NOVA; To the Moon; Interview with Rocco Petrone, mechanical engineer and director of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center from 1973-1974, part 2 of 3

Right after you knew there had been an explosion who rushed to the capsule, what happened? The pad crew was still at the pad and they were really on the same floor with the spacecraft. When the fire burst out and there was this build-up of pressure which caused the spacecraft to burst, it was a very pronounced flame, but you really couldn't see much because you had to window and we could see it through television. However, the pad crew then tried to get in and open the door. The problem was the spacecraft door was not the door we ended up with where we built

a door that could swing open. This door had to be in effect taken, a boost protector cover taken off and the spacecraft had to go in. So they had some difficulty getting that done. It took maybe a minute and a half or two and when they did, the inside literally had totally been burned, however it burned itself out because there wasn't that much consumables, but there were consumables to give you a sudden flare and our crew had expired. Now the hatch is interesting. How much did Gus Grissom have to do with that hatch? He had problems on Liberty Bell and the explosive hatch talked to Fajet and other people about the fact that did he have a lot to do with the design of that hatch? Did he almost do himself in by the way he insisted that hatch be designed?

I'm not certain of that. I didn't have any direct input to the design of the hatch. However, the problem that were as we had in Germany, opening doors, two doors had opened. It was felt that going to the moon we had to be more careful with the doors and yet an inward opening door and the pressure that built up from inside the spacecraft really sealed it and you couldn't open it up, it was just too much way that you'd have to pull against. The redesign of the door that was done right after the fire gave us an outward swinging door which with one handle the astronauts could hit and a pressure bottle would pop open the door, the door would be opened up in seconds so the door did play a part in the redesign and gave us something that was much, much safer. Now just as a very quick statement, do you think as tragic as the fire was, would we have

made it to the moon if that fire hadn't happened? Well I've reflected on that and I believe that the fire caused us to rededicate ourselves to make sure that there was no rock left unturned and I believe led to the safe landing in 69. If that had happened while we were on the way to the moon, we'd have lost a crew, never heard from them again and it would have been just a mystery hanging over the whole program which would have caused an untold delay and maybe even a cancellation. So in many way the men who were sacrificed did contribute to the safe landing in 69. Let's talk about Apollo 8 for a moment, tell the story if you would have the decision

to send 8 around the moon, was it a bold decision, was it a risky decision, how did you feel about it? Well the decision for Apollo 8 to go around the moon certainly was a bold decision. And we arrived out of the August of 68, the lunar module had fallen behind schedule. At the Cape where I had the lunar module that we were preparing for the first flight unmanned, the preparation was tedious and was taking time and component had to be changed or the radar of the engine many things. So Houston, I believe was George Low and Chris Kraft came up with the idea of going to the moon without the lamp, we could use the CSM command service module and they proposed

that in August, we looked at it to us it meant getting a bird ready for a man launch which has its demands and we had a meeting in Huntsville where the people came together, it was still secret at the time, we then broke from that meeting about a week, 10 day later got back together again in Washington and there as we looked at it we in effect were all asked our opinions and we knew was a bold move but we all felt it was doable and it also was the thing to do. So it became so natural and yet we knew it to the public it looked like taking an undue risk but we said if Apollo 7 is totally successful I've been the first man launch of the Apollo in Earth orbit using the Saturn 1B, if Apollo 7 was totally successful then we'd consider

going to the moon, now the Apollo 7 was in October, now we had to make a plan from August through October with the launch of Apollo 7 and its success we said we're going to now launch Apollo 8, the first step of the going to Earth orbit, then if everything is successful we'll go to the moon, we had planned to go to the moon but we could have terminated it if problems arose, so we actually got ready for 8 with the intent of going to the moon we did and as we know it was a beautiful launch and a beautiful mission. So the Russians figuring into any of this at this time was there pressure from the Russians do you guys think that the Russians were going to try to top us? Yes there was, the full extent of it I'm not aware but I'm aware of some of that.

