Advocates; Should the United States Press for Israeli Withdrawal From Occupied Territories and Offer to Guarantee Israel's Security? ; 409

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THE ADVOCATES: A MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROPOSAL: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES

PRESS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND OFFER TO

GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S SECURITY?

Announcer:

Good evening ladies and gentleman and welcome to THE ADVOCATES, the PBS

Fight of the Week. Tonight's debate is coming to you from Boston's

historic Faneuil Hall.

Semerjian:

Ladies and gentleman, may I have your attention please.

Announcer:

Moderator Evan Semerjian has just called tonight's meeting to order.

Semerjian:

Good evening and welcome to THE ADVOCATES. Tonight we examine a

proposal that would involve the United States in a Middle East

settlement, and specifically, our question is this: Should the United

States press for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and offer

to guarantee Israel's security? Advocate Lincoln Bloomfield says,

"Yes." Mr. Bloomfield?

Bloomfield:

To speed a settlement in the Middle East the United States must press

for major Israeli withdrawals from occupied Arab territories linked to

a firm U.S. guarantee of Israel's security. With me tonight are

Professor William Griffith of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

and Professor William Polk of the Adlai Stevenson Institute and the

University of Chicago.

Semerjian:

Advocate William Rusher says, "No."

Rusher:

Tonight's proposal would strip Israel of any real hope of defending

itself and then substitute for that hope an American promise to start

World War III if necessary to preserve the Israeli state. With me

tonight to argue against such multiple folly are Mr. Edward Luttwak,

Military Consultant and author, and Professor Uri Ra'anan of the

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Semerjian:

Thank you, gentlemen. By way of introduction let me first say that

Lincoln Bloomfield, who makes his first appearance as an advocate

tonight, is a veteran of the State Department and is currently a

Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology. William Rusher, a familiar face to ADVOCATES viewers, is a

syndicated columnist, and that column, incidentally, is called the

"Conservative Advocate." And now, before get on to the cases, let me

give a few words to you of background to tonight's question. This week

formal talks should begin in Geneva between Israel and her Arab

neighbors. The fact that talks will be taking place at all is a hopeful

sign, but even with the willingness of both sides to settle by

negotiation differences that have been a cause of intermittent war for

a quarter of a century there are many obstacles to reaching a

negotiated settlement. Tonight we focus on one of these, the issue of

territory. The Arab states seek the return of territories lost in war

with Israel as a condition for peaceful settlement. Israel, while

willing to return much of the captured Arab lands, insists that any

settlement must leave her with military secure boundaries and that

implies retaining some of the territory the Arab states want returned.

Tonight's proposal of U.S. military guarantees for Israel is offered as

a way of meeting both the Arab requirement that lost territories be

returned and the Israeli requirement that her security not be

jeopardized. Under the proposal the United States would press Israel to

withdraw from occupied territories, thus satisfying the Arab demands

and providing the conditions for peaceful settlement. And the United

States, by formal treaty, would guarantee the security of Israel

against aggression. That is the proposal and what is implied by

tonight's question. Should the United States press for Israeli

withdrawal from occupied territories and offer to guarantee Israel's

security? Now, before we begin I want to emphasize that neither side

tonight proposes wavering from the declared policy of support for

Israel which has been followed by every administration since the

founding of Israel in 1948. And now to the cases. Mr. Bloomfield, the

floor is yours.

Bloomfield:

In four bloody rounds of warfare in 26 years everyone has surely

learned that there will be no peace in the Middle East unless three

conditions are met: First, major Israeli withdrawals from occupied Arab

lands; Second, some tangible recognition of Palestinian nationality;

Third, some formula for internationalizing the holy places of

Jerusalem. It's painfully clear that if a settlement is not reached

this time another round of fighting is inevitable with far greater

consequences for Israelis, for Arabs, and for world peace. Now the door

is open to peace. The U.S. has a chance to use its influence to bring

about a peaceful settlement. I am convinced that this means the United

States should press for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories

and in exchange should offer a firm guarantee of Israel's security. To

support me in this approach, my first witness is William Griffith.

Semerjian:

Mr. Griffith, welcome to THE ADVOCATES.

Griffith:

Thank you.

Bloomfield:

William Griffith is Professor of Political Science at both

Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Fletcher School of Law

and Diplomacy at Tufts. Mr. Griffith, what will have to change to get a

real peace in the Middle East? What territorial changes, in your

opinion, will be required?

Griffith:

In my opinion, Israel will have to withdraw from almost all the

occupied territories which it conquered in 1967. I say almost all

because I think that Israel should retain a small strip on the Golan

Heights, overlooking the Sea of Galilee. It should retain a part of the

Latrun Salient in here, which threatens the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road.

And it should also be given a small part of the previous Arab sector of

Jerusalem so that the Israeli sector of the city will come up to the

Wailing Wall.

Bloomfield:

What about Palestine? What about the Palestinians?

Griffith:

As to the Palestinians, I think that they should have either their own

state or be incorporated in Jordan as they wish. They should be given

reparations for their lost property, a limited number should be allowed

to return to Israel, and the United States should participate in a

major fashion in indemnifying them for their losses.

Bloomfield:

Now, how would such an arrangement actually improve Israel's security?

Wouldn't it make her more vulnerable? Would this proposal head off

another war or not?

Griffith:

Let me first say that such a proposal would, in addition to the

internationalization of the holy city of Jerusalem, it would involve a

de-militarized zone on both sides of these boundaries with the United

Nations peacekeeping force in this zone to separate the Israelis and

the Arabs physically, and an American veto over this force being

withdrawn.

Bloomfield:

What are American interests here, Mr. Griffith? What are our objectives

in playing this active role in the Mid-east? Why is it in our interest

to pursue this kind of policy?

Griffith:

First and most important, to keep the peace, for without it another war

is inevitable; secondly, to contain Soviet influence in the Middle

East, which otherwise will increase; thirdly, to give more security for

Israel than it now has; and fourthly, to end the oil Arab limitation

and the oil boycott, for if this is not ended; Western Europe and Japan

will rush into depression and political instability, the United States

will rush into recession, and we will be isolated from our allies on an

issue so crucial for their economic security and our political and

economic security.

Bloomfield:

What about U.S.-Soviet relations?

Griffith:

U.S.-Soviet relations, I would argue, by this will be improved since

the danger of war will be much less, and moreover, it will be America

which will gain in the Arab world and keep its influence in Israel.

