment that we were fighting in because of the low overcast the fact that we didn't see the sun gave it a very eerie spooky look.

You had this utter devastation all around you. You had this horrible smell. I mean it you just cannot describe the smell of death especially when you're looking at a couple of weeks along. It's horrible. And it was it was there when you ate your rations. It was almost like you were you were eating death or even you couldn't escape it. After 24 days of fierce fighting South Vietnamese army units entered the citadel and raised the flag of South Vietnam where he had been saved but destroyed. 75 percent of its people were homeless. Eight thousand soldiers and civilians on both sides had been killed in the fighting. But the final toll was higher.

In 1969 a communist defected and told the chief of tour and province that the Communists had buried a number of people in his Rano and surrounding areas. The province chief ordered the bodies dug up to Exuma the remains of those who had been arrested during the Tet offensive. I along with others whose relatives had been killed inspected the remains. The smell was terrible but we had loved and missed our relatives and it was our duty to search for them. For those who found the remains of their relatives were gratified and those who were sad I continued looking along with others at food to aid more tunnels were dug up. Strangely all the skulls of the skeletons were smashed.

Their arms were tied and their positions indicated that they died kneeling. The skeletons were not stretched out. They were bundled up for huddled. Then I went on following the search party. Up until September 1969 I never found my father's remains. The bodies found in the mass graves were solemnly reburied by the South Vietnamese government. Bodies of officials army officers priests students some who bore no visible marks of violence had presumably been buried alive. 28 hundred bodies were eventually found and the massacre prompted U.S. and

South Vietnamese officials to predict a bloodbath if the communists won the war. For the communists However the Tet Offensive fell short of their expectations by V. At that time in the north we had devoted our resources and our energy to the liberation of the South in 1968. And achieved. We certainly felt a little let. Hi. I. Looking back at it now it is clear that the first objective of the liberation of the South was not accomplished but at that time we did attack the command centers of the American forces and the puppet regime

in the urban areas as well as in the provinces. We attacked the provincial headquarters the Saigon presidential palace the various secret police headquarters and the radio stations and in Saigon. We fought our way into the American embassy which was the most important American headquarters in the south. We were able to occupy all these places but we could not hold them. Therefore we did not gain enough time for the people to stage their general uprising. Against the decision wants to inflict as much damage as possible to the American and puppet command structures and to cause the American and puppet troops to lose their morale. Matt have a note for us you know strategy has never been purely military. Our strategy is always a general and integrated strategy

simultaneously. Military political and diplomatic plus Tet offensive of 1968 obviously had an objective that was both military and political and. As a military operation the offensive had failed. The Southern Viet Cong guerrilla forces had surfaced to be killed or captured in large numbers. After 1968 the war was increasingly fought by North Vietnamese as a conventional conflict. The political goal of forcing President to to accept a coalition government also failed. What they have realized is that the people was against them.

So I believe that the general uprising on they have a whole has not happened. They have met with the companies to them in front of people in the city. So they felt it was countryside. I said that the Viet Cong had created considerable damage here which is quite true. But that does not necessarily mean that we are not stronger here. I think we're stronger on a number of cops here. I think the Vietnamese armed forces for example have demonstrated their capability. I think they did an excellent performance. I think they've gained confidence in themselves. But even though it was a considerable military setback for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong out there on the ground it was in effect a brilliant political victory for them here in the United States. I'm not sure I fully understand the reasons why that should have occurred

but it became very clear after the Tet Offensive that many people at the grass roots such as my cousins in Cherokee County finally came to the conclusion that if we could not tell them when this war was going to end and we couldn't in any good faith that we might as well chuck it. The Tet Offensive came as a brutal surprise to President Johnson and all of his advisors. The we had been led to believe that the Viet Cong were pretty well. De-fanged. By that period that the. Pacification program had worked very well that most of the villages in South Vietnam were secure and that it was virtually impossible for the Viet Cong to rise to the heights that they did in 1968.

The shock of the terror attacks for Johnson the commander in chief to seek refuge in the military. Johnson the president said nothing to the nation. Had crystallized the dilemma of the war. Johnson wanted victory but his enemy though rebuffed was still not defeated. Could he win now without expanding the war and committing more troops. At the time the Tet Offensive. As for all those troops that were more. On the way to me anyway. That had been promised and had been organized and I asked that they be accelerated. Johnson approved this request and sent off an airborne unit. But by now Vietnam was draining America's overall military force.