The Russians had certain missions, they had been launching certain steps they were taking such as they had sent a spacecraft around the moon but they didn't want to man it and we then, in effect, got ahead of them. But the Russians certainly had efforts underway, probably what they were going to do was send men around the moon, not circum lunar but around the moon, and also then send a lander on the moon unmanned, bring back samples and that way try to top us, however they had difficulties with their launch and they did have an unmanned spacecraft around the moon at the time, well that came later in Apollo 11 but they did have the effort underway to put an unmanned lander on the moon, bring a sample back but they did not pull it off

at that time but there were efforts and there was pressure. Now just as an aside, how did you feel when that spacecraft, the Apollo 8 went around the moon the first time, came out from the dark side, you lost communications for a few minutes, was that a tense time, how did you feel when they came around the other side? Well I was listening to that of course intensely and the spacecraft went, she went at the orbit behind the moon as the men say they go in backwards, they can't really see their target either, they're working on what they know has got to be done, and we lost contact with them for a period of maybe 15, 20, 30, as they're going around the back side and when they came around the first time and we knew we were an orbit, it was just a great feeling and I forgot the exact words of Borman or Lovell and Anders but it was a great feeling.

Good, stop for a second Sean, take two, roll 70, did you think that 11 was going to make it? Well when we approached a decision to launch Apollo 11, we were all hopeful that it would make a landing, we were also realistic to know something small can go on and you may have to abort and return, now we had had at that time five launches of the Saturn 5, 2 1 manned and 3 manned, the manned were 8, 9 and 10, so now we come up to what you might say the big one, however the big one is just like the others and it was prepared the same, prepared the land but if something went wrong and we were prepared also for an abort and coming home at any time in the launch phase and any time in the flight phase, how did you feel when it was making the descent when the level was coming down?

I wanted to say we had being prepared at that time Apollo 12 was in the barn, two weeks and I mean two months away from launch and 13 had also started a preparation phase, we had two vehicles for 1969 that could have gone if they had to, could have gone in September and November and we had had two more attempts to the moon for 69, so our confidence was great but the confidence wasn't total and we had vehicles being prepared and prepared to come along and launch to the moon which we felt certain, one of those would have made it, however 11 worked and that, Cron take one, did you feel the air coming out of the whole program after 11 made it successfully? So when Apollo landed, Apollo 11 landed, I did not feel a deterioration in interest because it was still so new to us.

Once we launched Apollo 12 and then by the time we got to 13 the public interest started to wane, why will Americans just have a short time frame, short attention span, however those of us in the program were working formations beyond, we were developing science packages developing like the rover which we used later just went under development after Apollo 11. So although there was an attenuation on the part of the public, our interests were now in exploiting the landing for the scientific factor and we were as busy as ever, the time schedule was not as tight because we could expand it now because we had made our landing in 69, so the effort to improve the techniques from geology in the moon, for performing experiments on the moon, our efforts went into that and that continued.

Now by the time of 13 I said the public interest had started to wane and Lombia we had a very serious problem on 13 and the public interest peaked again. Again men were at risk, there was a problem and we had to work to bring him home alive and get that mission where it was finally brought to a termination when those parachutes opened up, we could then relax. So there was an attenuation on the part of the public not noticeable too much on 12 but by the time of 13 again when we came to 14 put interest was peaked again because we were going back after a failure. So when the lunar scientists began to come on board, did you feel some resentment from the engineers about the lunar science, was there a schism between the two?

Some people made a schism between the engineer and the scientists. I personally knew that was the reason for going to the moon and I knew our objective was to exploit the science, however there was a certain amount of heart feelings on a part of scientists that we weren't doing enough, well you still got to be safe. Going to the moon was not a cupcake or a duck soup. You had to do everything safely, you had to do it methodically and within now you graft an on more science. So we took these efforts and we developed packages such as the alsepi, Apollo lunar exploration package where we had maybe eight nine experiments one could do and a seismometer we were lifting to and so forth gradually. By the time we got the 17th, the scientists were totally on board and the cooperation

of the engineering science couldn't have been better. What about site selection? What did you have to do with site selection and was there always a debate back and forth about where you were going and why you were going there with the geologists? Well site selection was the number one role I had as Apollo program director and there was a debate, you can imagine there's no one going to agree to go to any one site. So we would have these looked at and studied and studied from maps, studied from trajectories required, studied from the geology that we might see at the site and then we'd have a formal meeting at which we'd listen, might they let the votes come in and then the decision had to be made and there was always a question of safety. You wanted to make certain that the site you're going to, you knew something about.