Bloomfield:

Now, what kind of influence or pressures might be necessary, and should

the United States actually employ them?

Griffith:

I think the United States should attempt-- indeed, I think it is

already attempting to persuade Israel that this move is in its best

interest and that the alternative to it is a constantly increasing

series of wars with greater and devastating Israeli casualties and our

involvement. If that does not work, however, and it probably will not,

I think the United States will have to use its military aid to Israel

as a means of pressure for bringing this about, for the United States

in the last analysis must make an American definition and not an

Israeli definition, or an Arab definition, of what it sees as essential

for its security in the Middle East and for peace in the world. From

this point of view, therefore, I argue, the case for withdrawal and

guarantees is overwhelming.

Semerjian:

All right, that's very interesting. Thank you very much. Let's hear now

from Mr. Rusher, who has some questions for you.

Rusher:

Professor Griffith, I agree entirely with what you've just stated to be

your central objective, which is an American policy in the American

interest and in the interest of peace for it and for the world. But I'd

like to talk to you, if I may, about how this extraordinary proposal is

going to have that effect. In return for this very substantial

withdrawal of Israeli forces that you have described to substantially

the pre-1967 boundaries, the Israelis, I gather, are to receive a

guarantee from the United States, is that correct?

Griffith:

Yes, that's correct.

Rusher:

And what is this guarantee to consist of? What will we do hereafter if

they're attacked?

Griffith:

We will do what we would always have done in any case and what we

should have done in any case, which is to prevent by American military

force if necessary the physical destruction of Israel.

Rusher:

American military force, if necessary. Now, that means, I take it, that

we are going to be committed by a treaty, I take it, a Senate-approved

treaty, is that right, to go to the aid of Israel with American force,

with American troops, American Navy, Air and ground, if need be, is

that correct?

Griffith:

I assume that you would agree with me, Mr. Rusher, that we would have

done so in 1970, or at any other time when Israel was threatened.

Rusher:

Not at all. Mr. Griffith, if you assume that, you'll assume anything.

Griffith:

Then I assume that you are prepared to surrender the security of the

state of Israel to its destruction. I am not.

Rusher:

I'm trying to find out what you're prepared to do. Are you prepared to

embark upon World War III in order to guarantee the minimal borders of

Israel that you described or not?

Griffith:

I'm prepared to use American military force to preserve the security of

Israel.

Rusher:

Are you prepared to answer my question?

Griffith:

That is my answer.

Rusher:

Will there be, if necessary. World War III in order to guarantee those

borders?

Griffith:

There will much more likely be World War III if we do not carry out my

proposal.

Rusher:

Whether it is likely one way or the other, if those borders are

violated, and World War III is necessary to preserve them, you

recommend World War III.

Griffith:

No, I do not recommend World War III.

Rusher:

What do you recommend in that case?

Griffith:

Because in the first place I argue, as I did before, that we would

always have guaranteed militarily the borders of Israel, and secondly I

argue that only by this proposal, by a formal treaty commitment, will

we convince the Arabs that they dare not violate this border...

Semerjian:

Professor...

Griffith:

While with your refusal to accept a formal commitment, you are

encouraging the Arabs to violate the border and the Soviets to support

them.

Rusher:

I may be doing a great many things with my policy, but it is your

proposal that we are studying tonight. And your proposal either does or

does not contemplate a third World War if necessary.

Griffith:

It does not contemplate it. It is, in fact, necessary to prevent it.

Rusher:

Then I must ask Mr. Bloomfield whether or not his witness is correctly

describing his position. I understood that the guarantee that you were

speaking about earlier was a guarantee of all military support

necessary. Is Mr. Griffith...

Semerjian:

Well, rather than put a question to Mr. Bloomfield, let me ask you

this, Mr. Griffith. Is there any limit to the kind of aid under a

treaty that you contemplate?

Griffith:

You mean any limit to the military?

Semerjian:

That's right.

Griffith:

Such military aid as would be necessary to preserve the security of

Israel. That has been our...

Rusher:

Including nuclear...

Griffith:

That has been our policy since 1948. I'm not proposing to change it.

Rusher:

Including nuclear weapons?

Griffith:

If that became necessary, it would be used before.

Rusher:

If it becomes necessary, yes. Including nuclear weapons.

Griffith:

I see no reason to assume that it would become necessary.

Rusher:

I didn't say you did, but if nonetheless it became necessary, you would

be prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Griffith:

I do not think it would become necessary, and therefore I see no reason

to propose it.

Rusher:

Answer the question. Mr. Semerjian, will you ask him to answer the

question.

Semerjian:

Well, I think he has answered your question in that he doesn't believe

it will become necessary, but I think he was giving you a qualified yes

that if it did, he would so employ it.

Rusher:

If he is giving me a qualified yes, I will accept a qualified yes. This

proposes World War III if necessary. Let's take this U.N. force on the

border. How wide is this U.N. corridor, cordon sanitaire, to be?

Griffith:

I don't know exactly. I should think that it would require several

miles at least.

Rusher:

Several miles at least. On both sides, the Israeli and the other side?

Griffith:

On both sides.

Rusher:

And in that entire stretch between Haifa and Tel Aviv, where the actual

borders of the sea and of the state of Israel are about eight miles

apart, how much of those eight miles do you want to be U.N. territory?

Griffith:

It's not eight miles.

Rusher:

It is eight miles.

Griffith:

It's considerably more.

Rusher:

I beg your pardon.

Griffith:

And you would not need as much of that place.

Rusher:

How much would you need?

Griffith:

I don't know exactly.

Rusher:

You don't know. In other words...

Griffith:

That's, after all, a specific military question.

Rusher:

Yes, it is.

Griffith:

What I am arguing is that if you wish to prevent another war, you must

physically separate both contestants.

Semerjian:

All right, one brief question and answer, please.

Rusher:

And if the Arabs, nonetheless, did attack across this border of

indefinite size, which you claim the United Nations would be

protecting, how long would it take them to get to the major cities of

Israel?

Griffith:

That would depend who attacked...

Rusher:

I'm talking about the Arabs with tanks.

Griffith:

I don't see any reason to assume that they would get to the major

cities of Israel because they are not likely to attack...

Rusher:

Mr. Semerjian, I'm afraid Mr. Griffith declines to accept any

assumption except his own.

