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is from NET, the National Educational Television Network. These revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are a consequence of the American Revolution in that in many ways they continue where you started. And it seems to me that therefore if somebody wants to be nationally independent, wants to go through social reforms, develop a more decent way of human life in these countries, follows the American pattern. And therefore, neutrals are not potential Communists, but are potential friends of free nations. The Declaration of Independence, if you like, is an appeal to the whole world. But I think it's an exaggeration of American power, and an exaggeration of American responsibilities. There are many areas can only be saved by themselves. And if they can't- if they won't save themselves, the United States can't save them. [France: Raymond Aron]: The United States
is acting more or less like any Great Power in the past, with some differences -- the main one being that America is so powerful, that it's difficult to use completely its power. And that the modern weapons are so terrible, that it's easier to threaten to use them than really to use them. And to govern the world, it's not enough to deter, it would be necessary to convince. And you cannot do that by threatening to use H-bombs. [India: Ram Singh]: I like Mr. Johnson's policy in Asia, because for the first time he helping us to see some relations between power and responsibility, which was for a long time something to worry a report about this part of the world. Now, if you do the job well, you're taken in your hand, and you've many more admirers than you have today. Because
we do judge people by their success. [Japan: Masamichi Inoki] The United States is overloaded by responsibility, therefore I think the United States had better limit these responsibilities, especially in Asia and Africa. [Announcer] The National Educational Television Network presents At Issue!, a commentary on people, events, and ideas. This month At Issue! America Observed: An international dialogue on America's role in world affairs. To the peoples of the free world, America's competence in the handling of foreign affairs is a prime concern. For the 20 years since the end of World War II, the United States has taken the burden of responsibility for protecting the basic principles of freedom first enunciated in the Declaration of Independence. How well are we succeeding? In Japan, India, Germany,
France, and England we have asked eminent foreigners, both journalists and historians, to assess our involvement in the world and to look beyond the current crises in Vietnam and Santo Domingo. Of all of America's allies, France has been the most troublesome. President de Gaulle's policies of economic and military independence, plus his criticism of United States policies in Asia have caused great irritation in Washington. In Paris at the School of Political Science, Professor Serge Hurtig explains to NET reporter Andrew Stern the clashes of interest between France and America. [Serge Hurtig] I think there is a great clash of interests between Europe and America, and this has to be seen very realistically. In the economic field, for instance, while there must be a cooperation between Western Europe and America, there are many fields in which there will undoubtedly be opposition. For instance, American investment in Western Europe, sometimes welcomed, very often
welcomed, is very often resented by the competitors of American business, and this will probably go on for years and years. [Stern] French foreign policy has been a source of irritation to the last two American presidents, and some people in America are saying, "Why should we care what France thinks?" [Hurtig] I can see the point, I think that it's a very good point. But you obviously have to care about what France wants for a number of reasons. France has influence in Western Europe. France has become more prosperous, so prosperous in fact that she's able to put some pressure on foreign economies including people you're going to hear is youth if you if needed. And even if this seems very ungrateful on France's part, it is a reality. France has been having, not a deficit, but a surplus in recent years, due partly to American investment in France. The surplus has placed France in either gold
or dollars, and when it is in dollars, France can ask the federal reserve system for change of these dollars into gold, since American gold reserves have dwindled in recent years. This creates, usually, the panic in American financial circles. So there is some pressure which France can put on the United States by using this means. France has also in the military field constructed what may still be only a token nuclear force, one that is directed at France's allies, perhaps more even than at France's opponents, but it has a nuisance value, obviously, and you have to take care of that. And besides, France is considered by the rest of the world as one of the traditional powers; she has great cultural and political influence in a number of areas, in Africa...perhaps even in Latin America, and I think
it might be much better if it is possible for France and America to work together. And after all, you don't want to live in a hostile world, you want to live in a world that is at least friendly, if not really cooperative. I don't think you can completely dismiss France's hostility. [Host]: America has always prided itself on the fact that the American Revolution has had a great meaning for the rest of the world. Do you think that this idea, uh, still has any meaning today? [Guest]: Uh, yes. Revolutions are still made for the world in the name of the principles on which American democracy was founded. The paradox is that sometimes American foreign policy is hostile to those revolutions and this may be a very sad development. In the same way, I think, in the field of economics, there has been in the past the great ideological rigidity in American foreign policy. The commitment to free enterprise may sometimes seem very unrealistic. Sometimes government intervention in other
countries is by far the best way to achieve results which American economy ?inaudible? otherwise, and I hope that in the future some relax -ation will occur and that America will no longer insist so much on free enterprise where it is not applicable. [Host]: Raymond Arroyo, one of France's leading journalists and reigning political philosopher, examines United States policy and principles. [Arroyo] I would say the first position of the American foreign policy, and it's not an obvious position, is that the United States should prevent everywhere the expansion of communist regimes. So in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, the United States is acting as a sort of policeman against the expansion of communism, either by means of military force or by subversion or by revolution. And so, as long as United States has