Johnson's generals pressed him to take a step he had always resisted to call up the reserves to gird the nation for a bigger war. Mr Johnson then sent a message if you need further reinforcements Please call for. I took no steps in that regard I told General Wheeler came over. He was the chairman the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And Wheeler told me that it was a good prospect that the reserves had been mobilized that the strategy would be changed and if reserves are mobilized and our strategy was changed to be an offensive strategy that would break down some of the geographic areas of Laos and Cambodia. And allow us to take the war to the enemy in a more effective way through the bombing campaign. What I want. To bring the war to it to an end. It was in the context of a contingency plan based on an assumption of a decision and it was not a request per se but it was

presented as Westmoreland's request for 200 6000 troops for Vietnam. General Wheeler said they were needed to stop another attack. In fact Wheler plan to keep half the troops at home to replenish the depleted reserves. Another advisor wanted to use the troops to invade North Vietnam. I thought that the extra troops would be justified only if we use them in a very active policy to force an end of the war on the ground through putting forces in the North Vietnam. As far as north as Van and blocking off on the ground with U.S. forces multiple trials in Laos Johnson turned the troop request over to Clark Clifford his new secretary of defense a trusted adviser and supporter of the war from the beginning. President Johnson appointed a task force as soon as I went into the Pentagon and named me chairman of the task force. The reason was that the

military had specifically requested two hundred and six thousand more troops be sent to Vietnam. He wanted that analyzed. He wanted us to determine how the troops could be gathered and sent what the social political economic impact might be on the United States. The troop request came at a time when Johnson was concerned about case on the marine Garrison was still besieged. Johnson believed the North Vietnamese still planned a major assault against gays on. The. Marines surrounded and outnumbered. Were enduring deadly

artillery barrages as they waited for the North Vietnamese to storm the base. Have. To meet the needs of these fighting man we shall do whatever is required. Make no mistake about it. I don't want a man in here to go back home thinking otherwise. We are going to weigh in. Johnson did meet the needs of his medication.

He unleashed the air force against the North Vietnamese and circling the base in one of the most intensive bombing campaigns in history. By early March assured that case was safe and the Tet Offensive repelled Johnson quietly showed the request for six thousand troops. But the troop request a deeply influenced his new secretary of defense. I know for three full days I spent down in the tank with the Joint Chiefs of Staff where you sit with all of the communications devices that go

all over the world. We had long talks. How long would it take. They didn't know how many more troops would it take. They didn't 260000 answer the demand. They didn't know. Might there be more yes there might be more. It was all over I said. What is the plan to win the war in Vietnam. Well the only plan is that ultimately the attrition will wear down the North Vietnamese and they will have had enough. Is there an indication that we've reached that point. No there is. As a result of that kind of interview and that kind of information before the final examination was over and we submitted our report to President Johnson I had turned against the will. But we don't plan to surrender either and we don't plan to pull out either. And we don't plan to let people in portions and pressure and force us to divide our nation in a time of Gneisenau peril. The hour is here.

I then decided that what I must do would be to get all of the strength that I had because the mere fact that I had reached the conclusion was not very significant because the decision really lay with President Johnson. Clifford said. I noticed you this afternoon at the State Department and it seems to me you and I are on the same side. And I think we should form a partnership. You should be the partner in the White House and I'll be the partner in the Pentagon. You tell me what goes on over there. Let's see here and I'll tell you what happens. But we're here and together we'll get this country and our president out of this mess. Harry was our secret. Harry was very close to the president. Harry was an hour close he was close to other members of the White House staff. We began to develop a group. And I know that after a while the question would be very secretly Is he with us. That means is he

part of this group that is organized and dedicated to changing Lyndon Johnson's mind was almost like some very similar expression used in the French Revolution. Is he with us without his having to say so getting us out of this mess does not mean. Putting in another two or three hundred thousand men in order to beat North Vietnam the Viet Cong if met to begin the process of de-escalation as it was called a disengagement of the United States. I was exhilarated. On March 10th the New York Times revealed the Pentagon's request for additional troops. The request had been a closely guarded secret. The disclosures stunned members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Then holding hearings on Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was grilled on live television for two days.

