NOVA; To the Moon; Interview with Christopher Columbus Kraft Jr., NASA engineer and manager who helped establish NASA's Mission Control Center, part 2 of 4

the demands of the space program. So there was hardly any feel, whether it be materials, whether it be science, whether it be engineering, that weren't benefiting by the investment that the country made in the space program at that time. Good, terrific. Oh, that's good. What kind of hours did people work in here? Well, I think that in the early days of the space program, all the way through Apollo, people worked all of their waking hours. They may not have been at their desk or they may not have been in mission control, but I think they were giving us 100% of their capacity. It hurt a lot of people. It hurt a lot of families. I think a lot of people got ill from the fact that they worked those kind of hours. But that's the kind of dedication that was required to do the job. We didn't have that many brains in the country. We had 450,000 people working on Apollo at one time. But they were doing manufacturing, producing hardware. With actual people directly involved in the program and the leaders of the program were not that great,

not that large. And so we needed the dedication and the commitment of these people and they worked their heads off. And most of them worked all there. Every time they were, any time they were awake, I think they were thinking about what they had to do. And pulling that all together, I think you had to attribute to those of us that were in the management of the program. I was responsible for pulling that all together in operations. Max Fajet was responsible for doing it in engineering. And George Lowe was responsible for doing the program management. Joe Shea at first and then George Lowe. And that was a big task managing all these many things that had to come together and had to be coordinated and make sure that they understood what each other was doing. That was the big job in Apollo. It was the coordination of all those activities. And you didn't have to know how to do all of them. But you had to know how to bring them together. Apollo 1, the fire.

Where were you when you found out about the fire? Sitting at that console right there. I was going to be the flight director on the first Amanda Apollo flight. We've been having trouble that day. And so I went back to my office and came back to the control center about four or five o'clock in the afternoon. They were still having trouble getting it done. Gus was pretty unhappy about it. Then it had been a very long day. The communications didn't work. A lot of the procedures had to be worked out. And he was very unhappy with the way it was proceeding and said so. As I was listening, I could hear the intercom loops from the Cape as they were communicating. And we knew something serious had happened when we heard these screams in the intercom coming from the spacecraft. And we heard the people on the pad yelling about a fire and trying to do something. And the people in the block house dealing with that situation. It was obvious that something was wrong now.

I don't think we had the capability to tell that there was three men that were going to lose their lives. But I think we realized it was damn serious. And it didn't take long to realize that the three men were dead. Obviously, one can't say did you see it coming. But I've talked to Sharab about this on camera. What is it called? Go fever. Go fever. He termed it as. On reflection, could you see that it was things where Mercury was successful? Gemini was successful. 20 missions in 10 months. I mean, it was an incredible record. Were we just getting too cocky? No, I don't think that. I wouldn't blame the people for being cocky. I think that perhaps we had become complacent about the dangers that we were facing when we did that test. I think that people were running as fast as they could run.

So I can't argue the fact that maybe we were going too fast. We weren't willing to stop and integrate the learning process that we had gotten from Mercury and Gemini. Those of us in operations were trying very hard to get that re-engineered into the spacecraft. So there was some of that. There was the desire to get on with it. There was the recognition that we couldn't answer everything and everybody's desires. So yes, that was there. But I can't blame the accident on the kill the three astronauts on just plain goitis. I would have to say it was part of it. To be fair. But I think it was more a lack of recognition of the dangers of that particular test that people had neglected to think about very carefully. We had done the test, a identical test kind of test in Mercury. We had done a identical kind of test in Gemini.

We had done the test on this spacecraft several times. But it was just a combination of lack of recognition that we had 15 psi of pure oxygen in that spacecraft. And at 15 psi of oxygen, aluminum birds. So we just had neglected to think about that aspect of it. Why was it that way? The operating pressure in the spacecraft was normally 5 pounds per square inch. That's where we had done all the testing for fire, for ignition sources, for things that might happen at those kind of pressures. But we were dealing here with 15 psi, which was not an in-flight requirement. The spacecraft, after it was launched from the pad and got into space, was never more than 5 psi. It was this particular pad test that created this terrible danger, which I think people forgot. They just became complacent about the fact

that that was a much more serious and risky thing than they had thought about it. What effect did it have on the program? I know, I hesitate to say this, but I have to say it. I don't think we would have gotten to the moon in the 60s if we had not had the fire. That's a terrible thing to say, but I think it is true. The reason for that is that we had not taken the time to integrate the things that we had learned from Mercury and Gemini in a hardware sense, but into the design of the Apollo spacecraft. Apollo was being designed and built in the same time period as Gemini was being designed and flown. And so many of the things that we had learned from experience in Mercury and Gemini did not get put into the spacecraft that we were designing at the time.

North America was a new contractor. They did not have that experience that McDonald's had. The people that were managing the program, Joe Shea and his people did not have the benefit of having done Mercury and Gemini. And so that kind of learning process was not there. So because of the fire, we had a hiatus of about 18 months. That allowed us to take this experience that we had gained and put it into the spacecraft design. The first thing that, excuse me, that George Lowe did as the program manager was ask the people in the program, what have you been wanting to do for the last year that wasn't done? Let's make a list of those things. We've got the opportunity now, and we'll make a list of all these things and we will come up with things that are absolutely required to do, criticality one, those that we have a high desire to do, those that are desirable to do. We'll make a list of them.