the first principle of his foreign policy, to prevent any communist regime, be it in the center of Africa, in a very small and unimportant republic, there will be new problems everyday. So it may be that this principle is an obsession and not completely justified by the new situation. When there are only two actors, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, like in the Cuban crisis, it is relatively easy, because big powers have a common interest in avoiding a big war. But in Vietnam, you have, on one side, at least four actors, namely the Viet Cong, North Vietnam, Peking, and Moscow. On the other side, you have two actors, the United States and the so-called South Vietnamese government. How to bring all these six actors together for a settlement, I must confess I don't
know how and when it will be possible. [Host]: Some people that we have talked to have said that President Johnson is now looking more inward and that the United States is becoming more involved with its internal problems rather than its external problems. What do you think of this proposition? [Arroyo] Don't you believe that there are two propositions? The Johnson's administration would like to be inward looking, and after all you could lead in the New York Times, that's in the articles of James ?inaudible?, that is is time for the United States to look up after themselves, because during twenty years, the main preoccupation of the government was foreign policy. And in these things, there was a tendency in Washington to say, that maybe the first priority should belong to the internal affairs of the United States. But for the time being, Johnson is discovering that it's easier to say than to do. And then, let's suppose that Johnson is thinking more of the fight
against poverty or about desegregation, than about the multilateral force, which after all, would be rather reasonable. But that would not mean isolationism, because to believe that what has to be done inside the United States is just as important or more important than some form of European organization, does not mean isolationism. So in the question of isolationism, it seems to me to be for the time being, absolutely excluded. The United States will stay in Europe as long as necessary, and the United States is so involved in Asia, that I cannot conceive of the possibility of retreat. [Host] America has always prided itself in its foreign policy that it is doing everything under the general guise of making the world safe for democracy. What do you think of this proposition? [Arroyo]: Not "the world safe for democracy," I don't believe that is the expression used after the Second World War, it was the
expression used by Wilson, if my memory's correct. [Host]: Correct. [Arroyo]: So, "the world safe for democracy," I would say that was, the crusading spirit was the United States. And I recently wrote that the crusading spirit of the United States is fortunately dying, by that I mean that the United States had lost many of their high hopes they had that they would be able to make the world safe for democracy, and I would go even beyond this-- the United States is discovering that it's not so easy to be at the same time, efficient, powerful, and moral. Because after all, one of the great ideals of the American foreign policy was that it's wrong to use force in relation to other powers. That it's wrong to intervene in the affairs of other states. And it cannot be said that,
in the case of San Domingo, that these high principles have been applied. I do not criticize, I'm just observing, that in the case of the colonial wars or wars of liberations when Great Britain or France were involved, it was easier for the United States to claim, to act according to monitor? and when comes to western hemispheres, the official principles is not to tolerate communist regime; which is a very different principle, perhaps a good one, but a more pragmatic one that the principle of high morality because nobody has given to the United States the role of preventing every revolution. Maybe it's necessary in national interest the United States but it's certainly not the role of law to intervene in San Domingo, to prevent communist in power, if communist were about to take power, which I don't know
China was often saying in its propaganda that the United States was the paper tiger, and after all the atomic weapons were not so dangerous. In the case of Vietnam I believe that the...the... facts that Johnson did bomb North Vietnam, has on a certain level, a positive result. Namely, that the United States has shown, determined that in certain cases to employ its force, and the result is that the people will take into consideration the possibility of action of the United States and not be satisfied with the notion of paper tiger so when you lose on the level of morality, you win on the level of resolution or determination of brutality. In the case of San Domingo, the use of the Marines means the greatest loss of prestige for the United States on the level of morality. It
may have a certain positive result by showing that the United States is not ready to accept a Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. But, it seems to me impossible for the United States to govern Latin America with Marines. And I believe that in that case, the balance sheet is negative and bad, and that the good results achieved in Chile or Venezuela have been largely lost by the San Domingo episode. [Host] Germany, still riding the crest of a general European economic boom, remains politically vulnerable to changes in the Cold War. As long as the questions of German reunification and Berlin remain unsettled, Germany's alliance with the United States will dominate its foreign policy. Should this alliance falter, Germany may have to look for new solutions. At the University of Airlongen?, Political Scientist Waldemar Besson, analyzes the influence of the United States on Germany
today. [Besson]: I think I should put this very frankly. I think we live here in a province of the free world, and what happens in the United States is what happens in the capital of the free world. And therefore what happens can be an encouragement for people who want to be free, or can be a disappointment for those who believe that men should be free. And therefore, uh, you would judge more severely, in many ways- A person living in this country, for example, will always look for encouragement, uh, when he argues in democratic terms, because he says, "There's the continuity of democratic institutions. There you have a country with an unbroken democratic tradition from the 18th century onwards, and if this has been happening there, if this has been possible there, it must be possible in other places as well. It is not the failure of democracy if it fails, it's the failure of persons who are not able to handle it.