There was an uprising in this country in opposition to this war. It's going to get worse. This talk about sending over 100000 to 200000 more troops. You're going to create a very serious difficulty in this country if you people go through with that. Now Mr. Secretary for some years we have been bombing the North as I understand it this bombing of the north and three purposes. One to hurt not be a day that's been done. Secondly to stop the infiltration of men down across the aisle and the whole campaign trail has that been done. It has not been stopped completely. Senator we now suppose that it could stop it completely. But we do know that it has had some. Major impact upon the capacity of the other side to. Carry out this infiltration and has cost them very heavily. The rate of infiltration in 1965 was about fifteen hundred a month. In 1966 about forty five hundred a month in

1967 between fifty five hundred and six thousand a month. And in 1968 it's my understanding that in January 20000 men came down from not be of interest. That is that correct figure or a correct as an example was a as a possible correction. And then the third factor in addition to her reducing infiltration. The third factor was to bring knowledge to the conference table. Are they any closer to the conference table now than they were when the bombing began. We have seen no evidence that they are prepared to undertake serious discussions toward a peaceful settlement of this situation. Senators Morse and Mansfield have long opposed the war. But after teth supporters like Senator Carl month of South Dakota began to abandon him Johnson is one who has consistently supported the decision of the administration. To stay on and press on with this war. I am totally and be

disappointed by your answer and I think this is one of the great cause it's biggest sanction in this country. I'm convinced the majority of Americans would like to see a priority and unless it is established and announced by this administration I think we're going to increase the divisiveness which I hate to see developing in the country now. Congress wanted to change. Either victory or withdrawal. Congress also concerned about the cost of the war forced Johnson to trim his domestic programs. He could not spend more on a limited war. And he feared an expanded war. That's his greatest fear as he once put it was that. An American pilot was going to. Miss his target in Hanoi or Haiphong Harbor and put a bomb down the smokestack of a Russian freighter. With the Russian minister on board and that the pilot would be from Johnson City Texas.

He was he was extremely disturbed that we might provoke the Russians or earlier the Chinese. Into coming to the aid of Vietnam and that was one of the. That was one of the tremendous dilemmas he had throughout the war. When a great many Americans wanted the United States to go ahead and finish it off. Johnson also had to consider the war at home. Until then he had dismissed street demonstrations but 1968 was a presidential election year. And out of the growing anti-war sentiment there emerged the peace candidate thrust into prominence by the shock of the Tet offensive. I am a candidate for the nomination of the presidency on the. Democratic ticket. I ran for that office against an incumbent leader of our party because I believe as. I find many people in this country do believe now and. Have for the last five or six months

that we are involved in a very deep crisis of leadership a crisis of direction and a crisis of national purpose and the entire history of this war Vietnam no matter what we call it as one of continued air and of misjudgment. Senator Eugene McCarthy nearly beat Johnson in the New Hampshire primary and the close vote jolted Johnson. At the time it looked like a vote for peace. In fact it was a vote against Johnson's conduct of the war. Many New Hampshire voters felt that he wasn't being tough enough. They favored getting out of a war he refused to win. A plurality of those who voted for McCarthy who later said they preferred George Wallace a strident anti-communist when in the communist era when I become the president. Give you a passport. You don't.

Johnson was further rattled when Robert Kennedy joined the presidential race. The glamorous Kennedys had always worried him Robert had switched to a peace platform and Johnson smell defeat in Wisconsin in the next primary. A far away war was taking its toll at home Johnson turn to a group of elder statesmen called the wise men they had consistently backed his war policies he convened them on March 25th. They included the establishment figures like former Secretary of State Dean Acheson former ambassador to Vietnam Maxwell Taylor and former National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. I remember what happened because as it happened. The rest of the brethren had asked me to be a kind of a reporter in this that kind of person in NSC meetings earlier.

I was more or less at the center of gravity of the group and our recommendation. On the whole. Not without dissent disagreement was that there should not be. An increase in. Force levels in South Vietnam and that there should be. A modification of the policy of bombing. Now here was a group saying Mr. President stop trying to win the war. Start cutting back don't send any more man. We think you ought to get out. It's a very bitter pill. I think he had himself decided really that he would not do the ground force reinforcement. So it was more gloominess in a way than our specific recommendations that he may have found troubling.