Semerjian:

All right, let's go back to Mr. Bloomfield for a question.

Bloomfield:

Mr. Griffith, what, in your opinion, would be the result of not

reaching a settlement, due in part to the failure of the United States

to act and use its influence now?

Griffith:

It would make it much more probable, what Mr. Rusher says that he's

trying to avoid, World War III, because it is only by convincing the

Arabs and the Soviets that they need have no doubt that we would

protect Israel that we can prevent another war, which might mean the

destruction of Israel and could mean World War III. Mr. Rusher's

proposal--or rather, his resistance to our proposal--is in fact

bringing about what he so, in my opinion, incorrectly claims he's

trying to prevent.

Semerjian:

All right, Mr. Rusher, do you want to try again?

Rusher:

I will try one more time, Mr. Semerjian.

Griffith:

Please do.

Rusher:

You are proposing, Mr. Griffith, a guarantee.

Griffith:

I am proposing a formalization of the guarantee which already exists.

Rusher:

A guarantee, nonetheless.

Griffith:

No more than the guarantee we now have except that it is in treaty

form.

Rusher:

There is either a guarantee or there is not. Is there going to be a

guarantee?

Griffith:

There is now.

Rusher:

Is there going to be?

Griffith:

There will be now and...

Rusher:

And will there be a guarantee of as much military force as necessary to

defend Israel, including nuclear weapons?

Griffith:

No more than there is now.

Rusher:

Answer the question.

Griffith:

That's my answer: no more than there is now.

Rusher:

That is not the answer.

Semerjian:

Well, Mr. Griffith, I must say that when you say that, everybody has a

different notion of what there is now. Now, Mr. Rusher is trying to

find out from you to what extent are you willing to commit the United

States in the form of a treaty? And what is the answer to that

question?

Griffith:

It is my argument that we should formally commit the United States by

treaty to what, in fact, it is committed now, no more and no less: the

prevention of the destruction of the state of Israel.

Semerjian:

By any means necessary, is that right?

Griffith:

No more and no less than we are now committed. We are now committed by

any means necessary.

Rusher:

Evidently, Mr. Semerjian...

Semerjian:

All right, thank you, Mr. Griffith, for being with us tonight. Mr.

Bloomfield.

Bloomfield:

Professor Griffith has given his suggestions for the possible shape of

an agreement. Now, for my next witness, I call William Polk.

Semerjian:

Mr. Polk, welcome to THE ADVOCATES.

Bloomfield:

Mr. Polk is President of the Adlai Stevenson Institute and Professor of

Middle Eastern History at the University of Chicago. Mr. Polk, why is

it so important for the United States to press now for a settlement in

the Middle East?

Polk:

I think we simply can't afford to return to a situation of armed

troops. The Israelis, to take them first, lost approximately one tenth

of 1 percent of their population in the recent war. That is more

people, proportional to their population, than we lost in the entire

Vietnam war. The Egyptians, on their side, have suffered very grievous

damage and are caught in a spiral of poverty and underdevelopment which

world peace and decency demands be broken. As far as I can figure out,

there is no possible way of employing an arms embargo short of true

peace. And lastly, it seems to me quite clear that if we go back into a

situation of armed truce, there will be another war and the next war

will be nuclear.

Bloomfield:

How can peace be sold to both sides in the Middle East, Mr. Polk?

Polk:

Well, I think the most important thing of all is that we must attempt

to create what might be called a negotiating climate, that that is

really the true role of us on the outside, that we must try, in so far

as we can, to help the more statesmanlike and constructive of the

people on each side to move toward a situation in which they are

responsibly protecting their national interests. That means, above all

else that we recognize that the negotiating situation is not unlike all

negotiating situations, that the people who sit on each side of the

table must not only agree with one another, but must be able to go home

and sell to their own constituents what they have agreed to.

Bloomfield:

What is the importance of the security treaty we speak of here?

Polk:

Well, I think the most important aspect of all of this is the impact on

the domestic politics, on the negotiating climate, again, if you will,

of each side. I don't happen to believe that the security guarantee is

a major new step of any kind. As Mr. Griffith points out, it is in fact

a formal codification of a situation which has existed de facto in

American politics since 1948. But I do believe that the symbolic impact

of that on the negotiating situation makes it more easy for the

statesmen on both sides to go home and show their constituents that

they are in fact operating in a statesmanlike way.

Bloomfield:

Well, in that connection, what do both sides actually have to gain from

this proposal?

Polk:

I think both sides have a very great deal to gain; in fact, the whole

world community has. Israel's most important single national objective

is to be accepted in the Middle East neighborhood, and only if that is

accomplished does it have any real, long-term security. On their side,

the Egyptians who have suffered grievously from a past of neglect and

poverty have almost everything to gain by a true achievement of peace

in which a serious attack can be made on the problems of a burgeoning

population, of poverty, and of the destruction of part of their

environment. Of course the Palestinians have a great deal to gain in

the sense of the recognition of their nationhood. And the whole world

community has to get out from under the shadow of this terrible,

destructive fear and danger of warfare.

Semerjian:

One very brief question.

Bloomfield:

Could you sum up for us very briefly why you support this proposal?

Polk:

It seems to me the most important thing about the proposal is that this

is an opportunity for peace. It probably will not remain an opportunity

very long, and everything must be done to bring it to a head.

Responsible politicians on both sides must be encouraged and helped to

do what they must do to protect their nations, and we on the outside

must help them to achieve that degree of flexibility which alone will

make negotiations really possible.

Semerjian:

All right, thank you, Mr. Bloomfield. Mr. Rusher, your witness.

Rusher:

Mr. Polk, you spoke of the proposal that is made, at least by Mr.

Bloomfield tonight if not by Mr. Griffith, as formalizing , or

codifying, what has been American policy since 1948, is that correct?

Polk:

Yes, sir.

Rusher:

Is it your impression that the United States has been informally

committed since 1948 to nuclear warfare with the Soviet Union if

necessary in order to defend the borders of Israel?

Polk:

I believe that it is very likely that any American government would

have been pushed in that direction.

Rusher:

It would have been pushed. I'm asking you whether that has been the

informal policy of the government of the United States?

Polk:

I don't believe that the policy, per se, was ever codified in that

sense.

Rusher:

I didn't say it was. I said "informally."

Polk:

Yes, sir, I believe it has been...