Because here you have the proof that the institutions can be sound -- it's only the men which don't know how to behave or use it." And therefore, it seems to me, the whole world, particularly the free world, looks at the United States for this kind of moral and democratic leadership. And therefore, whatever happens in the United States will be put to a rather severe scrutiny in other parts of the world, particularly in this country and in the other countries of the NATO. [Host]: But what about the possibility of a growing feeling of internal nationalism within Europe, following General de Gaulle's lead? [Besson]: I'm not so sure whether this whole thing is really such a strong tendency as it might look like in the- in the moment. You know that we have German Gaullists as well, and some persons in this country, uh, who also feel that our alliance should
be reversed -- that Western Europe should play an independent role in world policy. But it's always the insistence on Western Europe, it's not the insistence of a German or a French role in the world. It's the idea that these European states independently cannot play a role at all. And therefore, there is a sort of internal limitation to nationalism, because it can only be a European nationalism, and we just don't know what this is like, this European nationalism. [Host] You recently completed a study of U.S. foreign policy from the time of President Roosevelt to the time of President Kennedy. What changes do you see in U.S. foreign policy right now? [Besson]: I think it's a retreat from Kennedy's principles of the conduct of American foreign policy. It seems to me that Mr. Johnson is far closer to the era Dulles than he is to his own predecessor. The Johnson administration
neglects the fact that the process of emancipation in the southern half of the globe is only loosely connected with the east/west conflict and has to be regarded under very different categories, then the relationship of the West with the communist countries. [Host]: Well if the United States were not to be involved in these countries, uh, who if anyone would be? [Besson] Problem is, does anybody have to be involved in other words, are there not other possibilities, and or other solutions possible in solving the problems of these countries? Let me refer again to Mr. Kennedy's interpretation of America's global interests. He said that there is this neutral, this large neutral world, uh, which does not want to be drawn into the east-west conflict. There
are new nations trying to develop their own individuality, their own their own personal, their own national fate. It seems to me that we have to rely on you to listen to the principal are with which we can be allied. [Host] Die Zeit is one of Germany's most influential weeklies. Its political editor, Theo Sommer, is a highly regarded commentator. We asked Mr. Sommer if he foresees a time when the western alliance would handle international problems jointly rather than separately. [Sommer] I think it will be a very important task, confronting the western alliance in the coming years, to work out a system of building beyond the pale just NATO countries, because there are too many problems arising in the Far East or in the Middle East, which will immediately affect the fate of all the nations in Western Europe and North America as well, and I don't think in the long run the alliance can survive unless we find a method
of dealing with these new problems jointly, rather than separately. [Host] Do you see any solution for control of nuclear weapons? [Sommer] I think there's a real, a growing realization that what it really takes is sharing of planning authority. Again the same problem, how do the Europeans fit into the American descison making machinery? It's not a problem decision taking; who is pushing on the bottom in the final, dreadful moment and decision but it's a problem decision making whose name down the rules, under what circumstances, and how these terrible weapons might be used. Now I think the Europeans have the right to be in on this decision making process and if they are in I think, they can with confidence leave the actual decision taking to the American President. But the one
is the preset the position of the other. [Host]: Now, President Kennedy, uh... during the time that he was President, built himself among Europeans and throughout the world, a tremendous reputation as a man of international interests. With President Johnson, has this feeling continued, is it changing or what is your feeling about it now? [Sommer]: Well, let me be frank Kennedy had a kind of appeal Johnson couldn't hope to match. Uh... Kennedy was young, he was... ah was modern in his ideas, he didn't hesitate to look at things from a new angle. Uh... he had vision such as some people say de Gaulle has, he looked ahead into the
future. With Johnson we don't really get that feeling. We know he's there, we know he's committed to the old aims and targets set by the Kennedy administration but we are not really so sure and confident that he goes about fulfilling these and reaching these targets in the same effective manner Kennedy did, or promised to do. And this applies in particular to to the problems of the Western Alliance. I think the President will either have to make a compromise with General de Gaulle, and work for that compromise or he'll have to aim at a confrontation with de Gaulle and work at that too. Ah... just ignoring the General, uh... just leaving for instance the solution of the nuclear