You had to have pictures so you could see bowlers of it, certain size. You also wanted to have landmark tracking if you could, it gave you an ability to put your trajectory directly over the site but those were also exciting times done in the back room but we'd listen to all, everyone had their say and then the decision had to be made as to what site we're going to for the next mission and then work the one coming up beyond that. What was the biggest complaint you had from the geologists about the sites that were, the six that were actually selected? Was it because they were all in the equatorial belt? Well they were near equatorial belt when we went to Taurus literal which was our launch 17, we were a good bit away from the equatorial belt and one had to be careful because to get a return trajectory that let you be safe, you then had to restrict yourself. Now there was one site, certain people wanted to go to Copernicus and land in the crater.

Now that was quite a bit off, it put us in a different orbit and that's one we felt we needed more experience on before we undertook. So on Copernicus I was always delaying that one because of the trajectory and the safety that would be involved in going into that trajectory around the moon but overall I think we generally succeeded in satisfying the greater majority, not all the greater majority of the scientists on our site selection. Now 12, I mean right after 11, everybody said okay you made it safe, 12, let's get more experimental but there's a lot of debate among geologists about the fact you're going back to the surveyor that the site wasn't that interesting, describe that debate to me. What were the geologists unhappy with on 12? Well I think the geologists and the scientists were basically unhappy because they hadn't yet seen the program work. It wasn't only going to a surveyor of a known site, it was still more of a bland site,

it was very close to the equator of the moon, it was further west but it didn't have all that attraction but yet in it we were taking our first alcep, our first Apollo lunar space exploration package which we had on a full bore size thermometer, we had on magnetometers, but on devices the package weighed in the neighborhood of a few hundred pounds, it was quite a, yet it was all packaged in with a small self-contained, good bit automatic device which the astronauts took out of the lamp, took out and then deployed it. I think after 12, the scientists started to see what could be done and literally by the time we got, I believe, to 15, they were totally on board, 15 which was the ones that had a Hadley app on it, we had a rover, had an alcep, we had EVAs we could do more

than one, and the scientists then saw the returns, the time the astronauts could spend on selecting their samples, documenting their samples, the different experiments we were able to perform, so I think by the time of 15, the scientists were fully on board. Did you have a bit of a mutiny on 12 of those shoemaker Wilmont S. King, Don Wise? There was a bit of a mutiny, you might say, and I recall it from the standpoint of certain people not being able to have their way, and you just can't get involved in that, I mean you've got to pick a site, you've got to pick it far enough in advance so you can make a model, you can train on that site, and really 12 was picked as a site before we landed on 11, I mean as a site, and therefore some of the scientists weren't happy that we weren't extending ourselves enough, again that was my decision, we extended ourselves

enough to take the risks I felt acceptable, and where the scientists may have wanted to do more, I had to lay out for them what the problems were, and I say starting with 11, remember we were just to land and get home, starting with 12, you're now not going to take a big quantum jump, and this had been put in motion before, the package for the lunar module, what we're going to put on board, has to be decided months in advance, for example when we, I say went to 15, which is the first of a J series, of a new series of vehicles where we could stay longer, we had a rover, we had a four-and-a-pound vehicle that we slipped into a quadrant of the LEM, and the astronauts were just one cable, we're able to get that thing deployed, and you had now on the moon the ability to go miles

away, the additional experiments we put into the outset, the Apollo lunar space exploration package were growing, the time we could spend on the moon had grown, so by 15, which was 1971, it was two years later, we were going full bore in science, now some scientists were eager, they wanted to do it right away, and we felt you needed time to get your experience ready, to get your hardware tested, and not just jump right into the pool without knowing how deep it was, great, what was the trajectory problem on 17, describe it to me quickly if you would rock, what scared you about 17, well I must say on 17, we're going further away from an equatorial plane, I was not overly concerned with the trajectory or we wouldn't have gone, obviously we've got to, I say keep it safe, now the question of landmark tracking,

what you tried to do, Mick, sorry any one more, okay, would you hear it click or something? Yeah I know, well I can, there were no divorces, there were, there were a lot of strain, a lot of problems, I mean you couldn't be with the kids on the night, weekends, you're probably working, it was a strain, but I think when we were together it was quality time, and the divorce rate was not that high, okay, okay, terrific, our confidence was great, but the confidence wasn't total, and we had vehicles being prepared, and prepared to come along and launch to the moon, which we felt certain, one of those would have made it, however eleven worked, and that then let us put the other vehicles on a longer time frame where we went from two month to four month intervals, great, great, okay, one more roll and I think

we'll be there for the couple of hours.