Rusher:

Do you think that the American people have known since 1948 that they

were committed informally to nuclear warfare for the sake of the state

of Israel?

Polk:

I think that every American government has made it very clear that it

would defend Israel.

Rusher:

Do you think that this is the policy approved and known to be approved

by the people of the United States?

Polk:

I believe it is.

Rusher:

And therefore when it is to be codified, it will consist of no more,

but it will now be a codified commitment, will it not, to go, if

necessary, to a nuclear war with the Soviet Union on behalf of the

borders of Israel?

Polk:

I think your continued emphasis on nuclear warfare is an impossible

formulation of the question, if I may. I'm not trying to avoid your

question.

Rusher:

What's so impossible about it?

Polk:

Impossible in the sense that all American commitments throughout the

world, including the NATO treaty, the Southeast Asia treaty, the CENTO

treaty and so forth, have talked about the use of force to defend the

treaty obligation. It has been certainly the policy of every American

administration to use what force was necessary to defend Israel.

Everyone may question when one finally reaches the issue of whether

it's nuclear warfare or not what the final decision will be, and I

don't believe that any American President would take your codification

of an a priori, pre-determined decision on that.

Rusher:

Mr. Polk, there is either a policy or there isn't. Now, I do not

necessarily expect that everything that happens in the Middle East will

lead to the third World War. I haven't said that. But you and Mr.

Bloomfield and to some ill-defined extent even Mr. Griffith are

attempting to lead the United States into a codification of a policy.

You have revealed to us that this is a policy that in your opinion has

contemplated, at least tangentially, nuclear war since 1948, and that

therefore you're not asking for anything different. I suggest to you,

sir, that you have the courage to be candid with this audience and to

admit that what you are asking is something that no American

Administration has ever given, that no American Administration would

dare face to the American people or present, and that your own side

tonight is running from because it doesn't dare face it either.

Polk:

Is that a question?

Rusher:

Yes, it's a question, and it's directed to you.

Polk:

My answer is very simple: that the policy of the American government

since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 has been based on the

defense of that state. That policy is what I would advocate and what I

believe Mr. Bloomfield's side is advocating tonight, period.

Rusher:

Defense to what extent?

Polk:

Defense.

Rusher:

To what extent?

Polk:

Mr. Kissinger described it a few days ago as defending the integrity of

the state of Israel but not its conquered territory.

Rusher:

To what extent?

Semerjian:

Well, Mr. Rusher, are you trying to pin him down...

Rusher:

Yes.

Semerjian:

As to exactly what the military commitment will be?

Rusher:

Yes, I've been trying to do that progressively with a side that has

failed miserably to state what it is presenting to this audience.

Semerjian:

Well, let me interrupt for just one second, Mr. Rusher, and get off the

nuclear war kick for just one minute.

Rusher:

It is not a kick, Mr. Semerjian.

Semerjian:

Well, however you wish to characterize it.

Rusher:

However you do.

Semerjian:

Let me ask the witness: Mr. Polk, I take it you're advocating a treaty

with Israel, a military treaty, is that right? If the United States

entered into such a military treaty with Israel, do you think the

Soviet Union would then enter into such a military treaty with the Arab

nations?

Polk:

What my hope would be, sir, is that a multiparty treaty would be

entered into in which a recognition would be made by each side of the

action of the other.

Semerjian:

Well, I take it your proposal has no control over what the Soviet Union

will do.

Polk:

My proposal certainly doesn't, but I believe that in the course of

negotiations there would be several conditions put forth.

Semerjian:

Go ahead, Mr. Rusher.

Rusher:

When Mr. Tom Wicker of the New York Times warned the other day that

this proposal of this type is precisely the kind of open-ended,

possibly uncontrolled, military commitment in a volatile situation that

Vietnam should have taught us to avoid, was he wrong?

Polk:

No, I don't think an open-ended commitment is wrong. I think what we're

all trying to create, as I suggested, is a climate in which a different

kind of situation can be made to arise.

Rusher:

When Mr. Wicker went on to say that the only real guarantee of security

Israel could ever have is a stable and amicable peace with its

neighbor, was he wrong?

Polk:

No, sir, certainly not.

Rusher:

Then what good is a guarantee?

Polk:

I tried to explain that, sir, in my answer to the question earlier,

that it helped to create a situation in which both sides could in fact

work toward peace.

Rusher:

How good are U.S. guarantees in that area anyway? In 1957 Secretary of

State Dulles gave the Israeli ambassador a written guarantee that the

United States would assure passage of Israeli ships through the Strait

of Tiran in return for Israel's withdrawal from Sharm el Sheikh. Do you

know what happened thereafter?

Semerjian:

One very brief answer.

Polk:

Yes, sir, I know what happened.

Rusher:

We ran out on the commitment, didn't we?

Polk:

No, I don't think we did.

Semerjian:

All right, I'm going to have to interrupt here. I'm sorry. Let's go to

Mr. Bloomfield.

Bloomfield:

As a factual matter, we did not run out on the commitment, and we're

prepared to implement it. Mr. Polk, just to put this issue in better

balance, as a lifetime expert on international relations, would you say

that formalizing a treaty commitment to Israel would increase or

decrease the chance of a nuclear war between the United States and the

Soviet Union, arising out of a Middle Eastern clash?

Polk:

It would certainly decrease it.

Semerjian:

All right, Mr. Rusher.

Rusher:

Israel, I would submit, can hardly be expected to welcome your proposal

for its withdrawal to these shrunken borders. Would you comment on the

following statement of the Foreign Minister: "The acceptance of such a

proposal would amount to a voluntary and complete mutilation of the

state in every respect. She would be completely paralyzed, and from a

strategic point of view her position would become extremely difficult.

Sooner or later she would fall." What is your comment?

Polk:

My comment, sir, is that the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and the

government, indeed, as a whole, has also said that it would be prepared

to withdraw from the territories under conditions of peace.

Rusher:

And therefore this statement is a mistaken description of their policy

and position?

Polk:

I think the question--or the statement--is a statement of a policy

given a certain situation, given no...

Rusher:

Well, you're quite right. It was actually the statement of the

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister in rejecting the idea of British

guarantees of the border of Czechoslovakia, which did subsequently

fall.

Semerjian:

All right, thanks very much. Thank you, Mr. Polk, thanks for being with

us tonight. Mr. Bloomfield.