problem to the British and the Germans will not do. There is not going to be an Atlantic Alliance evolving on lines, uh... in which there is no future unless the American President lays down these lines. He doesn't have to ram his program down the throats of the Europeans, but he'll have to make pretty clear just what it is he wants and the Americans want. Because as soon as he shows that he is uninterested the Europeans will lose interest too, as long as he shows that he is interested, that he's a driving force behind the whole program for reform and revision and innovation then the Europeans will of necessity follow. [Host] By why should we take the lead? [Sommer] You just happened to be the strongest power. Your stake is the biggest, not that ours is less, but
I think this is the responsibility of what that historians of former ages used to call the hegemonial powers, you are a hegemonial power. You don't escape your responsibility by ignoring it and history is likely to catch up with any American President who would like to retract his country again to withdraw it back to and who the snail shell of isolationism. Now I don't imply for a moment that President Johnson is really trying to do that, but he hasn't always during the past few months avoided created just that impression. and impressions in the field of foreign affairs very often count just as much and weigh as heavily as facts. [Host]: In the last several years, India's role as international intermediary and
peacemaker has declined markedly. Solutions to the interlocking problems of poverty and population are not in sight, despite massive U.S. aid efforts. The Chinese Communist attack of 1962 forced India to take a more realistic attitude toward its role in world affairs. Today official and unofficial attitudes toward United States' actions in Southeast Asia differ greatly. Ram Singh is editor of The Weekly Thought, a journal similar to England's New Statesman. He talks with Al Perlmutter about the United States' role in Asia. [Singh] I should think the American role was quite well defined by the Americans themselves, and I have no reason to doubt it. It is to help the newly independent countries -- most of them are newly independent countries in Asia -- maintain their independence, and, uh, make social progress, which will enable them to remove such
things such as backwardness and poverty, illiteracy. But I say, America's role is to help these countries preserve their independence. In this connection I'd like to make one observation, and I'm really sorry that I have to make this observation. For a long time, your people gave the impression that...this fight against Communism was your sole concern. You never let these people, uh, have some kind of experience of their own. Because the fight against Communism or this kind of danger, it is an external threat and internal threat combined, but mainly the problem in this countries a party they're going to be a woman as is as colonel us all of
us that you haven't called your column on that and he has traditionally followed a neutral us policy and international affairs but lately it has been supporting the United States' efforts in Asia and then now and describes this policy as neutralist. It is time to make a distinction between neutralism and ah, call it non-alignment. and non-align was supposed to be dynamic. In the sound?? that to reset new ?definitions? on merits, not that it's not apply judgement with person with issues and and um for a long time we carried on with that policy. A long with that a bit of the mind of the planners of India's foreign policy, was the experience with the British. And, um, you see, you see, uh, the devil you know is better than the devil you don't don't know. But to [realign?] that thing; I mean the enemy you knew
is worse than the enemy you don't know. And if we could talk the British out of India, there is no reason why you could talk anybody into reason out of any obdurate position. And that remained our fate for a long time. But then we began to have these experiences at the hands of the Chinese. Then we realized that, uh, while we should to hope for the best, we had to prepare for the worst. And there was also the reason why we came to see others' problems as they themselves might see it, which is something new. In Vietnam there are facts of geography which compel a more realistic disposition on our part. After all, if Vietnam falls, all of Malaysia will be in danger. And, in fact, the [hint] of our eastern security will no more be there for this job and you'll have the floodgates opened. That had been, I think, uh, the realization
now, though we are not prepared to say it so openly for various reasons. I say, I can speak about it frankly because I don't hold any responsibilities in the government. But, um, uhh, I'll put it this way, that we are having a more realistic attitude toward Vietnam, what was your role in Vietnam. We have had some kind of experience to chasten us the indian express says india's largest circulating English language daily. Its editor, Frank Moraes, is a frequent visitor to the United States. He appraises the impact of President Johnson's domestic programs on India. [Moraes]: I think Lyndon Johnson's concept of the Great Society has a special application and even a special lesson for India. I think it shows a very live social consciousness and civic consciousness in quarters where one would least suspect they existed.