We had 125 different articles of whatever you wanna call it and we got them all done. And that in my mind was what made the Apollo program as successful as it was. Had we not done that, I believe that we had all kinds of hardware issues, all kinds of experienced problems in going to the moon that we did not have because we had that time to do it. What was with Shira on set? Well, frankly, I think you have to ask Shira that question more than you have to ask, Chris Graffle. I saw the beginnings of that took place after he flew in Germany, and I think that Shira became somewhat the hero guy, and I think that he therefore demanded certain things be done, and I think he got out of line. I think he probably didn't realize he was out of line. I think he was concerned about the hardware

and justifiably so. The hardware was to put it in the realm of the accident report. They said it was shoddy workmanship, indeed it was, and it needed to be corrected. And that's what we did from the spacecraft that Gus Gristleman had and the spacecraft at Shira, and it was greatly improved. So he was worried about those kinds of things. I think he was concerned about his life. I think he was concerned that we might do something that might jeopardize his capability to survive. So I think those are the kind of things that were in the back of his mind. Why he reacted like he did once he got there, I think you'll have to ask Shira, because I think it was inexcusable as far as I was concerned. And I think he would probably say that today himself. But I think that there probably was some justification for him feeling somewhat frightened about the vehicle he was gonna fly in.

Okay, cut. Switch the mag over. How many of them are there? Okay. Paul Seven, if you look at it from an engineering point of view, is awfully successful. I mean, everything turned out right about that flight. The engine worked well, the spacecraft worked well. We really didn't have any serious problems. The astronauts did a very good job in flying the machine, and so it was a shame that Shira and Cunningham and Izzly reacted the way they did to the inputs from the ground. They were recalcitrant, they were defiant. And it came over that way on the ground, and we had never had that situation occurred on the ground before. We had astronauts that made mistakes. We had astronauts that weren't very smart, flying space.

But we'd never had people that were that recalcitrant. And so they got worse and worse as time went on in terms of their unwillingness to respond to the inputs from the ground. And it came off sounding probably worse than it was. So I have to say that they did, from an engineering point of view, a very good job. They flew it well. It's just that they created this aura of defiance which did not need to be there. And that got them in trouble with the management. It got them in trouble with Slatin, got them in trouble with Gil Ruth, got them in trouble with me. And as far as I was concerned, people who acted that way in space, we had too many astronauts around that would do a good job and not act that way, that would prompt you to say, well, why should you fly those people again? And that's the way I felt. Yeah, that's what Cunningham said that you said, he wouldn't fly again, you wouldn't fly him again.

Right, over your dead body. Correct. So he said he'd never heard that until I mentioned it to him in the interview. Turn that off. OK, Ethan. When did lunar science enter your life, Chris? Well, there were really two phases to Apollo as far as I was concerned. One was go to the moon, land men on the moon, get a grab a handful of rocks, get back in the spacecraft, get back to Earth, do that, do it well, do it safely. That's what our objective was. And because of the time constraints, because of the press of whatever you can do in a given day, that was what we concentrated on. A lot of the geological community wanted to do a lot more, and they misinterpreted that kind of approach as being, well, these guys do not

want to have anything to do with us. Now, I've personally had meetings with the geology people and told them, look, let us get the engineering job done. Then, after we have landed men on the moon, we'll do whatever you want us to do within the capability we have to do it. They didn't believe me. I don't blame them for not believing me. Because I just didn't have time to listen to them. Neither did George Lowe. But go look at the planning that was going on to answer what they wanted to do. You'll find it was going on all along, that we had modified the instruments. We had modified our way of thinking. We had started thinking about lunar rovers. We had started thinking about staying longer periods on the lunar surface. Why? For no other reason than doing science. The only reason we were going back to the moon was to do lunar science. A lot of us were accused of not wanting to do any more beyond Apollo 11, nonsense.

We did what we thought was best for the country, what we thought was best for science. And we listened to whatever they wanted to do on the last five flights that landed on the moon. And I think if you talk to the responsible lunar people, they'll give you that same answer. When the idea of geologists astronauts came up, how did you feel about that? Did you think that was a good idea? Did you think test pilots could do a good enough job? When we first had science astronauts in the program, they were predominantly came in to be the adjunct of science to the astronaut corps. Mostly we had engineering test pilots. And we wanted a group of people there that were a sample of the total country. I think most of us in the management of NASA recognized the need for having scientists in the program. On the other hand, we also recognized that going to the moon was no easy job.

Training to go to the moon was no easy job. Flying at lunar landing training vehicle, which Armstrong had to bail out of, which other pilots had to bail out of, and almost killed three people in the process, was not an easy job. You wanted test pilots that had the capability and background and knowledge and experience and the inner feeling of how to deal with those kind of problems. So that was the two sides of the coin. And therefore, I don't think that Slayton himself was ever convinced that you ought to have somebody in a flying machine that was that complex who didn't do that as a living, hadn't been trained all their lives to be the working lives, to be test pilots. So it was bound to be that kind of feeling relative to scientists. Now, how about Jack Schmidt? Jack Schmidt was as good a man to do that job as anybody we had in the program.