To see price increases the cost on the afternoon of March 30 first after two months of indecision. Johnson rehearsed an address to the nation is scheduled for that evening. Those additional expenditures is so good. Clifford MC What did you hear when you're going to have to get him in the next hour. The grand George going on and this fiscal year. And as late as March 28 his aides were still divided on Vietnam policy he did bring into sharp focus the importance of that speech became paramount. Sub meetings were held. Efforts were made to persuade this person then that person stand up under pressure and so forth. Let's persuade the president to make the decision to begin to get out of Vietnam. Finally the morning of the twenty eighth came and we met in the office of the Secretary of State Dean Rusk. There were five or six persons there at the time. We started in and we went through a

draft of the speech. It was so strong we will be in there we will be fighting. They will not drive us up. We will save Vietnam speech. There was a meeting and Secretary Rusk's office Russ Clifford Bill Bundy the assistant secretary for the Far East roster and me Clifford said the speech is a disaster. I thought the draft was dreadful. I thought that it was harsh. I thought that it talked about the continuation of the war. It talked about Tet how Tet could be resolved. There was some suggestion about sending some of the man not the whole 260000. To me it needed much changing and much men. The really surprising thing was it Ruskin Rostow did not fight Clifford on that but began to speak as if. All right let's. What do we have to put in

line to write a different kind of speech. I went back and wrote a different speech a very different speech. As a quick illustration the first few sentences of that speech in the original draft said I wish to talk about the war in Vietnam. That was the first sentence. By time the speech was written and rewritten we work days on it before it was given the first sentence read. Good evening my fellow Americans. Tonight I want to speak to you. Of peace in Vietnam in Southeast Asia. And that speech was almost a complete reversal of what the speech started out to be. The president had before maybe the 10th or 12th or 14th draft of the old line of speeches that he had one day the alternate the next morning he called me and said I want to I don't like what you say there on page three. And I looked very quickly to see which one he was talking

about and it was one day. So he was on the alternate speech. He was on the speech that call for de-escalation. Tonight I have ordered our aircraft and our naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam except in the area north of the demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatens allied forward position and where the movement of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that thread. I had cut off the para ration the ending of the speech which was a kind of McPhearson effort to write Churchillian. It had been on every draft of every speech from the beginning. Clifford called me just before we met on that Saturday and said you know that person doesn't belong there anymore the speech has changed. You can't make that kind of speech. We've now got and then ended with the sort of we will fight them in the lanes in the

villages and the beaches language that that is in that parish and so I just cut it off. I didn't have time to write anyway. Johnson ask me where was it. I like that. And I said well I didn't like it not. Doesn't really fit with the speech go upstairs and write a new one and I'll make it short because the speech is already a very long one. He said You don't need to worry about time. I may have a little ending of my own. And he walked out of the room leaving me and Clifford and I turned around at Clifford and said Good lord is he going to say sayonara you're going to quit. Clifford looked at me as if I were out of my mind. We'd all assumed of course that he would run. He loved the job he reveled in it. About five in the afternoon I got back to my office and Johnson called me. And asked me what I thought about the speech that he was about to deliver and. Two or three hours. And I said I thought it was pretty good. I was really proud and glad that we had turned turn

and change the speech. He said I've got an ending. Said I've heard that you know what. It. I said I think so. And he said what do you think about it. I said I'm very sorry Mr. President. And he said. OK so long partner. With America sons in the field far away. With America's future under challenge right here at home. With our hopes and the world's hopes for peace in the balance every day. I do not believe. That I should devote an hour a day of my time. To any personal partisan cause or to any duties other. And the awesome duties of this office the presidency. Of your country.

Accordingly. I shall not seek. And I will not accept. The nomination of my party for another term as your president. As promptly as possible after he spoke I had a press conference and announced formally that the 260000 troops were not to be sent. This is part and parcel. I believe that the president does seem to place a limitation at this time on our troop level at a point not exceeding five hundred and fifty thousand. It seemed appropriate that it should be sad if that's what he meant and I assumed that that was what he meant. From the tone of his speech on March 30 first there was still those who very much wanted to. The military still thought the matter was hanging fire. That ended after that statement was made

publicly there was no further comment about the $206. The Tet Offensive had a further impact in mid-May North Vietnamese diplomats arrived in Paris to negotiate for the first time that week the Viet Cong launched a new offensive. Americans fought on the same objective and independent South Vietnam. But after taps the strategy changed. There were peace talks. And the slow withdrawal of American troops. The. Talking and fighting.

Went on for the next five years.