Typically in an affluent society, where men at the top must have a certain measure of perceptiveness and sensitivity in order to be aware of the deprivation of the poverty, of the misery, of the underprivileged in that society. And I think that is the great lesson for India. And I must also say that Johnson has come as a surprise to very many of us, who never thought he would develop into this imaginative, purposeful, and very human individual, that he has done. [Different speaker]: Is the United States' role in Asia a positive one right now? [Moraes]: Quite frankly, I think there are some doubts and possibly some measured disquiet, uh, but, so far as Vietnam is concerned, my personal opinion, which might be in a minority,
is that the United States is certainly playing a very useful and a very vital part in this region of the world by containing Chinese communism and expansionism. This, I say frankly, is also in the interests of India, and anything that contains Chinese expansionism and communism in this area should, I think, logically be welcome to us. [Announcer]: Our closest ally in the Far East is Japan. A phenomenally successful military occupation preceded the current economic boom, which makes Japan the richest nation in Asia. But in the world of international power politics, Japan has remained fairly isolated. Recent attempts to negotiate disputes in Malaysia and Vietnam have so far been unsuccessful. Japanese-U.S. relations remain close, but continuing turmoil in southeast Asia and the possibility of increased trade
with nearby China may cause some problems. In Kyoto, Andrew Stern talks with political scientist Masamichi Inoki, who evaluates U.S. postwar Asian policy. [Inoki]: The United States policy has been extremely successful as to western Europe and as to Japan and, uh, as to the Soviet Union. Now I think, yeah, nobody could imagine Germany would enjoy high standard of living, as now, in 1945. And I think, yeah, nobody could imagine Japan would be producing 40 million tons of steel in 1964. But, yeah, this is true. And, in this aspect, I think, uh, we
Japanese are very much grateful to the United States for its economic aid, economic aid to Japan, and, I think, yeah, United States policy toward Japan and Europe was successful because, in Japan and Germany, and other [western?] countries. They are relatively effective and the [Korean? economy?], therefore the United States' economic aid could be successful. On the other hand, in Asia, and other developing countries, the so-called [inaudible] countries, this kind of, uh, relatively clean and effective [geography?] [diplomacy?] doesn't exist, and I think at these countries in the process of nation-building, their nation-building has not been completed yet, and in such areas I think, yeah, the United States military and economic aid does not work
as the United States has expected. And sometimes it has, uh, I mean, a counter-effect. [Interviewer]: Could you give me some examples of this? [Inoki]: For instance, in South Vietnam, the United States helped the government in Saigon sincerely and wholeheartedly. But, nevertheless, today in Saigon, no feasible government does exist and therefore the United States is, uh, taking full responsibility in South Vietnam. But, I think, yeah, in Asian countries any Western power, uh, including the United States, can take full responsibility in, in, in, in their country, yeah? Without, uh, feasible government of indigenous people, United States' policy would not be successful. In this respect I think, yeah, it is in my opinion hopeless to prevent South Vietnam from, uhh,
being communized. But even if Vietnam would be taken over by communists, I think, uhh, after, I think, yeah, 5 or 10 years, the communist regime in Vietnam would be more and more independent from the influence of Peking and Moscow. And, uh, you know, the history of Vietnam, the history of Vietnam has been the history of existence against Chinese domination and the French colonialism. And, therefore, in this respect, I am, in the long run, very much optimistic. [Announcer]: If Japan continues to develop industrially as it has, it will no doubt have to look for new markets, including communist China. So, 1: do you think that trade between Japan and communist China will increase, and 2: if it does, would
this alter Japan's relationship with the United States? [Inoki:] Yes, our trade lead in the states he thinks that enable them we with our China trade. It's a very important point. Therefore, uh, since, yeah, uh, China was taken over by communists in 1949 I was of the opinion that Japan had better have a normal relationship with Peking government, because foreign policy must be based on facts, not on fictions, one of wishful thinking, and since 1949 China is ruled by Peking government, not by the government of Chiang Kai-shek. That's my point. But, nevertheless, I think, yeah, for Japan the friendship with the United States is [unintelligible] a necessary condition for our life or death and therefore the most important point falloff foreign policy is
to increase our China trade without decreasing our United States trade. [Announcer]: England, long before America, knew some of the problems of handling worldwide power and responsibility. This shared experience and our common heritage make England our most understanding ally. At her country house outside London, author-journalist Dame Rebecca West comments on current U.S. difficulties. [West]: When you're just goi-, suffering all the discomforts that we did when we were in your position, your bearing what is known as the "white man's burden." We did and you Americans weren't very nice to us when we did, you were always saying we were doing the wrong thing, not unders-, you didn't understand then, when you exercise power there's hardly ever a right thing to do, there is only the thing that is more right than another. If you've got power you're almost bound to make some degree of a fool of yourself. And that you're doing, of course, at
times, as everybody does. I don't say you're doing it badly, I don't think you are. [Interviewer]: Dame Rebecca, what kinds of things should we have learned from your experiences? [West]: Well, um, uhh you see ther was a story of Augustine Birrell when he was, uh, very old and [inaudible] somebody, a young statesman, went to get his advice that he ought to give us an old, uh, state- as an old statesman, and the old man was sort of in his last gasp and he just looked up and said, "My only advice is: always give way to [inaudible] and never believe the man on the spot." You see, I'm pretty cynical about it. I don't really believe that our experience, as it was in the past, is, um, very much value, a very much value, because
conditions are so entirely new. [Interviewer]: The American Revolution has had a great symbolic meaning to many peoples in Latin America and in Africa. Do you think that the American Revolution has a significance today? [West]: Uh, my gosh it's staggering to think how many millions of people all over the world have never heard of it, and those are the people you've got to deal with. They don't know the American Revolution from my Labrador dog, couldn't tell the difference. I ca-, you'd have to begin further than that, anyway, they'd probably, uh, there's a lot of revolutions going on, competing and that's a lovely thing never to wo-, to, uh, mention: the word "revolution" because, um, uh, revolutions are highly enjoyable people will, uh, enjoy taking part in them, and yours that had a very favorable outcome than, most of them didn't.