He not only was a great geologist, he was a good pilot. He knew how to be trained. He was willing to do the training, willing to take the risks of doing the kind of training necessary to become a lunar module pilot. And he was an extreme contributor to our program. He did a great job for us. He was an interface with the scientist. So personally, I was not unhappy about Jack Schmidt being on Apollo 17. And I think we did the right thing. In retrospect, we certainly did the right thing. The astronauts who had to fly with him were probably unhappy at the time. But they also learned a loving too. Characterize for me, if you would, Gene Schumacher, both his contribution, he's gone now. But what did you think of Schumacher? Well, I think that you have to put Schumacher in the context of being one of the people that depended upon for determining what the lunar environment was. We didn't know what the conditions of the surface were.

We didn't know what the radiation characteristics would be when we got there. We didn't know the effects of temperature on the moon. Those guys knew all those things. They had been studying it all their lives, so they understood the moon. We engineers needed to have that knowledge. That's what the USGS did for us. It was very important to have that as design requirements on our vehicles. So from the beginning, they were an intimate part of determining the lunar environment that we had to work in. They helped us with the geology of the moon from the standpoint of the, what do you call them, the computer programs necessary to orbit determination. They helped us with the gravitational makeup of the moon. Those kind of things were very important in the early stages. Then once we got to the point where we wanted to do pure science on the moon, that we wanted to do geology on the moon, we wanted to do traverses on the moon.

They were indispensable. And so Schumacher and others like him were in the forefront of that and did a great deal to help us. I've talked to you about Apollo 8 before. I see if you'd said the same thing to me now that you did then. How significant was Apollo 8 to the program? Well, Apollo 8, I thought, was the breakthrough. I think it was the place where we really cut our aspers, so to speak, on how to go to the moon and back. It was a tremendous amount of first done in Apollo 8, which laid the groundwork for being able to do the rest of the Apollo program. It gave us the confidence level. We got our feet wet in lunar navigation and we got our feet wet in how to go to and from the moon and how to use the deep space network around the moon and how to look at the moon itself. And how would we integrate the people into it? And what could the astronauts do after they got there? All of those things were extremely important. And the program had that capacity for building

on its past capabilities and learning. It was amazing to me how much you would see that, not only in the people in the Mission Control Center, but the people that flew the spacecraft. They seemed to immediately absorb everything that the previous astronauts had learned. So that was a tremendously big stepping stone of making the decision to go to the moon when we did to land on the moon. And so I think it was essential. It was absolutely the keystone of the program. Was it a huge decision to make? I mean, it was a leap forward, big leap. It was a very difficult decision to make because we had to do it in the face of a lot of political opposition. I mean, I'm an internal political opposition. There were a lot of people that thought we shouldn't do that because they wanted to wait until we did the whole thing when we did it. They didn't see going to the moon on that flight would be that much of an advantage, why didn't we wait and so when we were ready to land on the moon.

But we in operations didn't want to do it that way. We wanted to do it in a building block process. And I think that we had our way. And I think it was extremely important that we built these blocks of learning on Apollo 8, on Apollo 9, and Apollo 10, particularly doing lunar rendezvous. That was extremely important. And by the way, we weren't ready to go to the moon to land on when we did Apollo 8. We were very lucky. We were in the position that the command and service module was ready. The lunar module was not. And that gave us the opportunity to do what we did on Apollo 8. The meeting that was helped, the foreman, has described this. He said the meeting was the most incredible he's ever been in when the decision was made. Can you describe that, Tim? Well, I think Frank was referring to the time that we met in my office to decide what the flight plan was going to be and what the flight objectives were going to be. Good.

Yeah, he said. And I think he would probably say that today himself. But I think that there probably was some justification for him feeling somewhat frightened about the vehicle he was going to fly in. OK, cut. Switch the mag over. I'm going to go get that. OK, you're all right so far, though, right? And about a year ago, about where that was very, very good. And then Siemens has written a book. What were you interviewing Siemens? And you need to read his book. Because some of the things he talked about were very poignant relative to the fire. And so you have to understand the trauma that those men were passing through to understand Mr. Atwood. Yeah. OK, we're going to go back to 7%, which is where else? Speak up as much as you can. OK? Yep.

Good. All right. Just to get, what was your reaction to what happened up there on Apollo 7? And what was the outcome as far as that crew is concerned? What do you think? Yes, please. All right. Apollo 7, if you look at it from an engineering point of view, was awfully successful. I mean, everything turned out right about that flight. The engines worked well. The spacecraft worked well. We really didn't have any serious problems. I said that once I was about lunar scientists, when did they first enter your life? What was your impression of geology and getting that kind of stuff done on the moment? All right, here we go. Just need to get a second to get out of the frame. OK. You ready? I'm going. And Mark. When did lunar science enter your life, Chris? Well, there were really two phases to Apollo, as far as I was concerned. One was, go to the moon, landman on the moon, get out.