Bloomfield:

We believe, as does the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, that the

United States has a chance now which may not come again to help achieve

a real settlement in the Middle East. To break the dismal cycle of

diplomatic failure that brought suffering to both Arabs and Israelis

for a quarter century we need a new approach, we need new ideas, we

need new momentum, and that is tonight's proposal.

Semerjian:

Thank you, Mr. Bloomfield. For those of you who may have joined us

late, Mr. Bloomfield and his witnesses have presented the case in favor

of a U.S. military pact with Israel to help the chances of peace in the

Middle East. And now for the case against, Mr. Rusher, the floor is

yours.

Rusher:

America, and indeed the whole world, has a high stake in peace in the

Middle East, hut how is peace to be achieved? On the one hand there is

Israel, supplied by us with weapons and presently occupying important

areas of Arab territory along her own vulnerable borders. On the other

are the Arab states determined to repossess those territories. Surely

common sense would tell us to let the two sides negotiate with Israel

ultimately agreeing to draw back from much of her buffer zone in return

for a genuine peace with her neighbors. Tonight's proposal, on the

other hand, and I urge you not to be deceived by the desperate attempt

to conceal its real implications that we have seen by the two witnesses

tonight, is one of those typically professorial constructions that seek

to dispense with the tedious business of negotiations and the

inevitable tensions between neighbors by two bold strokes: first,

Israel is to be compelled by American pressure to withdraw to borders

she rightly considers utterly indefensible, and then America is to

stand guard forever over that emasculated Israel, threatening World War

III if necessary if anybody dares to attack it. Bold indeed, and more

than a little insane. To explain why, I call first upon Mr. Edward

Luttwak.

Semerjian:

Mr. Luttwak, nice to have you with us tonight.

Rusher:

Mr. Luttwak is an author and consultant on military affairs, formerly a

resident of Israel. Mr. Luttwak, tonight's proposal first requires the

United States to compel Israel, by threats of withdrawing our support,

to pull back to something very close to her 1967 borders. What will be

wrong with that from Israel's own standpoint?

Luttwak:

Well, in the first place it would remove every incentive for the Arabs

to make peace because the one incentive the Arabs have to negotiate

seriously is to obtain the return of the territory they held

previously. If you give them back the territory on a platter, the

negotiations will be like a fixed ballgame because everyone will know

what the result is.

Rusher:

What if the United States thereupon guarantees these shrunken borders

of Israel? Doesn't that solve Israel's problem nonetheless?

Luttwak:

In other words, Israel gives back the territories, the Arabs are not

compelled to negotiate a peace because they've got them anyway, but

then the United States steps in and offers a guarantee. Well, in the

first place, the security problems of Israel have been mainly,

throughout the period, small border incidents--there have been three

thousand border incidents, or thereabouts, since independence. Now, if

the United States will honor its guarantee, it will have to intervene

roughly once or twice a day. If it does not honor the guarantee, its

words will be exposed as hollow within a matter of days of this

fixed-up settlement.

Rusher:

And what about the credibility from the Israeli standpoint of the

American...?

Luttwak:

Well, if you're talking here about a guarantee against a major war--you

see, you could argue that the guarantee would only come in the case of

a major war--so then you have the small problem that you have parts of

Israel that are so narrow. This is the squeezed oranges, the 1967

borders of Israel. Here you have about six miles across; here you have

nine miles across. Now, a guarantee for Australia is fine because it

would take about six months for anyone to prepare for an invasion in

Australia. But here, the Arabs could prepare, invade and reach the

capital city of Tel Aviv, the centers of the country itself, before you

would even have time to wake up the President of the United States.

Rusher:

What about this famous "buffer zone" of Professor Griffith's? Doesn't

that afford protection?

Luttwak:

Well, I find it really quite an extraordinary proposal...

Rusher:

Could you talk this way a little, please?

Luttwak:

Yes. Well, he was proposing, I take it, a de-militarized zone where

both sides would be forbidden to have military forces for a certain

depth. Now, of course, Katyusha rockets travel for about ten miles or

so, so you need at least that much, since you've had about 5,000

Katyusha shot over the border. Now, if you try to have a ten mile

buffer zone here, you just couldn't be able to fit it in, and here it

would go right into the Mediterranean Sea, so you have the United

Nations troops gliding over the waves.

Rusher:

Mr. Luttwak, then what is Israel's best hope in your opinion?

Luttwak:

I think Israel's best hope for peace is the same as any other country's

best hope for peace, which is to allow the natural military equilibrium

to establish borders through conflict, through war, through

negotiations leading to peace, as the borders of every other country

have been shaped in the past.

Rusher:

For that purpose they continue to need and will continue to need

American military supplies, is that correct?

Luttwak:

So long as the United States is willing to supply one tank for every

three tanks the Russians supply, one plane for every three planes the

Russians supply, that will be plenty.

Semerjian:

All right, thank you. I'm sorry. Let's go now to Mr. Bloomfield. No,

wait a minute. Okay, that's all right, Mr. Bloomfield, go ahead with

your questions.

Bloomfield:

Just a factual point. Of course no one, including the Arabs, is now

asking for withdrawal before negotiations. Mr. Luttwak, on the border

issue, the issue of defensible borders, how did Israel's post-1967

borders, all of that extra land, protect her better last October than

the shrunken borders protected her in 1967?

Luttwak:

Well, in the first eighteen hours of the war the Syrians penetrated to

a depth of approximately 19 miles; superimposed on the pre-1967

borders, that would have been right into an area of about 100,000 --

they would have reached 100,000 civilians whose fate I would not like

to contemplate.

Bloomfield:

How long did the 1967 war last, Mr. Luttwak?

Luttwak:

The 1967 war lasted for six days because...

Bloomfield:

With small borders. And how long did the 1973 war last with the large

borders, Mr. Luttwak?

Luttwak:

Ah, yes, it is true of course that although they were attacked by

surprise, it took the Israelis all of three weeks to get the Arabs to a

position where they had to beg for a ceasefire to bail them out. I know

three weeks is a long time.

Bloomfield:

But what about casualties? How about the casualties in the 1967 war

with very small borders, the casualties in the 1973 war with great big,

defensible borders?