then you don't get in these lofty promises of the game had just learned that and since the revolution was really aware that you can charm people would like what you do with the idea of the revolution people whose son problems specifically is the young so allison had two inches thick it do that what's good is a revolution and the people who live in greece and the company bought them to grow tobacco and said man this is already in a solution at all olmert is trying to help in one form or another what what kind of baby do you think is most effective you've got a great gift for education like the french the french defense you've won this all over the world that passion for doing if you patients are beyond and here the us ambitions their real motive
was a pure passion for their crops and you're done exactly the same thing and you would always exporting education and of course what you continued to is the world's most is just a crossroads and cottage trade at his home in cambridge england a lifelong observer of american politics sir dennis broken sees a change in recent united states foreign policy i would have been taken and god won't take a new direction and i not true and i like it very much the idea of the united states has got to protect the whole world is sort of new mobile competition it can very dangerous and i think it will be on par with the new world of the nation of african partners' lives they cater to change from local relief for the policy of the kennedy administration is last year in that way and of course it's not a time to be you put on the concentration would launch people
get scared about in this traditional chinese emergency again convened another handler and they're going to be a quick solution impose an issue that for a long long time increasing demand from religion conventional untrue commitment which overwhelmingly unpopular and mccain knows this isn't the dilemma of behaving the computers all of the biggest ideology this constant confusion and in statements towards doing and sentiment probably needs much better governance likely to get under any of the contending parties it i would include paul was any coffee and watching the improvement government of obama but some of the southern senators might dump a couple now that you can't do that and then one more question if we weren't all honesty what would an imperious
too long you must find another name for quote something different this of course is hosted within a decision of a business kind of thing there has been a view in the united states that it is america's responsibility to make the rest of the world security for democracy you think the time for this kind of thinking is ending know the jewish religion it hurt he would have been doing that have been in recent years with an extension of a public park in preserve the status quo at auschwitz had just worked with the americans who the nurses hadn't planned to but the city probably isn't big enough division which isn't strong enough and that is an illusion and the dangers the british never believed this because the new interim should be weakened want to be like the bottom of a compromise so much panic of the
nineteenth century it was based on a very realistic assessment of bird call set the roman era <unk> united states are as legitimate as proximate disease the exercise and has welcomed the jump rope right fiction and so on it's basically an exception to the nominees except except dislikes of needles and alive this exists across the world heard of the soviet union is the stronger position of them recently sent an epidemic in august it's all from the tempest significant partially second highest mountain range of the world to get into that and they're so rich and other states as a natural geographic inconsistent and was one of the safer parts improvement this is by nature and part of the american speed of them constantly you can't help that the slow we'll learn about the piece is that the united
states is actually making the world safe for democracy and therefore is justified in its actions. Well that's what they haven't done in South Vietnam. The Americans have stopped the elections that were to be held 1956. It wasn't North Vietnam that stopped them, the United States stopped them. Everyone knows this except the State Department. And nobody believes it was issued by the State Department. So, and this is- I don't mind it, but I think elections in Vietnam are bound to be phony no matter who runs them. Now the idea of elections the medical island many countries dance mountains and some lingo term it's or there isn't an issue of vietnam people defending itself as required artistic vision pablo but cricket works in other states is not a party to find a vietnamese gotten deeper you can even complicate the people leavitt was ultimately is the united states senate either way what the militia who lied about the statements about defending democracy as it was
was not want to be defended his support position has been that when a south vietnam veteran also was sort of like a little bit and i don't know any case it's a democracy free nations the people that and dishes rather isms of communism when we were still hadn't been stories of chiang kai shek had been a mention that about that and what was wrong and all these cases was the bishops didn't want him to run defending democracy is sense the fight that any meaning and nobody in southeast asia but for this is this is the show the next generation to different policy one is a realistic about defensive posture julian koenig do the united states should not be diminished that it will begin the oceans because churchill ballmer is only policy makes sense but i don't think george macdonald with other rather than the slogans the jefferson declaration of them
said a decent respect the opinion of mankind he meant slightly more repetitive or not will the decoration the list of grievances is not perhaps as authentic as the vatican's think the lettuce roughly true of some of the stated mission of roughly falls by boat might successful lying but they dislike of comfort by a competent patient jealous president johnson much is he wants to put his own personal stamp on his administration has always had a tremendous respect for france and eleanor roosevelt i won't lose a key is living up to these principles domestically brilliant play and i think that's really moves and is in fact a new society that society's the public and belton texas you so says he knows what the law is i'm already funding abortion and better than candidate but an enemy's concentration of the news falls down as a reset united states i don't think he's interested
in art and doesn't notice the variations are areas in which these things were in boston or he's not couple of other people's susceptibility is and he doesn't do it hasn't got awesome than just labor congressman kennedy and militias justified about itself has affected him and all who oppose a kennedy and really very vivid still years up to staff a little johnson marine unit nine one vote will president says news of an image even inside the times is the lives outside the lives of that consequently the immense success the problem and has success inside the nazis the judicial success but justice says and all of these things that important realities and of course they have a good effect in the long run though not the long run because the government commissioned members that didn't own domestic problems this convention competition in men's shirts which they joined the world of
those domestic programs a kind of domestic which isn't that an example for other countries to this country and it's now been offset by the pitch in other states for each with a bar and chatting on policies which are the people believe in a political leader going to succeed a great many people would buy an outsider status of vietnam about what when and has that don't think the government owned by the bases along with a more accurate picture that a common human that and its lowest possible price paid for extravagant statements were announced it's making the world safe oh after wilson didn't make the most of the block was your name a description rather be interesting contrast to the gridlock along the government say for democracy it's a dangerous trade and that ought to be in the us in nineteen sixty five world never music duo for democracies of interest rates the world doesn't agree that god given mission to save the whole world isn't so many awesome about and have the next
one and then they don't want to say by this is all about russia possibly by china what are some of the prospects for the future it is in the united states we were on discovering that what it's going to court will is a long storied career and multitasking feeds a fault suddenly i believe that the united states we use goes that china i didn't come as china without the required permits isn't golf with an eighteen inch pin in one way no way the united states we load the cooking as a necessity or the infamous committees try out ideas with earlier moscow of time but that's the same time could probably the united states really gotten and then through connally's block having lost its unity the fact that stance at yale are becoming common it was losing to companies
drop of golden orb storyboard for being infected a new element was a big spit it when girls and oscar levant which didn't exist to be and i believe that the united states' foreign policy when they've gone unless principle and it in kenya fervently wished on the list but perhaps it's normal to accept that some people want to make it a when you should do accents lincoln lens of the security of the united states don't know the pain or what is happening on the central africa for life my guest will be there the world we become music and coming years more complex you know it's i think europeans and americans have both only one real prospect for the future
prospects for survival and profit all right the world many countries in asia hello there was in residence on and it is a common to all those models up with a new law that will oldham wrote a little kid we went to the levees and has the job of his cynical invasive and it is if in that turned up some other headaches of
saving that will always say verizon or at lippincott national discovers that all their young for the sick people the chinese and so but the chinese run into trouble last they will human nature that i am grateful that all americans saying the management problem for good at the expense of european attitude and i just it's so the federal reserve that you think that there's an upside to have is all i am the most efficient and an immediate danger and that some of the dangers of mythical and some are just that what individuals of other countries think of the United States probably does not alter, or even affect, our foreign policy is directly yet as the world's most powerful democratic nation our actions are watched very closely, and the examples we set are
often guideposts for the actions of others. When our leadership appears to falter -- the effects are far-reaching. Americans have a great curiosity about what others think of us this often helps us to see ourselves in a new or clearer perspective. This perspective is essential for a nation that must constantly redefine its goals -- and readjust its objectives in a fast changing world. [TRAFFIC NOISES] [TRAFFIC NOISES] [TRAFFIC NOISES] [TRAFFIC NOISES]
[TRAFFIC NOISES] [CLOSING MUSIC] [ANNOUNCER]: This is NET -- The National Educational Television Network.
Series
At Issue
Episode Number
57
Episode
America Observed
Producing Organization
National Educational Television and Radio Center
Contributing Organization
Thirteen WNET (New York, New York)
Library of Congress (Washington, District of Columbia)
AAPB ID
cpb-aacip/75-62f7mc95
NOLA Code
AISS
If you have more information about this item than what is given here, or if you have concerns about this record, we want to know! Contact us, indicating the AAPB ID (cpb-aacip/75-62f7mc95).