Luttwak:

The 1973 war was a general Arab war like the 1948 war. In 1948 Israel

lost one percent of its population. In 1973 it lost one-tenth of one

percent. The reason was exclusively the fact that you have room in

which to withdraw and room to maneuver. Without this room you'd be

fighting Syrian tanks in the streets of Tiberias and Egyptian tanks in

the streets of Tel Aviv.

Bloomfield:

Mr. Luttwak, I understood you to say that this would be dealt with

through conflict and other normal measures--the word "normal" was not

yours, but the word "conflict" was yours. Do you think Israel can stand

another round of fighting? What weapons would likely be used in the

fifth round?

Luttwak:

Well, I think that neither side wants to have another round of

fighting. After all...

Bloomfield:

But I heard you say through conflict they would continue to deal with

their neighbors.

Luttwak:

the Israelis are now 20 miles from Syria, they're 60 miles from Cairo,

and if another round of fighting--this gives a major disincentive to

the Arabs not to start another round of fighting. The Israelis also

have a disincentive not to start another round, and it is through the

acceptance of the military reality that you move to peace, as has

happened all over the world everywhere. The people interfere and fix

the ballgame every time the result is coming out...

Bloomfield:

Do you still assume that the Arabs wish to annihilate Israel, that that

is their objective, Mr. Luttwak?

Luttwak:

I am not an expert on these matters. I am only a nuts and bolts man,

but I will draw your attention to the fact that the editor of the

Lebanese newspaper Al Nahar is in prison for having revealed the secret

conclusions of the Algiers conference, in which it was said in the

first stage we will get back the 1967 territories, in the second stage

we will get back the rest. He is in jail, sir, for having revealed this

information.

Bloomfield:

Isn't the effect of what you're saying that we can't have peace when

the Arabs refuse to make peace and we can't have peace when the Arabs

agree to make peace?

Luttwak:

Not at all. In 1948 all the Arabs fought Israel, including Lebanon that

was a fierce antagonist. In 1967 the Lebanese were out, and the border

of peace of sorts has been established. In 1973 the Arabs fought minus

Lebanon and minus Jordan. The next war, if it happens, could well see

the Egyptians out, and at this point you will have the Middle East move

towards a natural peace, the same sort of natural peace that exists

between France and Germany, between Italy and France, France and Spain,

that is the peace arrived at by the natural processes, not with schemes

and plans or guarantees that no one means to honor.

Bloomfield:

May I read you a quotation, Mr. Luttwak, without identifying the author

for the moment and see if you recognize it? "Peace," this man said,

"real peace is now the great necessity for us. It is worth almost any

sacrifice. To get it we must return to the borders before 1967. As for

security, militarily defensible borders, while desirable, cannot by

themselves guarantee our future. Real peace with our Arab neighbors,

mutual trust and friendship, that is the only true security." Do you

recognize the author?

Luttwak:

I fully agree, and this is to be arrived at by negotiation. You...

Bloomfield:

May I tell you who said that?

Luttwak:

You prefer ... I know who said that.

Bloomfield:

Prime Minister Ben Gurion...

Luttwak:

Of course.

Bloomfield:

One of the greatest Zionist leaders.

Luttwak:

Precisely. In the context of negotiations, not Professor Blumenfeld,

that we'll return to the Arabs the territory.

Bloomfield:

Bloomfield, thank you.

Luttwak:

And then--he was talking in the context of negotiations.

Bloomfield:

I must repeat again that no one is asking territories be returned

before negotiation.

Luttwak:

In the context of free negotiations the Israelis are willing to

return--and I've said this a hundred times--most of the occupied

territories; I fully agree, but not in a fixed deal.

Semerjian:

All right, let's go back now to Mr. Rusher for a question.

Rusher:

Mr. Luttwak, I would like to go back to the question of the Israeli

attitude toward an American guarantee, assuming that guarantee means

guarantee in the ordinary sense in which you and I would understand it.

What is wrong with the credibility of such a guarantee, if anything,

from the Israeli standpoint, or is it a credible guarantee?

Luttwak:

The American guarantee would not be credible because of the fact that

no American President could possibly allow himself to get involved in a

situation where he would be forced to intervene militarily twice a day.

And the geography is so inimical to any such guarantee that it couldn't

possibly be enforced.

Semerjian:

All right, let's go back to Mr. Bloomfield.

Bloomfield:

What evidence is there, on the basis of this long and lugubrious

record, Mr. Luttwak, that the Arabs and the Israelis can by themselves,

unaided, reach a settlement?

Luttwak:

The evidence is the very war of 1973, when instead of having all the

Arabs fight, you had the Lebanese out and the Jordanians out. The next

war there will be a third one out, if there is a war. But if you are

going to have a fixed up, contrived settlement, you will probably have

a war in which the United States will be involved, and then God knows

what happens. If you don't have a fixed up settlement, then I'm sure

that the Israelis and the Arabs, negotiating freely, will--could--very

well come to a solution, especially with Egypt, and the Israelis--as

I've said a hundred times--are willing to give up most of Sinai for a

genuine, negotiated peace with Egypt, with full diplomatic relations,

commercial relations, and so on.

Semerjian:

All right, thank you, Mr. Luttwak, for being with us tonight.

Rusher:

And now, having heard of this matter from the standpoint of Israel

primarily, let us hear of it instead from the standpoint primarily of

the United States. I call upon Professor Uri Ra'anan.

Semerjian:

Professor, welcome to THE ADVOCATES.

Rusher:

Professor Ra'anan is Professor of International Politics at the

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy near Boston and an affiliate of

the Center for International Studies at MIT Professor Ra'anan, what is

wrong with the idea of an American guarantee of Israel's borders after

they have been reduced to about their 1967 dimensions?

Ra'anan:

What is primarily wrong in my opinion is that it will achieve the exact

opposite of the intention of those who propose it, namely to avoid a

direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Let me explain, please. An Israel, with topography, the frontiers that

render her defensible, plus the supply of American weapons, is

perfectly capable of taking care of herself, as she has shown very

recently. And in that case all the United States has to do is to

persuade the Soviet Union from staying out of direct intervention as

long as the United States itself stays away from direct intervention; a

quid pro quo: We don't come in and you don't come in. If you render

Israel topographically indefensible and then guarantee these

indefensible frontiers, the meaning is that American manpower has to be

used to come in on the ground and defend Israel. In that case the

United States has lost all its leverage over the Soviet Union not to

come in. The inevitable result is that you have American and Soviet

forces facing each other on the ground in the Middle East, whereas now

you do have a confrontation, but it is merely one by proxy, through

friends and allies and clients who are supplied militarily.

Rusher:

Wouldn't an American guarantee solve all these problems by its very

finality?

Ra'anan:

I think its very finality--if it be a final one--is what renders it

least credible, least credible to Israel, to the Arabs, and I'm sorry

to say, to the Soviet Union, and most probably to the Congress of the

United States.

Rusher:

It is least credible because they do not, in fact, expect that the

United States would carry all the way through on that commitment, is

that it?

Ra'anan:

That is exactly correct.

Rusher:

And how far might that carry-through extend?

Ra'anan:

If necessary, if the Soviet Union and the United States confront each

other on the ground, nuclear war.

Rusher:

But how else can we achieve permanent peace, sir, in the Middle East

except by such a guarantee?

Ra'anan:

I still believe, as others have said, through free, untrammeled, direct

negotiations between the parties involved, and that has never yet

happened, and I my add, there are no signs--and I'm sorry to say

this--that it is about to happen in Geneva. I heard President Sadat

with my own ears saying in English at a press conference, "We will sit

in the same room with the Israelis, but we will not negotiate with them

directly." And it is also a fact that the meeting of Arab heads at

Algiers stated that there were going to be two stages: one stage in

which Israel was driven back to the 1967 frontiers, and a second step

which was called euphemistically the restoration of the national rights

of the Palestinian people, but it was added, the national rights as

interpreted by the National Charter of the Palestinian Liberation

Organization, and that Charter states specifically that instead of

Israel, there shall be a Palestinian state consisting of Moslems,

Christians, and those Jews who were there prior to 1948--that is to

say, 20 percent of Israel's population.

Semerjian:

All right, let's see what kind of questions Mr. Bloomfield has for you.

Bloomfield:

Mr. Ra'anan, is it not the case that for about twenty-four years Israel

sought negotiations with the Arabs and the Arabs refused to negotiate

with them, rather than the issue of being direct negotiations while in

the same room. Wasn't the question negotiation or not negotiation?

Ra'anan:

You're absolutely right. That was correct. But I would like to add here

that Israel offered negotiations at a time when she was still living

within the 1967 frontiers. She was not occupying any Arab territory at

that time, and the Arabs refused to negotiate in spite of the fact that

Israel was not sitting on Arab territory. In other words, the

territories have not been the obstacle to peace.

Bloomfield:

Well, but things do change, of course, and you did quote President

Sadat accurately, I'm sure. But do you recall a statement President

Sadat made in 1971 in which he spoke of a willingness to enter into a

peace agreement with Israel, and wasn't that a milestone, a change, in

two decades of unremitting Arab refusal to do that?

Ra'anan:

I know to what you are referring. You're referring to the Egyptian

answer to Ambassador Yariv's famous memorandum.

Bloomfield:

Yes, exactly.

Ra'anan:

That answer was qualified. A number of qualifications were added as to

the nature of the peace, as to the nature of the contact, and Egypt

asked, as a pre-condition, that Israel accept her version of the final

frontiers between the two countries.

Semerjian:

Excuse me for a minute, Mr. Bloomfield. Let me see if I can clarify one

thing. Professor, I believe you've testified that you're against an

American military treaty with Israel, is that correct?

Ra'anan:

Under the circumstances that have been outlined.

Semerjian:

Are there circumstances in which you would propose one?

Ra'anan:

I would say that if there were merely supplementary guarantees to a

freely negotiated peace agreement, one that, in fact, showed the

willingness of both sides genuinely to live in peace, and these

guarantees were supplementary to that, I would not then be opposed to

them. What we are discussing here is a guarantee in lieu of a freely

negotiated peace settlement, guarantees which go with an imposed

settlement.

Bloomfield:

I think, Mr. Ra'anan, that may misstate somewhat the position of our

side, but it may represent your interpretation of our position. Let me

come back to something else. You spoke of Israel taking care of

herself. I seem to recall General Dayan as being quoted during the

period when some Israeli soldiers were objecting to the ceasefire as

saying, "The arms you're using today," in effect, "arrived from the

U.S. this morning." isn't Israel really completely dependent on

American arms? Are there any other supporters of Israel in the world

who are willing to supply her armament so she can take care of herself?

Ra'anan:

Well, I would agree with you that it is correct that the United States

is the main arms supplier of Israel. There is a reason for that. The

main arms supplier for the Arabs is the Soviet Union, and it is only

the United States today manufactures arms at the level at which the

Soviet Union is sending them to the Arabs.

Bloomfield:

But shouldn't we all be worried, those of us who are interested in the

support of Israel's integrity, that American support might waver if a

chance for peace were to be passed up at this time? Shouldn't we take

advantage of every opportunity including this one to work for a major

settlement?

Ra'anan:

I agree with you whole-heartedly that one should take advantage of

every genuine opportunity. I am questioning, to my regret, whether

Geneva, under the circumstances I have outlined, when one of the sides

is still saying no direct negotiation, which means, "We don't really

recognize your existence," constitutes as such a genuine opportunity,

and secondly, I must agree with what Mr. Luttwak said before that if

you can start a war, a kind of Pearl Harbor like the Yom Kippur War,

and know that at the end of it you're going to be rewarded with a

settlement imposed on your adversary, that means you cannot lose--you

attack and you win, its great; you lose, someone will come and rescue

you. That is asking for further wars.

Semerjian:

One very brief question and answer.

Bloomfield:

To come back just for a moment...

Semerjian:

Wait a minute.

Bloomfield:

I hope that won't be taken out of my time, Mr. Moderator.

Semerjian:

Go ahead and ask it.

Bloomfield:

Unless it's reciprocated at some other occasion. Doesn't defensible

imply the past? In other words, isn't it true that there are missiles

now in Egypt which can reach Tel Aviv, and that one really can no

longer define Israeli security, or anyone's security, in terms of this

or that boundary?

Semerjian:

One quick answer, Professor.

Ra'anan:

Yes, there is no such thing as absolute security, I agree with you. But

we are talking now not about an odd missile hitting, an odd place in

Israel, we are talking about the occupation of Israeli soil and the

destruction of its population. And the nature of the weapons that exist

today argue most strongly for greater strategic depth and not for less

so.

Semerjian:

All right, let's go back, then, to Mr. Rusher.