Description
Episode Description
This month At Issue presents an assessment of U.S. aims and achievements throughout the world by foreign journalists and historians. Through exclusive on location interviews in Japan, Germany, France, India, and England, America Observed focuses on the views of important non-government thought leaders whose opinions are rarely given exposure in this country. Journalists and historians featured on the program are: Masamichi Inoki, political scientist, University of Kyoto, Japan; Waldemar Besson, historian and political scientist, University of Erlangen, Germany; Theo Sommer, political editor, Die Zeit, Hamburg Germany; Raymond, Aron, French journalist and social philosopher whose articles frequently appear in Figaro and many American journals; Serge Hurtig, political scientist, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, France; Ram Singh, editor, Thought Magazine, New Delhi, India; Frank Moraes, noted author and editor of the India Express; Dame Rebecca West, English journalist and author; Sir Denis Brogran, English journalist and longtime observer of the American scene. Topics discussed by the international experts include the power and responsibility of the United States, the status of U.S. foreign policy today, prospects for U.S. return to isolationism, President Lyndon Johnson's image abroad, the differences between Presidents Johnson and Kennedy, U.S. policy in Vietnam and Santo Domingo, the U.S. role in Europe and Asia today and how it may differ in ten years. Running Time: 59:10 (Description adapted from documents in the NET Microfiche)
Series Description
At Issue consists of 69 half-hour and hour-long episodes produced in 1963-1966 by NET, which were originally shot on videotape in black and white and color.
Description
This month At Issue presents an assessment of U.S. aims and achievements throughout the world by foreign journalists and historians. Through exclusive on location interviews in Japan, Germany, France, India, and England, America Observed focuses on the views of important non-government thought leaders whose opinions are rarely given exposure in this country. Journalists and historians featured on the program are: Masamichi Inoki, political scientist, University of Kyoto, Japan; Waldemar Besson, historian and political scientist, University of Erlangen, Germany; Theo Sommer, political editor, Die Zeit, Hamburg Germany; Raymond, Aron, French journalist and social philosopher whose articles frequently appear in Figaro and many American journals; Serge Hurtig, political scientist, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, France; Ram Singh, editor, Thought Magazine, New Delhi, India; Frank Moraes, noted author and editor of the India Express; Dame Rebecca West, English journalist and author; Sir Denis Brogran, English journalist and longtime observer of the American scene. Topics discussed by the international experts include the power and responsibility of the United States, the status of U.S. foreign policy today, prospects for U.S. return to isolationism, President Lyndon Johnson's image abroad, the differences between Presidents Johnson and Kennedy, U.S. policy in Vietnam and Santo Domingo, the U.S. role in Europe and Asia today and how it may differ in ten years.
Broadcast Date
1965-07-00
Asset type
Episode
Genres
Talk Show
News
News
Topics
News
News
Global Affairs
Media type
Moving Image
Duration
01:00:13
Embed Code
Copy and paste this HTML to include AAPB content on your blog or webpage.
Credits
Assistant Editor: Jackson, Bob
Associate Producer: Cunniff, Lois
Camera Operator: Waku
Camera Operator: Parkash, Ved
Camera Operator: Waldorf, Len
Editor: Goldsmith, Charles
Executive Producer: Perlmutter, Alvin H.
Interviewee: Sommer, Theo
Interviewee: West, Rebecca
Interviewee: Aron, Raymond
Interviewee: Hurtig, Serge
Interviewee: Singh, Ram
Interviewee: Inoki, Masamichi
Interviewee: Besson, Waldemar
Interviewee: Moraes, Frank
Interviewee: Brogran, Denis
Producer: Stern, Andrew A.
Producing Organization: National Educational Television and Radio Center
Reporter: Stern, Andrew
Researcher: Schidlof, Ivan
Researcher: Style, Angela
Researcher: Putnam, Beverly
Researcher: Menzel, Ingrid
AAPB Contributor Holdings
Thirteen - New York Public Media (WNET)
Identifier: wnet_aacip_31310 (unknown)
Format: Digital Betacam
Generation: Master
Duration: 00:59:10
Library of Congress
Identifier: 1832687-1 (MAVIS Item ID)
Format: 1 inch videotape: SMPTE Type C
Generation: Master
Library of Congress
Identifier: 1832687-2 (MAVIS Item ID)
Format: U-matic
Generation: Copy: Access
Color: B&W
Library of Congress
Identifier: 1832687-3 (MAVIS Item ID)
Generation: Master
Library of Congress
Identifier: 1832687-4 (MAVIS Item ID)
Generation: Copy: Access
Library of Congress
Identifier: 1832687-5 (MAVIS Item ID)
Generation: Copy: Access
Library of Congress
Identifier: 1832687-6 (MAVIS Item ID)
Format: 2 inch videotape
Generation: Master
Color: B&W
If you have a copy of this asset and would like us to add it to our catalog, please contact us.
Citations
Chicago: “At Issue; 57; America Observed,” 1965-07-00, Thirteen WNET, Library of Congress, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed March 29, 2024, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-75-62f7mc95.
MLA: “At Issue; 57; America Observed.” 1965-07-00. Thirteen WNET, Library of Congress, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Web. March 29, 2024. <http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-75-62f7mc95>.
APA: At Issue; 57; America Observed. Boston, MA: Thirteen WNET, Library of Congress, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-75-62f7mc95