Rusher:

Professor Ra'anan, you mentioned in our original discussion that

neither the Arabs nor the Soviet Union nor the people of the United

States would believe in the kind of guarantee that is proposed, or was

supposed to have been proposed, by the other side tonight. Will you

tell me why?

Ra'anan:

It is self-evident that to go into a situation where, as I said earlier

on, the United States would have troops on the ground and the Soviet

Union reciprocally would have its troops on the ground, to then

implement such a guarantee means a direct confrontation with the Soviet

Union not by means of supplying arms to each other's friends, but by

means of shooting at each other. Under these circumstances we're

talking about World War III.

Semerjian:

All right, Mr. Bloomfield, one very quick question.

Bloomfield:

Perhaps you'd let me have two very quick ones.

Semerjian:

One very quick question.

Bloomfield:

All right. Do you agree that a Mid-East settlement is in the United

States' national interest?

Ra'anan:

It is in everybody's interest.

Bloomfield:

Isn't it true that our current treaty commitment to Israel is a

powerful one right now? Excuse me, our current security commitment to

Israel.

Ra'anan:

The security commitment at the moment consists of two factors.

Bloomfield:

But isn't it quite strong?

Ra'anan:

It is not anything like a commitment to send in manpower, and Israel

has never asked for that. It consists of giving arms to Israel, number

one, and of keeping the Soviet Union out while the United States is

there.

Semerjian:

All right, thank you. I'm going to have to interrupt. Thank you,

Professor, for being with us tonight.

Rusher:

In 53 programs on THE ADVOCATES I have never seen a more desperate

effort to avoid the clear and necessary implication of a

straight-forward proposal. If an American military guarantee to Israel

means, or is intended to mean, anything, then the American people

surely are entitled to know what its possible consequences are. One of

them, and it is not remote, as Professor Ra'anan has pointed out, is

nuclear war, and while I can understand the reluctance of Mr.

Bloomfield and his witnesses to admit this, I can neither forgive nor

disregard their bare-faced attempt to conceal it.

Semerjian:

Thank you. That completes the cases, and now its time for each of our

advocates to summarize his case, and, Mr. Rusher, could we have your

summary?

Rusher:

In the Munich agreement of 1938 British Prime Minister Neville

Chamberlain forced Czechoslovakia to concede to Hitler those very

border areas which alone could have made her defense conceivable. In

return he gave Czechoslovakia a guarantee of those shrunken borders.

Six months later Hitler occupied Czechoslovakia while Britain stood

idly by and did exactly nothing. Eighteen months later still World War

II began. It is the repetition of this tragic blunder that you are

being asked to endorse tonight. First, Israel is to be forced by

American pressure to give up the only borders that make military sense,

and then America is to guarantee that we will defend what is left to

Israel at the risk of nuclear war with the Soviet Union if necessary.

In the end Israel would be swallowed up by her neighbors and then will

come World War III. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, America will be

offered the choice between dishonor and war. She will choose dishonor

and she will have war. Israel has asked no such thing of us. She seeks

only the arms she needs to defend reasonable borders herself. She

should be allowed, with our help and blessing, to negotiate her own

destiny.

Semerjian:

Thank you. Mr. Bloomfield?

Bloomfield:

Our side has been accused tonight of proposing to take away not only

Israel's security, but her ability to negotiate as well. Nothing could

be further from the truth. In fact, the major purpose of this proposal

is to make possible a settlement which will guarantee the future of

Israel, offer relief to the war-torn people of the Middle East, and

conform to the over-riding national interest of the United States to

prevent World War III. Before you vote on tonight's question, ask

yourself, do you agree that a settlement is essential, do you think a

settlement is possible without Israeli withdrawals such as we have

proposed, don't you think that the U.S., in the interest of such a

settlement, should be prepared to formalize its commitment. I hope you

will consider these questions and agree that we should weigh in in the

service of world peace now.

Semerjian:

Thank you, gentlemen. Now it's time for you in our audience to get into

the act. What do you think about the question debated tonight? Should

the United States press for Israeli withdrawal from occupied

territories and offer to guarantee Israel's security? Send us your

"yes" or "no" vote on a letter or postcard to THE ADVOCATES, Box 1973,

Boston 02134. Under the Constitution, for any treaty to take effect, it

must first be ratified by the Senate, and that's where you come in. How

would you want your Senator to vote on this question? Let us know and

we'll tabulate your votes and distribute them to all members of

Congress and to others interested in the question. Remember the

address: THE ADVOCATES, Box 1973, Boston 02134. Now THE ADVOCATES will

not be seen in the last week of December but will return to its regular

time in the first week of January, so let's take a look ahead to that

program.

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Semerjian:

And now, with thanks to our able advocates and their distinguished

witnesses, we conclude tonight's debate.

Transcript

Transcript

Series: Advocates

Program: Should the United States Press for Israeli Withdrawal From Occupied Territories and Offer to Guarantee Israel's Security?

Episode Number: 409

Contributing Organization: WGBH (Boston, Massachusetts)

AAPB ID: cpb-aacip/15-4f1mg7fx1c

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Description

Credits: Guest2: Rusher, William A., 1923-2011
Guest2: Ra'anan, Uri, 1926-
Guest2: Luttwak, Edward
Guest2: Polk, William Roe, 1929-
Guest2: Griffith, William E.
Guest2: Bloomfield, Lincoln P., 1920-
Moderator2: Semerjian, Evan
Publisher: Supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.

AAPB Contributor Holdings: WGBH
Identifier: ca3293506f26eea4ed3f206c3467d82692f0394b (ArtesiaDAM UOI_ID)
Format: video/quicktime
Color: Color
Duration: 00:00:00

Citations: Chicago: “Advocates; Should the United States Press for Israeli Withdrawal From Occupied Territories and Offer to Guarantee Israel's Security? ; 409,” 1973-12-20, WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed October 20, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-4f1mg7fx1c.; MLA: “Advocates; Should the United States Press for Israeli Withdrawal From Occupied Territories and Offer to Guarantee Israel's Security? ; 409.” 1973-12-20. WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. October 20, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-4f1mg7fx1c>.; APA: Advocates; Should the United States Press for Israeli Withdrawal From Occupied Territories and Offer to Guarantee Israel's Security? ; 409. Boston, MA: WGBH, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-15-4f1mg7fx1c